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FOREWORD 
 
The papers in these Proceedings will be presented at the ICMI 19 Study 
Conference on proof and proving in mathematics education that is taking place at 
the National Taiwan Normal University in Taipei, Taiwan, from May 10 to May 
15, 2009. They were selected following a strict refereeing process. Each paper 
was reviewed by at least two reviewers, and when necessary, a third reviewer was 
used. In the interest of timely dissemination these papers are now being published 
as submitted, without revision or polishing. 
These papers all focus on proof and proving, but cover a great variety of topics. 
Some of them, for example, put the emphasis on the formal aspects of proof, 
adopting the position that the most appropriate way to establish a mathematical 
truth is to construct a deductive argument using valid inferences from axioms. 
Others take as their starting point that informal aspects of mathematical proof 
such as visualization and diagrammatic reasoning are more important than its 
formal aspects in mathematical practice, and thus should take precedence in 
mathematics teaching.  
The papers also encompass a variety of views as to the most effective ways of 
teaching proof, and of maintaining a culture of proving in the classroom, at all 
educational levels. Several focus the different forms and roles that proof might 
take in the mathematics curriculum if it is to be taught effectively. Others focus 
more on the role of the teacher, looking into the influence of teachers’ views of 
proof on the opportunities they create for students to engage in proving.  
Needless to say, none of the authors, though unanimous in calling for renewed 
attention to proof and proving in mathematics education, would seek to deny the 
simple fact that there is much more to mathematics than proof and proving.   
These pre-conference Proceedings do not constitute the final printed output of the 
ICMI 19 Conference. A post-conference publication, the Study volume, will 
appear in the New ICMI Study Series (NISS). The exact format of the Study 
volume has not been decided. We expect it to be an edited book that can serve as a 
standard reference in the field of proof. 
The ICMI 19 conference on proof and proving in mathematics education is the 
19th of a series of studies organized by the International Commission on 
Mathematical Instruction (ICMI) and designed to address key issues in 
mathematics education. In preparation for this conference, the International 
Program Committee (IPC) published a Discussion Document and a call for papers 
in the International Journal on Mathematics Education ZDM (2008, 40, 329-336); 
they were also posted on the Conference website in December 2007 
http://www.icmi19.com. Shorter versions of the Discussion Document appeared 
in a number of other journals of mathematics education and in the newsletter of 
ICMI.   
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ICMI STUDY 19: PROOF AND PROVING IN MATHEMATICS 
EDUCATION: DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 
 
Gila Hanna, Michael de Villiers, Ferdinando Arzarello, Tommy Dreyfus, 
Viviane Durand-Guerrier, Hans Niels Jahnke, Fou-Lai Lin, Annie Selden, 
David Tall, and Oleksiy Yevdokimov 
 
I. RATIONALE 
Mathematics educators face a significant task in getting students to understand the 
roles of reasoning and proving in mathematics. This challenge has now gained 
even greater importance as proof has been assigned a more prominent place in the 
mathematics curriculum at all levels. The recent National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics (NCTM) Principles and Standards document and several other 
mathematics curricular documents have elevated the status of proof in school 
mathematics in several educational jurisdictions around the world.  
This renewed curricular emphasis on proof has provoked an upsurge in research 
papers on the teaching and learning of proof at all grade levels. This 
re-examination of the role of proof in the curriculum and of its relation to other 
forms of explanation, illustration and justification (including dynamic graphic 
software) has already produced several theoretical frameworks, giving rise to 
many discussions and even heated debates. An ICMI Study on this topic would 
thus be both useful and timely. 
An ICMI Study on proof and proving in mathematics education would necessarily 
discuss the different meanings of the term proof and bring together a variety of 
viewpoints. Proof has played a major role in the development of mathematics, 
from the Euclidean geometry of the Greeks, through various forms of proofs in 
different cultures, to twentieth-century formal mathematics based on set-theory 
and logical deduction. In professional mathematics today, proof has a range of 
subtly different meanings: for example, giving an axiomatic formal presentation; 
using physical conceptions, as in a proof that there are only five Platonic solids; 
deducing conclusions from a model by using symbolic calculations; or using 
computers in experimental mathematics. For mathematicians, proof varies 
according to the discipline involved, although one essential principle underlies all 
its varieties:  
To specify clearly the assumptions made and to provide an appropriate 
argument supported by valid reasoning so as to draw necessary conclusions.  
This major principle at the heart of proof extends to a wide range of situations 
outside mathematics and provides a foundation for human reasoning. Its 
simplicity, however, is disguised in the subtlety of the deep and complex  
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phrases “to specify the assumptions clearly”, “an appropriate argument” and 
“valid reasoning”.  
The study will consider the role of proof and proving in mathematics education, in 
part as a precursor for disciplinary proof (in its various forms) as used by 
mathematicians but mainly in terms of developmental proof, which grows in 
sophistication as the learner matures towards coherent conceptions. Sometimes 
the development involves building on the learners’ perceptions and actions in 
order to increase their sophistication. Sometimes it builds on the learners’ use of 
arithmetic or algebraic symbols to calculate and manipulate symbolism in order to 
deduce consequences. To formulate and communicate these ideas require a 
simultaneous development of sophistication in action, perception and language.  
The study’s conception of “developmental proof” has three major features: 
1.  Proof and proving in school curricula have the potential to provide a 
long-term link with the discipline of proof shared by mathematicians.  
2.  Proof and proving can provide a way of thinking that deepens mathematical 
understanding and the broader nature of human reasoning. 
3.  Proof and proving are at once foundational and complex, and should be 
gradually developed starting in the early grades. 
A major classroom role for proof is essential to maintaining the connection 
between school mathematics and mathematics as a discipline. Although proof has 
not enjoyed the same degree of prominence in mathematical practice in all periods 
and contexts, and although standards of rigour have changed over time, proof 
undoubtedly lies at the heart of mathematics. 
Similarly proof and proving are most properly used in the classroom to promote 
understanding, which in no way contradicts their role in mathematics. 
Mathematical proof consists, of course, of explicit chains of inference following 
agreed rules of deduction, and is often characterised by the use of formal notation, 
syntax and rules of manipulation. Yet clearly, for mathematicians proof is much 
more than a sequence of correct steps; it is also and, perhaps most importantly, a 
sequence of ideas and insights with the goal of mathematical understanding -- 
specifically, understanding why a claim is true. Thus, the challenge for educators 
is to foster the use of mathematical proof as a method to certify not only that 
something is true but also why it is true.  
Finally, the learning of proof and proving in school mathematics should be 
developmental and should start in the early grades. The success of this process 
would clearly depend on teachers’ views about the essence and forms of proofs, 
on what teachers do with their students in classrooms, on how teachers interpret 
and implement curricular tasks that have the potential to offer students 
opportunities to engage in proving, and on how they diagnose students’ 
difficulties in proving and design instructional interventions to help overcome 
these difficulties.  
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II. THEMES OF THE STUDY 
The ICMI Study will be organised around themes that provide a broad range of 
points of view on the teaching and learning of proof in various contexts, whether 
symbolic, verbal, visual, technological or social. Within each of the themes, the 
following issues are of utmost importance: 
1.  Teachers’ views and beliefs 
2.  Teachers’ preparation and professional development 
3.  Curriculum materials and their role in supporting instruction 
Below, we describe some of the themes and suggest a number of related research 
questions. Contributions on each theme should address these specific questions 
but need not be limited to them, so long as any additional questions raised are 
relevant to that theme.  
1. Cognitive aspects 
Cognitive aspects of proof cover the entire development of proof and proving, 
from the young child to the research mathematician. They range from the manner 
in which the growing person develops a proving attitude to convince the self and 
others, through the initial use of specific examples, through prototypical 
numerical and visual examples representing broader classes of instances, to 
formal axiomatic proofs widely acceptable to the mathematical community. 
While proofs are considered either valid or invalid, the development of proof, 
both in the growing child and in the research of mathematicians, involves 
arguments that carry various levels of conviction that are not absolute. For 
example, Tall’s framework of worlds —of conceptual embodiment, proceptual 
symbolism and axiomatic formalism—suggests a dynamic development of proof 
through embodiment and symbolism to formalism. For instance, the formula for 
the sum of the first n whole numbers can be proved from a specific or generic 
picture, from a specific, generic or algebraic sum, from a practical potentially 
infinite form of induction, from a finite axiomatic form of induction from the 
Peano postulates, or even from a highly plausible visual demonstration. This part 
of the study will consider various theories of cognitive aspects of proof. 
Possible questions about cognitive aspects:  
1.  Is it possible/preferable to classify forms of proof in terms of cognitive 
development, rather than just in terms of type of proof (e.g., by exhaustion, 
contradiction, induction)? 
2.  When we classify proof cognitively, can we look from the learners’ 
viewpoint as they grow from the elementary grades to university, rather 
than just from the expert’s viewpoint, and appropriately value their current 
ways of proving? 
3.  How do we encompass empirical classifications of proof processes within a 
coherent cognitive development (which may differ for different 
individuals)?  
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4.  How can teachers and mathematics educators use our knowledge about 
learners’ cognitive development to develop ways of teaching proof that 
take account of each learner’s growing ways of proving? 
5.  What are learners’ and teachers’ beliefs about proof, and how do they affect 
the teaching and learning of proof? 
6.  What theoretical frameworks and methodologies are helpful in 
understanding the development of proof from primary to tertiary education, 
and how are these frameworks useful in teaching?  
2. Argumentation and proof  
Understanding the relationship between argumentation (a reasoned discourse that 
is not necessarily deductive but uses arguments of plausibility) and mathematical 
proof (a chain of well-organised deductive inferences that uses arguments of 
necessity) may be essential for designing learning tasks and curricula that aim at 
teaching proof and proving. Some researchers see mathematical proof as distinct 
from argumentation, whereas others see argumentation and proof as parts of a 
continuum rather than as a dichotomy. Their different viewpoints have important 
didactical implications. The first group would focus mainly on the logical 
organisation of statements in a proof and would aim to teach a conceptual 
framework that builds proof independent of problem solving. On the other hand, 
the second group would focus primarily on the production of arguments in the 
context of problem solving, experimentation and exploration, but would expect 
these arguments to later be organized logically so as to form a valid mathematical 
proof.  
From a very young age, students show high degrees of ability in reasoning and in 
justifying their arguments in social situations; however, they do not naturally 
grasp the concept of mathematical proof and deductive reasoning. Therefore, 
educators must help students to reason deductively and to recognize the value of 
the concept of mathematical proof. Some educators hold the traditional 
assumption that teaching students elements of formal logic, such as first-order 
logic with quantifiers, would easily translate into helping them to understand the 
deductive structure of mathematics and to write proofs. However, research has 
shown that this transfer doesn’t happen automatically. It remains unclear what 
benefit comes from teaching formal logic to students or to prospective teachers, 
particularly because mathematicians have readily admitted that they seldom use 
formal logic in their research. Hence, we need more research to support or 
disconfirm the notion that teaching students formal logic increases their ability to 
prove or to understand proofs.  
Possible questions about argumentation and proof: 
1.  How can we describe the argumentative discourses developed in 
mathematics teaching? What is the role of argumentation and proof in the 
conceptualization process in mathematics and in mathematics education?  
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2.  Within the context of argumentation and proof, how should mathematics 
education treat the distinction that logicians and philosophers make 
between truth and validity?  
3.  To what extent could focussing on the mathematical concept of implication 
in both argumentation and proof contribute to students’ better grasp of 
various kinds of reasoning?  
4.  How can educators make explicit the different kinds of reasoning used in 
mathematical proof and in argumentative discourse (e.g., Modus Ponens, 
exhaustion, disjunction of cases, Modus Tollens, indirect reasoning etc.)?  
5.  Quantification, important in reasoning as well as in mathematics, often 
remains implicit. To what extent does this lead to misconceptions and to 
lack of understanding?  
6.  How can teachers deal with the back-and-forth between conjectures and 
objects or between properties and relations involved in the exploration of 
mathematical objects? To what extent does this exploration help students 
understand the necessity of mathematical proof rather than just 
argumentation?  
7.  Are we justified in concluding that logic is useless in teaching and learning 
proof just because many mathematicians claim that they do not use logic in 
their research? What kind of research program could be developed to 
answer this question?  
8.  What are the relationships between studies on argumentation and proof by 
researchers from other disciplines, e.g., logicians, philosophers, 
epistemologists, linguists, psychologists and historians, and research in 
mathematics education?   
9.  What conditions and constraints affect the development of appropriate 
situations for the construction of argumentation and proof in the 
mathematics classroom?   
10.  Which learning environments and activities help to improve students’ 
ability in argumentation and proof?   
3. Types of proof  
Some aspects of the study might deal with types of proof characterized by their 
mathematical or logical properties, such as specific proof techniques, (e.g., proof 
by exhaustion, proof by mathematical induction, proof by contradiction) or proofs 
of specific types of claims (e.g., existence proofs, both constructive and 
non-constructive).  
These different types of proof (or techniques of proving) may have many diverse 
pedagogical properties and didactic functions in mathematics education. A case in 
point is inductive proof (proof by example), which is frequently the only type of 
proof comprehensible to beginners; it may be mathematically valid (e.g., for 
establishing existence or for refutation by counterexample) or invalid (e.g., 
supportive examples for a universal statement). Another type, generic (or 
transparent) proof, is infrequently used but may have high didactic potential.  
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The various ways of proving, such as verbal, visual or formal, may be a factor in 
understanding proofs and in learning about proving in general. Specific proofs 
may lend themselves particularly well to specific ways of proving.  
Possible questions about types of proof: 
1.  To what extent, and at which levels of schooling, is it appropriate to 
introduce specific proof techniques?  What are the particular cognitive 
difficulties associated with each type of proof? 
2.  Is it important to introduce proof in a diversity of mathematical domains and 
which proofs are more appropriate in which domains? 
3.  At which level and in which curricula is it relevant to introduce the notion of 
refutation? In particular, when should one raise the question of what is 
needed to prove or refute an existential claim as opposed to a universal one? 
4.  How and at which stage should teachers facilitate the transition from 
inductive proof (proof by example) to more elaborate forms of proof?  
5.  What status should be given to generic proof? How can the properties of 
generic proofs be used to support students’ transition from inductive to 
deductive proof?  
6.  At which level, and in which situations, should the issue of the mathematical 
validity or lack of validity of inductive proofs be discussed, and how?  
7.  To what extent and how is the presentation of a proof (verbal, visual, formal 
etc.) relevant in understanding it and in learning about the notion of proof 
generally? 
8.  To what extent is the presentation of a proof (in)dependent of the nature of 
the proof? Do some proofs lend themselves particularly well to specific 
presentations? For example, can visual theorems have non-visual proofs? 
9.  Do students perceive different types of proofs as more or less explanatory or 
convincing? 
4. Dynamic Geometry Software and Transition to Proof   
Both philosophers and psychologists have investigated the connection between 
deductive reasoning and argumentation. However, there is still no consensus on 
the exact nature of this connection. Meanwhile some researchers have looked for 
possible mediators between plausible argumentation and mathematical proof. The 
main didactical problem is that at first glance there seems to be no natural 
mediator between argumentation and proof. Hence, the problem of continuity or 
of discontinuity between argumentation and proof is relevant for research and for 
teaching of proof. 
Dynamic Geometry Software (DGS) fundamentally changes the idea of what a 
geometric object is. DGS can serve as a context for making conjectures about 
geometric objects and thus lead to proof-generating situations. Specifically, it can 
play the role of mediator in the transition between argumentation and proof 
through its ‘dragging function’, thanks to its instant feedback and to the figures 
created on the screen as a result of the dragging movements. The dragging  
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function opens up new routes to theoretical knowledge within a concrete 
environment that is meaningful to students. For example, it can introduce 
seemingly infinite examples to support a conjecture or it can help in showing 
students degenerate examples or singular counterexamples to a statement (e.g., 
when a given construction that works for building a figure degenerates into 
singular cases, producing a different figure). Moreover, while dragging, pupils 
often switch back and forth from figures to concepts and from abductive to 
deductive modalities, which helps them progress from the empirical to the 
theoretical level. The different modalities of dragging can be seen as a perceptual 
counterpart to logical and algebraic relationships. In fact, dragging makes the 
relationships between geometric objects accessible at several levels:  perceptual, 
logical and algebraic.  
Possible questions about DGS environments:  
1.  To what extent can explorations within DGS foster a transition to the 
formal aspects of proof? What kinds of didactical engineering can trigger 
and enhance such support? What specific actions by students could support 
this transition?  
2.  How could the issues of continuity/discontinuity among the different 
phases and aspects of the proving processes (exploring, conjecturing, 
arguing, proving etc.) be addressed in DGS environments? 
3.  To what extent can activities within DGS environments inhibit or even 
counter the transition to formal aspects of proof?  
4.  What are the major differences between proving within DGS environments 
and proving with paper and pencil? 
5.  How can the teacher handle the different modalities of proving (induction, 
abduction, deduction etc.) that explorations in DGS environments may 
generate?  
6.  How can DGS help in dealing with proofs by contradiction or proofs by 
example, given that through dragging one could get ‘infinite examples’, 
degenerate examples or the singular counterexamples to a statement?    
7.  How can DGS environments be used for approaching proofs not only in 
geometry but also in other subjects, such as algebra and elementary 
calculus?  
8.  What are the significant differences among different DGSs used in teaching 
proof?  
9.  What are the main differences between DGS environments and other 
technological environments (software other than DGS, concrete materials, 
mathematical machines, symbolic computation systems etc.) in tackling the 
issue of proof in the classroom? Can a multiple approach, which suitably 
integrates different environments, be useful for approaching proof? 
5. The Role of Proof and Experimentation  
The traditional view of proof has ignored the role of experimentation in 
mathematics and has perceived the verification of mathematical statements as the  
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only function of proof.  However, in recent years several authors have emphasized 
the intimate relationship between proof and experimentation, as well as the many 
other important functions of proof within mathematics besides verification: 
explanation, discovery, intellectual challenge, systematization etc. Moreover, 
research in dynamic geometry has shown that, despite obtaining a very high level 
of conviction by dragging, students in some contexts still display a strong 
cognitive need for an explanation of a result; that is, why it is true. Such a need 
gives a good reason for the introduction of proof as a means of explaining why a 
result is true.  
However, not all new results in mathematics are discovered through 
experimentation.  Deductive reasoning from certain givens can often directly lead 
to new conclusions and to new discoveries through generalization or 
specialization. In this context, proof takes on a systematizing role, linking 
definitions, axioms and theorems in a deductive chain. Likewise, experimentation 
in mathematics includes some important functions relevant to proof: conjecturing, 
verification, refutation, understanding, graphing to expose mathematical facts, 
gaining insights etc. For example, mathematicians can formulate and evaluate 
concept definitions on the basis of experimentation and/or formal proof, as well as 
comparing and selecting suitable definitions on the basis of criteria such as 
economy, elegance, convenience, clarity etc. Suitable definitions and axioms are 
necessary for deductive proof in order to avoid circular arguments and infinite 
regression. Thus, the establishment of a mathematical theorem often involves 
some dynamic interplay between experimentation and proof.  
The relationship between proof and experimentation poses a general didactical 
and educational research question: How can we design learning activities in 
which students can experience and develop appreciation for these multi-faceted, 
inter-related roles of proof and experimentation? This in turn comprises several 
additional questions. 
Possible questions about proof and experimentation: 
1.  How can teachers effectively use the explanatory function of proof to make 
proof a meaningful activity, particularly in situations where students have 
no need for further conviction?  
2.  How can students’ abilities to make their own conjectures, critically 
evaluate their validity through proof and experimentation, and produce 
counter-examples if necessary be stimulated and developed over time? 
3.  How can teachers and mathematics educators develop effective strategies 
to help students see and appreciate the discovery function of proof -- for 
example, deriving results deductively rather than experimentally or from 
deriving further unanticipated results and subsequent reflections on those 
proofs?  
4.  What are students’ natural cognitive needs for conviction and verification 
in different mathematical contexts, with different results and at different 
levels? How can these needs be utilized, changed and developed through  
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directed instructional activities so that students appreciate the verification 
function of proof in different contexts? 
5.  What arguments can teachers use in school and university to foster 
students’ appreciation of the meaning of proof and to motivate students to 
prove theorems? 
6.  What type of ‘guidance’ is needed to help students eventually produce their 
own independent proofs in different contexts? 
7.  Rather than just providing them with pre-fabricated mathematics, how do 
we involve students in the deductive systematization of some parts of 
mathematics, both in defining specific concepts and in axiomatizing a piece 
of mathematics? How able are students to identify circular arguments or 
invalid assumptions in proofs and how do we develop these critical skills? 
6. Proof and the Empirical Sciences  
Frequently, students do not see a connection between argumentation in empirical 
situations and mathematical proof. They consider proof a mathematical ritual that 
does not have any relevance to giving reasons and arguments in other 
circumstances or disciplines. However, mathematical proof is not only important 
in mathematics itself but also plays a considerable role in the empirical sciences 
that make use of mathematics.  
Empirical scientists put up hypotheses about certain phenomena, say falling 
bodies, draw consequences from these hypotheses via mathematical proof and 
investigate whether the hypotheses fit the data. If they do, we accept the 
hypotheses; otherwise we reject them. Thus, in the establishment of a new 
empirical theory the flow of truth provided by a mathematical proof goes from the 
consequences to the assumptions; the function of a proof is to test the hypotheses. 
Only at a later stage, after a theory has been accepted, does the flow of truth go 
from the assumptions to the consequences as it usually does in mathematics. 
These considerations suggest a series of questions for investigation. 
Possible questions about proof and the empirical sciences: 
1.  To what extent should mathematical proofs in the empirical sciences, such 
as physics, figure as a theme in mathematics teaching so as to provide 
students with an adequate and authentic picture of the role of mathematics 
in the world? 
2.  Would insights about the role of proof in the empirical sciences be helpful 
in the teaching of geometry, given that geometry deals with empirical 
statements about the surrounding space as well as with a theoretical system 
about space? 
3.  Could insights about the complex role of proof in the empirical sciences be 
helpful in bridging students’ perceptual gap between proof and proving in 
mathematics and argumentation in everyday life? 
4.  To what extent and how should philosophers of mathematics, mathematics 
educators and teachers develop a unified picture of proving and modelling, 
which are usually considered completely separate topics in mathematics?    
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5.  Could a stronger emphasis on the process of establishing hypotheses (in the 
empirical sciences) help students better understand the structure of a proof 
that proceeds from assumptions to consequences and thus the meaning of 
axiomatics in general? 
6.  To what extent does a broader conception of proof require the collaboration 
of mathematics and science teachers?  
7. Proof at the Tertiary Level  
At the tertiary level, proofs involve considerable creativity and insight as well as 
both understanding and using formal definitions and previously established 
theorems. Proofs tend to be longer, more complex and more rigorous than those at 
earlier educational levels.  To understand and construct such proofs involves a 
major transition for students but one that is sometimes supported by relatively 
little explicit instruction. Teachers increasingly use students' original proof 
constructions as a means of assessing their understanding. However, many 
questions remain about how students at the tertiary level come to understand and 
construct proofs. Here we lay some of the questions out clearly, proposing to 
examine them in the light of both successful teaching practices and current 
research. 
Possible questions about proof at the tertiary level: 
1.  How are instructors’ expectations about students’ performance in 
proof-based mathematics courses different from those in courses students 
experienced previously? 
2.  Is learning to prove partly or even mainly a matter of enculturation into the 
practices of mathematicians? 
3.  How do the students conceive theorems, proofs, axioms, definitions and the 
relationships among them? What are the students' views of proof and how 
are their views influenced by their experiences with proving?  
4.  What are the roles of problem solving, heuristics, intuition, visualization, 
procedural and conceptual knowledge, logic and validation?  
5.  What previous experiences have students had with proof that teachers can 
take into consideration? 
6.  How can we design opportunities for student teachers to acquire the 
knowledge (skills, understandings and dispositions) necessary to provide 
effective instruction about proof and proving? 
  
III. DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
The ICMI Study on the role of proof and proving in mathematics education 
consists of three components: 1) an invited Study Conference, 2) a Study Volume 
and 3) a Study Website. 
1) The Study Conference will be held in Taipei, Taiwan, from May 10 to May 15, 
2009.   
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As is the normal practice for ICMI studies, participation in the study conference is 
by invitation to the authors of accepted contributions. The number of participants 
will be limited to approximately 120. We hope that the conference will attract not 
only “experts” but also some “newcomers” to the field with interesting, refreshing 
ideas or promising work in progress, as well as participants from countries usually 
under-represented in mathematics education research meetings. Unfortunately, an 
invitation to participate in the conference does not imply financial support from 
the organisers; participants should finance their own attendance. We are seeking 
funds to provide partial support for participants from non-affluent countries, but 
the number of such grants will be limited. 
The Study Conference will be a working one; every participant will be expected to 
be active. We therefore hope that the participants will represent a diversity of 
backgrounds, expertise, experience and nationalities.   
The printed proceedings, available at the conference, will contain the refereed 
submissions of all participants and will form the basis of the study’s scientific 
work.   
2) The Study volume, a post-conference publication, will appear in the New ICMI 
Study Series (NISS). Participation in the conference does not automatically 
ensure inclusion in the book. The Study volume will be based on selected 
contributions as well as on the outcomes of the Conference. The exact format of 
the Study volume has not yet been decided. We expect it to be an edited book 
which can serve as a standard reference in the field. 
3) The Study website, http://www.icmi19.com accessible before, during and after 
the conference, will contain information on the conference and will be updated 
periodically. 
A report on the Study and its outcomes will be presented at the 12th International 
Congress on Mathematical Education in 2012. 
Review process 
Submitted contributions were strictly reviewed and selected on the following 
criteria: (a) clear links to the Study's goals; (b) explicit fit with one or more of the 
themes; (c) clear structure and exposition; (d) potential to contribute to the quality 
and advancement of the Study.  
International Program Committee  
Gila Hanna, OISE/University of Toronto (Canada), Co-Chair 
Michael de Villiers, University of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa), Co-Chair 
Ferdinando Arzarello, Università di Torino (Italy) 
Tommy Dreyfus, Tel Aviv University (Israel) 
Viviane Durand-Guerrier, IUFM de Lyon (France) 
Hans Niels Jahnke, Universität Duisburg-Essen (Germany) 
Fou-Lai Lin, National Taiwan Normal University (Taiwan)  
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Annie Selden, New Mexico State University (USA) 
David Tall, University of Warwick (UK) 
Oleksiy Yevdokimov, University of Southern Queensland (Australia) 
Wann-Sheng Horng, Institute of Mathematics, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, Chair 
of the Local Organizing Committee 
Bernard R. Hodgson, Université Laval (Canada), ex officio 
ICMI Executive Advisors: Michèle Artigue, Paris-Diderot - Paris 7 (France); 
Hyman Bass, University of Michigan (USA); Mariolina Bartolini-Bussi, 
Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (Italy) 
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DIGITALLY-ASSISTED DISCOVERY AND PROOF 
Jonathan Michael Borwein 
University of Newcastle, Australia and Dalhousie University, Canada 
 
Abstract. I will argue that the mathematical community (appropriately defined) is 
facing a great challenge to re-evaluate the role of proof in light of the power of 
current computer systems, of modern mathematical computing packages and of 
the growing capacity to data-mine on the internet.  With great challenges come 
great opportunities.   I intend to illustrate the current challenges and 
opportunities for the learning and doing of mathematics.  As the prospects for 
inductive mathematics blossom, the need to make sure that the role of proof is 
properly founded remains undiminished.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this section I make some preliminary observations many of which have been 
fleshed out in (Borwein and Devlin, 2008), (Borwein and Bailey, 2008), and 
(Bailey et al, 2007). The core of my paper focuses on the changing nature of 
mathematical knowledge and in consequence asks the questions “Why do we 
wish to prove things?” and “How do we teach what and why to students?”  
I am attracted to various notions of embodied cognition: 
“the large human brain evolved over the past 1.7 million years to allow 
individuals to negotiate the growing complexities posed by human social 
living.”  (Small, 2008, p. 113) 
In consequence we find various modes of argument more palatable than others, 
and are more prone to make certain kinds of errors than others. Likewise, Steve 
Pinker’s observation about language as founded on 
 “…the ethereal notions of space, time, causation, possession, and goals 
that appear to make up a language of thought.” (Pinker, 2007, p. 83) 
remain equally potent within mathematics.  
To begin with let me briefly reprise what I mean by discovery, and by proof.  The 
following attractive definition of discovery has the satisfactory consequence that 
a student can certainly discovery results known to the teacher: “In short, 
discovering a truth is coming to believe it in an independent, reliable, and 
rational way.” (Giaquinto, 2007, p. 50) 
A standard definition of proof from the Collin’s Dictionary of Mathematics 
follows.  
PROOF, n. a sequence of statements, each of which is either validly 
derived from those preceding it or is an axiom or assumption, and the final Borwein, Jonathan Michael 
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member of which, the conclusion, is the statement of which the truth is 
thereby established. 
As a working definition of the field I offer  
Mathematics, n. a group of subjects, including algebra, geometry, 
trig-onometry and calculus, concerned with number, quantity, shape, and 
space, and their inter-relationships, applications, generalizations and 
abstractions. 
We typically take for granted the distinction between induction and deduction and 
rarely discuss their roles with our students --- let alone the linguistically confusing 
fact that a proof by induction is a deduction.  
Induction, n. any form of reasoning in which the conclusion, though 
supported by the premises, does not follow from them necessarily.  
Deduction, n. a process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows 
necessarily from the premises presented, so the conclusion cannot be false 
if the premises are true.   
Despite the convention identification of Mathematics with deductive reasoning 
Kurt Gödel  in his 1951 Gibbs Lecture said 
“If mathematics describes an objective world just like physics, there is no 
reason why inductive methods should not be applied in mathematics just 
the same as in physics.” 
And this has been echoed or amplified by logicians as different as Quine and 
Chaitin. 
Armed with these terms it remains to say what I connote by digital-assistance. I 
intend such as  
  The use of Modern Mathematical Computer Packages (be they Symbolic, 
Numeric, Geometric,  or Graphical) 
  The use of More Specialist Packages or General Purpose Languages such 
as Fortran, C++, CPLEX, GAP, PARI, MAGMA, … 
  The use of Web Applications such as: Sloane’s Encyclopedia of Integer 
Sequences, the Inverse Symbolic Calculator, Fractal Explorer, Euclid in 
Java.
1 
  The use of Web Databases including Google, MathSciNet, ArXiv, JSTOR, 
Wikipedia, MathWorld, Planet Math, DLMF, MacTutor, Amazon, and 
many more that are not always viewed as part of the palette. 
All entail data-mining in various forms. As Franklin (Franklin 2005) argues that 
what Steinle has termed “exploratory experimentation” facilitated by “widening 
technology” as in pharmacology, astrophysics, biotechnology is leading to a 
                                           
1 All are available through the collection preserved at  http://ddrive.cs.dal.ca/~isc/portal.  Borwein, Jonathan Michael 
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reassessment of what is viewed as a legitimate experiment in which a “local 
model” is not a prerequisite.  Hendrik Sørenson cogently makes the case that 
experimental mathematics is following many of the same tracks.  
“These aspects of exploratory experimentation and wide instrumentation 
originate from the philosophy of (natural) science and have not been much 
developed in the context of experimental mathematics. However, I claim 
that e.g. the importance of wide instrumentation for an exploratory 
approach to experiments that includes concept formation also pertain to 
mathematics.” (Sørenson, 2008) 
 In consequence the boundaries between mathematics and the natural sciences 
and between inductive and deductive reasoning are blurred and getting blurrier 
(Avigad 2008). 
With these prefatory remarks made I turn to the three mathematical examples 
which form the heart of my paper.  I leave it to the reader to decide in each case 
how much credence to put in the process I describe. 
 
THREE EXAMPLES 
 
A.  DATA MINING: What’s that number? (1995 to 2008) 
In 1995 or so Andrew Granville emailed me the number  
: 1.433127426722312 α =…  
and challenged me to identify it (our online Inverse calculator was new in those 
days). I asked Maple for its continued fraction? It was 
(*)    [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,...] 
I reached for a good book on continued fractions and found the answer 
 
0
1
(2)
(2)
I
I
α =  
where I0 and I1 are Bessel functions of the first kind. (Actually I knew that all 
arithmetic continued fractions arise in such fashion, but as we shall see one now 
does not need to this).  
In 2008 there are at least two or three other strategies:  
•  Given (*), type “arithmetic progression”, “continued fraction” into 
Google   
 
•  Type 1,4,3,3,1,2,7,4,2 into Sloane’s Encyclopaedia of Integer 
Sequences 
 Borwein, Jonathan Michael 
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I illustrate the results of each.  
On October 15, 2008, on typing “arithmetic progression”, “continued fraction” 
into Google, the first three hits were   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover the MathWorld entry tells us that any arithmetic continued fraction is of 
a ratio of Bessel functions and refers to the second hit above.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued Fraction Constant -- from Wolfram MathWorld 
 - 3 visits - 14/09/07Perron (1954-57) discusses continued fractions having terms 
even more general than the arithmetic progression and relates them to 
various special functions. ... 
mathworld.wolfram.com/ContinuedFractionConstant.html - 31k  
HAKMEM -- CONTINUED FRACTIONS -- DRAFT, NOT YET PROOFED 
    The value of a continued fraction with partial quotients increasing in arithmetic 
progression is I (2/D) A/D [A+D, A+2D, A+3D, . ... 
www.inwap.com/pdp10/hbaker/hakmem/cf.html - 25k -  
On simple continued fractions with partial quotients in arithmetic ... 
     0. This means that the sequence of partial quotients of the continued fractions 
under investigation consists of finitely many arithmetic progressions (with ...
www.springerlink.com/index/C0VXH713662G1815.pdf - by P Bundschuh – 
1998 Borwein, Jonathan Michael 
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Correspondingly – since May 2001 – Sloane’s wonderful integer sequence data 
base at http://www.research.att.com/~njas/sequences/ responds splendidly: with 
links, code, and references as well as a definition of the requisite Bessel functions. 
 
Since the mid-nineties the Inverse Symbolic Calculator at 
http://ddrive.cs.dal.ca/~isc has returned  
Best guess: BesI(0,2)/BesI(1,2) 
Most of the functionality of ISC has been built into the “identify” function in 
Maple in versions since 9.5. 
 
B. INSTRUMENTAL COMPUTING: Pi and 22/7 (Year do through 2008) 
The following integral was made popular through a 1971 Eureka (a Cambridge 
undergraduate journal) article  
 
44 1
2 0
(1 ) 22
0d
1
 
7
xx
x
x
π
−
<= −
+ ∫  Borwein, Jonathan Michael 
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Set on a 1960 Sydney honours final, and as a Monthly Problem after that, it 
perhaps originated in 1941 with Dalziel (author of the 1971 article who did not 
reference himself)! 
Why should we trust the evaluation? Well both Maple and Mathematica can 
‘do it’. 
A better approach is to ask Maple to evaluate the indefinite integral 
 
44 1
2 0
(1 )
d
1
xx
x
x
−
+ ∫  
It will return  
  () ()
4 4
76 53
2 0
1 12 4
d4 4 a r c t a n
17 3 3
t xx
x tt ttt t
x
−
=−+ −+ −
+ ∫  
and now differentiation – either by hand or computer – and the Fundamental 
theorem of calculus proves the result. More details are given in Chapter three of 
Borwein and Bailey 2008. This is perhaps not a conventional proof but it is a 
totally rigorous one: and provides an ‘instrumental use’ of the computer.  In 
general, students should be encouraged to see if a computer algebra system can 
evaluate indefinite sums and integrals whenever it has successfully evaluate a 
definite version. 
 
C.  CONCRETIZATION: Some matrices conquered 
In the course of proving conjectures about multiple zeta values (Borwein and 
Bailey 2008) I needed to obtain the closed form partial fraction decomposition for
  
 
,,
00
1
(1 ) (1 )
st st
jj
s tj j
jj
ab
x xx x ≥≥
=+
−− ∑∑  
 
The closed form for a is 
 
, 1 st
j
st j
a
sj
+ −− ⎛⎞
=⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 
 (with a symmetric form for b) as was known to Euler, but is easily discovered  by 
looking at the first few cases in Maple and, if the pattern is still not clear, by 
asking Sloane’s Encyclopedia. Once discovered a conventional proof by 
induction is easy. We needed also to show that M=A+B-C was invertible where 
the n by n matrices A, B, C respectively had entries  
 
  () () ()
111 22 1
1, 1, 1
21 1
kkk nj nj j
nk k k
+++ −− − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
−−− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ −− − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
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Thus, A and C are triangular and B is full. For example in 6 dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After messing around with lots of cases it occurred to me to ask Maple for the 
minimal polynomial of M.  
>linalg[minpoly](M(12),t);  returns 
2 2 tt − ++  
Emboldened I tried  
> linalg[minpoly](B(20),t);  
> linalg[minpoly](A(20),t);  
> linalg[minpoly](C(20),t);  
and was rewarded with 
322 1, 1, 1 ttt −+ −+ −+ . Since a typical matrix has a full 
degree minimal polynomial, we are assured that A, B, C really are roots of unity.  
Armed with this discovery we are lead to try to prove  
22 2 ,, , AIB C A CIC A B ====  
which is a nice combinatorial exercise (by hand or computer). Clearly then we 
obtain also  
 
32 2 ?) ( ) B BB BC A B C A A I == = = =  
and the requisite formula  
 
1
2
M I
M
− +
=  
follows with a little algebraic manipulation of the prior identities.. Characteristic 
or minimal polynomials (rather abstract for me when I was a student) now 
become members of a rapidly growing box of concrete symbolic tools, as do 
many matrix decompositions, Groebner bases, etc … 
 
CONCLUSION 
The students of 2010 live in an information-rich, judgement-poor world in which 
the explosion of information, and of tools, is not going to diminish. So we have to 
teach judgement (not just obsessive concern with plagiarism) when it comes to 
using what is already possible digitally. This means mastering the sorts of tools I 
have illustrated.  Borwein, Jonathan Michael 
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Additionally, it seems to me critical that we mesh our software design -- and our 
teaching style more generally -- with our growing understanding of our cognitive 
strengths and limitations as a species (as touched upon in the introduction) . 
Moreover, there is some body of evidence  from Cliff Nass’s CHIME lab at 
Stanford that cognitive styles are changing for the “born digital” as illustrated by 
measurement of the Stroop effect (which measures cognitive interference) for 
proficient multi-taskers.
2  
We also have to acknowledge that most of our classes will contain a very broad 
variety of skills and interests (and relatively few future mathematicians). Properly 
balanced, discovery and proof, assisted by good software, can live side-by-side 
and allow for the mediocre and the talented to flourish in their own fashion. 
Impediments to the assimilation of the tools I have illustrated are myriad as I am 
only too aware from recent my own teaching experiences. These impediments 
include our own inertia and organizational and technical bottlenecks (this is often 
from poor IT design - not so much from too few dollars). The impediments 
certainly include under-prepared or mis-prepared colleagues and the dearth of 
good material from which to teach a modern syllabus. 
Finally, it will never be the case that quasi-inductive mathematics supplants proof. 
We need to find a new equilibrium. Consider the following 
empirically-discovered identity  
 
 
 
where the denumerators range over the primes. Provably, the following is true. 
The analogous ‘sum equals integral’ identity remains valid for more than the first 
10
176 primes but stops holding after some larger prime, and thereafter the error is 
positive but less than one part in a googolplex. It is hard to imagine that inductive 
mathematics alone will ever be able to handle such behaviour (Baillie et al, 2008). 
That said, we are only beginning to scratch the surface of a very exciting set of 
tools for the enrichment of mathematics, not to mention the growing power of 
formal proof engines.  I conclude with one of my favourite quotes from George 
Polya and Jacques Hadamard  
“This "quasi-experimental" approach to proof can help to de-emphasis a 
focus on rigor and formality for its own sake, and to instead support the 
view expressed by Hadamard when he stated "The object of mathematical 
                                           
2 See www.snre.umich.edu/eplab/demos/st0/stroop_program/stroopgraphicnonshockwave.gif  
 
sinc( / 2)sinc( /3)sinc( /5) sinc( / 23)sinc( / 29) x xx x x d x
∞
−∞ =∫ L
sinc( / 2)sinc( /3) sinc( /5) sinc( / 23)sinc( / 29)   
n
nn n n n
∞
=−∞ ∑ LBorwein, Jonathan Michael 
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rigor is to sanction and legitimize the conquests of intuition, and there was 
never any other object for it.”
3 
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WHY PROOF?  SOME LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF 
MATHEMATICS 
Judith V. Grabiner 
Pitzer College in Claremont, California, USA 
 
In teaching various types of mathematics, we teach proof.  Why?  Many 
justifications are given.  Proofs let us distinguish between true results and results 
that seem plausible but are not generally true.  The process of proving teaches us 
to reason logically.  The careful formulation of arguments lets us see how 
individual mathematical results are related to broader mathematical ideas.  Many 
subjects, from physics to politics, use mathematical models whose validity 
requires demonstration. Even qualitative arguments in these subjects use the 
techniques of logical proof. And the proof of a mathematical result lets us answer 
the question, “Why is this true?”   
Can the history of mathematics provide evidence to support these justifications?  
In this lecture, we will look at some important episodes in the history of 
mathematics that involve proof.  These episodes illustrate the roles that proofs, 
changing standards of proof, and what people think counts as a proof have 
historically played, both in the development of mathematics and in the wider 
intellectual world. 
The examples will include Aristotle’s proof-based model for science; the role of 
the principles of optimization and symmetry -- these principles were used both to 
show that there can be a science of probability, and to argue that there couldn't be 
a non-Euclidean geometry; the changing standards of proof between the 
algorithmic calculus of the eighteenth century and the proof-based version in the 
nineteenth century; the influence of proof-based mathematics on western thought 
at large; and the social importance of everybody’s understanding logic.  
 
 Longo, Giuseppe 
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THEOREMS AS CONSTRUCTIVE VISIONS 
Giuseppe Longo 
CNRS, Ecole Normale Supérieure et CREA, Ecole Polytechnique 
Abstract. We briefly review from an epistemological perspective some ideas 
about the foundation of mathematical concepts and proofs. In reference to basic 
cognitive phenomena, we will focus on order and symmetries as core 
“construction principles” for mathematical knowledge. Some hints to axioms and 
proofs, from Euclid to recent “concrete incompleteness” theorems, will provide 
the examples motivating our approach. 
 
1.    THE CONSTRUCTIVE CONTENT OF EUCLID’S AXIOMS.  
Euclid’s Aithemata (Requests) are the least constructions required to do 
Geometry: 
1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point. 
2. To extend a finite straight line continuously in a straight line. 
3. To draw a circle with any center and distance. 
4. That all right angles are equal to one another. 
5. That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on 
the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced 
indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right 
angles.       (Heath,  1908) 
 
These “Requests” are constructions performed by ruler and compass: an abstract 
ruler and compass, of course, not the carpenter’s tools, but tools for a dialogue 
with the Gods. And they provide the least “constructions principles” the geometer 
is requested to be able to apply.  
As a key point, note that these requests follow a “maximal symmetry principle”. 
When drawing a straight line between two points, you obtain the most symmetric 
structure: any other line would introduce asymmetries by breaking at least the 
axial symmetry of the straight line. The same can be said for the second axiom, 
where any other extension would yield less symmetries. Similarly for the third, a 
complete rotation symmetry that generates the most symmetric figure as for a line 
enclosing a point; and the fourth, where equality is defined by congruence, that is 
by a translation symmetry. Finally, the fifth construction: again, it is a matter of 
drawing, intersecting and then extending. Actions that give the most symmetric 
construction: when the two lines do not intersect, then the two inner angles are 
right angles and they must be so on both sides of the line intersecting the two 
given lines (the most symmetric situation). The other two cases, as negations of 
this one (once the theorem in chapter I, n. 29 has been shown), would reduce the Longo, Giuseppe 
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number of symmetries. In their equivalent formulations (more than one parallel in 
one point to a line, no parallel at all), both yield less symmetries, on a Euclidian 
plane, then having exactly one parallel line. 
In conclusion, Euclid’s requests are the least principles of construction required to 
do (Euclidean) geometry. They found geometry by actions on figures, implicitly 
governed by symmetries, at the core of Greek culture, art and science
1. The 
formalist universal-existential version (“For any two points on a plane, there 
exists one and only one segment between these points” etc) missed the 
constructive sense and misled the foundational analysis by the anguishing quest 
for formal, thus finitistic, consistency proofs. We know how it ended: by Gödel’s 
theorem, there is no such a proof for the paradigm of finitism in mathematics, 
formal arithmetic. 
2.  FROM AXIOMS TO THEOREMS 
“Theorem” derives from “theoria”. In Greek, it means “vision”, like in “theater”: 
a theorem shows, by constructing. So, the first theorem of the first book shows: 
take a segment and trace the (semi-)circles centered on the extremes of the 
segment, with the segment as radius. These intersect in one point. Draw the 
straight lines form the extremes of the segment to that point. This produces an 
equilateral triangle. 
For a century we have been told that this is not a proof (in Hilbert’s sense!): one 
must formally prove the existence of the point of intersection. Oh, my God, these 
people are missing the Gods!
2 As observed by Wittgenstein, points, in Euclid, are 
obtained as a result of an intersection of lines. Lines are ideal objects; they are a 
cohesive continuum with no thickness. Both points and continuous lines are 
founding notions, but the conceptual path relating them is the inverse of the 
point-wise constructions that dominate mathematics since Cantor. The immense 
step towards abstraction in Greek geometry is the invention of continuous lines 
with no thickness, as abstract as a divine construction. As a matter of fact, how to 
propose a general Measure Theory of surfaces, the aim of “geo-metry”? If your 
plane figure has thick borders, what is the surface of the figure?  
Thus, the proposal of this amazing conceptual (and metaphysical) invention: the 
line with no thickness. Points with no dimension, as Euclid defines them
3, are 
                                           
1 Symmetry, in Greek, means “balanced” or, more precisely, “measurable”. But the sense we give to symmetries 
today underlies Greek “Aesthetics” and this in the Greek sense of the later word: symmetries are at the core of their 
sensitivity, knowledge and art; they underlie the “original formation of sense”, as Husserl would say (see the 
conclusion and Weyl (1952)). 
2 Schrödinger stresses, as a fundamental feature of Greek culture, the absence of « … the unbearable division, 
which affected us for centuries… : the division between science and religion » quoted in Fraisopi (2009). 
3 Actually “signs” (σημειον, definition α): Boetius first used the word and the meaning of “point”. A sign-point 
(σημειον) in Euclid is identified with the letter that names it (see Toth, 2002). Longo, Giuseppe 
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produced by intersecting lines or they sit at the extremes of a segment (definition 
©). But lines are not composed by signs-points. 
As we will say below, a line, either continuous or discrete, is a gestalt, not a set of 
points. Greek geometric figures and their theatrical properties derive by 
constructions from these fundamental gestalts, signs and lines, in a game of 
rotations and translations, of constructed symmetries and symmetry breakings. 
And these gestalts, we will argue, inherently penetrate proofs, still now. 
3. ON INTUITION 
(Mathematical) intuition is the result of an historical praxis, it is a constituted 
frame for active constructions, grounded on action in space, stabilized by 
language and writing, in inter-subjectivity. 
A pure intuition refers to what can be done, instead of to what it is. It is the seeing 
of a mental construction, it is the appreciation of an active experience, of an active 
(re-)construction of the world: we can intuit, because we actively constitute 
(mathematical) knowledge on the phenomenal veil between us and the world.  
As for this early and fundamental gestalt, the continuous line, our historical brain 
sets contours that are not in the world, beginning with the activity of the primary 
cortex: its neurons activate by continuation along non-existing lines that attributes 
non-existing contours of objects (at most, contours are singularities). The recent 
analyses of the primary cortex (see Petitot, 2003) highlight the role of 
intra-cortical synaptic linkages in the perceptual construction of edges and of 
trajectories. In the primary cortex, neurons are sensitive to “directions”: they 
activate when detecting a direction, along a tangent. And the neurons which 
activate for almost parallel directions, possibly along a line, are more connected 
than the others. In other words, neurons whose receptive field, approximately and 
locally, is upon a straight line (or along parallel lines) have a larger amount of 
synaptic connections among themselves. Thus, the activation of a neuron 
stimulates or prepares for activation neurons that are almost aligned with it or that 
are almost parallel, like the tangents along a continuous virtual line in the primary 
cortex. And we detect the continuity of an edge by a global “gluing” of these 
tangents, in the precise geometrical (differential) sense of gluing. More exactly, 
we force by continuity the unity of an edge by relating neurons which are 
structured and linked together in a continuous way and, locally, almost in parallel. 
Their “integral” gives the line. 
The humans who first drew the contours of a bison on the walls of a cavern, like in 
Lascaux, instead of painting a brown or black body, communicated to other 
humans with the same brain cortex and life experience. A real bison is not made 
just of thick contours like in some drawings on those walls. Yet, those images 
evoke the animal by a re-construction of it on that phenomenal veil which is the 
constructed interface between us and the world. The structures of mathematics 
originate also by those drawings, by their abstract lines. The Greek limit 
construction of the ideal line with no thickness is a further step. Longo, Giuseppe 
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Consider now the other main origin of our mathematical activities: the counting 
and ordering of small quantities, a talent that we share with many animals, (see 
Dehaene, 1998). By language we learn to iterate further, we stabilize by names the 
resulting sequence; we propose numbers for these actions. And these numbers 
where first associated, by common names, with parts of the human body, 
beginning with fingers. Then, by writing, their notation departed from just 
iterating fingers or strokes; yet, in all historical notations, we still write with 
strokes up to 3, which are given by three parallel segments interconnected by 
continuous drawing, like 2, which is given by two connected segments. But 
conceptual iteration has no reason to stop: it may be “apeiron”, “with no limit”, in 
Greek. Thus, since that early conceptual practice of potential infinity, we started 
seeing the endless number line, a discrete gestalt, because we iterate an 
action-schema in space (counting, ordering …), and we well order it by this very 
conceptual gesture. That is, look at that discrete endless line, which goes from left 
to right (in our western culture, the opposite for Arabs, say), and observe: “a 
generic non empty subset has a least element”, isn’t it so? This is the principle of 
well-ordering as used every day by mathematicians: it is a consequence of the 
discrete spatial construction, a geometric invariant resulting from different 
practices of discrete ordering and counting into mental spaces. And arithmetic 
(logico-formal) induction follows from it, it doesn’t found it, contrary to Frege’s 
and Hilbert’s views (see below). Its conceptual construction is the result of these 
ancient practices, by action and language, it organizes the world and allows proofs. 
It is a new gestalt, a discrete ordering where individual points make no sense 
without their well-ordered context. 
4. LITTLE GAUSS PROOF
4 
At the age of 7 or 8, Gauss was asked by his school teacher to produce the result of 
the sum of the first n integers (or, perhaps, the question was slightly less 
general … ).  He then proved a theorem, by the following method. He wrote on the 
first line the increasing sequence 1, … , n,  then, below it and inverted, the same 
sequence; finally, he added the vertical lines… 
1    2  …     n 
    n     (n-1) …     1 
  ------------------------- 
  (n+1)     (n+1)  …  (n+1) 
Then the result is obvious:  
2
) 1 (
1
+
= ∑
n n
i
n
 This proof is not by induction. Given n, 
a uniform argument is proposed, which works for any integer n.  Following 
Herbrand, we may call prototype this kind of proof: it provides a (geometric) 
prototype or schema for any intended parameter of the proof.  Of course, once the 
                                           
4  This section is partly borrowed from the introduction to Longo (2002). Longo, Giuseppe 
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formula  
2
) 1 (
1
+
= ∑
n n
i
n
  is given, it is very easy to prove it by induction, as well.  
But, one must know the formula, or, more generally, the ‘induction load’.  And 
little Gauss did not know the formula; he had to construct it as a result of the proof. 
And here comes the belief induced by the formalist myth: proving a theorem is 
proving an already given formula! This is what we learn, more or less implicitly, 
from the formal approach: use the axioms to prove a given formula -- an 
incomplete foundation, as we shall see and a parody of mathematical theorem 
proving. 
Note that, except a few easy cases, even when the formula to be proved is already 
given (most known example: Fermat’s last theorem), the proof requires the 
invention of an induction load and of a novel deductive path which may be very 
far from the formula (in Fermat’s example, the detour requires the invention of an 
extraordinary amount of new mathematics). This is well known also in automatic 
theorem proving, where the human intervention is required even in inductive 
proofs, as, except a few trivial cases, the assumption required in the inductive step 
(the induction load) may be much stronger than the thesis, or with no trivial 
relation to it. Clearly, a posteriori, the induction load may be generally described 
within the formalism, but its “choice”, out of infinitely many possible ones, may 
require some external heuristics (typically: analogies, symmetries, symmetry 
breakings…). 
More generally, proving a theorem is answering a question, like Gauss’ teacher’s 
question, concerning a property of a mathematical structure or relating different 
structures, it is not proving an already given formula. 
Let’s speculate now on a possible way to Gauss’ proof. In this case, little Gauss 
“saw” the discrete number line, as we all do, well ordered from left to right. But 
then he had a typical stroke of mathematical genius: he dared to invert it, to force 
it to go backwards in his mind, an amazing step. This is a paradigmatic 
mathematical invention: constructing a new symmetry, in this case by an 
audacious space rotation. And this symmetry gives the equality of the vertical 
sums. The rest is obvious. In this case, order and symmetries both produce and 
found Gauss’ proof. Even a posteriori, the proof cannot be found on formal 
induction, as this would assume the knowledge of the formula. 
4.1 Arithmetic induction and the foundation of mathematical proof.  
In the few lines above, we hinted to an understanding of the ordering of numbers 
with reference to a mental construction, in space (or time). Frege would have 
called this approach “psychologism” (Herbart’s style, according to his 1884 
book). Poincaré instead could be a reference for this view on the certainty and 
meaning of induction as grounded on intuition in space. In Brouwer’s 
foundational proposal, the mathematician’s intuition of the sequence of natural 
numbers, which founds mathematics, relies on another phenomenal experience: it 
should be grounded on the “discrete falling apart of time”, as “two-ness” (“the Longo, Giuseppe 
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falling apart of a life moment into two distinct things, one which gives way to the 
other, but is retained by memory” (Brouwer, 1948)). Thus, “Brouwer’s number 
line” originates from (a discrete form of) phenomenal time and induction derives 
meaning and certainty from it. 
Intuition of ordering in space or time, actually of both, contributes to establish the 
well ordered number line, as an invariant of these active phenomenal experiences: 
formal induction follows from, it doesn’t found this intuition, in Poincaré’s and 
Brouwer’s philosophy. By recent scientific evidence (see Dehaene, 1998), we 
seem to use extensively, in reasoning and computations, the “intuitive” number 
line; these neuropsychological investigations are remarkable facts, since they take 
us beyond the “introspection” that the founding fathers used as the only way to 
ground mathematics on intuition. We are probably along the lines of transforming 
the analysis of intuition from naive introspection to a scientific investigation of 
our cognitive performances. 
Let’s now go back to . . . the sum of the first n integers and induction. It is about 
eighty years later, Peano and Dedekind suggested that a proof, such as little 
Gauss’, was certainly a remarkable achievement (in particular for such a young 
man), but that adults had to prove theorems, in number theory, by a “formal and 
uniform method”, defined as a “potentially mechanisable” one, insisted Peano 
and Padoa. Then, they definitely specified “formal induction” as the proof 
principle for arithmetic (Peano Arithmetic, PA).   
Frege set induction at the basis of his logical approach to mathematics; he 
considered it a key logical principle, and gave to PA, by this, the founding status 
that it still has. Of course, Frege thought that logical induction (or PA) was 
“categorical” (to put it in modern terms), that is that induction captured exactly 
the theory of numbers, or that everything was said within PA: this logical theory 
simply coincided, in his view, with the structure and properties of numbers (Frege 
didn’t even make the distinction “theory vs. model” and never accepted it: the 
logic was exactly the mathematics, for him). 
We know how the story continues. In his 1899 book “The Foundation of 
Geometry”, Hilbert set geometry on formal grounds, as a solution of the 
incredible situation where many claimed that the rigid bodies could be not so rigid, 
that light rays could go along possibly curved geodetics . . . . Riemann’s 
habilitation (under Gauss’ supervision), in 1854 (Riemann, 1854), had started this 
“delirium”, as Frege called the intuitive–spatial meaning of the new geometry, 
(Frege, 1884, p.20). Helmholtz, Poincaré and Enriques developed both the 
geometry and, their own way, Riemann’s epistemological approach to 
mathematics as a “genealogy of concepts”, partly grounded on action in space. 
For these mathematicians, meaning, as reference to phenomenal space and its 
mathematical structuring, preceded rigor and provided “foundation”, (see Boi, 
1995; Bottazzini, 1995). Thus, by mathematics, geometry in particular, they 
wanted to make the physical world intelligible. Proving theorems by rigorous Longo, Giuseppe 
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tools for them did not coincide with a formal/mechanical game of symbols
5. 
Hilbert had a very different foundational attitude: for the purposes of foundations 
(but only for these purposes), forget the meaning in physical spaces of the axioms 
of non-Euclidean geometries and interpret their purely formal presentation in PA. 
In his 1899 book he fully formalized a unified approach to geometry and 
“interpreted” it in PA, by analytic tools. Formal rigor and effective-finitistic 
reduction are at the core of it. 
Thus, on one hand, the geometrization of physics, from Riemann to Einstein and 
Weyl (via Helmholtz, Clifford and Poincaré), brought to a revolution in that 
discipline, originating by breathtaking physico-mathematical theories (and 
theorems). On the other, the attention to formal, potentially mechanisable rigor, 
independent of meaning and intuition, gave us the strength of the modern 
axiomatic approach and… fantastic logico-formal machines, from Peano and 
Hilbert to Turing and our digital computers. 
At the 1900 Paris conference, Hilbert definitely contributed to giving to PA (and 
to formal induction) their central status in foundation, by suggesting to prove 
(formally) the consistency of PA: then the consistency of the geometric 
axiomatizations would have followed from that of formal number theory, by his 
analytic interpretation, with no need of reference to meaning, in time, in space or 
whatever. 
Moreover, a few years later, he proposed a further conjecture, the “final solution”, 
said he, to all foundational problems, a jump into perfect rigor: once shown the 
formal consistency of PA by finitistic tools, prove the completeness of the formal 
axioms for arithmetic. Independently of the heuristics of a proof, its certainty had 
to be ultimately given by formal induction. 
However, there was more than this in the attitudes of many at the time (and still 
now). That is, besides foundation as “a-posteriori formalization”, the “potential 
mechanization” of mathematics was truly dreamed, not only as a locus for 
certainty, but also as a “complete” method for proving theorems. As mentioned 
above, the Italian logic school firmly insisted on this, with their “pasigraphy”, a 
universal formal language, a mechanisable algebra for all aspects of human 
reasoning. And the “sausage machine” for mathematics (and thought), as 
Poincaré ironically called it, could be put at work: provide pigs (or axioms) as 
input, produce theorems (or sausages) as output (traces of this may still be found 
in applications of AI or in… teaching). We know how the story of complete 
a-posteriori formalization and, a fortiori, of potential mechanization ended . . . 
Hilbert’s conjectures on the formally provable consistency, decidability and 
completeness of PA turned out to be all wrong, and the 1931 proof of this fact 
originated (incomplete, but) fantastic formal machines, by the rigorous definition 
                                           
5 More on the connections between “proof principles” vs. “construction principles” in 
Mathematics and in Physics is in Bailly and Longo (2006). Longo, Giuseppe 
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of “computable function”. More precisely, Gödel’s negative result started a major 
deepening of logic: besides recursion theory (in order to prove undecidability, he 
had to define precisely what decidable/computable means), also model theory 
(the fact that not all models of PA are elementary equivalent strongly motivates 
further investigations) and proof theory (Gentzen) had a new start. Negative 
results matter immensely in science, (see Longo, 2006). The latter lead to the 
results, among others, by Girard and Friedman: one of these proofs, beyond PA, 
will be briefly analyzed below.  
As for number theory, the main consequence is that formal induction is 
incomplete and that one cannot avoid infinitary machinery in proofs in the 
rigorous sense of Friedman, (see Friedman, 1997, for example). In some cases, 
this can be described in terms of the structure of “prototype proofs” or of 
“geometric judgments” (see below), with no explicit reference to infinity.  
4.2 More on prototype proofs 
“. . . when we say that a theorem is true for all x, we mean that for each x 
individually it is possible to iterate its proof, which may just be considered a 
prototype of each individual proof.” Herbrand (1930), (see Goldfarb, 1987).  
Little Gauss’ theorem above is an example of such a proof. But any proof of a 
universally quantified statement over a structure that does not realize induction, is 
a “prototype”. For example, consider Pythagoras’ theorem: one needs to draw, 
possibly on the sand of a Greek beach, a right triangle, with a specific ratio 
between sides. Yet, at the end of the proof, one makes a fundamental remark, the 
true beginning of mathematics: look at the proof I gave, it does not depend on the 
specific drawing, but only on the existence of a right angle. The right triangle is 
generic (it is an invariant of the proof) and the proof is a prototype. There is no 
need to scan all right triangles. Similarly, if you want to prove a property for any 
element of (a sub-set of the) real or of complex numbers . . . that is for elements of 
non-well ordered sets. But, in number theory, one has an extra and very strong 
proof principle: induction. What is the difference between prototype proofs and 
induction? 
In a prototype proof, you must provide a reasoning which uniformly holds for all 
arguments, and this uniformity allows (and it is guarantied by) the use of a generic 
argument. Induction provides an extra tool: the intended property doesn’t need to 
hold for the same reasons for all arguments. Actually, it may hold for different 
reasons for each of them. One only has to give a proof for 0, and then provide a 
uniform proof from x to x + 1. That is, uniformity of the reasoning is required only 
in the inductive step. And this is where a prototype proof steps in again, the 
argument from x to x +1. Yet, the situation may be more complicated: in case of 
nested induction also this inductive step, a universally quantified formula, may be 
given by induction on x. However, after a finite number of nesting, one has to get 
to a prototype proof going from x to x + 1 (induction is logically well-founded). Longo, Giuseppe 
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Thus, induction provides a rigorous proof principle, which, over well-orderings, 
holds in addition to uniform (prototype) proofs, modulo the fact that, sooner or 
later, a prototype-proof steps in. Note though that the prototype/uniform argument 
in an inductive proof allows deriving from the assumption of the thesis for x, its 
validity for x + 1, in any possible model. On the other hand, by induction one may 
inherit properties from x to x+1 (e.g., totality of a function of x, see Longo, 2002). 
As we already observed, in an inductive proof, one must know in advance the 
formula (the statement) to be proved: little Gauss did not know it. Indeed, 
(straight) induction (i.e. induction with no problem in the choice of the inductive 
statement or load) is closer to proof-checking than to “mathematical theorem 
proving”: if you already have the formal proof, the computer can check it, in 
many cases a very useful task. 
Concerning “concrete” incompleteness, an analysis of the unprovability of 
normalization for unpredicative Type Theory, Girard’s system F, in terms of 
prototype proofs, is proposed in Longo (2002). 
5. Induction vs. well-ordering in Concrete Incompleteness Theorems 
Since the ‘70s several examples of “concrete incompleteness results” have been 
proved. That is, some combinatorial and interesting properties of number theory 
can be shown to be true, but their proofs cannot be given within its formal 
counterpart, PA. A particularly relevant case is Friedman Finite Form (FFF) of 
Kruskal Theorem (KT), a well-known theorem on sequences of “finite trees” in 
infinite combinatorics (and with many applications). For a close proof-theoretic 
investigation of KT, (see Harrington, 1985; Gallier, 1991); we borrow here a few 
remarks from Longo (2002), where a further analysis is proposed. The difficult 
part is the proof of unprovability of FFF in PA. Yet, we are interested here only in 
the proof that FFF holds over the structure of natural numbers (the standard model 
of PA). FFF is easily derived from KT, so the problems, as for its formal 
unprovability, lies somewhere in the proof of KT. Without entering into the 
details even of the statements of FFF or KT, for which we refer to Harrington’s 
book and the papers above, let’s just hint to the place where “meaning” or the 
geometric structure of integer numbers, in space or time (the gestalt of 
well-ordering), steps into the proof. 
The set-theoretic proof of KT, given in the references above, goes by a strong 
non-effective argument. It is non-effective for several reasons. First, one argues 
“ad absurdum”, i.e. one shows that a certain set of possibly infinite sequences of 
trees is empty, by deriving an absurd if it were not so (“not empty implies a 
contradiction, thus it is empty”). More precisely, one assumes that a certain set of 
“bad sequences” (or sequences without ordered pairs of trees, as required in the 
statement of KT) is not empty and defines a minimal bad sequence from this 
assumption. Then one shows that that minimal sequence cannot exist, as a smaller 
one can be easily defined from it. Note that this minimal sequence is obtained by 
using a quantification on a set that is . . . going to be proved to be empty, a rather Longo, Giuseppe 
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non-effective procedure. Moreover, the empty-to-be set is defined by a ∑
1
1  
predicate, well outside PA (a proper, impredicative second order quantification 
over sets). For the non-intuitionist who accepts a definition ad absurdum of a 
mathematical object (a sequence in this case), as well as an impredicatively 
defined set, the proof poses no problem. It is abstract, but very convincing (and 
relatively easy). The key non-arithmetizable steps are in the ∑
1
1  -definition of a 
set and in the definition of a new sequence by taking, iteratively, the least element 
of this set. 
Yet, the readers (and the graduate students to whom I lecture) have no problem in 
applying our shared mental experience of the “number line” to accept this 
formally non-constructive proof: from the assumption that the intended set is 
non-empty, one understands (“sees”) that it has a least element, without caring of 
its formal (∑
1
1 )definition. Or, if the set is assumed to have an element, then the 
way the rest of the set “goes to infinity” doesn’t really matter, in order to 
understand that it must have a least element: the element supposed to exist (by the 
non-emptiness of the set) must be somewhere, in the finite, and the least one will 
be among the finitely many which precede it, even if there is no way to present it 
explicitly. This is well-ordering. Finally, the sequence defined ad absurdum, in 
this highly non-constructive way, will never be used: it will be absurd for it to 
exist. So its actual “construction” is irrelevant. Of course, this is far away from PA, 
but it is convincing to anyone accepting the “geometric judgment” of 
well-ordering: “a generic non-empty subset of the number line has a least 
element”. This theatrical vision of a property, a fundamental judgment, is 
grounded on the gestalt discussed above. 
An intuitionist acceptable proof of KT has been later given in Rathjen (1993). 
This proof of KT is still not formalizable in PA, of course, but it is “constructive”, 
at least in the broad sense of infinitary inductive definitions, as widely used in the 
contemporary intuitionist community. It is highly infinitary as it uses induction 
beyond the first impredicative (huge!) ordinal Г0. Yet another remarkable 
contribution to the ordinal classification of theorems and theories, but in no way 
this proof is “more evident” that the one using well-ordering as above. In no way 
it “founds” arithmetic more than this geometric judgment, as the issue of 
consistency is postponed to the … next ordinal, where induction would allow 
derive the consistency of induction up to Г0. 
Conclusion 
In our approach, we ground mathematics and its proofs, as conceptual 
constructions, in our “phenomenal lives” (as Weyl would put it): concepts and 
structures are the result of a cognitive/historical knowledge process. These 
originate from our action in space (and time) and are further extended, by 
language and logic: from connectivity we go to homotopy theory or to the 
topological analysis of dimensions, say. Symmetries lead us up to duality and Longo, Giuseppe 
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adjunctions in Categories, which are very abstract notions. The ordering of 
numbers is extended into transfinite ordinals.  
Of course, these notions may be formalized, each in some “ad hoc” way, but there 
is no Newtonian or Zermelo-Fraenkel absolute (and complete) universe. 
Moreover, evidence and foundation are not completely captured by the 
formalizations, and this beginning with the axioms:  “The primary evidence 
should not be interchanged with the evidence of the ‘axioms’; as the axioms are 
mostly the result already of an original formation of meaning and they already 
have this formation itself always behind them”, Husserl (1933). We applied this 
perspective in the sketchy analysis above of Euclid’s axioms.  
Moreover, also (concrete) incompleteness tells us that the reference to this 
underlying and constitutive meaning cannot be avoided in proofs or in 
foundational analysis, as the consistency issue is crucial in any formal derivation 
and it cannot be solved within formalisms. 
Besides the early references to geometry, we focused on arithmetic as the 
foundational analysis mostly did so, since Frege. It gave us fantastic 
logico-arithmetical machines and … major incompleteness results. By showing 
that geometric judgments are unavoidable even in number theory, we stress, a 
fortiori, their relevance for general mathematical proofs. Thus, we need to ground 
mathematical proofs also on “geometric judgments” which are not less solid than 
the logic ones: “symmetry” for example is at least as fundamental as the logical 
“modus ponens” or it steps heavily into mathematical constructions and proofs. 
Physicists argue since long “by symmetry”. More generally, modern physics 
extended its analysis from the Newtonian “causal laws”, the analogue to the 
logico-formal and absolute “laws of thought” since Boole and Frege, to an 
understanding of phenomenal world by our active geometric structuring of it: 
from the conservation laws as symmetries (Noether’s theorem), to the geodetics 
of relativity theory
6.  
The normative nature of geometric structures is currently providing a further 
understanding even of recent advances in microphysics (Connes, 1994). Thus, our 
foundational analyses and their applications should also be enriched by this 
broadening of paradigm in scientific explanation: from laws to geometric 
intelligibility. But in logic as well, we have to depart from viewing formal 
properties and logical laws as a linguistic description of an independent reality, 
and move towards their appreciation as a result of a praxis. They are the 
constituted invariants of our practice of discourse and reasoning, since the Greek 
Agora’, organized also, but not only, by language: they are the result of an open 
ended “game” between us and a world, in space and time, that is of the 
inter-subjective construction of knowledge.  
                                           
6 See Weyl (1927) for an early mathematical and philosophical insight into this; see van 
Fraassen (1993) and  Bailly and Longo (2006) for recent reflections. Longo, Giuseppe 
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A PERSPECTIVE ON THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICS 
Frank Quinn 
Virginia Tech, USA 
 
Mathematical conclusions come close to being completely reliable. We offer an 
account of mathematics based on reliability, methods for obtaining reliable 
conclusions, and the origins of these methods. 
This account has considerable explanatory value and offers detailed and 
provocative perspectives on many issues. For instance it suggests that history 
before the twentieth century and the pronouncements of eminent mathematicians 
are likely to be misleading. 
The account also has implications for education. Proofs, for example, are located 
at the upper end of a context of accurate work: 
• Accurate working of problems 
• Accurate knowledge and use of definitions and theorem statements 
• Accurate reasoning and justifications (proofs) 
Careful design of early stages in the context should both improve immediate 
outcomes and provide cognitive templates for later stages. The account provides 
relatively detailed guidance on how this might be accomplished. 
Educational practice is a compromise between complexity of human learning, 
politics of educational objectives, and the nature of the subject, and the first two 
seem to be more difficult than the last. The more clarity we have about our subject 
the better we will be able to negotiate this compromise. 
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TEACHING PROOF TO UNDERGRADUATES:  
SEMANTIC AND SYNTACTIC APPROACHES 
Lara Alcock 
Mathematics Education Centre, Loughborough University, UK 
This paper contrast the rationales behind semantic and syntactic approaches to 
teaching an undergraduate transition-to-proof course, using data from interviews 
with two mathematicians.  It addresses the ICMI theme of teachers’ views and 
beliefs, with particular focus on (1) instructors’ expectations in proof-based 
courses and (2) both example-based and logical structure-based skills that we 
would like students to develop before arriving at university. 
INTRODUCTION 
The ICMI discussion document says that mathematical proof consists of “explicit 
chains of inference following agreed rules of deduction, and is often characterized 
by the use of formal notation, syntax and rules of manipulation” but is also 
“perhaps most importantly, a sequence of ideas and insights with the goal of 
mathematical understanding…”.  Weber and Alcock (2004) used a similar 
distinction to characterize a syntactic proof production as one that involves 
drawing inferences by manipulating symbolic formulae in a logically permissible 
way, and a semantic proof production as one that uses instantiations of 
mathematical concepts to guide the formal inferences drawn.  Small-scale studies 
have indicated that there might be differences in the degree to which individuals 
tend to adopt each of these strategies, in real analysis (Pinto & Tall, 2002) and in 
general “transition to proof” courses (Alcock & Weber, 2008), and at the graduate 
level in number theory (Alcock & Inglis, in press).  This is also consistent with 
mathematicians’ self-reports of distinctions within their own activity (e.g., Burton, 
2004; Nardi, 2007; Tall, 1991).   
But what does this mean for the teaching of mathematical proof?  Is it necessary, 
even, that we agree, or are there multiple valid approaches?  The study reported 
here (and in Alcock, 2008) addresses these points by contrasting perspectives of 
two mathematicians teaching an undergraduate transition-to-proof course.   
THE INTERVIEW STUDY 
The excerpts used here come from a study in which five mathematicians each 
took part in two interviews about their experience of teaching an undergraduate 
transition-to-proof course called Introduction to Mathematical Reasoning.  They 
each had several years’ experience and taught the course regularly to classes of 
fewer than 25 students, meaning that they were regularly exposed to students’ 
verbal and written attempts to construct proofs.  This paper shows similarities in 
the way that two of these mathematicians described student difficulties, and 
contrasts their different responses to these perceived problems.  
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SIMILAR CONCEPTIONS OF THE ISSUES 
Both professors were personally committed to teaching the course, because of its 
importance in supporting higher level courses and out of personal interest. 
P1: When I made the decision that I really wanted to understand how to teach this 
course, and work on it, well then it became a passion. 
P3: It’s certainly to me an extremely enjoyable experience because I find it 
challenging and I’m learning a lot.  And I have always had a general interest in 
strange ways of thinking.  […]  Probably if I wasn’t a mathematician I’d be an 
anthropologist. 
Both remarked that what a mathematician might consider to be natural logical 
reasoning could not be taken for granted in the student population. 
P1: Most mathematicians would like to live in a world where people are born with 
[basic logic].  And, you know they just – that it just develops naturally, you know that 
you don’t have to do any…specific effort to get it across.  And…well it’s just not true, 
certainly for our students.  
P3: To me there is no doubt that there are lots of very basic things that people like you 
and me absorbed somehow without consciously studying them in a systematic way in 
a course.  […]  We have some ability to think along those lines, that our students 
either don’t have, or if they have it, it hasn’t been sort of nurtured or developed in the 
way it should have been.  
Both noted that students’ early arguments often could not be critically analyzed. 
P1:  [I say to the students] “…so there is a place in your argument where you lied to 
me.  And there must be a critical place.” […] So of course at this point they’re not 
writing proofs.  They’re not even writing arguments that you can apply this kind of 
analysis to.  It’s so kind of vague or so diffuse… 
P3: Most of the proofs, ideas in the homework…I cannot even tell what’s wrong with 
them.  I cannot even pinpoint the step where it goes wrong. 
Both discussed the need to teach students about using predicates as building 
blocks for mathematical statements, with particular attention to the need to 
control for the scope of different variables. 
P1:  [T]hey have to give everything a different name, to introduce it you must list all 
the properties that that thing has – you can’t later on sneak in something. 
P3: If you want to prove that the sum of two even integers is even, then […] you take 
x and you write it as 2a, and you take y and you write it as 2b, but you cannot write it 
as 2a again. 
P3: [T]here is a distinction between statements and other utterances that are not 
statements, and what you prove is statements.  […]  You may prove various 
properties of the derivative, but you don’t prove the derivative.    
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Both discussed the problem that at least the “weaker” students seemed to expect 
mathematics to be about manipulating symbols in order to “get something”. 
P1: One problem is that they do not think at all about the statements that they’ve 
proved.  In other words, they are looking to do everything in a purely syntactic way. 
[…]  They give a proof which is […] complete nonsense because using a proof like 
this you could prove absolutely anything. 
P3: I would say that 99% of the questions students ask are formulated in procedural 
terms.  Like, “Can I do this?”, “Can I do that?” rather than “Is this true?”, “Is this 
right?”  And they have to do with symbol manipulation. 
However, the two expressed contrasting beliefs about how to respond. 
PROFESSOR 1: A SEMANTIC RESPONSE 
Professor 1 stressed his concern about the need to emphasize meaning in the 
students’ thinking, contrasting this with Professor 3’s approach. 
P1: When we do a proof, […] although we know in principle that it can be done 
syntactically, we can bring it down to some axiomatic system…that, in fact, you think 
very semantically.  […]  You’re thinking about the objects themselves, and you are 
confident with your ability to do…to do legal reasoning on this thing. 
P1: [The students] come with a pretty syntactic view of mathematics.  They see a 
mathematics problem and they know certain rules for manipulating.  [Professor 3] 
wants them to really understand the syntax of what they’re doing, and to work on 
writing it.  My problem is that it’s more of the same.  In other words, it encourages 
students to think of mathematics as a syntactic enterprise, rather than trying to assign 
meaning to what they’re doing. 
He explained that he liked to “start with interesting problems where the answer is 
not obvious” and that he liked a book based on discrete mathematics because 
P1: It’s a domain in which you can actually draw nice pictures, and the pictures have 
a direct correspondence with the proofs you’re writing.  So you can do examples. […]  
You can scribble out numbers to test out the proof ideas. 
This emphasis on examples continued as he talked about the way he used them in 
understanding definitions and in checking arguments. 
P1: If I see a definition, I immediately instantiate it.  You know, try some examples.  
[…]  You describe a new definition, you say, “Let f be a function, let x be a real 
number, we say that…” and then some relationship between f and x holds if blah blah 
blah.  […] [T]hey have to realize that this definition only makes sense in the context 
of, I have to have a function in mind and I have to have a number in mind.  
P1: This particular part of the argument is more actually much more general than the 
specific situation you’re dealing with.  And therefore I can do a check on this part of 
the argument by thinking about that more general situation and doing examples 
within that more general situation.  
He lamented students’ apparent lack of similar activity.  
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P1: [If] they don’t understand the definition, they’ll just skip that sentence and go on.  
They will come in for help on a particular problem, and five or ten minutes into the 
discussion I’ll realize that they never bothered to process this particular definition.  
They have no idea what this means.  
P1:  I also tell them things like, before you try to prove a statement, let’s say it’s “For 
all…something,” then you should, look, illustrate.  […]  Pick some examples, just so 
you can see how…how this theorem works.  So maybe you don’t see exactly how it’s 
going to help you do what you have to do, but trust me, it will.  You have to just get 
into the habit of understanding it.  And they just refuse to do this.  
He discussed his construction of tasks that focused on building these skills. 
P1:  I have one where I define what a partition of a set means […]: a collection of 
subsets such that the empty set is not one of the subsets, for every element of the 
underlying set there is a subset that contains it, for any two sets in the partition the 
intersection is empty.  Which is pretty abstract, when you look at something like that.  
And then I just ask, okay, construct three examples of a partition on the set 
{1,2,3,4,5}.  And then, okay, construct an example of a collection of sets on 
{1,2,3,4,5} which satisfies the first two properties but not the third, the first and the 
third properties but not the second, the second and third properties but not the first.  
He noted, however, that experience had also led him to introduce an increasing 
number of “guide rails” to head off common syntactic errors.  He expressed regret 
about this and stressed his view that work on syntax should be minimized. 
P1: It’s a little bit of a disappointment [that] I can’t build so heavily on these 
interesting problems. […]  They have to learn enough syntax, syntactic things about 
proofs…um…so that they can stay within the lines, somehow.  And I’m trying to find 
the minimum point that I can get that to, because it’s so boring.  And because it’s – 
and also because that’s their habit of thinking, it’s syntactic.  And if they’re going to 
succeed in this course then they have to get away from that. 
PROFESSOR 3: A SYNTACTIC RESPONSE 
Professor 3, in contrast, did not think it reasonable to set challenging problems.  
P3: I hear a lot of talk about the fact that it’s important to give them challenging 
problems with interesting mathematics.  […]  I can understand [this].  Maybe on this 
level they have these problems because this stuff is boring, but more challenging 
mathematics might be interesting.  But I have doubts, because even when I put 
moderately challenging problems, what I always find is that the main obstacle is not 
that they don’t know what to do, the main obstacle is that they will do anything, and 
don’t seem to think it needs justification. 
He confirmed that he might expect students to check statements using examples. 
P3: They definitely don’t have the habit of approaching statements critically, asking 
themselves “Is this really true? Let me see. Let me try some examples and I will 
check”.  
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However, this was in response to a specific question and was his only such 
comment.  He spoke more of his concern over the lack of precision in students’ 
use of notation, and their lack of experience of thinking in terms of structures. 
P3: The difficulty with understanding the rigidity of mathematical…grammar […] 
extends to the point that, for example, students are unaware that mathematical letters, 
symbolism, is case sensitive.  You cannot introduce a natural number little n, and then 
refer to it as capital N in the next sentence.   
P3: The sentence is of a certain form. […] And the main obstacle is that […] most 
students don’t seem to have had any courses in English grammar, in anything else 
that might teach them how to think in terms of structures, logical structures. 
He emphasized his response to this in terms of insisting upon standard phrasing. 
P3: So for instance I don’t accept it when a student says, “a number x is even if x is 2k, 
where k is an integer”.  I don’t accept that because there is supposed to be an 
existential quantifier there. 
P3: …never use the word “any” because in mathematics it tends to mean too many 
things.  “Any” can sometimes mean “some”, it sometimes means “all”.  Now the 
good student would know how to use the word “any” correctly.  But a not-very-good 
student is likely to use it in a way that is ambiguous, so better never to use it. 
He discussed his overall aim that learning to use mathematical syntax in this 
precise way would prepare students for proving more complex statements. 
P3: And I insist very much on minimizing the number of rules because I have 
become convinced that this is the antidote to the general…amorphousness of their 
work. […] There is a need to put a lot of rigidity and they are…maybe it doesn’t hurt 
to go to the other extreme for a while.  Once, in one course. 
P3: It seems to me that when one makes a thing very minimal in this way, this has a 
very positive side. […] When there is only one thing you can do, then it’s much easier 
to know what you can – what you should do.  […]  If you have a sentence that is, for 
example, a universal sentence, so “For all x, blah blah blah,” then there is only one 
way to prove that: “Let x be arbitrary, we prove that blah blah blah.” 
He acknowledged that this syntactic approach did not capture “real proof”, but 
expressed his view that going beyond this was unrealistic. 
P3: Doing proofs, mathematical proofs, is not a matter of analyzing logical structures 
and statements, and applying the logical rules of inference.  That, if you want, that 
may be the frame, the…the thing that supports the proof.  But the real proof and the 
real mathematics is not that.  And that should also be conveyed in the course.  But of 
course it’s too much.  That’s wishful thinking. 
DISCUSSION 
These two professors conceptualized the problems of teaching proof in similar 
ways, but diverged in their beliefs about how to address them.  Both had well 
thought-out and reasonable positions, and the purpose here is not to judge either  
1‐34  ICMI Study 19－2009 
as better or worse but to emphasize the fact that teaching at the undergraduate 
level, particularly at the transition-to-proof stage, might vary considerably in its 
emphasis.  This is pertinent to stated aims of the ICMI study, because the notional 
smooth development from early forms of argument into formal proof was not 
experienced by these professors; both found the majority of their students to be 
unprepared for the reasoning expected in their courses.  Indeed, teachers and 
professors do not all communicate with each other and agree about the ethos of 
mathematics classes.  Students will therefore encounter different approaches, 
which raises the question of what skills they need to develop in order to respond 
flexibly to different emphases in later classes.  The distinction used here may be 
useful in characterizing some of these skills: here Professor 1’s semantic 
approach needed students to generate examples, and Professor 3’s syntactic 
approach needed practice in thinking in terms of logical structures.  These skills 
could be incorporated into earlier mathematics lessons in a variety of ways, which 
I hope might be discussed at the conference. 
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PROVING IN EARLY CALCULUS 
Ferdinando Arzarello            Domingo Paola                Cristina Sabena 
Università di Torino, Italia;Liceo "Issel", Italia;Università di Torino, Italia 
In most countries, students are introduced to proof and proving within geometry 
and calculus environments. Keeping the geometric context as reference, this 
paper focuses on proving processes in early calculus and intends to show some of 
its specificities. It analyses students' processes in a grade 10 problem-solving 
activity carried out with the use of TI-nspire software and in paper and pencil. 
Two main approaches, a "quasi-empirical" and a "quasi-theoretical" one are 
identified, and the peculiar role of formulas and computations are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Proving processes are a complex issue, particularly when students are asked to 
produce some proofs by themselves and not only to repeat by heart a proof read in 
a book. In fact, the process of proving, particularly for non–experts, includes 
many references to what is referred to as informal aspects of proving (see 
Tymoczko, 1985; Feferman, 2000; and Arzarello, 2007, p. 43), such as empirical 
evidences, special cases, and the explorative and argumentative activities that are 
necessary to understand the meaning of the propositions to be proved and to find 
out the link with other propositions. 
The features of informal proving processes strongly depend on the mathematical 
topics to which they refer. Following the curriculum, Italian higher secondary 
school students generally approach proofs in geometry and in calculus. In this 
paper we focus on proving processes of students that face early calculus
1 
problems (including the approach to functions). They reveal many important 
analogies but also deep differences with respect to those carried out within 
elementary geometry.  
The paper is divided into this introduction and three more sections. In the first one 
we shall sketch an a-priori analysis of proving processes within the geometrical 
and the calculus environments, pointing out analogies and differences. In the 
second one we shall corroborate our analysis with an emblematic case study, 
where 10
th grade students face a proving activity in early calculus. The last section 
contains a final discussion.  
PROVING PROCESSES: ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY VS/ EARLY 
CALCULUS ENVIRONMENTS 
Let us consider two typical proofs, in geometry and in calculus (e.g. the proof by 
Pappus that in a triangle ABC with AB congruent to AC, the angles in B and C are 
                                           
1 In some curricula, part of what we call here early calculus is classified as algebra; such 
terminological differences depend on cultural and traditional issues; it is beyond the aim of this 
paper to discuss them.  
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congruent, see Greenberg, 2001, p. 87; and the proof of  lim
x→0
sin x
x
=1, see Thomas 
& Finney, 1988, pp. 66-68). In the geometrical proof we have essentially one type 
of objects, the figures (with their conceptual and figural aspects: see Fishbein, 
1993) and two types of actions made by the subjects on the figures: 
constructions/manipulations and explorations. These ingredients are linked to the 
theory in different ways by the discoursive productions of the subjects. In the 
calculus environment the situation is more complex: we still have figures, with all 
their multifaceted aspects, and in addition we have two other different objects: 
formulas and numbers. Subjects’ actions consist not only in constructions, 
manipulations and explorations of figures but also of formulas and numbers and 
in various connections among them (e.g. writing an algebraic formula 
corresponding to the graph of a function or building a numerical table for the 
values of a function). Manipulations of formulas and numbers correspond to 
precise practices, nameley calculations. Also such calculations are governed by a 
theory, as in geometry; but in calculus often the theory and its axioms (e.g. those 
on real numbers) are not made so explicit, remaining admitted as shared practices 
that correspond to an implicit theory
2.  
As in the case of geometry, all these ingredients and their mutual relationships are 
linked in different ways by the discoursive productions of the subjects. This 
brings on the table fresh typologies of informal reasoning, which were not present 
in the geometrical context, such as reasoning by analogy on the structural aspects 
of a formula, and looking for numerical regularities. An extreme consequence is 
that the status of a formal proof itself changes: now computations can become 
proofs, which in a sense is one of the major achievemnts in modern mathematics 
(from Descartes to Turing: see Arzarello, 2007; Lolli, 2005, pp. 22-33). We shall 
illustrate this point in the next section, where we shall sketch some of the proving 
processes developed in a 10
th grade class in an early calculus environment. 
TEACHING EXPERIMENT 
A classroom has been involved in a long teaching experiment running for all the 
five years of Italian secondary school (grades 9-13), with the aim of introducing 
students to theoretical thinking. The methodology is based on the following 
points: 
a)  problem solving activities, in which the students are asked to describe and 
justify the adopted strategies, with the aim of fostering a cognitive 
continuity between the explorative and productive phases of the proving 
process;  
                                           
2 For example, in treating a limit like 
h
x h x
h
2 2
0
) (
lim
− +
→  students often use the admitted practice 
that consists in developing the formula, simplifying by h and then putting h=0 in the result. It is 
an abbreviated method of deduction, which could be justified within the theory.  
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b) group-works and classroom discussions, to foster the use of natural 
language as mediator between students' thinking processes and the formal 
language of mathematics; 
c)  extensive exploitation in classroom and at home of ICT technologies. In 
particular, students use TI-nspire
3, a software by Texas Instrument that 
provides different environments in a strongly integrated way: CAS, text 
editor, dynamic geometry, analysis and representation of data, and program 
editor.  
In this paper we focus on an activity proposed in grade 10, as part of a program 
that introduces elements of early calculus. Students work in groups (five groups 
of 4-5 students each) and are video-recorded. In the previous lessons, they have 
been involved for about 15 hours in activities focusing mainly on the local aspects 
of functions using  different registers
4: 
- the graphical register; the local straightness as cognitive root of local 
linerarity (Tall, 2000), using the “zoom”, “slope” and “tangent” function of 
the software; 
- the numerical register; approximation of the slope of a line tangent to a 
function in a point, using the spreadsheet of the software;  
- the symbolic register; determination of the slope of a line tangent to a 
function in a point, using the CAS environment of the software, and paper 
and pencil. Such slope has then been named as "derivative in a point", and 
the derivative function has hence been introduced, as describing the slope of 
the tangent line. 
The activity focuses exactly on this passage from local to global aspects of 
functions: 
Consider the function f(x) = x
2. Which kind of graph has the function that describes 
how the slope of the tangent line changes, with the change of x (i.e., the derivative 
function)? And what about in case of the function g(x) = x
3 - 3x
2? Describe in a clear 
and complete way how you have tried to answer the question. Justify your answers. 
The data analysis reveals an interesting variety in the solving strategies, in which 
we identify some common features. All groups have initially asked themselves 
what are the derivative functions of f(x) = x
2 and of g(x) = x
3 – 3x
2 and have then 
proved (excepted one group) their conjectures through computations. For what 
concerns the question about the kind of graph of the derivative function, it is 
possible to classify the solving strategies into two categories: 
a)  a quasi-empirical approach in TI-nspire environment (three groups); the 
terminology is from Lakatos: see the discussion in Tymoczko, 1985, Part 
II. 
b) a quasi-theoretical approach in paper and pencil environment, with the 
computation of the limit of the incremental ratio. The terminology 
                                           
3 http://www.ti-nspire.com/tools/nspire/index.html. 
4 For a precise definition of registre (of semiotic representation) see Duval (1985), p.21.   
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"quasi-theoretical" is used here to indicate techniques and technologies (in 
the sense of Chevallard
5) induced by the use of TI-nspire that have become 
part of the students' solving methods (two groups).  
The students that have followed a quasi-empirical approach have exploited the 
practices induced by the use of the software. They have drawn the graph of the 
function in the dynamic geometry environment, chosen a point P in it and asked 
for its coordinates. Then they have used the “tangent” menu to build the tangent 
line t in P and have declared the ascissa of P and the slope of t as variables. They 
have used the software features to build a spreadsheet containing the values of the 
independent variable (the abscissa of P) and of the dependent variable (slope of t) 
in two columns. Finally, they have computed the finite differences
6 of the 
dependent values column and concluded that it is a linear function. This strategy 
has been implemented mainly in the graphical and numerical registers of the 
software; only one group has studied since the beginning the links between 
graphical and symbolic aspects, trying to link the coefficients a, b, c of the generic 
quadratic function to the geometrical characteristics of the derivative function. 
The students that have followed a quasi-theoretical approach have on the contrary 
used a symbolic-algebraic register since the beginning. They have searched for a 
general rule for the computation of the derivatives of a quadratic and a cubic 
function, and have then applied it to the particular cases. To find out such general 
rule, they have computed the limit of the incremental ratio as illustrated in Note 3. 
As observed there, the practice substitutes the explicit theory. Even if it is true that 
the same thing happens to the experts, there is a crucial difference: the expert is 
able to justify his practice, whereas the novice is not. One group, in particular, has 
posed the problem of finding out a formula for the derivative function of a generic 
polynomial function of grade n. Their methodology consisted first in finding the 
formula for the derivative of a second and third grade (polynomial) function; then 
in justifying it with the computation of the limit of the incremental ratio; and 
finally in conjecturing a formula for the derivative of a grade n function exploiting 
formal analogies and observed regularities. This strategy has been implemented 
in paper and pencil environment with a local use of the software to accomplish 
complex computations. 
                                           
5 According to Chevallard (Bosch & Chevallard, 1999), a human practice can be described in 
terms of a praxeology, which is constituted by four components: a set of similar problems 
(called a type of tasks), a way to work the type of task (called a technique), an explanation of 
how the technique works (called a technology), a theory  which is able to legitimate the 
technology. With the term quasi-theoretical we intend to stress the local character of the 
students’ theoretical productions, as pointed out in the final discussion, and to avoid confusion 
with the usual meaning of the word technology in mathematical education, referring to ICT. 
6 In the previous year, the students have used TI-nspire to implement the finite differences 
technique to study the behaviour of functions. For instance, they learned that the linear function 
is the only one case in which the first differences are costant.  
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DISCUSSION 
The proving processes of almost all groups are articulated in three phases in 
which the genericity of the mathematical objects changes and increases little by 
little. Each phase is characterized by a proving step of abductive nature
7, which 
marks the passage from an explorative to a deductive phase. The three phases can 
be identified by making explicit the questions D1, D2, D3 to which all groups in 
their activity have tried to answer: 
D1: Which function is the derivative of y = x
2? The answer (a linear function) is 
obtained through the two methods a) e b) illustrated above. The former shows 
analogies with those typical of the geometrical environment; the latter is 
significantly different for the algebraic treatment of the generic objects (see also 
below in D2).  
D2: Which linear function? To answer this question the students use the letters 
and relate the particular case y = x
2 to the general one. Some groups use the 
analogy on the structure of the formula to discover the derivative of the cubic. The 
computation they perform by introducing h and passing to the limit is their proof 
in the sense that it explains why such formula holds. The explanation (proof) here 
is not developed in discoursive practices with specific markers (for instance, 
"if…then") as in geometry, but it is in the computation itself: there is a change in 
the statute of the proving processes and themselves. The differences with the 
geometric environments are most striking. Another difference regards the generic 
example. In geometry, figures can be used as generic example (Balacheff, 1999); 
in our case, the generic example is provided by the use of the letters that 
accomplish a proper ostensive function: a generic quadratic function is in fact f(x) 
=ax
2+bx+c. It is the computation to require the symbol to represent the generic 
object. It is the passage from the synthetic to the analytic, which has been possibly 
fostered by the recourse to the software and by the didactic practice.  
D3: Which rule for the derivatives of the polynomial functions? Here the answers 
are all obtained by means of mere formal analogies. 
As emerges from the data analysis, in the proposed activity the students have not 
provided any proper proofs, nor they were expected to: they were not in the 
conditions to do so, since they did not (yet) posses a theory of reference, which 
makes explicit the notion of logical consequence between the axioms. 
Nevertheless, we argue that their activity has a high theoretical value, since it has 
the function of creating and making explicit the links between the involved pieces 
of knowledge. Such pieces of knowledge become connected in a web more and 
                                           
7 Abduction is a sort of 'reverse deduction', albeit very different from an empirical induction 
(Peirce, 1960). The best explanation of the term is that given by Peirce himself: suppose I know 
that a certain bag is plenty of white beans. Consider the following sentences: A) these beans are 
white; B) the beans of that bag are white; C) these beans are from that bag. A deduction is a 
concatenation of the form: B and C, hence A; an abduction is: A and B, hence C (Peirce called 
hypothesis the abduction). An empirical induction would be: A and C, hence B.  
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more and little by little. Its complexity will then become a stimulus to search for a 
“higher view” on its components, that is to say, ethimologically
8, to search for a 
theory to accommodate them.  
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8 According to the experts, the word theory seems to derive from Greek θεωρία theoria, which 
means "contemplation, speculation"; the word would result from θεωρός "spectator", θέα thea 
"a view" + ￿ρ￿ν horan "to see", literally "looking at a show".  
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LOGICAL AND SEMIOTIC LEVELS IN ARGUMENTATION 
Ferdinando Arzarello              Domingo Paola     Cristina Sabena 
Università di Torino, Italia; Liceo "Issel", Italia; Università di Torino, Italia 
We analyse the ingredients present in argumentative processes of students who 
solve early calculus problems. The research highlights some limits of structural 
analysis based on the Toulmin model, and shows that for a better understanding 
of such processes we need also a semiotic analysis of the resources used by 
students, and of the practices carried out with such resources. 
INTRODUCTION 
Current research on proving processes often considers structural models of proofs 
and argumentations. For example, some people (Pedemonte, 2007) analyze 
argumentations and proofs using the ternary Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1958), 
which will be discussed in the next section. On the contrary, Duval (1992-1993) 
accepts a ternary nature only for proofs.  He distinguishes them from 
argumentations: in fact proofs steps are based on a “recycling process”, where the 
conclusion of a step becomes the premise of the next one; on the contrary, 
inferences are drawn through “intrinsic connextions”, namely are based on the 
content. Others (Pedemonte, 2007) put forward that also in proving processes 
content elements may be present. For example, the content elements are particular 
evident if one considers the role of conjectures, examples and counterexamples 
(Balacheff, 1988) in the steps of students while solving a problem, where they are 
asked to conjecture and possibly to prove something. 
In this paper we present an ongoing research that studies argumentative and 
proving processes of students who are solving early calculus problems. We shall 
show how the content elements are crucial even in the formal aspects of proving. 
We shall use the Toulmin model as used by Pedemonte (2007) to analyze the 
dialectic role of examples, counterexamples, and refutations in the evolution of 
students’ argumentations. Our research points out that the role of the content may 
be more or less influential in such an evolution according to the practices that 
students are able to develop within and between the semiotic resources they use to 
represent the problem they are solving.    
ARGUMENTATION AND PROVING PROCESSES: SOME 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS TOOLS  
The Toulmin model is based on the following formal analysis of an argument: 
-   C (claim): the statement of the argument, 
-   D (data): data justifying the claim,  
-   W (warrant): the inference rule that allows to link data to the claim.   
This formal structure of an argument may be enriched by auxiliary elements: a 
qualifier, that indicates the strength of the leap from the data to the warrant; a 
rebuttal, that is a more or less local counter-example to the argument; backing, 
that gives additional support to the warrant.  
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While solving a problem students generally use different semiotic resources, 
which include different types of signs
1: inscriptions, words, gestures, etc. All of 
them are important tools for supporting the thinking processes of students in 
mathematics. Many mathematical inscriptions belong to precise semiotic system 
or registers (Duval, 1985, p. 21), within which the signs are linked to precise 
practices and theories taught in the school (e.g. the principle of identity of 
polynomials)
2.  
The semiotic resources enter in a strong way in the argumentation and proving 
processes. Hence they must be taken into account by any model for arguments. 
This is achieved only partially by the Toulmin model, even if it is enlarged to 
embrace Pedemonte’s distinction between abductive and deductive aspects 
(Pedemonte, 2007). In fact, to suitably describe argumentative processes we point 
out two of their main aspects: their logical and semiotic features. Specifically, we 
analyse how students control these two levels. The logical control concerns the 
structure of the arguments, and can be analysed with the enlarged Toulmin model. 
The semiotic control concerns the semiotic resources used by students to 
represent the situation and the practices that they carry out with them. As an 
example, let us consider the way one can prove the infinity of prime numbers: the 
usual proof has a logical structure with steps that can be analysed by the Toulmin 
model; possibly one can have abductive and deductive steps; but important 
ingredients are the representation of numbers as a product of primes, the practices 
linked to them and the theorems grown from by such practices. To understand and 
a fortiori to produce such a proof one must control both levels. Hence we need an 
integrated model, where also the semiotic and praxeological elements
3 are present. 
In the example analysed in the next section, we will show how a group of students 
approaches a problem situation in early calculus. The two episodes we shall 
comment show at first glance big differences between them. But if we analyze 
them exclusively with the Toulmin model such a difference is not explained: the 
logical structure reveals the same in both episodes. We can explain such 
difference analysing the semiotic resources used by the students and the way they 
control the related praxeologies. 
                                           
1 As sign or semiotic resource, we consider anything that "stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity" (Peirce, 1931-1958, vol. 2, paragraph 228). 
2 Chevallard analyses all this considering the notion of praxeolgy (Bosch & Chevallard, 1999).   
3 According to Chevallard (Bosch & Chevallard, 1999), a human practice can be described in 
terms of a praxeology, which is constituted by four components: a set of similar problems 
(called a type of tasks), a way to work the type of task (called a technique), an explanation of 
how the technique works (called a technology), a theory  which is able to legitimate the 
technology. With the term quasi-theoretical we intend to stress the local character of the 
students’ theoretical productions, as pointed out in the final discussion, and to avoid confusion 
with the usual meaning of the word technology in mathematical education, referring to ICT.  
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A CASE STUDY 
We propose the analysis of two episodes from a group activity in early calculus 
context, at grade 10. The activity is part of a long teaching experiment running for 
all the five years of the Italian secondary school (grades 9-13), with the aim of 
introducing students to theoretical thinking.  
In the previous lessons, students have been involved for about 16 hours in 
activities focusing mainly on the local aspects of functions, using different 
registers both in paper and pencil, and in CAS software. In the graphical register, 
the students have been introduced to the local straightness as cognitive root of 
local linerarity (Tall, 2000), using the “zoom”, “slope” and “tangent” functions of 
the software. In the numerical register they have learnt how to approximate the 
slope of a line tangent to a function in a point, and have investigated the 
increments of polynomial functions. They have learnt that linear functions 
correspond to constant increments, quadratic functions to constant second order 
increments, and so on (what in the classroom it is called “incremental technique”). 
In the symbolic register, they have determined the slope of a line tangent to a 
function in a point. Such a slope has then been named as "derivative in a point", 
and the derivative function has hence been introduced, to describe the slope of the 
tangent line. 
In the example we consider the students are answering the following question: 
Consider the following graph of a function y = f(x).  
What can you say about the graph of the function that 
describes how the slope of the tangent line changes, with the 
change of x? Justify your answers. 
Students worked in small groups, and the teacher 
supervised their activity by interacting with each group. 
Beyond collecting their written sheets, we video-recorded 
the group formed by M, L, and R. In the following, we 
analyse two episodes from their solving process. 
First episode: a successful refutation 
The students immediately recognize that the problem has the same structure of 
one that they have already solved. In fact, the previous activity asked the same 
question referring to the functions f(x) = x
2 and g(x) = x
3 - 3x
2. In such a case, they 
have worked in the symbolic register, successfully computing the incremental 
ratios and their limits. Their argumentation in that case can be described 
according to Toulmin schema, as follows: 
Data: polynomial function, 
Warrant: limit of incremental ratio, 
Claim: the derivative function. 
The students turn now to the problem of obtaining the data: they examine whether 
the graph corresponds to a polynomial function, and whether they can find out its 
equation. They try to obtain numerical values from the graph, so to be able to 
apply the “incremental technique” (see above) and determine a polynomial model  
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for the given graph. After some trials, they refute such a possibility, as having 
scarce possibility of success. Here it is how the students report on this first 
attempt:  
If the function were polynomial, and we knew its equation, we could, for what 
made explicit in the former activity, solve the problem. As a consequence, the 
problem is to succeed to trace back to a plynomial function, and in this regard, 
initially we had thought to take the coordinates of some points of the function, in 
order to compute their differences and discover what kind of function it was; but it 
impossible to us, for two reasons: 
-  we cannot have the exact coordinates of points 
-  we would need too many points to get useful information on the slope. 
Accounting for their exploration, the students appear conscious of the limits and 
potentialities of their ideas. More precisely, we can identify a double level control 
on argumentation: 
• at a logical level, an abductive step (with the correct use of hypothetical 
linguistic construction: “If the function…solve the problem”), the warrant 
(“for what made explicit in the former activity, solve the problem”), and the 
obtained claim (“solve the problem”); 
• at a semiotic level, the refutation of the adopted techniques (“but it is 
impossible…”).  
The two levels are well articulated both from a linguistic point of view (“As a 
consequence, the problem is…”), and from a meta-cognitive perspective: in fact, 
they recognize that their strategy is theoretically valid, and refuse it since 
practically unfeasible. In other words, they show a double control over the theory 
and the techniques adopted. 
Second episode: a missed refutation 
Following the teacher’s suggestion, the students give 
up to perform conversions into other registers, and 
focus on the graphical one. Soon they identify the 
stationary points as having slope equal to zero. The 
teacher suggests putting such information in a 
Cartesian graph, and the students produce a diagram 
as in Figure 1, in which they correctly record the 
information about the zeroes of the slope function, as 
well as its sign. They turn then to describe how the 
slope function increases/decreases. We report an excerpt of students’ discussion 
about this issue: 
1.  R: Here (pointing on the second flex of the graph) it’s roughly constant 
2.  L: No, let’s start from here (pointing on the left part of the graph). Here, isn’t it 
decreasing? That is, it is decreasing less and less (miming the graph moving his hand in 
the air; Figure 2). Yes, look! 
3.  The slope…does like so, in theory…(putting the pen on the sheet; Figure 3) 
 
Figure 1  
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   Figure  2     Figure  3 
4.  L: It decreases less and less, the slope function 
5.  M: It decreases less... 
6.  L: Less 
7.  M and R: Yes, right […] 
8.  M: So, here (writing in the sheet, see Figure 4) it decreases less and less. Until arriving 
to zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
Adopting Toulmin model, the structure of the students’ argumentation can be 
described as follows: 
Data: graph of the given function 
Warrant: slope of the tangent line 
Claim: information on the slope function 
However, even if Toulmin structure for argumentation is preserved, the 
conclusion (claim) is wrong, and the argumentation is deceptive. We see that L 
guides the argumentative process by proposing that in the left part of the graph 
(deictically referred to with the gesture) the slope is decreasing less and less. 
Actually, this is not the case. In fact, as correctly reported in the diagram (see Fig. 
1), in that interval the slope function is negative and reaches zero in a point named 
as α; therefore it has to be increasing. Other contradictions can be found in the 
final diagram (Figure 4). Why the students do not detect such a contradiction? 
Why in this case the refutation is not emerging? We hypothesize that the students 
are influenced by perceptive facts and are thinking to the slope in its everyday 
meaning, i.e. as an intrinsic characteristic of the steepness of a path, rather than as 
a number with sign, as in the context of mathematical calculus. In their 
argumentative process, we notice: 
-  an inadequate use of semiotic resources: language and gestures (see Fig. 2) are 
both misleading, since both refer to the everyday meaning of the term “slope”; 
-  a missing mastery and control over the techniques related to the diagram 
suggested by the teacher. 
Figure 4 [A: decreasing less and less; B: 
increasing more and more; C: increasing less and 
less; D: decreasing constantly; E: decreasing less 
and less; F: increasing more and more] 
  A 
  B    C 
  D 
  E 
  F  
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Differently from the previous case, a semiotic control does not play along with a 
logical control, and this lack is determining for the result of the argumentative 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
Drawing from a problem solving situation, we proposed the analysis of two 
argumentative processes both fitting Toulmin model. In one case, however, by 
performing a refutation (rebuttal) the students succeed in their argumentation, 
whereas in the other one they fail to notice a contradiction and the refutation is 
missing. From a didactical and cognitive point of view, we are interested in 
understanding the differences between the two cases. From our analysis, it 
emerges that though a control at the logical level is present in both episodes 
(coherently with Toulmin model), a control at the semiotic level is missing in the 
case of failure. Current literature has correctly criticised the idea that content 
aspects are absent in proofs. Our research highlights the essential role played by 
the signs to which the subjects resort to represent the problem situation and by the 
techniques they have to solve them. This is not new in mathematics, if we think at 
its history. For instance, Euclid’s “Elements” are a theoretical layout of the 
practices emerging from the use of rule and compass. 
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INTRODUCING MORE PROOF INTO A HIGH STAKES 
EXAMINATION 
Neil Buckley and John Monaghan 
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This paper discusses issues in introducing more proof into a high stakes 
examination. It is relevant to ICMI Study 19 theme 3, Curriculum materials and 
their role in supporting instruction. The paper has  three sections: introduction – 
gives contextual information; the examiner’s viewpoint – raises issues in setting 
and grading proof questions; networks of influence – looks at ‘actors’ who 
influence the ‘construction of proof’ in the high stakes examination. 
INTRODUCTION 
We raise issues in introducing more proof into a high stakes examination. We 
provide an outline of the examination, two reports and an ongoing project. A-level 
Mathematics (‘A’ for ‘advanced’) is a high stakes qualification with six equally 
weighted units typically taken by 18 year old academic stream students and used 
by Higher Education institutions to select students for degree level courses. 
Applications have distinct optional units of which candidates must take two. Proof 
is examined within four compulsory pure mathematics units. A minority of 
students also study Further Mathematics units. The main method of assessment is 
‘timed unseen’ written examinations called ‘papers’. A government body, the 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), is responsible for regulating the 
development of qualifications and monitoring standards over time. Examination 
specifications are developed by awarding bodies which are accredited by the 
QCA. AQA is one of three awarding bodies in England which provide detailed 
syllabi (within the specifications) and write, mark and grade unit examination 
papers. 
The Smith Report (Smith, 2004) was a major government publication which 
addressed a wide range of issues for mathematics for 14-19 year old students but 
here we consider its recommendations with regard to high attaining academic 
stream students for “greater facility in mathematical reasoning (including proof)” 
(Recommendation 4.5). The Smith Report clearly valued proof. This 
recommendation was a reaction to a perceived lowering of standards with regard 
to reasoning and rigour, but it did not say what proof is. The Smith Report called 
for independent bodies to be commissioned to design 14-19 Curriculum and 
Assessment Mathematical Pathways. 
The government, through QCA, awarded two ‘Pathways phase 1’ projects. We 
report on that awarded to the University of Leeds; the output was a report 
(unfortunately not in the public domain) which, like the Smith Report, covered a 
wide range of issues. With regard to proof it noted: 
Proof is not currently a significant feature in A-level. … Reference is made to 
‘knowing’ specific proofs and proving trigonometrical identities ...Where the words 
‘proof’ or ‘prove’ were used, then algebraic/trigonometric manipulation was  
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expected … we recommend ... greater emphasis to proof and this emphasis should be 
reflected in more questions being set that involve proof and proof-theoretic ideas. 
The principal recommendations of the Leeds phase 1 project led to the 
AQA-Leeds 14-19 Mathematics Pathways project (Pathways phase 2), a 
government contract to ‘trial and pilot’ curriculum and assessment innovations. 
‘Trial’ and ‘pilot’ are QCA terms. A pilot requires the development of full 
specifications (syllabi and examinations) and the award of qualifications. This is 
obviously a very serious matter; examination questions should be accessible to the 
great majority of candidates, even if they are unable to successfully complete 
them. Trials involve trying out design aspects, e.g. draft examination questions, in 
non-high stakes settings, e.g. internal school examinations. 
Monaghan & Roper (2007) also considers issues in introducing proof into this 
high stakes examination: what is proof in examinations, problems in setting proof 
questions, the preparation of students, ethical issues, trialling in the present for a 
future examination and questions about teaching. In this paper we consider issues 
from the viewpoint of the examiner and influences on the ‘construction of proof in 
timed written examinations’, i.e. how proof, as it exists at this stage in the trialling 
and piloting, has come to be what it is.  
THE EXAMINER’S VIEWPOINT 
This section addresses practical issues in assessing proof from the view-point of a 
senior A-level examiner. Grading of examinations is criteria referenced by 
ex-perienced examiners (typically 20+) considering papers and candidates’ 
scripts from two sessions prior to the session being graded as well as the current 
cand-idate scripts, but in a context based on statistical analysis of results taken by 
candidates the previous year all referenced to performance in UK exams at age 16 
and a similarly referenced comparison between the awarding bodies. Each paper 
is individually graded and then marks are standardised. Typically each paper is 90 
minutes long and covers all but a small amount of the paper’s poss-ible subject 
content. There is no choice of questions. The lowest pass grade (E) is essentially 
defined as competence in many but not all of the skills, but not necessarily the 
ability to significantly problem-solve without guidance. The highest pass grade 
(A) requires competence in virtually all skills and problem solving without 
explicit guidance and requires ‘multi-step’ (LMS, 1996) math-ematical reasoning. 
The papers are designed to test subject content, reasoning and assessment criteria 
to a consistent standard set and monitored by QCA. 
It was not deemed feasible for a 90 minute paper to ‘cover the subject content’ of 
a sixth of an A-level and address ‘proof’ satisfactorily. If too few marks are 
allocated they will not contribute materially to the grade. Past experience has 
shown that proof questions require time to develop a strategy. The difficult idea 
for the student, the strategy, precedes the proof. This has implications for the 
design of the mark scheme which must reward relevant work following an error in 
the argument. The pilot merged the equivalent of two 90 min. examinations into a 
150 min. examination (13 questions) covering the content of the final two  
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compulsory ‘pure’ units. This allowed us to set questions which address proof. 
The marks (15 out of 125 on proof; 10 on unstructured problems) allowed 
sensible assessment to the criteria whilst giving students sufficient ‘thinking and 
contemplation’ time. As a consequence we cannot cover as much of the subject 
content as previously, but we can include related ideas when we miss out a topic. 
Proof questions were undefined in the Smith Report but we thought they should 
form a coherent relationship with other questions so that the question paper as a 
whole has a consistent style and language. In our experience in a time-limited 
examination covering significant subject content, assessment criteria and 
reasoning requirements, differences in the style of questions can have devastating 
effects on student performance. A problem with ‘proof’ questions is that they 
often require a particular mathematical thought process based on a perception of 
the mathematical structure involved in the problem. These can be taught to a 
recipe. An example, proof by induction of the formula for a series is usually 
answered well in a formulaic way including some very ‘perceptive’ statements. 
When we first introduced proof by induction questions were poorly answered 
despite being explicitly mentioned in the subject content for the paper. In 
subsequent papers these were answered well. Teachers are evaluated on their 
students’ results and students have an incentive in a high stakes examination to do 
well, beyond that of exploring mathematical ideas. In high stakes examinations 
the subject content, assessment criteria and requirements of candidates have to be 
precisely defined or the assessment is unfair, dependent on an unspoken collusion 
between examiners and teachers ‘in the know’.  
Students are taught to recognise cues in questions and respond appropriately. 
Hence trigonometrical ‘proof’ questions are relatively accessible since the 
identities which they require are necessarily specified in the subject content and 
can usually be easily recognised, possibly following some conventional algebraic 
manipulation. Other ‘proof’ questions are often not as accessible as they often 
require reasoning not explicit in the subject content. It might be argued that one 
could set trigonometrical ‘proofs’ without reliance on recognisable identities. 
However, these identities are part of the subject content and, hence, must be tested 
regularly. In any case teachers will teach to the test based on previous question 
papers and students taught in this way will usually be assimilating useful 
strategies for solving mathematical problems.  
There are however some ‘proof’ questions which apparently cannot be ‘taught’ at 
this level. We have set questions on proof by contradiction in the current system, 
which is a very difficult concept for students at this level. Even high attaining 
students find great difficulty in expressing their argument cogently. Our strategy 
with these questions was to split them into two parts – the algebraic manipulation 
followed by the proof requiring the reasoning and the result was candidates 
gained marks for the first part but usually nothing for the proof, despite teachers 
being given guidance as to what was required in examiners’ reports. Apparently 
students could not be drilled to succeed in this. Is this, then, an appropriate test of  
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mathematical reasoning at this level? We do not want ‘dead’ marks on a high 
stakes paper and need to be sure that such topics can be understood by students in 
the learning environment in which they study. 
These candidates are mainly 18 year old students who have only recently studied 
many of the topics and are sitting a high stakes paper. They include a minority of 
mathematics enthusiasts but also very many for whom mathematics is of interest 
but not a priority or is just necessary for their career aspirations.  
We end this section with three ‘proof’ questions: the first two trialled for the pilot 
specimen 150 minute paper with 125 marks in total and the third from a trial paper: 
1 Prove that  x
x x
2 cot 2
1 sec
1
1 sec
1
=
+
−
−
.    
Students often made initial algebraic manipulation slips which invalidated their 
argument, but knew what they were expected to do.  
2 The function f is defined by  () 1              
1
1
≠
−
+
= x
x
x
x f  The inverse of f is f
 -1. Prove   that 
the graphs of  ( ) ( ) x   and   1 - f y x f y = =  do not intersect.      
Finding f
--1(x) was generally well done; the rest led to a rapid decline in marks. 
3  Given     , 1    ,
1
) ( ≠
−
= x
x
x
x f prove that  ( ) ( ) x f x f n = +1 2  where n is a whole number. 
Students found this a difficult question.  The algebraic techniques required are 
basic but ‘fiddly’. The majority could not produce a ‘proof’ meriting credit. 
NETWORKS OF INFLUENCE 
Many of the influences discussed are present in any assessment innovation but 
some are specific to the introduction of more proof. This section has two 
interrelated themes: proof in this innovation began as a vague construct; 
‘distributed agency’ in introduction of more proof into examinations. We draw on 
ideas from actor network theory (ANT) and activity theory without wholly 
embracing either in this paper; Mietten (1999) describes both theories and how 
they can co-exist in research. ANT constructs drawn on are ‘obligatory passage 
point’ and artefacts as actors. Principles from ‘third generation activity theory’, 
which seeks to understand “dialogues, multiple perspectives and networks of 
interacting activity systems” (Daniels, 2001, p.91), are multivoicedness, the need 
to embrace an historical viewpoint and the centrality of contradictions in 
innovation. We also draw upon the construct ‘boundary objects’.  
Figure 1 shows the network of actors we consider. The Smith Report is on top. 
The Smith Report should be viewed historically – it is a response to over a decade 
of concern and dissatisfaction amongst influential UK mathematicians with the 
state of 14-19 mathematics education following ‘reforms’ in the 1980s, e.g. LMS 
(1996). These influences are denoted by the arrows leading to the Smith Report in 
Figure 1. The Smith Report in general and, with regard to our focus in this paper,  
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the call for “greater facility in mathematical reasoning (including proof)” is a 
‘boundary object’ which is also an ‘obligatory passage point’, i.e. actors must 
acknowledge and appear to value it to be part of the innovation process (but by 
leaving it open as to what proof is, the thing valued is left vague and open to 
multiple interpretations). 
 
 
 
is, the thing valued is left vague and open to multiple interpretations). 
 
Figure 1 Actors and influences in introducing proof into a high stakes examination 
Underneath the Smith Report in Figure 1 is the first ‘14-19 Mathematics 
Pathways’ project. To obtain the award the Leeds Pathways team had to address 
issues in the Smith Report but this should not be viewed cynically, the Leeds team 
did embrace many of the values in the Smith Report. The output of the Leeds 
14-19 Mathematics Pathways project was a report. The Leeds report was not 
simply the opinions of the authors. The project consultation process was 
extremely wide and involved organisations, individuals and focus groups of 
teachers. The report was a consensus of views. This is the first aspect of what we 
call ‘distributed agency’ above; if the report was to become a future reality, then it 
should involve what ANT authors call ‘interessement’. The section of the report 
dealing with proof at A-level recommended greater emphasis be given to proof 
and ‘proof-theoretic ideas’ in examinations. The focus on examinations was due 
to a perceived need to change classroom teaching. Proof was already on the 
curriculum but was scantily represented in examination questions. The report’s 
authors, under the belief that most teachers in England ‘teach for the test’, 
considered that more proof in examinations would lead to greater emphasis on 
proof in classrooms. The report contrasted proof with ‘proof-theoretic ideas’. An 
example of the latter is showing that a continuous function has a root in an interval 
by showing that the function’s values at the end points have different signs. 
Incorporating proof-theoretic ideas was seen as a way to overcome proof 
becoming ‘fossilised’, e.g. students memorising manipulations to prove standard 
trigonometric identities. 
The principal recommendations of the Leeds Pathways phase 1 project lead to the 
AQA-Leeds Pathways phase 2 project. We, the authors, were key individuals in 
the A-level innovation representing two ‘communities of practice’, AQA and 
Leeds University. AQA is an activity system where the object of the activity is the 
award of nationally recognised and graded qualifications. John was an outsider 
whose role was to ‘broker’ a boundary object, the A-level recommendations from 
Pathways phase 1, which was a revised ‘obligatory passage point’. In ANT terms 
his role was ‘interessement’ and ‘enrolment’. John and Neil, collaborated to write 
Ì    È    Ë
Smith Report 
È 
Pathways phase project 1 
È 
 Chief ExaminersÌ                     ËResults from trial questions  
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the initial trial proof questions but a number of other AQA people were 
peripherally involved: professional, i.e. full-time, subject officers and part-time 
Chief Examiners for the A-level modules. A wide variety of proof questions were 
trialled with varying levels of success, i.e. some questions had a very low facility 
index! This clearly influenced what was considered feasible in pilot examination 
questions. Questions which required students to prove trigonometric identities 
had a reasonable facility index. We comment on trigonometric identities to note a 
‘contradiction’ in activity theoretic terms, “Contradictions are historically 
accumulating structural tensions within and between activity systems.” (Daniels, 
2001, p.94) The phase 1 report was critical of trigonometric proofs but in phase 2 
trialling suggested that they could be ‘successful’ in terms of students actually 
being able to do them under examination conditions. 
Other actors became more centrally involved in the piloting. AQA chief 
examiners wrote specimen examinations, pilot schools were recruited, AQA 
professional subject officers wrote draft ‘specifications’, QCA scrutinised the 
specifications which were revised and sent to schools. These were all actors 
(human or not; individual or group) in the network of influences in the 
introduction of more proof into A-level examinations and they are marked as such 
in Figure 1. In terms of our opening comments in this section, ‘proof as an initially 
vague construct’ and ‘distributed agency’, these actors contributed to the 
distributed agency in ‘constructing proof’ in the pilot qualification. An 
‘operational’ view of proof is emerging through what appears to be examinable 
and acceptable to the consensus of actors. We do not know whether this is a view 
of proof anticipated by the authors of the Smith Report. 
Acknowledgement Thanks to QCA for allowing us to report on these matters. 
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PROOF AND PROVING IN PRIMARY SCHOOL:  
AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
Maria G. Bartolini Bussi 
Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Italy 
A growing interest is shown, at the international level, for teaching and learning 
activities where the participation of students is encouraged by experimental 
approach.  Aim of this paper is to show that experimental approach is not against 
the development of a theoretical attitude. Three different case studies are 
discussed, concerning teaching and learning in primary school. Additional data, 
collected during the classroom experiments, are presented to focus on the 
teacher's role and on the ways of constructing experimental settings where a 
theoretical attitude is nurtured rather than obstructed, to produce general 
methods and to construct mathematical proofs.  
INTRODUCTION 
We conceive a mathematical theorem as a system of statement, proof and theory 
(Mariotti et al. 1997). All these components are important: the theory as a system 
of shared principles and deduction rules; the statement as the result of a 
conjecturing process; the proof as a sophisticated argumentation that, on the one 
hand, is connected with the conjecturing process, and, on the other hand, is 
consistent with the reasoning styles of mathematicians (e. g. deduction from the 
hypotheses). This approach is consistent with Jahnke (2007) who speaks about 
local theories, i. e. small networks of theorems based on empirical evidence and 
claims : 
There is no easy definition of the very term ‘‘proof’’ since this concept is dependent 
of the concept of a theory. If one speaks about proof one has to speak about theories. 
Arzarello (2007) adds: 
A statement B can be a theorem only relative to some theory; it is senseless to say that 
it is a theorem in itself: even a proposition like "2+2=4" is a theorem in a theory A (e. 
g. some fragments of arithmetic).  
In primary school, theories are germ theories, based on empirical evidence, with 
the expansive potential to capture more and more principles (Bartolini Bussi et al., 
1999). Jahnke (in press) claims that the term hypotheses might be more useful to 
denote the shared principles, drawing on a deep historico-epistemological 
analysis and on the observation that this word is general, less technical and with 
more connections with other related fields of research (e. g. physics).  Following 
Jahnke, in this paper, I call the shared principles hypotheses of the germ theory. 
EXAMPLES FROM LONG TERM TEACHING EXPERIMENTS 
As from the mid nineties, my research team carried out teaching experiments on 
the approach to theoretical thinking in mathematics, at primary school level (e.g., 
Bartolini Bussi, 1996; Bartolini Bussi et al., 1999; Bartolini Bussi et al., 2007). In  
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this paper, for each case study, a crucial task on proving is discussed together with 
the process of collective construction of the germ theory. The discussion of this 
last issue is supported by unpublished additional data. 
Perspective drawing (Bartolini Bussi, 1996) 
A teaching experiment was carried out in several primary classrooms from 2nd 
grade on, focusing on the plane representation of 3d space by means of 
perspective drawing. In a collective discussion the teacher asked pupils to identify 
what is changed and what is invariant when one compares the geometrical 
properties of some 3d objects and the ones of their perspective image. The results 
of observations and of comparisons between reality (i.e. the world of real objects) 
and representation (i.e. the world of images on paper) were collected in a 
summary of hypotheses written on a poster and on individual notebooks. One of 
the summaries follows. 
REALITY REPRESENTATION 
straight lines straight lines 
4 equal angles (on the top) different angles 
square (top) quadrilateral (top) 
parallel vertical lines (legs) parallel vertical lines (legs) 
pairs of parallel lines (top) 2 parallel and 2 not parallel lines (top) 
Table 1: Changes and invariants from reality to representation 
This summary was written comparing a real square table with drawings and 
photos. It refers to both geometrical objects (e.g. lines, angles, square, and 
quadrilateral) and relations (e.g. equal, parallel) and real objects (e.g. legs, top). 
Hence the summary is hybrid and mixes input from real world and from geometry 
world. The crucial hypothesis of the germ theory concerns the invariance of 
alignment (straight lines are represented by straight lines).  
 
Figure 1: The table and the small ball 
The summary showed very useful for the following crucial drawing problem (for 
other problems, see Bartolini Bussi, 1996). A table, drawn in perspective with a 
small ball on the floor, is given together with the following task (fig. 1) 
Draw the small ball in the centre of the table. You can use instruments. Explain your 
reasoning.  
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐55 
Students who are not well acquainted with the hypotheses of the theory in the 
table 1 (even mathematics students at University level!) usually try to solve the 
problem by either rough estimate by sight (drawing the ball in a point without 
comments) or by measure (tracing the lines joining the midpoints of the opposite 
sides of the quadrilateral). In the classrooms of this case study, on the contrary, in 
the 5th grade, correct solutions were common with meaningful justifications. A 
short excerpt of a longer protocol is given below: 
I used the method of diagonals. I couldn't use the lines not diagonals (medians) 
because, as the table has been drawn in perspective, medians aren't the real ones 
anymore, as measures change. As opposite angles remain opposite, I use diagonals in 
order to maintain the points aligned, i. e. to connect opposite vertices (Costanza, 5th 
grade). 
The importance of the theory (table 1) was stated by students in both written 
protocols and oral sentences during classroom discussions: they always strove to 
get a general method that might have been used in any situation, also when 
experimental control was not possible. The word theory was commonly used to 
justify why the method worked (e.g. "according to our theory"). 
Gears: the motion (Bartolini Bussi et al., 1999) 
A second teaching experiment was carried out in many primary school 
classrooms (from the 2nd grade on), focusing on the motion of gears. In this case 
the germ theory was built around the following hypothesis, discovered by means 
of experiments with everyday objects containing gears. 
Two wheels in gear by means of teeth turn in opposite directions. 
A crucial exploration problem was given by means of the following task.  
We have often met planar wheels in pair. What if there were three wheels? How could 
they be positioned? You can build the possible situations by drawing or by cutting. 
Remember you must always give the necessary explanations and write down your 
observations. 
Most pupils (4th graders) succeeded in producing mental experiment by means of 
drawing. They applied the germ theory to sequences of wheels (rows) in gear with 
each other. A conflicting situation appeared when the "clover" configuration was 
drawn by accident. A protocol follows (see the figure 2): 
Let us try to draw the wheels in another way. Yes, they are on the same plane; but if I 
try to turn one we would see that two turn in the same direction and the other turns in 
the opposite direction. They cannot be in gear, because the first turns clockwise, the 
second anticlockwise and the third clockwise too, but the first and the third touch 
each other and so they are not in gear.  
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Figure 2: The "clover" configuration. 
Although the language is hybrid and not precise, an embryo of indirect proof 
shows up. 
After the solution of other problems concerning more and more wheels, a 
comprehensive text containing "the theory of planar gears" (Bartolini Bussi et al., 
1999, p. 77) was prepared by the teacher, drawing on the pupils' sentences in both 
written protocols and classroom discussions. The long text was discussed in the 
classroom and adjusted by pupils.  In this case too, the tension was towards 
general methods, to be applied without experimental control. 
We can FORESEE the direction of the last wheel of a very long row WITHOUT 
DOING EXPERIMENTS: it is enough to know whether their number is odd or even. 
Gears: shapes and position (Bartolini Bussi et al., 2007) 
Within the same teaching experiment, a further path was explored in the 5th grade, 
concerning shapes and position of gears. The simplified drawing of a toothed 
wheels as a circle (as pupils said "a toothless wheel") had been shared from the 
2nd grade in order to save time in drawing.  The following problem was given: 
In a class the pupils have been given the following task: "Draw a wheel S with a 
radius of 3 cm in gear with the wheel that is drawn to the left in the figure 3 (radius 5 
cm)". A pupil, after some attempts, has produced the drawing to the right but has 
noticed that there is something wrong. What is wrong? Try to solve the problem 
yourself and explain him how to adjust his drawing. 
 
Figure 3: The given (to the left) and the produced (to the right) drawing 
This task was usually solved by dynamic strategies, trying to "move" the small 
circle to avoid intersection. Eventually the new expression tangent circles was 
introduced together with an overabundant theory (some hypotheses are equivalent 
to each other for the experts), as follows:  
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If I have two tangent circles (fig. 4): 
1) the point of tangency is aligned with the two centres; 
2) the line segment joining the two centres crosses the point of tangency; 
3) the distance of the two centres is equal to the sum of radii. 
Vice versa, if I have three aligned points A, T, B, the circle with centre A and radius 
AT and the circle with centre B and radius BT are tangent at T. 
A
B
T
 
Figure 4: The theory 
This theory allowed solving rigorously the following crucial construction 
problem: 
Draw a circle with radius 4 cm tangent to the given circles. Explain clearly the 
method so that others can use it. Explain carefully why the method works. 
 
Figure 5: Draw a circle tangent to two given circles. 
For the details of classroom process with the usual tension towards general 
methods and theoretical justifications see Bartolini Bussi et al. (2007).  
DISCUSSION 
The three case studies are different. In the first two the crucial tasks are modeling 
problems, while in the third the crucial task is a true geometrical construction 
problem, linked with the construction of a triangle with given sides. Yet they 
share some features: the germ theory is built explicitly; the root of the germ theory 
is mathematical modeling of a physical situation (hence the texts are hybrid); the 
tension is towards justifying why either the method or the reasoning works. The 
didactical organization alternated functionally individual tasks to be solved by 
words and drawings and collective discussions orchestrated by the teacher and 
consolidated experimentally a teaching and learning model that was later 
developed in a comprehensive theoretical framework (Bartolini Bussi & Mariotti, 
2008). The above case studies address some relevant issues: the way of 
structuring experimental activity in order to nurture rather than obstruct a 
theoretical attitude; the teacher's role in designing suitable tasks and in  
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orchestrating classroom discussion in order to foster a tension towards general 
methods, proof and proving. This last point is also related to the possibility of 
introducing, as soon as possible, philosophy of science and mathematics, as 
suggested by Jahnke (in press). Talking about general methods and justification (e. 
g. Bartolini Bussi et al., 2007, p. 242) is a kind of philosophical discussion within 
the reach of primary school pupils. 
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DO IMAGES DISPROVE BUT DO NOT PROVE? 
TEACHERS’ BELIEFS ABOUT VISUALISATION  
Irene Biza*, Elena Nardi* and Theodossios Zachariades** 
*University of East Anglia (Norwich, UK), **University of Athens (Greece) 
Teachers’ epistemological beliefs about the role of visualisation in mathematical 
proof may be influenced by several factors. Our study explores these potential 
influences through engaging teachers with tasks that invite them to: reflect 
on/solve a mathematical problem; examine flawed (fictional) student solutions; 
and, describe, in writing, feedback to students. Teachers are also interviewed. We 
discuss responses to one Task (which involved recognising a line as a tangent to a 
curve at an inflection point) of 25 teachers (out of 91) who rejected the line. We 
focus on the written and interview data from two participants in order to explore 
the relationship between beliefs about the sufficiency and persuasiveness of a 
visual argument and personal images about tangent lines. 
INTRODUCTION 
Research into the relationship between teachers’ beliefs (epistemological, 
mathematical and pedagogical) and pedagogical practice has attracted increasing 
attention by mathematics education researchers (e.g. Cooney et al, 1998; Leatham, 
2006; Leder et al, 2002). In this paper we draw on a study that is currently in 
progress in Greece and in the UK in order to explore this relationship particularly 
with regard to teachers’ beliefs about the role visualisation can play in 
mathematical reasoning. 
In recent years the debate about the potential contribution of visual 
representations to mathematical proof has intensified (e.g. Mancosu et al, 2005).  
Central to the debate is whether visual representations should be treated as 
adjuncts to proofs, as an integral part of proof or as proofs themselves (e.g. Hanna 
& Sidoli, 2007; Giaquinto, 2007). Within mathematics education the body of 
work on the important pedagogical role of visualisation has also been expanding – 
see Presmeg (2006) for a substantial review. Overall we still seem to be rather far 
from a consensus on the many roles visualisation can play in mathematical 
learning and teaching. So, while many works clearly recognise these roles, several 
(e.g. Aspinwall et al, 1997) also recommend caution with regard to “the ‘panacea’ 
view that mental imagery only benefits the learning process” (p315).  
One of the aims of this study we report in this paper is to explore the relationships 
between teachers’ beliefs about the sufficiency of a visual argument, their views 
on the persuasiveness of a visual argument and their personal mathematical 
images. The mathematical case we examine is tangent lines. 
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THE STUDY AND THE TANGENT TASK  
The data we draw on in this paper originate in an ongoing study in which we 
invite teachers to engage with mathematically and pedagogically specific 
situations which have the following characteristics: they are hypothetical but 
likely to occur in practice and grounded on learning and teaching issues that 
previous research and experience have highlighted as seminal. The structure of 
the tasks we ask teachers to engage with is as follows – see a more elaborate 
description of the theoretical origins of this type of task in (Biza et al, 2007): 
reflecting upon the learning objectives within a mathematical problem (and 
solving it); interpreting flawed (fictional) student solution(s); and, describing, in 
writing, feedback to the student(s). 
In what follows we focus on one of the tasks (Fig. 1) we have used in the course of 
the study. The Task was one of the questions in a written examination taken by 
candidates for a Masters in Mathematics Education programme. The participants 
of our study were ninety-one mathematics graduates with teaching experience 
ranging from a few to many years. Most had attended in-service training of about 
80 hours. In addition to the scripts we also collected data through interviewing a 
selection of the participating teachers: their individual interview schedules were 
based on the first level analysis briefly described below. Interviews lasted 
approximately 45-60 minutes. 
The mathematical problem within the Task in Fig. 1, and the two fictional student 
solutions in it, provide an opportunity to explore two beliefs about tangent lines 
that previous studies describe as particularly strong in students’ understanding of 
tangents: a curve and its tangent at a point have one and only one common point; 
and, a tangent keeps the whole curve in the same semi-plane (e.g. Biza, Christou 
& Zachariades, 2008; Castela, 1995). These studies attribute these beliefs partly 
to students’ earlier experience with tangents in the context of the circle, and some 
conic sections. More details about the mathematical problem, the aims of the Task 
and the Greek curricular context in which this Task was developed are available 
in (Biza, Nardi & Zachariades, 2008). 
The first level of analysis of the scripts consisted of entering in a spreadsheet 
summary descriptions of the teachers’ responses with regard to the following: 
perceptions of the aims of the mathematical exercise in the Task; mathematical 
correctness; interpretation/evaluation of the two student responses included in 
the Task; feedback to the two students. Adjacent to these columns there was a 
column for commenting on the means the teacher used (verbal, algebraic, 
graphical) to convey their commentary and feedback to the students across the 
script. The discussion we present in this paper is largely based on themes that 
emerged from the comments recorded in this column. One of the themes 
concerned the beliefs (epistemological and pedagogical) of the teachers about the 
role of visualisation.  
Forty-three of the 91 participating teachers supported Student B’s claim that the 
line in the Task is not a tangent line – explicitly (25/91) or implicitly (18/91).  
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From the analysis of the data from the 25 teachers who explicitly supported 
Student B’s claim three interrelated themes regarding teachers’ perceptions of 
tangents and their beliefs about visualisation emerged: Mathematical views on 
whether the line is a tangent or not, beliefs about the sufficiency/acceptability of 
the visual argument used by Student B and beliefs about the role of visual 
thinking in their students’ mathematical learning. Below we focus on the second 
of these themes. Specifically we examine the relationships between the teachers’ 
beliefs about the sufficiency of a visual argument, their views on the 
persuasiveness of a visual argument and their personal images about tangent 
lines. We do so in the context of the data, written responses to the Task and 
interviews, from two participants, Nikos and Anna. 
Year 12 students, specialising in mathematics, were given the following exercise: 
‘Examine whether the line with equation y = 2 is tangent to the graph of function f, 
where 
3 () 3 2 fx x =+ .’ 
Two students responded as follows: 
Student A 
‘I will find the common points between the line and the graph solving the system: 
33 3 0 32 32 2 30
2 22 2
x yx x x
y yy y
= ⎧⎧⎧ =+ + = = ⎧
⇔⇔ ⇔ ⎨⎨⎨ ⎨ = == = ⎩ ⎩⎩⎩
 
The common point is A(0, 2). 
The line is tangent of the graph at point A because they have only one common point 
(which is A).’ 
Student B 
‘The line is not tangent to the graph because,  
even though they have one common point,  
the line cuts across the graph, as we can see  
in the figure.’  
 
 
 
a.  In your view what is the aim of the above exercise? 
b.  How do you interpret the choices made by each of the students in their responses 
above? 
c.  What feedback would you give to each of the students above with regard to their 
response to the exercise? 
Figure 1: The Task   
1‐62  ICMI Study 19－2009 
VARIATION OF TEACHERS’ BELIEFS ABOUT THE ROLE OF 
VISUALISATION – THE CASES OF NIKOS AND ANNA 
Ten of these twenty-five teachers did not dispute the sufficiency of the visual 
argument used by Student B. Of these ten, eight made no reference to an algebraic 
argument. One teacher made some reference to both the “algebraic and graphical 
methods” implying that she accepted the validity of both. Another one set out 
with some reference to an algebraic argument that involved accepting the line; on 
the way, as she proceeded to a consideration of Student B’s solution, she deleted 
the algebraic argument and concluded her response with agreeing with Student B. 
The other fifteen teachers, while basing their inference on the graph and 
supporting Student B’s claim, stated the need for supporting and verifying the 
claim algebraically (11 explicitly and 4 implicitly). These teachers, although they 
hinted at the algebraic argument for the justification of the answer, they did not 
employ it in the argument they offered the students. As a result they did not 
confront the inconsistency between rejecting the line and the algebraic argument.  
The teachers propose the algebraic argument either in order to support (e.g. “more 
feasible”, offering a “more rounded view of the problems” etc) or to validate 
mathematically (e.g. “the graph not necessarily constituting a valid complete 
proof”) the graphical one. Additionally, nine of these twenty-five teachers 
declared overtly their view of the graphical approach employed by Student B as 
evidence of “conceptual” understanding. For more detailed analysis of these 
views see (Biza, Nardi & Zachariades, 2008). Below we examine more closely 
the views of two of these teachers, also as expressed in the interviews. 
The first teacher, Nikos, in his written answer, accepted as correct Student B’s 
response and mentioned that the student’s choice of the graphical solution was 
“clever”, “quick” and “not time-consuming”. However he expressed some doubts 
about the applicability of the graphical solution in a general case. Furthermore, as 
it transpired in the interview, between writing this response and being interviewed 
he changed his mind about rejecting the line. In what follows he reflects on his 
written response as well on the acceptability, or not, of a graphical argument.  
Nikos initially claimed that, generally, he would accept a proof based on a 
graphical argument. Then he added that “it depends on the case” and he offered a 
case in which the line is a tangent without splitting the curve (e.g. a tangent at a 
point of the graph of y=x
2+1). “For this case”, he said: “I would like the algebraic 
solution” because “when you need to prove something … [the graph] is not 
enough … the graph could be inaccurate”. When asked “why he accepted Student 
B’s graphical response”, he said that he believed that this line was not a tangent 
and “if you make a graph in which the line is not a tangent, I will accept it … that 
means, from the graph I will accept it” and he added that “if I believed that the line 
is a tangent … I would not accept only the graphical [solution]”. Later, he 
sketched a parabola and a secant line of it. It was clear in the sketch that the slope 
of the line was different than the slope of the curve at the common point. “If the 
student made a graph like that”, he said, “I could accept his claim that the line is  
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not tangent”. Later, he sketched a tangent of the parabola and he added “in that 
case the graph is not enough [to claim that the line is a tangent]”. 
Anna, the second teacher, in her written answer, while accepting Student B’s 
solution, stressed that students are not always at ease with visualisation and are 
often reluctant to use it. Although she appreciated Student B’s answer, she would 
ask him “how he could solve the task if he couldn’t sketch the graph of the given 
function”. For that reason – and, we note, not because she was concerned about 
the validity of the graphical solution – she would propose to the student the 
necessity of the algebraic solution.  
Similarly to Nikos, Anna, between writing the response and being interviewed, 
had realised that she should accept the line as a tangent. We asked Anna, in the 
interview, if she would accept Student B’s graphical solution as correct if the 
student had concluded with the acceptance of the line as a tangent.  She said: “I 
think that we have to do all the process” because “the line could be here [showing 
on the graph] higher or lower where it isn’t a tangent” and “I cannot decline that it 
isn’t tangent but I cannot say that it is”. When we asked her why she accepted the 
graphical explanation in her written response, she claimed: “I accepted it because 
he said that it wasn’t and I had in my mind that when I see the line splitting [the 
graph] there is no other choice, whatever it was”. 
It appears that Nikos and Anna are ready to accept a visual argument without any 
algebraic verification if the information in the image is, to them, a clear and 
convincing disproof of a statement. Both regarded the image in the Task as 
evidence for rejection – as a counter-example. Furthermore they both made clear 
that to prove that a line is a tangent an algebraic argument is necessary. 
CONCLUDING REMARK 
About half of the teachers in our study appeared to get ‘carried away’ by the 
image in the Task – or, in Aspinwall et al’s (1997) term, by these ‘uncontrollable’ 
images of the tangent line – and agreed (explicitly or implicitly) with Student B’s 
incorrect claim that the line is not a tangent.  To these teachers the persuasiveness 
of the image was so strong that they did not feel compelled to seek further 
verification. However we cannot necessarily infer the teachers’ stable belief about 
the sufficiency of a visual argument from these responses. The cases of Anna and 
Nikos offer a reason for this. As they both explained, a visual argument that 
refutes a statement (in this case an image that suggests that a line is not a tangent) 
is sufficient. However to make a case for a line being a tangent, a visual argument 
is not sufficient and an algebraic argument is necessary. We credit the 
combination task engagement-followed by-interview for the identification of 
subtle issues regarding the teachers’ epistemological beliefs (such as the above, 
about visualisation) and for the raising of their awareness of these issues (Biza, 
Nardi & Zachariades, 2007).  
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ENACTING PROOF IN MIDDLE SCHOOL MATHEMATICS  
Kristen N. Bieda 
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, USA 
Although justifying and proving have been gaining in importance in school 
mathematics in all grade levels and across all content areas over the past decade, 
little research has examined how tasks designed to develop students’ 
competencies in justifying and proving are enacted in the classroom. This paper 
presents findings from a study of the implementation of proof-rich tasks in 
classrooms utilizing the Connected Mathematics Project (CMP) curriculum. 
Findings from this work suggest that middle school students’ classroom 
experiences with justification and proof are insufficient for developing desired 
conceptions of mathematical proof. Implications of this work for curriculum 
development and teacher education will be discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Proof in school mathematics within the United States since the decline of the 
“New Math” movement in the late 1960’s has typically been instantiated as a 
topic in a secondary-level geometry course. However, unlike other topics in 
mathematics education, little attention has been paid to how the process of 
proving is taught. Students’ experiences with proving at the middle school level is 
becoming increasingly important, as the research indicates that students struggle 
with producing mathematical proof within and beyond the high school geometry 
course (Chazan, 1993, Harel & Sowder, 1998, Hoyles, 1997, Weber, 2003). 
Given that tasks exist in middle school curricula, particularly the Connected 
Mathematics Project (CMP), that provide opportunities to engage students in 
justifying and proving their reasoning (G.J. Stylianides, 2007), it has been 
unknown, to this point, the process of enacting proof-related tasks. The aim of the 
work presented here is to shed light upon the process of learning to prove in 
middle school classrooms from the perspective of understanding a pedagogy of 
proving as it currently emerges in practice —specifically, to answer the question: 
How do curricular opportunities intended to engage middle school students in 
justifying and proving become enacted?  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As the mathematics education community has understood the potential and 
importance of developing students’ competencies in proof and more research is 
starting to examine the pedagogy of proving, there is a need for a widely held 
definition of proof that takes into account the process of proving as it evolves in 
classrooms. The following framework of proof, which guided the work presented 
here, aligns conceptions of proof from the discipline with the demands of school 
mathematics:  
Proof is a mathematical argument, that is, a connected sequence of assertions for or 
against a mathematical claim, with the following characteristics: (i) it uses statements  
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accepted by the classroom community (set of accepted statements) that are true and 
available without further justification; (ii) it employs forms of reasoning (modes of 
argumentation) that are valid and known to, or within the conceptual reach of, the 
classroom community; and; (iii) it is communicated with forms of expression (modes 
of argument representation) that are appropriate and known to, or within the 
conceptual reach of, the classroom community. (A.J. Stylianides, 2007, p. 6) 
One critical feature of the definition is the prominence to the role of the classroom 
community. As proof emerges as a product of discussions about what is required 
to justify a conjecture for all cases and how various forms of an argument 
influence a proof’s potential for justification, students learn that proof goes 
beyond convincing one’s self and convincing a friend, but it must convince the 
broader classroom community. 
With Stylianides’ (2007) proof framework in mind, the design of this research 
draws from a framework of the implementation of a mathematical instructional 
task (Stein et al., 1996). The process of enacting mathematical tasks begins with 
the curricular task either developed by a teacher or written in a textbook (task as 
written), evolves as the teacher conceptualizes the task to be implemented (task as 
intended), the task is introduced and taken up by the students (task as 
implemented), and student learning results (task as enacted). Along each stage of 
the model, there are several factors that influence the success of the task 
enactment. For example, the teacher’s content knowledge, both pedagogical and 
mathematical, plays a significant role in how the teacher decides to use the task 
from its intended form to its implemented form. As this study seeks to understand 
the pedagogy of enacting proof-related tasks, the focus of the research is on how 
the task as intended is implemented and becomes enacted in the classroom. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data was collected through observing lesson implementations in seven 
middle-school teachers’ classrooms. Three 6
th grade teachers, two 7
th grade 
teachers, and two 8
th grade teachers and their students participated in the study. 
Each lesson observed was identified to contain a task that engaged students in 
generating conjectures prior to the observation. All of the classrooms in the study 
utilized the Connected Mathematics Project (CMP) curriculum, a curriculum 
where 40% of the tasks are proof-related (G.J. Stylianides, 2007). At least six 
lessons were observed per teacher; there were a total of 49 observations across all 
seven classrooms. 
During the lesson observation, the researcher took fieldnotes along with 
audiotaping to document the most salient classroom events and discussions 
related to students’ conjecturing and justifying. The fieldnotes were analyzed to 
distinguish elements of the implementation as proving events. A proving event 
consisted of an initial response provided by a student to a task eliciting a 
conjecture, with the teacher’s and students’ feedback to the student’s initial 
conjecture. Elements of the fieldnotes were coded using the A.J. Stylianides’ 
(2007) proof framework at the turn level; thus, individual student and teacher  
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moves related to each part of the proving process were coded as separate instances. 
The product of this analysis provided information as to what parts of establishing 
proof were enacted in the proving events, as well as how frequent each of these 
activities was in the proving process for each classroom. Once the parts of the 
proving events were determined, the data were utterances from the teacher and the 
students were coded using a constant comparative method of coding (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967), focusing on the teacher’s and students’ moves during proving 
events.  
RESULTS 
Analysis of the fieldnote corpus revealed that while proof-related tasks were 
generally implemented as written (71% of the time), roughly half of the 
opportunities to prove, students’ generalizations provided in response to the tasks, 
were never supported with justifications (see Table 1). 
Grade 
Level 
Number of Problems 
as Implemented 
Number of 
Opportunities to 
Prove
1 
Number of Opportunities 
to Prove Never Supported 
with Justifications 
6th  31 65  24 
7th  13 28  17 
8th  8 16  9 
TOTAL  52 109  50 
Table 1: Opportunities to prove generated from problems implemented 
Table 1 shows that there was little difference in the rate at which students in 7th or 
8th grades produced justifications compared to 6th graders, suggesting that 
students have difficulties with justification and proof throughout middle school 
and teachers fail to address the needs of students as they learn to justify their 
reasoning. Data analysis revealed several trajectories that proof-related tasks 
followed during implementation (see Figure 1). Although each task ultimately 
resulted in either being enacted or not enacted, depending upon whether 
justifications were provided to generalizations in response to proof-related tasks, 
there were three outcomes in terms of the teacher’s and students’ responses to the 
generalization. 
 
 
 
                                           
1 As each problem was implemented, more than one opportunity to prove could be generated. 
As such, the totals reflect situations where more than one opportunity to prove emerged during 
the implementation.  
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Figure 1: Trajectory of Proof-Related Tasks 
Of the 50 proof-related problems not enacted, where students did not provide a 
justification for their generalizations, the most prevalent response was for no 
feedback to be given to the students’ generalizations (42% or 21 out of 50). In 
essence, these emergent opportunities to prove were ignored by the classroom 
community. The following excerpt from Mr. Zeff
2’s 8th grade class illustrates this 
type of response, or lack thereof.  
In this excerpt, students work on an investigation from CMP based on the classic 
“wheat and chessboard” problem, using a context of a king providing a reward to 
a peasant for saving the life of the king’s daughter. The king allows the peasant to 
stipulate her reward, and the clever peasant suggests that the king place 1 ruba, 
comparable to a penny, on the first square of a chessboard, followed by 2 rubas on 
the second square, and 4 rubas on the third square, continuing in the same manner 
of doubling the previous amount until all of the squares had been covered. An 
alternative plan presented, Plan 2, reduces the size of the chessboard to 16 squares, 
but the king has to triple the amount of rubas he places on each subsequent square. 
In the exchange below, Mr. Zeff leads a discussion about the two plans:  
Mr. Zeff: Ok, what are the similarities between both plans? 
Brian: One gets multiplied by 2 and the other is multiplied by 3. 
Damon: Yeah, Plan 2 is always higher. 
Mr. Zeff: Let’s have a little caution on that one, just from what we see so far. Lakesha, 
will you share your equation? 
                                           
2 All names presented here are gender-appropriate pseudonyms. 
Student(s) Make 
Generalizations (i.e. 
claims, conjectures)
Student(s) Justify Generalizations 
(Proof-Related Problem Enacted) 
Student(s) Do Not Justify 
Generalizations 
(Proof-Related Problem Not Enacted)
No 
Feedback 
Given
Student 
to 
Student 
Feedback 
Teacher 
Feedback  Teacher 
Request 
for Student 
to Student 
Feedback 
Teacher 
Sanctions 
Conjecture 
without 
Justification 
No 
Feedback 
Given 
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐69 
Lakesha: I got  .  
Mr. Zeff: Usually I start the equation with r equals. You can do it anyway you want. 
[writes   on the overhead projector] 
Mr. Zeff: What are we doing over and over again? 
Brian: Multiplying by 3. 
Mr. Zeff: Right, and just by trial and error you see that it is always one box before it. 
What is another reason...why do you subtract one from it?  
Brian: You triple every single square but one. 
Mr. Zeff: Which one?  
Brian: The first square. 
Mr. Zeff: Ok, so we didn’t triple the first time so it’s always one less.  
Mr. Zeff: Which plan is better?  
Damon: Plan 1  
Mr. Zeff: Which is better for the King?  
Brian: Plan 2. 
Mr. Zeff: [puts up graph of exponential equation on overhead projector] OK, now 
let’s look at your graphs. You should have a very, very straight line at the bottom.   
Throughout the excerpt, we see few requests from Mr. Zeff for students to provide 
justification for their generalizations. As a result, he implicitly sanctions their 
generalizations without insisting upon justification. Further, Mr. Zeff’s decision 
to have students continue sharing answers, without justification, reinforces a 
classroom culture where justifying and proving are not essential components of 
everyday mathematical practice. 
Although space limitations do not allow for a full presentation of results and 
examples from the data, there was evidence of missed instructional opportunities 
during the proving events across the middle school classrooms. Across all grade 
levels, there were only 28 opportunities to prove supported by justifications 
consisting of general arguments. When examining how teachers addressed 
students’ justifications as they were made public, nearly 30% of the justifications, 
primarily based on general arguments, never received feedback. Further, when a 
teacher sanctioned a justification with a positive appraisal, it was just as likely 
that it was a justification based on non-proof arguments as it was a justification 
based on general arguments.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The results in this study reveal that middle school students produced few general 
arguments in response to proof-related tasks, a finding not surprising considering 
the literature on students’ difficulties with proving. Stein et al. (1996) defined 
several factors that contribute to the decline of high-level cognitive activities such  
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as generating proof, including time constraints and lack of accountability. As the 
excerpt presented illustrated, the relative lack of sufficient critical feedback once 
a proof-related task was enacted (e.g., pushing students to move beyond 
examples-based justifications) contributed to relatively few justifications based 
on general arguments. A confluence of factors, including time constraints, lack of 
accountability, and lack of curricular support, worked against the development of 
a community in the classroom where one’s reasoning, once public, was expected 
to be scrutinized. During the study, I will present additional data to support these 
conclusions. 
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PROVING IN NUMBER THEORY AT THE TRANSITION 
FROM SECONDARY TO TERTIARY LEVEL: BETWEEN 
ORGANIZING AND OPERATIVE DIMENSIONS  
Véronique BATTIE 
University of Lyon, University Lyon 1, EA4148 LEPS, France 
At the beginning of French University, the failure rate in proving in mathematics 
is important.  In this paper, we explore this phenomenon in the case of number 
theory. In the proving process, we distinguish two complementary dimensions, 
namely the organizing one and the operative one. This distinction permits to 
situate the autonomy devolved to learners in proving tasks. We focus on the 
transfer of this autonomy in the secondary-tertiary transition from examples out 
of examinations given in 2006 in Grade 12 and in first year at University 
concerning congruences. According to us, this captures one of the sources of 
difficulties to prove in number theory faced by students arriving at University. 
INTRODUCTION 
In our researches in didactic of number theory, we are especially interested in 
proving in the secondary-tertiary transition
1. Within didactic researches related to 
this transition (Gueudet, 2008), we propose to study some of the ruptures at stake 
in terms of autonomy devolved to Grade 12-pupils and students. To characterize 
this autonomy in the process of proving in number theory, we exploit the 
distinction in the reasoning between the organizing dimension and the operative 
dimension (Battie, 2007).  
We distinguish two complementary dimensions. The organizing dimension 
concerns the mathematician’s « aim » (i.e. his or her « program », explicit or not). 
For example, besides usual figures of mathematical reasoning, especially reductio 
ad absurdum, we identify in organizing dimension induction (and other forms of 
exploitation in reasoning of the well-ordering ≤ of the natural numbers), reduction 
to the study of finite number of cases, and factorial ring’s method. The operative 
dimension relates to those treatments operated on objects and developed for 
implementing the different steps of the program. For instance, we identify forms 
of representation chosen for the objects, the use of key theorems, algebraic 
manipulations and all treatments related to the articulation between divisibility 
order (the ring Z) and standard order ≤ (the well-ordered set N). Among the 
numerous didactic researches on mathematical reasoning and proving 
(International Newsletter on the Teaching and Learning of Mathematical Proof 
and, especially for Number theory, see (Zazkis & Campbell, 2002 & 2006)), we 
can put into perspective our distinction between organizing dimension and 
                                           
1 In secondary-tertiary transition, number theory is primarily concerned with structures and 
properties of the integers (i.e. Elementary number theory). For a detailed consideration of 
various facets falling under the rubric of number theory, see Campbell and Zazkis, 2002.   
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operative dimension (in the reasoning in number theory) with the “structuring 
mathematical proofs” of Leron (1983). As we showed (Battie, 2007), an analogy 
is a priori possible, but only on certain types of proofs. According to us, the 
theoretical approach of Leron is primarily a hierarchical organization of 
mathematical sub-results necessary to demonstrate the main result, independently 
of the specificity of mathematical domains at stake. As far as we know, Leron’s 
point of view does not permit access that gives our analysis in terms of organizing 
and operative dimensions, namely the different nature of mathematical work 
according to whether a dimension or another and, so essential, interactions that 
take place between this two dimensions.  
First, we’ll present characteristics of number theory teaching in Grade 12 and in 
the first year of University. We’ll study two examples out of examinations given 
in 2006 in Grade 12 and in first year at University concerning congruences (for 
the study of University’s examination, we have an interview with the author and 
the papers of 73 students
2). Then, in a second part, we’ll illustrate the influence of 
teaching culture on the proving practice of Grade 12-pupils and students.  
NUMBER THEORY TEACHING IN GRADE 12 AND IN THE FIRST 
YEAR OF UNIVERSITY 
In Grade 12, number theory curriculum as an option comprises: divisibility, 
Euclidian division, Euclid’s algorithm, congruence, integers relatively prime, 
prime numbers, existence and uniqueness of prime factorization, least common 
multiple (LCM), Bézout’s identity and Gauss’ theorem
3. In the first year of 
University, there are two distinct populations: only part of students have attended 
number theory course in Grade 12. In the first year of University, number theory 
curriculum is the same than in Grade 12 but algebraic structures are clarified. 
In baccalauréat’s exercises (Battie, 2003a), autonomy devolved to pupils to solve 
number theory problems is mainly located at the operative dimension. Autonomy 
is devolved at the organizing dimension only for routine tasks as resolution of 
Diophantine equations ax+by=c (gcd (a,b) divide c), and when the organizing 
dimensions involved are considered as non-problematic by the institution, such as 
the treatment of logical equivalences. An example will be given afterwards. We 
make the hypothesis that baccalauréat’s exercises have an important influence on 
the choice of teachers and then, we can suppose that proposed tasks to pupils in 
class are mainly located at the operative dimension. This hypothesis is supported 
by our analysis of a training test for the baccalauréat (Battie, 2003b).  
In the first year of University, the situation is different. This is an example of 
number theory examinations (December 2006): 
                                           
2 The corpus comes from the master dissertation of Florence Buisson a student of us. 
3 If an integer divides the product of two other integers, and the first and second integers are 
coprime, then the first integer divides the third integer.  
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The purpose of this exercise is to solve in Z the following system of congruences in 
unknown n: (E)    
 
1)  Prove that 7 and 16 are coprime and write a corresponding Bézout’s identity. 
2)  What is the set of integers both multiple of 7 and 16? 
3)  By using Bézout’s identity, find an integer  0 n multiple of 16 and 
checking ) 7 (mod 3 0 ≡ n . Deduce a solution of the system (E). 
4)  Deduce from two previous questions the set of solutions of (E). 
This problem is a particular case of Chinese remainder theorem. To prove this 
theorem, the main organizing dimension refers to an equivalence that can be 
interpreted in terms of existence and uniqueness of a solution of the system or in 
terms of surjective and injective function which is, in this case, a ring’s 
isomorphism  (let m1, m2 be coprime integers, for all x, element of Z, the 
application at stake, from Z/m1m2 to Z/m1×Z/m2, associates to each element x 
mod (m1m2) the sequence of x mod m1 and x mod m2). For the operative 
dimension, the key to prove the existence of a solution is Bézout’s identity (m1 
and m2 are relatively prime); this is precisely the subject of Question 1. To prove 
the uniqueness of such a solution, the essential operative element is the result 
stating that if an integer is divisible by m1 and m2 then it is divisible by the product 
m1m2 and this can be achieved as a consequence of Gauss’ theorem or via the 
concept of LCM (LCM(m1m2) = m1m2); this is the subject of Question 2. Thus, 
the author of the exam highlights the two operative keys in the first two questions, 
but it doesn’t mark out the main organizing dimension. The only evidence of this 
kind appears through cutting issues 3 (existence of a solution) and 4 (obtaining all 
solutions from the solution i.e. uniqueness of the solution modulo 7 × 16). In this 
way, the author of the exam wants to bring out the linearity relation as he told in 
the interview by F.Buisson: 
“[…] we will use something which is general and that they [students] have already 
seen, it’s linearity phenomena which is omnipresent in mathematics. And then, in this 
case, the goal of this development
4 of the problem is a parallel with the linear 
differential equation, resolution of linear equation, linear system in any field, why not 
in R”.  
For each of the last two questions, the operative key is mentioned in response to 
questions 1 and 2 (“With Bézout’s identity […]”, “Deduce from two previous 
questions […]”). In conclusion, autonomy devolved to students is mainly located 
at the organizing dimension: keys of operative dimension are explicitly given to 
students while they have to build almost the entire organizing dimension 
(Question 4 illustrates particularly well this characteristic). And, for the author of 
                                           
4 The French term used is “acheminement”. 
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the examination, skills related to the organizing dimension are important criteria 
to evaluate students:  
“[…] me, what I want to see it is: has he [the student] got the idea to go to question 4 
from questions 2 and 3. Agree? So it is the higher level of the exercise to see a little, 
well, a little the best ones, the “ happy few ”, because then there are not many 
[students] who remain here.”  
We find also the problem of solving a system of congruences in the 2006 national 
baccalauréat:   
The purpose is to solve in Z the system (S)   
1) Prove that exists an ordered pair of integers (u,v) such that 19u + 12v = 1 (in this 
question it’s not required to give an example of such an ordered pair). Check that for 
such an ordered pair N = 13×12v + 6×9u is a solution of (S). 
2) a) Let 0 n be a solution of (S). Check that the system (S) is equivalent to 
b) Prove that the system       is equivalent to  () 19 12 mod    0 × ≡ n n . 
3) a) Find a ordered pair () v u,  solution of the equation  1 12 19 = + v u  and calculate the 
corresponding value of N. 
b) Determine the set of solutions of (S) (it’s possible using question 2)b). 
In this baccalauréat’s exercise, there are more indications related to organizing 
dimension than in the University’s examination and those indications are more 
detailed while, for the operative dimension, only Bézout’s identity is mentioned 
(without it appellation appears). This comparison permits to enlighten that the 
University’s examination offers several possibilities in operative dimension: 
instead of using Gauss theorem, essential to treat the baccalauréat’s exercise 
(question 2b), it’s possible to use the concept of LCM and work in Z/7Z 
(questions 2 and 3), that the author had not anticipated. 
In the secondary-tertiary transition, specifically in the Grade 12-University 
transition, there is therefore a transfer of the autonomy devolved in problems 
wording of number theory. At the entrance of University, students are much more 
responsible than in Grade 12 for the development of the organizing dimension of 
proofs. 
INFLUENCE OF TEACHING CULTURE ON MATHEMATICAL 
PRACTICE OF GRADE 12-PUPILS AND STUDENTS 
An analysis in terms of organizing and operative dimensions has permitted to 
examine the proving process of Grade 12-pupils from transcripts of pupils’ 
research (Battie, 2007 & 2008). In 2001, we proposed to a class of Grade 
12-pupils to produce number theory proofs of the irrationality of  2  and 3. In 
2007, we proposed to another such class to prove the fundamental theorem of 
(elementary) number theory
5 from historical texts. It appears that elements of the 
                                           
5 Existence and uniqueness of the factorization of a natural integer into a product of primes. 
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operative dimension (especially using emblematic theorems of the teaching 
culture such as Bézout’s identity and Gauss’ theorem) mostly guide pupils in their 
research. The few explicit tracks for the organizing dimension generally come 
from a vague recollection of what has been done in the classroom. Pupils mention 
organizing dimensions encountered at school as induction, reductio ad absurdum 
and separating even and odd cases, but they awkwardly introduce them and, 
mostly, they don’t use them afterwards in their research. There is an imbalance in 
the pupils’ proving process in terms of control of both organizing and operative 
dimensions. Some operative automatisms, coming from class practice, are 
entrenched so that they can be a source of genuine creativity in pupils’ 
mathematical researches. Some embryos of original proofs emerge but the fragile 
evolution of pupils in the organizing dimension prevents that those proofs could 
be built without the intervention of the teacher. Here, we identify one of the 
differences between pupils and experts in the number theory proving process: the 
balance in terms of control between what is “occurring” in each of two 
dimensions. In particular, experts, unlike pupils, have the opportunity to catch up 
with a failure to a given dimension by controlling the other one.   
In the first year of University, papers coming from the exam presented previously 
have been analyzed (73 students including 30 who attended optional number 
theory course in Grade 12). We focus on the last question that is emblematic of 
the gap between secondary and higher education as we have highlighted. This 
question was addressed by half of the students and we find proving elements in 25 
papers. Only 4 students (all of them have attended optional number theory course 
in Grade 12) manage to exploit the indications and solve the system of 
congruences. Breaking with the project of the author, this system can be rewritten 
in the form of the Diophantine equation 16x - 7y = 3; with this change of objects 
in operative working, the problem becomes the routine task mentioned for Grade 
12, also encountered in the first year of University ; all (operative) work on 
congruences is bypassed. Among the 21 remaining papers, 8 students (3 of them 
have attended optional number theory course in Grade 12) follow this process and 
none will be able to solve the system. We have already identified this breaking 
phenomenon during a training test for the baccalauréat (Battie, 2003b): even with 
a wording apparently fixed on the organizing dimension, Grade 12-pupils are able 
to gain independence from the organizing dimension behind the wording to build 
another one of their own. Our hypothesis is that this is not a bifurcation 
consciously constructed by pupils but a process induced by a choice made in the 
operative work left to the autonomy of pupils, the trigger being institutional origin. 
According to us, this realizes the dialectical process that could exist, in pupils’ 
research, between organizing and operative dimensions. 
CONCLUSION 
An analysis in terms of organizing and operative dimensions permits to situate the 
autonomy devolved to pupils and students in the wording of number theory 
problems, and more generally in exams. This type of analysis also offers the  
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opportunity to observe the effectiveness of this autonomy for Grade12-pupils and 
students from their written productions or, still better, through observing and 
transcribing their researches. In Grade 12-University transition, we notice a 
transfer of what is under the responsibility of learners: breaking with the culture 
of Grade 12-teaching, the skills related to organizing dimension become 
important at the University. According to us, this transfer is one of the sources of 
difficulties encountered by students arriving at University to prove in number 
theory: except for routine tasks, their control of organizing level is very too low. 
In students’ papers that we have analyzed, we have confirmation of this weakness 
contrasted with the success rate to operative questions (questions 1 and 2 in 
particular with a higher success rate for students who have attended number 
theory course in Grade 12). To continue this investigation we aim to focus on the 
years after the University entrance where we suspect that the transfer of autonomy 
to the organizing dimension is even more crucial. Another perspective is to test 
our hypothesis (Battie, 2008) that, in Grade 12 textbooks, too little attention is 
paid to existing springs to work at organizing dimension.  
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We try to point out how the integration of quantification and objects into the 
didactical analysis permits to question the “traditional” idea of a rupture 
between argumentation and proof in mathematics. We use a conceptual 
distinction described by Hintikka (1996) between indoor and outdoor games to 
assess the problem. Then we go to a description some examples of proof 
constructions and proof validation to provide some substance to our thesis. Our 
main claim is that the proof process is a dialectic one between actions on objects 
and syntactic (formal) work in proof construction. We think that claim to be 
inconsistent with the idea of a rupture between argumentation and proof. 
OUTDOOR AND INDOOR GAMES: THE BACK AND FORTH 
PROCESS 
First, we want to make explicit a distinction between what Hintikka (1996) calls 
an indoor game and an outdoor game. Let us go to an example inspired by 
Barallobres (2007) around the statement “for all natural number n, 
10(n+4)+5=10n+45”. One first game constructed on this statement could be the 
following: one chooses a natural number, and then one checks if the equality 
holds. Hintikka calls that game an outdoor game because the structural rules of 
the game allow the intervention of the objects (including properties and relations 
between them). Those objects contribute to the enrichment of the milieu 
(Brousseau, 1997) to help the player to decide if the statement is true. On the other 
hand, we can think of another game constructed on the same statement: one has to 
find the relevant mathematical properties and combine them into a proof. Here, a 
player could use the distributive, associative law. Two difficulties of the indoor 
games may be the choice of the relevant statements (axioms, theorems,…) and the 
construction of the strategy (a naïve combinatorial approach seems to be 
inefficient). Although the two kinds of games do not seem to have the same 
objectives
1, we are convinced that the emergence of a proof often rests upon a 
back and forth process between them. Barallobres (2007, p. 42-43) provides an 
example of that overlapping with pupils who were at the beginning of their 
algebraic learning: the indoor validation of the equivalence between the two 
formulas “10n+45” and “10(n+4)+5” goes together with original actions on 
                                           
1 Outdoor games try to answer to the question “is it true?” whereas indoor games 
try to answer to “why is it true?”.  
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numbers into an outdoor game
2. As Weber & Alcock (2004) shows, indoor games 
(syntactical proof procedure is their vocabulary) are very poor. Those games are 
formal ones; they have to be played only with the means of the structural form of 
the statements involved. On the other side, outdoor games are not games of proof 
if they are included in the back and forth dialectic. Barrier (2008) brings an 
example of an outdoor game played by pupils dealing with the statement “for all 
natural numbers a and b, if a and b are coprime then a
2 and b
2 are”. Pupils choose 
several pairs of coprime numbers and then test if their squares are also coprime. 
To achieve a test, pupils are conducted to use their prime factors decomposition 
which could provide a formal strategy of proof. Nevertheless, considering that 
outdoor games are outside the production of the proof process, they stopped the 
game without going to a formal validation. In fact, the transition from a game 
especially concerned with strategic choices and manipulations of objects to a 
game concerned with strategic choices and statement combinations needs a 
change of goal. The aim of this paper is to argue that the difficulty of this change 
has been over-emphasized in mathematics education, leading to the neglect of 
outdoor games in the proof process.  
ARGUMENTATION AND PROOF 
From our point of view, argumentation and proof have the same function of 
linguistic justification. In the example of the coprime numbers, the function is to 
explain why a player of the outdoor game is sure to win the game whatever the 
choice of natural numbers. That function, which is played with indoor games, is to 
deal with the validity of the statement inside a theory when the outdoor games 
were dealing with the truth of statement inside an interpretation domain. Of 
course, nothing ensures that the criteria of validity the players use fit with the 
standard of mathematics especially because those standards are evasive and rarely 
explicit in mathematics education (Dreyfus, 1999). Discussing about the 
distinction between argumentation and proof with the help of Toulmin’s model, 
Pedemonte (2007) considers that this distinction lies at the level structure of the 
indoor games. Duval (1991) strongly distinguish argumentation and proof 
arguing that proof has nothing to do with the content of the propositions involved. 
We think that this approach is a consequence of the exclusion of the objects
3 
(quantification) from the process of proof construction (Durand-Guerrier & Arsac, 
2005). If the final product of a proof is syntactic (without any reference to the 
content), we look to the proof process as a special case of  the argumentation 
process often including outdoor games which is clearly concerned with the 
                                           
2 Pupils show that the two formulas can be associated with different actions to 
calculate the sum 15+16+17+18+19+20+21+22+23+24 which are equivalent. 
The first action is to take the first number of the sum, multiply it by 10 and then 
add 45. The second one is to take the fifth number of the sum, multiply it by 10 
and add 5.     
3 Duval’s model is founded on propositional logic.  
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content of propositions (the objects, their properties and relations,…) (Barrier, 
2008, Durand-Guerrier, 2008). In the rest of this paper, we try to give substance to 
that thesis with the help of some description of proof construction and proof 
validation process.      
PROOF CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
Example 1: the case of the continuum 
We are going to a compact analysis of a memory from Bolzano (1817, 1996) we 
consider as a good example of the need to include a semantic perspective into the 
analysis of proof process. In this text, Bolzano takes as an objective to offer to the 
reader the “objective” and “strictly scientific” justification of the intermediate 
values theorem. He has no doubt about the correctness of the theorem but he is 
deeply disagreeing with the former proofs. The larger project of Bolzano is, in 
reaction against the kantian concept of “pure intuition”, to look for analytic 
foundations for the analysis. Many authors
4 claim that the absence of an adequate 
definition of real numbers made Bolzano’s project impossible to achieve. We find 
it interesting to reverse that point: Bolzano’s project of complete arithmetization 
of analysis permits to assess precisely the problem of the description of real 
numbers. In that perspective, having a didactic look on his proof is instructive. 
Convinced that the real numbers must be such that the intermediate values 
theorem is true (it means that the outdoor games are played on a continuum 
without any gap), Bolzano is “naturally” brought to deal with the Cauchy’s series 
and their convergence. While it is commonly considered that Bolzano made an 
error (he shows, supposing that the series was convergent, how to approach the 
limit and conclude that the series is convergent), we can also find many elements 
of a current and axiomatic definition of real numbers. Effectively, Bolzano said 
that Cauchy’s series convergence “contains no impossibility” in the sense that 
with that hypothesis we can “determine the quantity as accurately as desired”. The 
assertion “there is therefore a real quantity which the terms of the series approach 
as closely as desired if it is continued far enough” can be read as an acceptable 
(implicit) axiomatization: Bolzano proved that the object described is unique and 
that it does not introduce any contradiction (Barrier, to appear). Anyway, this is 
an example where convictions (a continuum without any gap) were motivating 
the improvement of the description of the objects and at the origin of the process 
of proof construction; Bolzano’s memory associate a semantic inquiry concerning 
numbers with a syntactic reconstruction of those numbers. The same kind of back 
and forth process between semantic and syntactic games has been observed in 
Lyon during experiments concerning the continuum. Pontille & al (1996) propose 
to secondary school pupils (grade 16) the following task (in a specific problem 
solving frame): “Given an increasing function f  between 1,2,…n} and 1,2,…n}, 
                                           
4 For example, Ewald (1996) in his introduction. More References concerning 
Bolzano’s mathematical and philosophical work can be found in Barrier (to 
appear).  
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with n an integer different from zero, show that f have a fixed point. Study the 
possible generalisation to f : [0;1]∩E→[0;1]∩E where E could be the set of 
decimal, rational or real numbers”
5. To deal with this family of questions (which 
have the same syntax), pupils work back and forth between formal (indoor) and 
informal (outdoor) aspects providing a deep understanding of mathematical 
objects through significant reasoning activity
6. Other various runs of that 
experiment (and others involving the statement  1 9 , 0 = ) have been done with 
university students. 
Example 2: An exercise in number theory 
We use here an experiment from Inglis & al. (2007). Andrew, an advanced 
mathematics student, is confronted with the conjecture « if n is a perfect
7, then kn 
is abundant
8, for any  IN k ∈  ». 
ANDREW : Ok, so if n is perfect, then kn is abundant, for any k. Ok, so what does it, 
yeah it looks, so what does it mean ? Yeah so if n is perfect, and I take any i p which 
divides this n, then afterwards the sum of these s pi  is 2n. This is the definition. Yeah, 
ok, so actually we take kn, then obviously all i kp divide kn, actually, we sum these and 
we get 2kn. Plus, we’ve got also, for example, we’ve also got k dividing this, dividing 
kn. So we need to add this. As far, as basically, there is no disquiet, k would be the 
same as this. Yeah. And, how would this one go ? [LONG PAUSE] 
INTERVIEWER : So we’ve got the same problem as up here [CONJECTURE 1] but 
in general ? With a … ? 
ANDREW : Yeah. Umm, can we find one ? Right, so I don’t know. Some example. 
INTERVIEWER : I’ve got some examples for you. 
ANDREW : You’ve got examples of some perfect numbers ? OK, so 12, we’ve got 1 
+ 2 + 3 + 4 + 6, then, ok, + 12. [MUTTERS] But this is not ? Ok, perfect, I wanted 
perfect numbers. OK, so let’s say six. Yaeh, and we’ve got divisors 2, 4, 6, 12. Plus I 
claim we’ve got also divisors. Yeah actually it’s simple because, err, because err, the 
argument is that we’ve also got 1 which is divisor, and this divisor is no longer here is 
we multiply. 
At the beginning of the interview, Andrew opens an indoor game. He manipulates 
the definition of the concepts involved in the conjecture but this strategy fails to 
construct a proof. Then, he asks for examples and begins an outdoor game: the 
interviewer provides him a perfect number and he has to check if the positive 
multiples of that perfect number are abundant. Andrew’s strategy in this outdoor 
                                           
5 We reformulate to be more concise. 
6 Contribution of Durand-Guerrier to ICME-11 TSG 34 (2008, p. 5) 
http://tsg.icme11.org/document/get/381 
7 A perfect number is an integer n whose divisors add up to exactly 2n. 
8 An abundant number is an integer n whose divisors add up to more than 2n.  
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game seems to be the clue of the completion of Andrew’s strategy in the former 
indoor game. Here again, the content of the statement to be proved step in the 
proof construction process. 
PROOF VALIDATION 
In this last section, we refer to Alcock & Weber (2005). The students 
(undergraduate from the University of Warwick, UK) were invited to check and 
make correction to a proof containing and invalid deduction from (1) to (2): 
(1)  1 = < n n         (2) So  ∞ → n  as  ∞ → n  
The only two students (thirteen responses were examined) who reject the proof 
because of an invalid warrant did it not because of the recognition of a logical and 
formal gap between (1) and (2) but because they knew some examples which 
show the warrant to be invalid. Differently said, taking into account the content of 
the statement, they played an outside game to check the warrant of the deduction 
step: is it true that when somebody provides me an increasing series, that series is 
also convergent? Three students rejected the proof because definitions were not 
employed. We think that fact to be quite revealing of a misconception of the 
proving activity. The manipulation of the definitions (see above, example 2) is in 
fact a common way in advanced mathematics of opening the indoor games. We 
can think that the rejection is founded on the student’s failure to recognize an 
indoor game. As Alcock and Weber (2005) say, this could be a sign of 
mathematical maturity. Nevertheless, definitions are not always employed in 
indoor games and, above all, very few mathematical proofs are enough detail to 
be identified with an indoor game. As an instance, Weber (2008) shows that 
professional mathematicians often use informal arguments or example-base 
arguments to check a proof (even to validate the proof). This is contradictory with 
that former identification. To finish with this example, notice that from only two 
students who refused the proof because of an invalid warrant, 10 did it when the 
interviewer helped them to interpret (1) as the series is increasing and (2) as the 
series is convergent. Our hypothesis is that this last intervention allowed the 
students to stand back from the indoor game and to enter the outdoor one. 
CONCLUSION 
Our aim has been to show how an approach articulating syntactic and semantic 
analysis with game-theoretical tools, could contribute to the understanding of the 
proof construction. Our work suggests that an exclusive syntactical approach to 
the proof is not enough. Worse, we think that it could contribute to some 
misunderstandings associating proof with its only formal aspects (Segal, 2000). 
We think that, rather than a rupture between argumentation and proof (if 
understood as a rupture between syntactical and semantic work), we should to a 
dialectic process.  
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We present a research about the learning of quantification at the beginning of 
tertiary studies in mathematics. We specifically investigate the gap between the 
logical account for quantification and the one from some students, and some prior 
mathematicians involving the variation’s vocabulary (in the physical sense). 
INTRODUCTION 
Students often feel disturbed when they are asked to produce, read or check a 
proof, especially at the secondary-tertiary transition (Gueudet, 2008). Teachers 
face strong difficulties to clarify their aims. Concerning quantification, their 
habits are heterogeneous, as well as the book’s approach (Arsac & 
Durand-Guerrier, 2000, Chellougui, 2004, Durand-Guerrier & Arsac, 2005). On 
the other side, some authors have emphasized the difficulty the students meet to 
deal with it (Dubinsky & Yiparaki, 2000, Selden & Selden, 1995). In this text, we 
present our research about the learning of quantification at the beginning of the 
tertiary level. We first introduce our epistemological inquiry which provides us a 
frame to carry out that research and then we move to a short presentation of our 
experiments.  
EPISTEMOLOGICAL INQUIRY 
Logical account of quantification 
We begin with a presentation of a few theoretical and logical frameworks who 
give account of mathematical quantification
1. We use these theories as tools to 
better understand students’ practices even if we do not think that students are 
“naturally” following one of them. This is precisely the gaps in the student’s 
practice which will catch our attention. Natural deduction and dialogic logic are 
dealing with logical validity. In natural deduction, formal methods of introduction 
and elimination of individual constant symbols are involved. For instance, from 
) (x xP ∀  one can deduce  ) (a P  or from  ) (a P  one can deduce  ) (x xP ∃ . The  RULE − ∀  
and  RULE − ∃  of the dialogic logic use the framework of a game between two 
individuals A and B; for instance, if the player A supports  ) (x xP ∀  then B can 
choose a symbol t and forces A to assert P(t). Model-Theoretical Semantics and 
Game-Theoretical Semantics are dealing with truth inside a domain of 
interpretation D. Model-Theoretical Semantics defines quantification with the 
help of the notion of satisfaction: for instance,  ) (x xP ∀  is true in D if and only if the 
                                           
1 Broader presentations and references can be found in Durand-Guerier & Arsac 
(2005) for natural deduction, Durand-Guerrier (2008) for Model-Theoretical 
Semantics and Barrier (2008) for the dialogic logic and Game-Theoretical 
Semantics.  
1‐84  ICMI Study 19－2009 
open statement P(x) is satisfied for every individual a of D (if P is a predicate, it 
means that P(a) is true in D). As dialogic logic, Game-Theoretical Semantics uses 
a game-theoretical framework opposing two players A and B. If A supports 
) (x xP ∀  then B can choose an individual a of D and force A to assert P(a). All of 
them are explaining quantification with some kind of substitution process. In the 
cases of deduction systems the process involves individual constants symbols. In 
the semantic ones the processes involves individual objects. The notion of 
variation (the physical one of a move in the time) is absent even if this notion is 
often used in the mathematic teaching and in the student’s verbal explanations. 
This is one of the gaps we find interesting to investigate. Before presenting our 
experimental work, we point out three examples of non standard use of 
quantification extracted from the history of mathematics and logic to contrast the 
logical construction.  
Example 1: Bolzano practice 
Dealing with the existence of a limit for the Cauchy’s series, Bolzano (1996) 
speaks of “quantity which can vary” or “constant quantity”. Roughly speaking, he 
considers that a series has a limit (he doesn’t use that term) when the quantity the 
series approaches is a constant one. That notion of quantity, susceptible to vary, 
has no equivalent in the modern conception of quantity. We claim elsewhere that 
his reasoning cannot be understood with the first-order logic means (Barrier, to 
appear). According to Dugac (2003, p. 26), Cauchy used to speak of “fixed limit” 
and “variable quantity” too. 
Example 2: Liouville practice  
As Cauchy, Liouville was a teacher at the Ecole Royale Polytechnique. The 
introduction of his Cours d’analyse (Liouville, 1995) is (our translation):  
“We call constant quantity a quantity which preserves the same value all along a 
calculation; and we call variable quantity a quantity which takes different values in 
the same calculation.” (Liouville, 1995, p.1).  
In this book, Liouville mostly uses open statements in which the concepts of 
function and of quantification are intertwined and treated by the means of the 
variation’s vocabulary. Liouville’s work is in fact prior to the discussions about 
the axiom of choice and prior to the logical distinction raised by Frege (grounding 
the modern logical notion of variation) between function and argument. We can 
find there confusions (sometimes assumed) about the letters status:  
“I say that we will have df(u)=f’(u)du. If u were an independent variable, a theorem is 
not needed […]. But if u were function of the independent variable, then du is only a 
part of the increasing of u.” (ibid., p. 10)  
We can note that this way of dealing with quantification is sometimes linked with 
invalid deductions (see below experiment 3).   
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Example 3: Peirce account  
Chauviré (2005) studies the account for quantification from Peirce. She explains 
that he considers that “all first order propositions speak of individuals, whatever 
they are, vague, general or precise” (Chauviré, 2005, p. 81, our translation). In an 
atomic proposition like  ) (a P , the individual is directly appointed by the speaker 
(the individual is precise) whereas in an existential proposition, the speaker has 
the responsibility of the choice which has not been done yet (the individual is 
vague), and in a universal proposition, the responsibility of the choice is 
transferred to the listener (the individual is general). This definition is 
game-theoretical flavoured but contrary to Game-Theoretical Semantics, the 
quantified propositions and the atomic ones have the same subject/predicate 
logical form. From the pragmatic point of view of Peirce, different quantifications 
do not suppose logical distinction; the distinction is rather inner to the individuals. 
As for Bolzano, some adjectives (precise, vague, and general) could be added to 
the individuals’ designation. 
EXPERIMENTS  
We are now going to the presentation of three experiments we have done in Lyon 
with first year tertiary students. Each of the dialogues we refer to were recorded 
and transcribed. The extracts in the following are translated from French to 
English. 
Experiment 1  
It allows us to point out that the vocabulary of variation is fully used in the first 
years of tertiary studies to deal with quantification. Among other things, we asked 
two groups (three and four students) of first years students of a French 
engineering school (INSA of Lyon) to decide if the following proposition were 
true or false
2: 
 “A caporal can become a general if and only if a caporal can become a general” 
They were also asked to provide some explanations and to give a unique answer 
for the group in order to stimulate the debates. This sentence from the natural 
language can be logically interpreted as  ) ( ) ( x P x xP ⇔ ∀  or as  ) ( ) ( y P x yP x ⇔ ∀ ∀
3. 
The first interpretation gives rise to a valid proposition and the second one to a 
non-valid one. The analysis of the debate shows that the students do not explicitly 
refer to any different interpretations. Even if they seem to be conscious that they 
didn’t have enough data to decide of the epistemic value of the sentence, they did 
not associate their disagreement with some divergent logical unpacking. Rather, 
                                           
2 « Un caporal peut devenir général si et seulement si un caporal peut devenir 
général. » 
3 There are obviously other possible interpretations. For example, Hintikka 
(1994), from where the idea of this sentence comes, does another one. This is 
nevertheless the only two interpretations we found in the experiment.  
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their argumentations and explanations include variation and time vocabulary: is it 
possible that the variable changes during the sentence.  
“K : […] Because there, it’s a more mathematical stuff [K refers to another sentence 
they have to value] and there you have a presupposed rule which say that this one it 
doesn’t change along your sentence instead of here you don’t have anything which 
say… It could very well change in a french sentence. […] 
K : Whereas in this thing you put a transition such that you very well know that your 
letter, it wont change like that except if you precise it. While there, you don’t know.” 
Experiment 2  
This experiment took place during an experimental course about mathematic 
reasoning involving first year mathematics students from the University of Lyon 
1. We found evidence that Bolzano’s style proofs were present at the 
secondary-tertiary transition. The students asked if the statement  1 9 , 0 = were true 
or not. Arguments (or a complete proof) were recommended. When the student S 
began to expose his argument, he considered  9 , 0  as a variable quantity we can 
manipulate. 
“S: the only, in fact the only 1 minus 0.9 infinite which is less than epsilon it’s 0. […] 
because if one takes, in fact, if one finds a 0.9 less than a positive epsilon, we are 
going from the principle that 0.9 is fixed, is finite. […] 
S: We know that zero point… that 0.9 it’s well… in fact I don’t know anymore how 
to write it. […] In fact it’s an infinity of 9 after. […] after the 0… after the decimal 
point. But if one minus nine well nine nine is less
4 than epsilon… then zero nine is 
finite, what finally brings to an absurdity […]” 
This manipulation of variable quantity is here paired (as in Bolzano’s proof) with 
confusion between the series and its limit, confusion we will find again with 
another student who refuses the equality  1 9 , 0 =  without refuting the validity of 
the proof proposed:  
“X: it only tends, it is not equal”.  
“it” refers to the same evasive “quantity” which is neither the series nor its limit. 
Its status is here very unclear.   
Experiment 3 
Undergraduate (two groups, two and three students) and graduate (two groups, 
two and three students) students of mathematics of the University of Lyon 1, as 
well as first year students of the INSA of Lyon (four groups, three or four students) 
were involved. The experimentation was organized around readings and studies 
of two proofs in calculus (including time for communication). The first proof is 
extracted from Liouville (1995) and the second one from Cauchy (1821). The two 
proofs contain invalid deduction associated with a confuse quantification. The 
                                           
4 S will later recognize that he would have better to say “more”.  
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proof from Liouville has already been presented and analyzed in Arsac & 
Durand-Guerrier (2000). Liouville try to demonstrate that a real differentiable 
function f with a null derivative on an interval is a constant function. He takes to 
elements x and x1 in the interval and cuts the interval [x,x1] into m pieces. He calls 
ε the bigger slope of the function’s linear approximation on each piece. Then, he 
remarks that f must be such that f(x1) - f(x) < (x1 - x) ε. He concludes that f(x1)=f(x) 
because ε tends to zero with the increasing of the number of piece in the interval
5. 
Of course, not any explicit quantification has been used (see above, example 2). 
The proof from Cauchy (1821, p.147-148) is the proof of the fact that the series 
(1+1/n)
n
 converge to real number e. We have adapted the proof from Cauchy to 
propose a more readable text to the student. The invalid step is when Cauchy 
deduces (2) from (1)
6: 
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Even if our analysis has to be completed, the experiment provides some evidence 
concerning the influence of the use of the variation’s vocabulary into the 
co-construction of a domain of interpretation (here the real numbers) and a 
standard formal framework (including quantification) to deal with it
7. As an 
example, some undergraduate students wondered if the increasing (with m) of the 
number of term in the sum (1) goes faster than the manner the terms of the sum (1) 
converge individually to the term of the sum (2). They seem to think that if it does, 
the deduction from (1) to (2) is not warranted. The conceptual frame they used 
includes the physical notions of time, speed and variation.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we tried to implicate logical, epistemological and experimental 
means to assess the question of the learning of quantification. Our results suggest 
that the vocabulary of variation plays an important role and that calculus is a 
domain where that question could be explicitly taken in account by tertiary 
teachers.  
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OLD META-DISCURSIVE RULES DIE HARD 
Judith Bar-Tikva 
Levinsky College of Education, Israel 
Learning of proof is important in mathematics education. There is considerable 
evidence of difficulties which learners encounter with proofs. Researchers 
suggest various cognitive models to describe sources of these difficulties. They 
also claim that teaching strategies of exploration can help the learners develop 
cognitively concerning the concept of proof. Since empirical studies do not show 
clear cut findings about learners' improvement as a result of these strategies, and 
since these strategies are not clearly tied to the cognitive models, I suggest 
viewing learners' difficulties from the commognitive perspective, which defines 
learning as the change and development of discourse which results in a different 
definition of the teacher's role.   
Proof is considered to be central to the discipline of mathematics and has been a 
major area of mathematics education research. Despite efforts by mathematics 
educators to promote understanding of proof, many learners, from students 
through prospective teachers to mathematics majors, find the study of proof 
difficult (e.g. Martin & Harel 1989; Selden & Selden, 1987). This body of 
research has been devoted to describing in detail errors in performance made, for 
example, when creating proofs, judging the validity of given proofs, and deciding 
on the truth or falsity of proofs.  
Given these difficulties, researchers have searched for explanations as to why 
these difficulties exist. A number of researchers address issues revolving around 
hidden cognitive aspects involved in the development of learners' understanding 
of proof (e.g. Balacheff, 1988; Harel & Sowder, 2007; Tall, 1995). Van Dormolen 
proposed a three level hierarchical model: (1) proofs characterized as "specific", 
in which a particular instance is being used to assess the truth of a claim; (2) 
proofs perceived as relying on "common properties", where common and 
different objects' characteristics are explored; and (3) proofs seen as involving 
"reason about reasoning", in which a formal proof is given.  
Balacheff (1988) also introduced a hierarchical model, identifying four levels of 
the cognition of proof. They are: naïve empiricism, in which the truth of a claim is 
asserted after verifying several examples; the crucial experiment, in which an 
assertion is verified based on a non-trivial example; the generic example, in which 
arguments are developed based on a prototypical example; and the thought 
experiment, in which explanations begin to be detached from particular cases and 
the foundational ideas of the proof are identified. 
Harel and Sowder (e.g. 2007) maintained that one's conception of proof can be 
described as "proof schemes", which are what is considered by the individual to 
be certain and persuasive. They proposed three main classes of proof schemes: 
external conviction proof schemes, in which proving depends on authority, on the 
appearance of the proof or on non-referential symbols; empirical proof schemes,  
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in which proof is inductive or relies on perception; and deductive proof schemes, 
in which a proof starts from axioms and is general, relying on operational thought 
and based on logical rules.  
These internal, unobservable cognitive models were constructed by researchers to 
describe learners' understanding and production of proofs. Some of these same 
researchers also claimed that the learning of proof, via communication and social 
interaction among students and between the teacher and students, is an important 
aid for students' learning of the concept of proof (e.g. Harel & Sowder, 2007). 
Students exploring proofs, trying out their own mathematical ideas and discussing 
them with others are considered to be teaching strategies that can foster learning. 
Although many researchers believe that "surely students who experience such 
instruction will develop different proof schemes" (Harel & Sowder, 2007, p. 40), 
findings are not clear cut, and, in some cases, students even come up with ideas 
and mathematical rules that do not count as proper in mathematics. Although not 
reported in these studies, another problematic result may emerge: an authority 
conflict between the learner and the teacher, where each party holds a different 
rule. 
In addition, there is no clear connection between the cognitive models proposed to 
explain learners' difficulties with proofs and the teaching strategies offered to 
overcome these difficulties.  
In this paper, I suggest a different interpretation of the difficulties learners 
encounter with proofs and, based on this perspective, propose a different way of 
teaching. This approach, the commognitive approach (a term coined by Anna 
Sfard which combines communication and cognition), does not deny the 
existence of unobservable cognitive structures but, rather, focuses on the 
observable discursive aspects of what is being studied.   
The point of departure of the commognitive approach is that thinking is a special 
case of communication, and learning is the change and development of discourse 
(e.g. Sfard, 2008). In this view, mathematical discourse on a certain mathematical 
topic has its own meta-rules, under which the discourse is being performed; e.g., 
an unwritten meta-rule in the discourse on the multiplication of natural numbers is 
that "multiplication always makes bigger". When a new topic is introduced, some 
meta-rules may change; e.g., in the discourse on the multiplication of rational 
numbers, the meta-rule about multiplication that guided the discourse on natural 
numbers is no longer suitable and must be changed. 
The teacher's role is to explicitly change the meta-rules of the old discourse to 
meta-rules of the new one. The learner's role is to accept these new meta-rules. At 
first, the learner will see the new discourse as somehow foreign, perhaps a 
"discourse-for-others". But, as she attempts to participate in the discourse and 
explore its inner logic, it will become a "discourse-for-oneself". In this view, the 
rules are adopted first and only afterwards are they understood. The transition 
from the old to the new meta-discursive rules must take place before the learners 
are fully fluent in the discourse.  
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Although this may be difficult, according to the commognitive approach, it is 
unavoidable. The reason for this is that some meta-rules can neither be shown to 
be logically necessary, nor are they always inevitably derived from what the 
learners already know. In fact, these rules can be seen as "mere" conventions, and 
the reason for their existence is not obvious. Different from the cognitive models 
approaches, when entering a new discourse, there is little room, at least in the 
beginning of the learning process, for the learner's autonomy and for exploring, 
finding or reconstructing these rules for themselves, on their own. If they do try, it 
is highly implausible that they will actually succeed. Furthermore, as findings 
show, there is a good chance that such explorations may result in mathematically 
unacceptable rules. 
This might lead to yet another problem, mentioned before: an authority conflict. 
On one hand, we have the learner who just constructed a new, but unacceptable 
rule but can provide an explanation that is convincing to her. On the other hand, 
we have the teacher, who is presenting the accepted rule, and does so, perhaps, 
without a convincing explanation. Thus, the teacher's role is to explicitly modify 
and change the existing discourse. Whatever change in the meta-rules is to occur, 
it must be initiated by the teacher.  
To illustrate this approach I would like to pay a visit to my college classroom. I 
will interpret with commognitive lenses what transpired in a teaching episode, in 
a part of a "proof theory" course devoted to the learning of proofs. The class 
started off with an assignment. I asked my students, 50 computer science majors 
in their first semester of studies, to judge the correctness of a given proof to a false 
statement in Algebra. The proof had a known error in the literature (e.g. Selden & 
Selden, 1987) in which the first step was to assume the correctness of the 
statement and, following logically correct but irreversible steps, the result was an 
obvious truth (0=0). The falseness of the statement was not obvious, so the 
students concentrated their efforts on examining the proof. 
About 50% of the students judged the proof to be correct. The other 50% judged it 
first as invalid, focusing on various specific steps in the proof, and trying, 
wrongly, to detect errors in them. After establishing that every step was 
mathematically correct, there was general agreement that the proof was valid. The 
overall explanation they offered was that a true conclusion must result from a true 
statement. My students claimed that: "We got 0=0, so there, it's always true!", or 
"All the steps are correct, and we got 0=0 which is always true, so of course the 
statement is true" and "When you start from something, if you do everything right 
and you get a true statement, then it means that what you started with is true". 
In order to shake things up a little, I presented a refutation of the statement. It was 
a rather simple counter example. This caused general confusion, disbelief and 
even some objections. They checked the refutation several times, and after they 
were reassured that the statement was indeed false, they found it difficult to 
explain why the proof was not valid. They claimed that "Since the statement is 
wrong the proof is also wrong, but I don't know why", or "Everything seems to be  
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right, so where is the problem"? Some even claimed that they still believed that 
the proof was correct! Again, none raised the idea that the problem was with the 
irreversibility of the proof's steps and none referred to the logical rule "if F then T", 
which can account for the fact that, in mathematics, a false statement can result, 
following correct logical steps, in a true statement .  
In this episode, the students were already acquainted with the mathematical 
concept of proof. And yet, the way they judged a given proof was not satisfactory. 
In commognitive terms, the meta-rule that has to be changed is the one that 
regulates the way students explain why a proof is correct or not. In justifying their 
judgments, they used everyday language, without giving a mathematical 
explanation. Of course, their wrong judgment could be traced back to the way 
proofs were taught in high school, but now, the change can only be done in 
discursive ways. In this change, the students should be reflective about the proof 
before the decision about its correctness is made. When they check if a proof is 
correct or not, they will have to use mathematical discourse, logical rules 
mediated by language, without any reference to everyday discourse.  
Let us return to my teaching episode. Following my students' claims, I presented 
them with the logical rule of "if F then T", trying to explain that, in mathematics, 
we can get a true statement from a false one. I also showed them that the steps in 
the given proof were irreversible. My students accepted my efforts with some 
uncertainty. In fact, in the classes that followed, they, once again, failed to 
recognize the falseness of the same kind of proof, and used their previous 
explanations to justify their incorrect judgment. One could say that this may be 
the result of my ineffective teaching. And that may be the case. But the 
commognitive approach would claim that "old meta-discursive rules die hard". 
Recall that meta-rules do not always seem to be necessary or inevitable, and 
cannot be justified in a truly convincing way.  
Coming to terms with the meta-discursive rules has to be a decision made by 
learners who wish to participate in the mathematical discourse. In the 
commognitive view, they should first accept these rules before fully 
understanding them, and be ready to follow the discursive lead of the teacher. 
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PRESERVICE SECONDARY TEACHERS’ COMPETENCIES 
IN PROOF  
Jill Brown    Gloria Stillman 
Australian Catholic University     University of Melbourne, Australia 
Proof and proving are essential elements of working mathematically for lower 
secondary mathematics students. Pre-service secondary mathematics teachers of 
such students need to exit teacher preparation with both well developed ways of 
understanding and thinking about proof and proving commensurate with at least 
this level of schooling. Such mathematical thinking includes deductive reasoning, 
generalising and recognising such thinking when presented by others. Responses 
of 4 pre-service teachers (2 recent graduates, 2 career changers) suggest even 
recent graduates do not necessarily enter postgraduate education programs with 
well developed notions of proof or generality. Pre-service courses need to include 
development of these ways of thinking. 
BACKGROUND 
Recently there has been renewed interest in proof and proving in schools 
worldwide as well as in mathematics education research (Hanna & de Villiers, 
2008). However, “many school and university students and even teachers of 
mathematics have only superficial ideas on the nature of proof” (Jahnke, 2007, p. 
80). As teacher educators, a key question of interest to us posed in the ICMI Study 
19 discussion document is: “How can we design opportunities for student 
teachers to acquire the knowledge (skills, understandings and dispositions) 
necessary to provide effective instruction about proof and proving?” (Hanna & de 
Villiers, 2008). One of the first steps in answering this question is to determine 
what competencies, dispositions and knowledge (mathematical, pedagogical, 
pedagogical content) pre-service teachers possess at exit from teacher education 
and content courses. However, we agree with Harel (2008), that in order to answer 
this question decisively the focus must be on the ways of understanding and ways 
of thinking pre-service teachers need at exit in order to function effectively as 
newly graduated mathematics teachers. We also restrict this discussion to 
pre-service secondary teachers as, in our experience, their mathematical 
background is different and what is assumed with regards to this is also different 
from students preparing to teach in primary or early childhood settings. In 
Australia most pre-service secondary mathematics teaching preparation programs 
are after students have completed a first degree (locally or overseas) with a 
required proportion of mathematical content at tertiary level. Furthermore, quite a 
number of students at particular universities are career changers rather than recent 
graduates coming directly from undergraduate degrees into teacher education. 
Both of these impact the answer to the question posed in our particular context. 
Little research has been undertaken where the focus has been pre-service 
secondary mathematics teachers and proof. Analysis by Jones (2000), for 
example,  of 75 secondary pre-service teachers’ conceptions of proof suggests  
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that “having the best qualification does not necessarily mean that the student 
teacher will make the most effective mathematics teacher” (p. 57) even for recent 
mathematics graduates. Selden and Selden (2003) investigated the ability of 8 
undergraduate students (including 4 secondary pre-service mathematics teachers) 
to judge correctness of student “proofs” of a mathematical statement. The 
researchers concluded that the undergraduate students tended to focus on the 
surface features of arguments and their ability to determine whether an argument 
proved a theorem was limited. 
In the various Australian state curricula, the emphasis on proof differs at the lower 
secondary level. In Victoria, for example, proof forms part of the working 
mathematically dimension of the curriculum document relevant to lower 
secondary (VCAA, 2005), as well as being mentioned in the various content 
dimensions. In working mathematically, level 6 (usually completed by students in 
Years 9 and 10), students are expected to  
formulate and test conjectures, generalisations and arguments in natural language and 
symbolic form. … They follow formal mathematical arguments for the truth of 
propositions (for example, ‘the sum of three consecutive natural numbers is divisible 
by 3’) (p. 37).  
Within the structure dimension at level 6, students are expected to “form and test 
mathematical conjectures; for example, ‘What relationship holds between the 
lengths of the three sides of a triangle?’” (p. 36) whereas Pythagoras’ Theorem is 
mentioned in the space dimension (VCAA, 2005).  
A crucial way of thinking that lower secondary students should experience must 
involve deductive reasoning. Thus, pre-teachers need not only to be able to 
execute formal proofs at least at a lower secondary school level but also their 
natural way of thinking should involve both deductive and empirical reasoning 
and they should be able to clearly distinguish between these two both in their own 
thoughts and actions and those of their students. In addition, the notion of 
generalisability needs to be well established so they can not only generalise 
propositions themselves but also recognise generality. The following case study 
explores the question of what should be the basis of experiences about proof for 
pre-service secondary mathematics teachers at lower secondary level by 
examining and discussing the mathematical content knowledge of four 
pre-service teachers and their ways of thinking (i.e., working mathematically) 
with lower secondary level mathematical content. 
THE CASE STUDY 
The case study reported here is part of the Competencies of Future Mathematics 
Teachers research project (Schwarz et al., in press), expanding the Mathematics 
Teaching in the 21st Century (MT21) study (Schmidt et al., 2007) through 
complementary case studies which are qualitatively oriented. These case studies 
have been conducted to date at a number of universities in Germany, Hong Kong, 
China and Australia.   
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Data from pre-service secondary mathematics teachers on one campus of one 
Australian university in Victoria are discussed here. Nine of a cohort of 14 
pre-service students at the end of their year-long postgraduate diploma course 
volunteered to participate and completed the section of a written questionnaire 
dealing with argumentation and proof. Six of these 9 students were from overseas 
and only 2 were recent graduates (i.e., had completed their undergraduate or 
postgraduate degree qualifying them to prepare as a secondary mathematics 
teacher during the previous two years). Six students were chosen for an in-depth 
problem-centered interview (PCI) (Flick, 2006) on the basis of 
consistency/inconsistency of their mathematical competencies and pedagogical 
content knowledge and their espoused beliefs about mathematics and the teaching 
of proof. Some of the responses from four of these students have been chosen for 
discussion here. Two were recent graduates and two career changers with at least 
10 years since they completed their qualifying degree (see Table 1 for details). 
The sample was balanced for gender and nationality of students. 
Participant  Gender  Years since Maths 
Qualification 
Location of secondary schooling 
Paul  male  25  Australia 
Ling  female  12  Malaysia 
Joel  male  < 2  Australia 
Pam  female  1  Malaysia 
Table 1: Details of Case Study Pre-service Teachers 
The questionnaire contained 3 multi-part items on argumentation and proof. One 
related to a proof of the proposition that doubling the length of the sides of a 
square also doubled the length of its diagonal and another was about the proof of 
the sum of three consecutive natural numbers being divisible by 3. The PCI 
allowed the researchers to gain further insight into the questionnaire responses. It 
included questions concerning content knowledge, general pedagogical 
knowledge and studies in mathematics and education. These included questions 
related to proof of the Triangle Inequality Theorem and the Half Perimeter 
Proposition (the half perimeter of a constructible triangle is always longer than 
each side of the triangle). Both formal and pre-formal proofs (Blum & Kirsch, 
1991) appeared in both instruments. For examples of some of the questions from 
both instruments see Corleis, Schwarz, Kaiser, and Leung (in press). 
Affinity with Proving in Lower Secondary Mathematics Lessons 
Based on questionnaire responses, the majority of the students at this site had a 
high affinity with proving in mathematics lessons and a formalist image of 
mathematics when it came to proof, “seeing mathematics as an abstract system 
that consists of axioms and relations” (Schmidt et al., 2007, p. 14). Of the four 
focus pre-service teachers, Pam’s view of mathematics was atypical, despite  
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having recently completed her degree at a prestigious Australian university 
specialising in mathematics and statistics. She saw mathematics as being: 
not just about calculation and not just about like all the theory, but it’s actually, it’s a 
big picture and you use it like anywhere. Mathematics, it’s fun, it’s interesting. 
Competencies in Proof Construction.  
Ling, who completed her undergraduate degree in Malaysia, exhibited very high 
competencies in formal proving when using Pythagoras’ theorem for proving the 
proposition about doubling the sides of a square and its generalisation to 
rectangles but, as she revealed in the PCI, the only theorem she could recall at all 
was Pythagoras’ Theorem. On all other occasions when required to construct 
proofs whether geometric or algebraic her attempts were categorised as 
demonstrating low competency. She was unable to show algebraically the 
divisibility proposition for the sum of three consecutive natural numbers could 
not be generalised for k numbers. Her response showed she believed it was able to 
be generalised. When working with the Triangle Inequality Theorem she clearly 
believed, demonstrating with reference to a triangle, that it was possible to 
construct a triangle where the sum of the lengths of two sides was equal to the 
length of the third side. She then used an example of such a non-constructible 
triangle to “disprove” the Half Perimeter Proposition. Paul, on the other hand, 
consistently demonstrated he had high competency in this area in all contexts 
except for the Half Perimeter Proposition for a constructible triangle.  
Both recent graduates, Joel and Pam, were unable to produce a formal proof for 
the proposition about doubling the sides of a square with Joel stating, “The 
pre-formal appears adequate to me”; whilst Pam wrote “Don’t know how to.” 
They both were able to generalise this proposition to rectangles but neither 
showed this in a formal manner. Both used specific cases to show that the 
divisibility proposition for the sum of three consecutive natural numbers could 
not be generalised for k numbers although Pam’s examples and logical argument 
were more complete. However, both struggled with the Triangle Inequality 
Theorem. They could not see the equivalence of the statement, “There is no 
shorter route than the direct one”, to the Triangle Inequality, appearing not to 
understand this “non-mathematical” statement. When asked when the Triangle 
Inequality would become equal, neither saw equality could only hold when the 
triangle degenerated to a line segment. Instead, both examined special cases. Joel 
eventually stopped exploring saying: “that is something I have to look into”. Pam 
drew a general equilateral triangle and two specific isosceles triangles (with side 
lengths of 4, 4 and 2 and 2, 2 and 6). When asked why she had used 6 instead of 4 
which she crossed out she replied: “Well because I have used 4 here, so just 
another number.” This is despite saying previously that the Triangle Inequality 
Theorem was valid for any combination of sides. She obviously was not aware of 
the inconsistency in her logic. Even though she appeared to believe she could 
choose lengths randomly, she concluded after drawing her cases: “yep, so I’ve 
found one is not equal, another one has to be greater than c, and another one is less  
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than c, and I don’t think we can get anything for the sum of two sides equal to c, 
yeah”. With the Half Perimeter Proposition, Joel drew two cases then wrote: 
1/2(A + B +C) >A|B|C before giving up. Pam’s “proof” was merely illustrating 
the proposition holds through substitution of specific values. 
Ways of Thinking 
What is surprising in the above examples is that the career changers, although at 
times struggling to activate dormant mathematical knowledge, both generally 
attempted to prove deductively. They also were able to recognise generality in 
pre-formal proofs. The recent graduates on the other hand, did not appear to have 
developed a sense of what constitutes a proof or proving in mathematics in their 
secondary and tertiary studies of mathematics. They also could not recognise the 
generality in the pre-formal proof examples. 
This becomes apparent when their ways of thinking are explored. Both when 
asked to consider a theorem or proposition always immediately starting toying 
with specific cases. Such actions are more than acceptable if the purpose is to get 
a sense of the meaning of a statement or proposition and even to ascertain whether 
or not it might be true. However, as the following shows, there are more grounds 
for concern if such actions merely become a façade for an empirical proof scheme 
being the modus operandi. 
Pam: Okay, half perimeter of a triangle ABC … Okay, so for example, I have drawn 
a triangle ABC and let’s say I put some numbers in it, and randomly 4 [AC], this 
probably make it 10 [BC] and a 12 over here [AB]. Okay, so the whole perimeter is 
12 + 10 + 4, that will be 26. Half of the perimeter is 13. Okay, now half perimeter of 
triangle ABC is always longer, and yes it is longer than 12, longer than 10, and longer 
than 4. Okay, now we do another triangle [repeats with a triangle with side lengths 5, 
11 and 8 giving a half perimeter of 12]. So the 12 [circles 12] is larger than 11, larger 
than 8, larger than 5, so the theorem is correct. 
When asked if this constituted a formal proof as requested, she replied, “Maybe. 
This is just a pre-formal proof…but I am not sure how to do a formal proof. A 
formal proof is usually with all the words.” She then indicated she believed it was 
a proof, the reason being “all the calculation”. Joel also appeared to consider 
measurements somehow transformed a pre-formal proof into a formal one when 
commenting on a pre-formal proof of the Triangle Inequality using elastic bands 
on a nail board: “…they are not proving it with the measurable values. I think they 
have to put measurements in to formalise it.” 
CONCLUSION 
The examples above suggest it is not sufficient for students to have covered the 
mathematical content of proofs and proving in tertiary undergraduate degrees (as 
in the case of the students educated in Malaysia to at least the end of secondary 
schooling) or both in secondary school and in their tertiary degrees as in the case 
of the Australians. As Blum and Kirsch (1991, p. 199) point out, in order to judge 
for themselves the validity even of pre-formal proofs, pre-service teachers need at  
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their “disposal ‘higher order’ knowledge and abilities” in mathematics than a 
student at the level of schooling for which such a proof is appropriate. Being able 
to work mathematically with the content at the level at which they are expected to 
teach requires not only mathematical content of a higher level of sophistication 
but also the development of ways of thinking mathematically that enable them to 
work and reason deductively and to be able to generalise and recognise generality. 
It does not appear, if the recent graduates are typical, that it can be continued to be 
assumed that these have been acquired through tertiary studies in mathematics. 
Pre-service mathematics education courses thus need to include many 
experiences for developing these ways of thinking. 
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A CONTEXTUALIZED APPROACH TO PROOF AND 
PROVING IN MATHEMATICS EDUCATION: FOCUS ON THE 
NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL TASKS 
Claire V. Berg 
University of Agder, Norway 
This paper is related to my ongoing research concerning the possibility to 
enhance teachers’ algebraic thinking through the creation and development of a 
community of inquiry. Here I argue for taking into consideration the way the idea 
of proof is contextualized within a specific mathematical task. In particular, this 
approach to proof and proving opens for characterizing the nature of a 
mathematical task by focusing on the kind of mathematical objects and the kind of 
questions which are involved in the task. Findings emerging from the analysis of 
data seem to indicate that this distinction might be useful for developing an 
understanding of the different ways the idea of proof is addressed through 
different tasks.  
INTRODUCTION 
My aim in this paper is to report on findings related to the recognition of the 
importance of the mathematical context within which the idea of proof is 
contextualized. More specifically, I focus on the nature of the mathematical tasks 
and introduce a distinction between a geometrical context and context related to 
the generalization of numerical patterns. The data presented in this paper, which 
have been collected in relation to my current doctoral thesis, illustrate the 
centrality of the nature of the mathematical task within which the idea of proof is 
addressed. In the first part of the paper I offer a brief description of the theoretical 
framework which I elaborated, then I present the methodological approach which 
I followed. In the second part of the paper I offer some findings emerging from 
the analysis of data. Finally I offer some considerations related to possible 
implications for teacher education. 
BACKGROUND 
Mathematics education researchers have considered the idea of proof from 
different perspectives. Most of the investigations on this topic have dealt 
primarily with the logical aspects of proof and with different approaches to 
students’ conception of proving (Harel & Sowder, 1996). Other aspects of proof 
have been investigated, including the role of intuition in proving, the central role 
played by heuristics in the teaching of proof (Hanna, 2000), the value of proof as 
an explanatory tool (Hanna, 1995), and justification and proof in the context of 
dynamic software (Hoyles & Healy, 1999). In this paper I develop and expand on 
previous considerations related to the social dimension of proof, as explained in 
Boero, Garuti & Mariotti (1996), by putting emphasis on the central role played 
by the nature of the mathematical task within which the idea of proof in 
contextualized. While Boero et al. (1996) have distinguished between tasks of the  
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“proof that” type and tasks requiring the production of a conjecture, I argue, in 
this article, for further investigation within the first kind of task and for taking into 
consideration the kind of mathematical objects (numbers, geometrical figures) 
involved in the tasks.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In my current thesis, which is situated in the context of in-service mathematics 
teachers’ professional development, I study the development of algebraic 
thinking within a community of inquiry consisting of a teacher educator, myself, 
and three in-service teachers, at lower secondary school. My particular focus is on 
the processes related to the development of algebraic thinking, and a major 
emphasis of the study is on exploring the creation and development of a 
community of inquiry. The theoretical framework within which my study is 
located has been elaborated by combining Wenger’s (1998) notion of community 
of practice with Vygotsky’s (1986) idea of scientific concept. Within this 
theoretical approach learning is understood in terms of social participation and 
knowledge is considered as relational by nature, between individuals and settings. 
In addition I recognize the central role played by inquiry (Jaworski, 2004a), as an 
emergent aspect of my study. The idea of community of inquiry has been 
explained by Wells (1999) and further developed by Jaworski (2004b).  
The three teachers Mary, Paul, and John are experienced teachers with several 
years of practice. During the school year our collaboration lasted, we organized 
nine workshops, approximately once a month, where we engaged collaboratively 
in mathematical tasks which I had designed in advance. I consider that these 
mathematical tasks acted as a means to develop both our community of inquiry 
and the participants’ algebraic thinking. In addition I followed each teacher in 
his/her class and conducted interviews both before and after classroom 
observation. The focus, in this article, is on the way the idea of proof is 
contextualized in different mathematical tasks which I presented during the 
workshops, and on the influence of the nature of the tasks on the way the 
participants elaborated an algebraic proof of the task.  
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
I consider that the design of my research is located within a methodological 
approach labeled as developmental research approach (Gravemeijer, 1994; 
Jaworski, 2005). One of the fundamental characteristics of developmental 
research is the existence of a cyclical process between development and research. 
Within the developmental cycle there is a cyclical process between thought 
experiment and practical experiment. Here I understand the notion of thought 
experiment as referring to an envisaged teaching-learning process, and practical 
experiment as referring to the actual implementation of the thought experiment in 
the relevant social setting. However, I was not only engaged in development, I 
was also researching on the development of algebraic thinking. This aspect is 
addressed in the research cycle. Within the research cycle there is a cyclical 
process between global theories and local theories. I consider Wenger’s (1998)  
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theory about community of practice and Vygotsky’s (1978, 1986) idea of 
scientific concepts as global theories and these constitute the starting point for the 
elaboration of my theoretical framework. Furthermore, I understand 
Gravemeijer’s notion of local theories as referring to the particular theoretical 
framework which I elaborated in order to conduct my research. I argue that this 
framework allows me to study and describe processes related to the development 
of algebraic thinking and mathematical learning within a sociocultural approach 
to learning.  
CONTEXTUALIZING THE IDEA OF PROOF: EXAMPLES FROM TWO 
WORKSHOPS   
During the school year our collaboration lasted, we organized nine workshops 
where I proposed the following tasks to the teachers: the first workshop was about 
various formations of Cuisenaire rods, in the second one we engaged in exploring 
what happens when we add even and odd number, during the third one I proposed 
an historical perspective into the development of algebraic symbolism, in the 
fourth workshop our group explored Viviani’s theorem, the fifth workshop was 
about four digit palindromes, during the sixth and seventh workshops we focused 
on the transition from written language to algebraic notation, in the eighth 
workshop the tasks were proposed by the teachers themselves, and in the last 
workshop we had an evaluation of all workshops. In this article I present evidence 
emerging from Workshop IV and Workshop V.   
Workshop IV about Viviani’s theorem 
During Workshop IV our group engaged collaboratively in exploring Viviani’s 
theorem. The theorem says that in an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances 
from a point within the triangle to the sides is equal to the height of the triangle. 
The rationale for presenting Viviani’s theorem during Workshop IV was to offer a 
task which opens for the possibility to develop an algebraic proof within a 
geometrical context, and thereby to introduce and use algebraic notation. In this 
workshop, the nature of the task was determined by the mathematical objects 
involved in the task, an equilateral triangle and the distances from a point to the 
sides, and the kind of question, to verify Viviani’s theorem. After trying different 
positions for a point P inside an equilateral triangle, our group decided to move 
further and to explore why Viviani’s theorem seems to be valid for all points P. 
One of the teachers proposed to introduce the symbol a to denote the length of the 
side of the triangle and to investigate the area of the triangle by dividing the 
triangle in three smaller triangles, drawing three segments of line from the point P 
to each edge of the triangle. The following excerpt brings evidence for how our 
group elaborated an algebraic proof: 
205. Paul (with a loud voice): like this, it [the proof] was smart! 
206. Claire: did you arrive at something? 
207. Paul (with enthusiasm): yes! 
208. John (with enthusiasm): same for me  
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209. Mary (with enthusiasm): yes, same for me 
210. John (with a loud voice): then we agree that the area of the three small triangles 
is as big as the area of the whole [triangle] and we put the following, yes, can we call 
it an equation or a claim, yes, I call it [the side of the triangle] a, so a multiplied by h3 
divided by two, plus a multiplied by h2 divided by two, plus a multiplied by h1 
divided by two is equal to a multiplied by h4, which is the big height, divided by two 
[h1, h2, and h3 are the three heights in the small triangles, h4 is the height in the big 
triangle] 
211. Claire: hmm, hmm 
212. John: common factors outside, then we get a divided by two, I have h4 there and 
a parenthesis with the other three heights in there, and then they [h1 plus h2 plus h3] 
have to be equal to it [h4] in order to be correct [h1+ h2+ h3= h4] 
By taking the initiative to explain his thinking to the other participants, it seems 
that John (210) offered an articulation of his own way of developing an algebraic 
proof of Viviani’s theorem based on area considerations. In addition, it seems that 
John was speaking for Mary and Paul, since they did not offer explicitly any 
explanations about their claims (205, 207, 209), just confirming that they had 
achieved some results. My interpretation of Workshop IV is that the teachers 
engaged easily in the elaboration of an algebraic proof for Viviani’s theorem and 
they seemed to be interested in exploring the connection between algebra and 
geometry. After having elaborated an algebraic proof, our group engaged in 
considerations about the possibility to implement this particular task in their class. 
As a way to develop the task further, the teachers discussed the possibility to take 
a different starting point and for example, given the point P to inquire how to 
construct, using a compass, an equilateral triangle when the distances from the 
point P to the sides of an equilateral triangle are given. It was during the 
discussion that Paul proposed, spontaneously, different ways of proving Viviani’s 
theorem, using the scientific concepts of tangent to a circle and of parallel line.  
Workshop V about four digits palindromes 
During Workshop V our group engaged collaboratively in exploring the 
divisibility of four digit palindromes by eleven. The rationale for presenting this 
task to the teachers was to follow the development of algebraic thinking in 
relation to generalisation of numerical patterns. In this workshop, the nature of the 
task was determined by the mathematical objects involved in the task, four digit 
palindromes, and the kind of question, to verify the divisibility of this kind of 
palindromes by 11. As the teachers engaged in the task, it seems that they 
discovered quickly different numerical patterns, and concentrated their efforts in 
exploring further these numerical patterns. The following excerpt brings evidence 
for the teachers’ fascination of numerical patterns as these emerged from 
inquiring into the task.  
89. John: just a moment, …, what did you say? 
90. Claire: well, when you say …[Claire is referring to John’s example: 1111]  
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91. John (talking at the same time as Claire, with a louder voice): one thousand one 
hundred and eleven? 
92. Claire: what does this mean? how can you write it? (pause) 
93. John (laughing a little): well, hmm 
94. Paul (very low voice): one thousand one hundred and eleven (pause, Paul is 
writing in his notepad) 
95. Claire: now I am keen to know what you are writing Paul! 
96. Paul (laughing): hmm, hmm [writing in his pad note] 
97. Claire: what is it you have found? 
98. Paul: yes, I am just finishing to calculate (John is laughing), a little calculation 
here! (pause) 
99. Paul (with a loud voice): if you take 1001, 2002, 3003, 4004, then the difference 
between the answer is 91! (laughing) this is quite incredible!  
I consider that this excerpt brings evidence of the teachers’ fascination for 
numerical patterns since, even if I tried to direct their attention to the possibility to 
express four digit palindromes in a general form (90, 92) using algebraic symbols 
(a 10
3+b10
2+b10
1+a10
0), Paul continued to explore numerical examples (94, 96, 
98) getting fascinated by the discovery of a new pattern (99). As a result I had to 
change momentarily my intended goal, which was to introduce algebraic symbols, 
and engage in Paul’s inquiry into numerical patterns (95, 97). My interpretation of 
Paul’s claim (99) is that he was referring to the fact that when dividing 1001 by 11 
one gets 91, dividing 2002 by 11 gives 182, and 3003 by 11 gives 273. Looking at 
the difference between the quotients, it is equal to 91. It was after repeated 
encouragements that the teachers moved away from the discovery of numerical 
patterns and achieved the elaboration of a proof for the divisibility of four digit 
palindromes.  
CONCLUSION 
The recognition of the importance of the mathematical context within which the 
idea of proof is addressed is providing a means for understanding the different 
ways of engaging in the elaboration of a proof. By distinguishing between a 
geometrical context and a context related to generalization of numerical patterns 
it is possible to understand the teachers’ different approach to the elaboration of a 
proof. I argue that these insights are significant for further research concerning the 
design and use of mathematical tasks in relation to both pre-service teacher 
education and in-service teacher professional development.   
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EPISTEMIC UNDERSTANDINGS IN MATHEMATICS AND 
SCIENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEARNING 
AnnaMarie Conner & Julie M. Kittleson 
University of Georgia, USA 
The importance of a learner’s understandings of how knowledge is established in 
science and mathematics is explored from the perspectives of science education 
and mathematics education. The process by which students engage in disciplinary 
activity contains similarities in terms of hypothesizing, justifying, evaluating, and 
legitimizing knowledge claims. However, there are significant epistemic 
differences that must be recognized. In particular, the deductive aspect of proof in 
mathematics parallels a hypothetico-deductive experimental and observational 
design in science, and while claims can be established with certainty in 
mathematics, scientific claims are tentative. These differences in epistemic 
commitments have implications for disciplinary learning. 
DISCIPLINARY EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVES: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
LEARNING 
Hanna and Jahnke (1996) suggested that a consideration of the role of 
mathematical proof in the experimental sciences might well shed light on how 
students view proof; this consideration requires understanding how mathematical 
proof relates to experimental science, particularly from the perspective of the 
learner. We approach this paper from the perspectives of a science educator and a 
mathematics educator who are interested in students’ and teachers’ epistemic 
understandings in mathematics and science and how these understandings interact 
in complementary and contradictory ways. By epistemic understandings, we 
mean understanding how disciplines establish truth, certainty, or knowledge. In 
particular, our examination of epistemology follows Kelly (2008) in examining 
“issues such as the growth of knowledge, the nature of evidence, criteria for 
theory choice, and the structure of disciplinary knowledge” (p. 99). In this paper, 
we propose there are connections between mathematics and science in how 
empirical evidence and deduction are employed to establish truth within each 
discipline. How problems are solved in a discipline depends on the epistemic 
tenets of the discipline. If learners’ epistemic understandings align with the tenets 
of the discipline, the learners are equipped with discipline-appropriate tools and 
strategies for solving problems. Conversely, understandings that are not aligned 
with epistemic tenets lead to less flexible approaches to solving problems. 
Our ultimate goal is to promote better understandings among students and 
teachers of how disciplinary knowledge is established in both mathematics and 
science. Science education standards emphasize that knowing science content is 
not sufficient for understanding science in a meaningful way; rather, students 
should understand how ideas in science are established and validated (NRC, 
1996). The prominence of the process standards (problem solving, reasoning and 
proof, communication, representation, and connections) (NCTM, 2000) and the  
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emphasis on students “doing mathematics” (Stein & Lane, 1996) suggest a similar 
emphasis on understanding the nature of mathematics at all levels of schooling. 
We posit that examining and understanding connections between mathematics 
and science will lead to valuable insights for teachers and teacher educators in 
focusing and sharpening both their own epistemic understandings and those of 
their students.  
Although mathematics and science share some epistemic commitments, there are 
significant differences that must be recognized. Proof can be used to illustrate 
such differences. Mathematical proof is the basis of knowledge in mathematics; 
establishing truth in science is more nebulous. Scientific knowledge is 
constructed by the interplay between theory and data, but truth is never conclu-
sively established. Examining epistemic tenets framing mathematics and science 
reveals areas of congruence between the establishment of mathematical 
knowledge and scientific knowledge, as well as areas of incongruence. 
Epistemic commitments in mathematics and science learning 
Students are likely to engage in problem solving endeavors in both mathematics 
and science classes. Given the overlap between activities in these classes, it is 
easy to see how students could equate how knowledge is established in math with 
how it is established in science. For example, knowledge is established 
deductively in mathematics, but mathematical inquiry also includes inductive 
searches for patterns. Inductive logic is a characteristic of the empirical sciences, 
but other forms of logic such as deductive or hypothetico-deductive thinking also 
characterize the sciences. In short, scientific knowledge is not characterized by a 
single mode of inquiry (Rudolph, 2000). While methods of inquiry in science do 
not correspond precisely to the deductive nature of proof in mathematics, there 
are similarities worth noting. Both mathematics and science use systems of 
thought characterized by logic and reasoning, and from a learning perspective 
there is reason to believe that understanding the tenets framing mathematical 
thinking can support understanding tenets associated with scientific thinking, and 
vice versa. However, it is important that students and teachers not confuse the 
level of certainty with which we hold that knowledge in the two disciplines and 
that they can differentiate between appropriate methods by which that knowledge 
is established.  
Points of congruence 
In mathematics, the traditional way to establish certainty is proof, which, while it 
defies precise definition (Hersh, 1993), relies on chains of logical inference built 
up deductively from previously established theorems and definitions. It has been 
well-established that proving is difficult for students and teachers (Bell, 1976; 
Coe & Ruthven, 1994; Knuth, 2002; Weber, 2001), and some have suggested that 
this is partially due to different meanings attributed to proof in different settings 
(Recio & Godino, 2001). Within mathematics, several functions of proof have 
been identified, such as verification, explanation, communication, and 
systemization, among others (deVilliers, 1990; Hanna, 2000). The most important  
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role for proof in classroom mathematics is commonly accepted to be explanation 
(Hanna, 2000; Hersh, 1993). Even outside the classroom, research 
mathematicians value explanatory proofs higher than those that merely confirm 
the truth of a statement. Rodd (2000) warns that, while proof establishes 
mathematical validity, a proof may not be convincing to a particular person, and 
thus not establish the truth of an idea for him or her. That is, a person may be 
convinced by something other than a proof, and a proof may not serve to 
convince. 
Emphasizing the explanatory value of proof in mathematics forges a connection 
to science because explanation is a key feature of science. In science, it is 
important that learners understand the relationship between evidence and 
explanation. According to Duschl and Grandy (2008), “the new views of science 
and of psychology raise pressing issues of how we know what we know and why 
we believe certain statements rather than competing alternatives” (p. 5). This 
vision of science education is a far cry from ‘the scientific method’ that far too 
often caricaturizes school science. As explained in terms of proof in mathematics, 
the explanatory aspect is key. In science, guiding learners to understand how 
explanations of natural phenomena are crafted from empirical evidence, in 
relation to existing information, is key. 
The interplay of inductive and deductive reasoning is apparent in both 
mathematics and science classrooms. To illustrate, consider two classrooms, one 
geometry and one physics. Both classes are taught by teachers who strive to align 
their teaching with the standards (NCTM, 2000; NRC, 1996). In the geometry 
class, students explore characteristics of a figure with dynamic geometry software 
that models Euclidean geometry, and develop a hypothesis about some aspect of 
relationships within that figure. In the science classroom, students explore the 
motion of a pendulum and develop a hypothesis about the relationship between 
the pendulum’s length, the mass of the bob, and the time it takes for the pendulum 
to complete one swing. To this point, at least from the perspective of the students, 
they have engaged in similar, perhaps almost identical, activity. However, it is at 
this point that the different epistemological understandings of the specific 
disciplines must engage. For in mathematics, the student must attempt to 
deductively prove the veracity of the hypothesis. No amount of experimentation 
will allow him or her, from a mathematical perspective, to establish the truth of 
the hypothesis, and once it is proved, it is established as true with no need to 
re-prove and no possibility of contradiction. In science, on the other hand, the 
student must carefully craft an experiment to determine whether his or her 
hypothesis is correct. This experiment may disprove the hypothesis, but it will not 
prove that it is correct. It may confirm the hypothesis, but that confirmation is 
tentative, and is subject to the possibility of disconfirming evidence.  
The evaluation of knowledge claims in both math and science rests on a social 
process. That is, “A community justifies knowledge through social 
practices….[which includes] the specific ways members of a community propose,  
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justify, evaluate, and legitimize knowledge claims within a disciplinary 
framework” (Kelly, 2008, p. 99). Similarly, Hersh (1993) defines proof as 
“convincing argument, as judged by qualified judges” (p. 389). Thus while a 
proof is to be deductive, it is judged adequate by a social process of argumentation 
and critique. In the example above, both classes may engage in a social process of 
accepting or rejecting the proof or experiment. The fate of the associated 
hypothesis may or may not depend on the outcome of the aforementioned social 
process. For instance, the class may reject the method of justification but not the 
entity being justified. Epistemic understandings are important because teacher 
with appropriate epistemic understandings can guide a community of learners to 
engage in social processes in ways that guide the development of appropriate 
disciplinary epistemic commitments. 
In math, students propose hypotheses based on evidence of patterns, perhaps by 
observing a numerical pattern or a consistency in geometric situation within a 
dynamic geometry context. Students’ justifications should be deductive in nature 
(but are not always). They would ideally lead to proof, at least to proof as 
appropriate for the particular classroom community. Knowledge claims are 
evaluated based on what is taken as shared knowledge in the classroom, based on 
the teacher’s understanding of mathematical knowledge, and based on an 
evaluation of the justifications provided by the students. A similar scheme is 
applicable in science, with differences primarily in the justification of a 
knowledge claim where deductive proof is replaced with a well-formulated 
experiment, observation, or further model-based explanation. 
Points of incongruence 
While there are certainly places where mathematics and science overlap, it is 
important to recognize where such overlaps do not hold. One noteworthy 
incongruence is illustrated by the classroom example above. In science, 
uncertainty is always a possibility; in math, when a hypothesis is proven it is truth. 
“[E]ven if individuals understand that scientific laws are equal in importance to 
theories, they rarely appreciate that all knowledge in science is tentative, 
occasionally seeing “proof” in science equal to proof in mathematics” (McComas, 
1998, p. 55). These distinctions must be understood by teachers as they attempt to 
engage students in authentic disciplinary experiences. “Whereas science seeks 
consistency with the natural/external world through empirical evidence, 
mathematics seeks consistency within its internal system through logical 
deduction. This basic but important methodological difference calls for 
sophisticated understanding and explicit discussion of the nature of mathematics 
and science” (Pang & Good, 2000, p. 74). Understanding this epistemological 
distinction is important for teachers and students since it gets at the heart of the 
different goals of mathematics and science. Not making this distinction runs the 
risk of confusing students, who often in geometry require more empirical 
evidence after having proved a theorem, thus not fully appreciating the power of 
deductive proof. Students must come to understand not only the differences in  
1‐110  ICMI Study 19－2009 
disciplinary methodology, but also the related outcome as regards the level of 
certainty with which we hold results. Students and teachers must come to 
understand the logic associated with solving problems in mathematics and science, 
and this is an understanding that must be developed over time. Mathematics and 
science teachers can use their epistemic understandings to point out distinctions 
between mathematical and scientific knowledge to their students, and can 
structure activities that engage them in considering the methodological 
distinctions, disparate goals, and levels of certainty of results. 
A teacher who understands the epistemology of both mathematics and science is 
in a better position to capitalize on the similarities between math and science and 
to highlight the subtle and more obvious differences between the two. For 
instance, such a teacher in a math class could ask students about designing an 
experiment in mathematics and point out the uncertainty left by such an 
experiment, perhaps highlighting this with an example such as suggested by 
Hadas, Hershkowitz, and Schwartz (2000), where experimentation may lead to 
uncertainty rather than certainty. Eventually, students can begin to understand the 
importance of internal consistency within mathematics, and the distinction of that 
from empirical science, where there is an external physical reality to be explained 
and with which to be consistent. 
“The development first of algebra and then calculus were indispensible to the rise 
of modern science and no science curriculum, inquiry based on not, can ignore the 
role of mathematics. How, and how much, mathematics to integrate is a difficult 
questions we must address….The bottom line for us is that the integration of 
science and mathematics needs more attention!” (Duschl & Grandy, 2008, p. 20). 
We are not calling necessarily for integration but for a concentrated effort to 
understand the epistemological foundations of each discipline on the part of 
teacher educators and teachers in order to enhance our ability to cultivate 
epistemological as well as content understandings in students. 
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THE DOUBLE TRANSPOSITION IN PROVING 
Richard Cabassut  
DIDIREM  Paris 7 University , IUFM Strasbourg University, France 
In this paper we propose methods to analyse proving. These methods are used to 
study proving in textbooks in secondary education in France and Germany  or to 
analyse students' correct proofs of the solution of a problem involving algebra 
and geometry. We observed different types of techniques, depending on the 
domain (algebra or geometry) and using different registers of representation 
(natural language, symbolic language, drawing ...). These observations stress the 
different functions of the proof in the official curriculum and in the hidden 
curriculum and show different didactical contracts in proving. We consider that 
proving in mathematics education is the place where mathematical proof meets 
extra-mathematical validation. 
THEORY AND METHODS  
From (Toulmin 1958) we consider an argument as a three-part structure (data, 
warrant, conclusion). We apply a warrant to data to produce a conclusion. We call 
arguments of plausibility the arguments in which the conclusion is plausible. It’s 
also a reference to the plausible reasoning of (Polya 1954) described under the 
name of abduction by (Peirce 1960, 5.189) : C is true and ‘if A then C’ is true, 
then A is more plausible. We call arguments of necessity the arguments in which 
the conclusion is necessary true. The ‘modus ponens’ is an example of reasoning 
of necessity: A is true, and ‘if A then C’ is true, then C is necessarily true. We call 
‘validation’ a reasoning that intends to assert, necessarily or plausibly, the truth of 
a statement. A ‘proof’ is a validation using only arguments of necessity and an 
‘argumentation’ is a validation using arguments of plausibility and maybe 
arguments of necessity. We analyse a validation by describing the sequence of 
arguments exposed in the validation. The nature of the warrant of the argument 
enables to differentiate argumentation and proof, or to differentiate mathematical 
argumentation (for example with mathematical definition, property or theorem as 
warrant) and extra-mathematical argumentation (for example with visual, 
inductive or pragmatic warrant).  
To explain the combination of arguments of necessity and arguments of 
plausibility in a same validation we need to identify the different functions of a 
validation. De Villiers proposed different functions of the proof in mathematics: 
 “verification (concerned with the truth of a statement), explanation (providing 
insight into why it is true), systematisation (the organisation of various results into a 
deductive system of axioms, major concepts and theorems), discovery (the discovery 
or invention of new results), communication (the transmission of mathematical 
knowledge)” (De Villiers 1990, 18). 
We extend these functions of the proof to the validation in the teaching of 
mathematics. For the function of verification we distinguish two functions: the  
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function of plausibility verifies the plausibility of the truth of an assertion; the 
function of proof verifies the necessity of the truth of an assertion. 
VALIDATION IN FRENCH OR GERMAN TEXTBOOKS 
Examples of validation of theorems are analysed in the most used textbook in 
general secondary education line (Gymnasium) in Baden-Württemberg 
(Lambacher-Schweitzer editor). The examples are chosen depending on the class 
where they are introduced (at the same class level than in France, earlier or later), 
on the domain (Geometry, measure, function, equation), the position in 
connection with the year  where proof is introduced (same year, earlier, later). In 
both countries proof is mainly introduced at grade 8 (13-14 years old). Inspirated 
by  (Clarke 2004) we look for a French textbook where a similar proof exists and 
we analyse for these similar proof the differences. When we don't find similar 
proofs we compare different proofs. We observe the presence of non 
mathematical warrants in the validation of theorems as illustrated in the following 
examples. 
Formulas on the perimeter and area of a circle (Cabassut 2005, p.331) are 
validated at grade 6 and 7 in France. The French textbook proposes 
extra-mathematic warrants (visual, inductive or pragmatic arguments) because 
mathematic warrants are not available at this grade. This formula is introduced 
early in the curriculum because a part of the pupils leave the lower secondary 
comprehensive school to join vocational school at the end of grade 9. The 
validation is done at grade 10 in Baden-Württemberg where the Gymnasium 
pupils usually keep the Gymnasium line from grade 5 to grade 13. Even if a 
complete mathematic proof is not available at this grade, additional mathematic 
warrants are used in the validation (definitions and theorems on perimeters and 
areas, on similar triangles and polygons, on similarity and area). The German 
validations are more developed than in the French case because the syllabus 
precises explicitly that the validation of the formulas of the perimeter and the area 
of the circle has to be used as a propedeutic to the teaching of limits which 
encourages the use of inductive arguments. 
For the theorem on the sum of angles in a triangle at grade 7 (Cabassut 2005b), a 
visual argument is necessary because the theorems on orientated angles are not 
available. Both textbooks propose a first validation using pragmatic argument 
(cutting and assembling of puzzle pieces, moving a Meccano triangle and 
measuring). Then they both propose a second validation using mathematical 
warrants (definitions and theorems on angles) and a visual argument.  
For the sign of a quadratic function at grade 10 (Cabassut 2005, p.331) in both 
countries algebraic theorems enable a mathematic proof. In the German textbook 
a graphic discussion with visual arguments from a particular graph of the 
quadratical function uses inductive and graphic arguments.  The French textbook 
uses a table of the signs of the quadratic function factors to discuss the sign of the 
quadratic function. The graphic discussion for quadratic unequation is very used  
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in Germany whereas the discussion on the tables of signs is very used in France. 
We observe here different didactical contracts (Brousseau 1997). 
For Pytagora's theorem at grade 8 (Cabassut 2005b) both textbooks validate that 
the quadrangle ERCO is a square by visual argument even if the theorems on 
angles and quadrangles are available to prove it on a mathematic way. 
We observe similarities in proofs: use of plausible and pragmatic arguments and 
use of visual technique when mathematic warrants are available or not (both cases 
are illustrated), use of mathematic and not mathematic technologies in the same 
proof (for example: visual or inductive technology and mathematic technology 
together used). These uses can be explained through the functions of the different 
proofs. For some proofs, techniques are different because the didactical contracts 
are different (for example in the case of the sign of quadratic function) or because 
the functions of the proof are different. The explanation and the propedeutic 
functions are more developed in the Baden-Württemberg textbook and the 
function of verification and of written communication seems more developed in 
French textbooks as confirmed by syllabus. 
VALIDATIONS WRITTEN BY FRENCH AND GERMAN PUPILS 
We analyse now proofs written by French or German students of 9
th or 10th
 grade 
(14 to 16 years old). It was requested from French classes in Alsace and from 
German classes in Baden-Württemberg to write a proof corresponding to the 
following problem formulated in the respective mother tongues. Each work 
corresponds to a different class (and thus to different teachers). Each work was 
corrected by two teachers. Then the 23 best works from each country were 
extracted (among the hundreds of works of each country). We will call A the 
French sample and B the German one, in order to reduce the temptation to extend 
A to all the French pupils and B to German ones. The idea is to study the correct 
proofs and not to study the errors produced by the pupils. This problem is 
interesting because its solutions need arguments from geometry and from algebra. 
In both countries the same mathematic technology (intersection theorem, 
calculations on equalities and fractions) are available. The text of the problem is 
the following. 
On a computer screen Gerard constructed the below drawing. The straight line (d1) 
and (d2) are parallels and 1cm distant from each other. He slides the straight line (d3) 
between (d3) keeping (d3) parallel to (d1) and (d2). He observes that the length AB and 
CD displayed on the screen are equals whatever position of (d3), but there are only 
approximate values. Prove that AB=CD whatever position of (d3).  
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Two prototypes of proof  
A qualitative study makes it possible to give off two prototypes of proof. A first 
proof from a French class has the following translation. M, A and E are on the 
same straight line in the same order. M, B and F are on the same straight line in the 
same order. In the triangle MEF, the straight lines (d3) and (d2) are parallels. It is 
why in the triangle MEF maths we can use the intersection theorem. Then 
MA/ME=MB/MF=AB/EF.  
N, C and E are on the same straight line in the same order. N, D and F are on the 
same straight line in the same order. In the triangle NEF, the straight lines (d3) and 
(d2) are parallels. It is why in the triangle NEF maths we can use also the 
intersection theorem. Then NC/NE=ND/NF=CD/EF. 
N, C and E are respectively the projected of M, A and E parallel to (d1) and (d3) 
then MA/ME=NC/NE. Then AB/EF=CD/EF. It is why whatever position of (d3) 
AB=CD. 
A second proof from a German class has the following translation. 
From intersection theorem there is:  
d1/c =a/(a+b) and d2/c= a/(a+b) 
d1 =a c /(a+b) and d2 = a c /(a+b) 
                     d1 = d2 
Conjectures and results 
One observes in the B sample the domination of the symbolic algebraic register 
and the recourse to the figure, with coding of the figure. In the A sample, one 
observes the absence of figure and the importance of the recourse to the written 
register and a great expansion of the discourse. One wishes to check by 
quantitative methods if these characteristics are statistically significant. Indeed, 
one finds copies of the two types in each country. The statistical study shows that  
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the recourse to the figure is significantly more frequent in B work than A. It is 
necessary to define a measurement of the expansion of the discourse which is not 
based on the number of words. For example “the intersection theorem” counts for 
four French words (« le théorème de Thalès ») and two German words (“der 
Strahlensatz”). The linguistic differences require a supra-linguistic method of 
discourse analysis. One distinguishes the following proving units in the 
formulation of an argument based on (Houdebine 1998) and (Duval 1995): 
context of the argument (for example: in triangle MEF), the entries of the 
arguments or data (for example: “points M, A, E are on a straight line”, 
“(AB)//(EF)”, the quotation of the rule of argument (for example: according to the 
theorem of Thales), an exit of the argument or conclusion (for example: 
“ MA/ME = MB/MF=AB/EF” , the introduction of a new data (for example a new 
point necessary for a geometrical construction).  
The statistical study shows that between the A sample and the B sample the 
difference of the number of proving units in geometry is statistically significant, 
whereas it is not in algebra. In geometry, the quotation of the context, the entry of 
argument are significantly more frequent while the variation is not statisti-cally 
significant for the quotation of the rule of argument. On the other hand in algebra, 
the quotation of the rule of argument is significantly more frequent in the B 
sample. The use of a drawing is significantly more frequent in the B sample. In the 
A sample the discourse in Geometry is more expanded (number of proving units) 
and more precise (the status of a proving unit is marked) : here the function of 
verification and the function of written communication are more emphasised in 
accordance with French syllabus putting Geometry domain as the main domain 
for proof learning. In the B sample the discourse is less expanded and has a 
greater use of drawing: the function of explanation is more stressed.  These 
differences illustrate different didactical contracts (Brousseau 1997) which 
develop different techniques and functions of the proof in a case where the 
available mathematic technologies are the same for both samples. 
DOUBLE TRANSPOSITION 
There are non mathematical validations in others institutions. Mathematical 
arguments can join non mathematical arguments to make a validation (for 
example for the sum of angles of a triangle: measurement, use of Meccano or 
cutting) in the institution that teaches mathematics: this new hybrid validation is 
called a didactic validation, and is created by transposing a validation used in a 
non-mathematical institution onto a validation used by institutions that teach 
mathematics. In this case, special functions are developed (function of 
explanation in the previous examples, function of discovery to prepare the 
teaching of limits). 
In a mathematical proof some mathematical arguments are available (to prove 
that the inner quadrangle is a square) or not available (orientated angles by the 
sum of angles of a triangle)) in the mathematic class. They are replaced by 
non-mathematical arguments (visual arguments in our example). It is a  
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transposition of a mathematical proof onto a didactic validation where the 
functions of explanation, plausibility or proof, and systematisation can be 
developed.  
In this sense didactic validation is the double transposition of mathematical 
proof and of the validation of non-mathematical institutions.  
In this paper we study the proof in a mathematic context. In the case of modelling, 
where the mathematic problem is a model for the problem of the reality, the 
extra-mathematic context is very important in the phases of the construction of 
models, the interpretation of the mathematical solution in real solution, and in the 
validation of the real solution. In the modelling context, the mathematic teacher 
has to transpose mathematic knowledge and extra-mathematic knowledge, 
mathematic validation and extra-mathematic validation with a stronger double 
transposition. This double-transposition is a challenge for mathematic teaching 
engineering and teacher training. The combination of arguments of plausibility 
and mathematical arguments are generally not allowed in a context of assessment 
where the functions of communication, systematisation and proof are developed 
as shown in (Cabassut 2005). The pupils have to understand the change in the 
didactical contract depending on what functions of the validation are developed 
and on what combinations of arguments are allowed. The main difficulty is that 
these two kinds of arguments refer to two different conceptions of truth. 
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This paper aims to investigate Taiwanese junior high school students’ proof 
conceptions in algebra with an incidental purpose to compare the results with 
Healy and Hoyles’ study (2000). Questionnaire survey was adopted as the main 
research method in the study. The 1059 surveyed subjects aged 14-15 years are 
nationally sampled by means of two-stage sampling. The students’ proof 
conceptions are focused on: the arguments they would adopt for their own 
approaches; the arguments they consider would receive the best mark; assessing 
the validity and explanatory power of the given arguments; and the competence of 
constructing a proof.  The main results of students’ responses to two multi-choice 
questions and their constructed proofs of are analysed and discussed.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of getting students to understand the role of reasoning and proving in 
mathematics has been drawing much attention within the community of 
mathematics education for decades. Many research studies indicate that students 
encounter difficulties when making mathematical proofs (Balacheff, 1990; 
Chazan, 1993; Duval, 1998; Harel & Sowder, 1998; Moore, 1994; Tall et al., 
2001). Some mathematics educators also try to get grasp of students’ transition 
from informal to formal reasoning (Hoyles & Healy, 1999; Moore, 1994). 
However, some different voice appears in North America. Many mathematics 
educators have suggested that proof should be degraded to a lesser role in the 
secondary mathematics curriculum for over the past several decades. But some 
researchers hold an opposite view by retorting that none of the factors they 
offered justifies such a move and asserting the value of proof in the classroom 
“both as a reflection of its central role in mathematical practice and as an 
important tool for the promotion of understanding” (Hanna, 1997, p.171).  
There exist many factors influencing students’ learning mathematical proof. 
Based on the construct of “proof schemes (Harel & Sowder, 1998)”, Harel and 
Sowder (2007) generalise a comprehensive perspective on the teaching and 
learning of proofs which consists of a range of factors including: mathematical 
and historical-epistemological, cognitive, and instructional-socio-cultural. Most 
of the empirical studies mainly focus on the cognitive factor by analysing 
students’ answers to questions requiring proof. Besides, students’ conceptions 
about proof that also influence their approaches to argumentation and proof  
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(Healy & Hoyles, 1998; 2000; Simon, 1996) are categorised in the cognitive 
factor (Harel & Sowder, 2007).  
In the little empirical evidence offered in the corpus of mathematics education 
research to document students’ views of proof and the relationship between their 
views and approaches to proof, Healy and Hoyles conducted a multi-year national 
research project Justifying and Proving in School Mathematics in England and 
Wales (Healy & Hoyles, 1998), in which included a survey of high-attaining 14- 
and 15-year-old students about proof in algebra (Healy & Hoyles, 2000). In 
Taiwan, our students’ performances in mathematics and science have been 
evaluated as leading in the world recently (e.g. PISA 2006; TIMSS 2003). 
Nevertheless, as mathematics educators, we are interested in their competence of 
mathematical argumentation, especially because the algebraic proofs have been 
removed from the curriculum. Therefore, as referring to Healy and Hoyles’ 
survey study, we also organised a national research project aiming at investigating 
Taiwan junior high school students’ competence of mathematical argumentation 
and formulating their learning trajectories of mathematics argumentation. It has to 
be noted that the subjects of Healy and Hoyles’ study were high-attainers who 
were at the top 20-25% of the student population, but the subjects in Taiwan were 
nationally sampled. 
The term “proof conception” (or conception of proof) had not been really defined 
by researchers when appearing in academic articles (e.g. Hoyles and her 
colleagues’ studies, Harel & Sowder’s studies). Until 2007, in her PhD 
dissertation about student teachers' conceptions of proof and facilitation of 
argumentation in secondary mathematics classrooms, Conner gives a definition of 
it by defining “a person’s conception of proof as the person’s ability to prove and 
analyze arguments, perception of the role and need for proof in mathematics, and 
affective perception of proof” (Conner, 2007). In our study, as the subjects are 
junior high school students who just start to encounter what so called 
“mathematical proof”, it seems unnecessary to assess their perceptions of the role 
and need for proof and affective perceptions of proof. Therefore, as referring to 
Healy and Hoyles (1998) and other researchers’ works in various aspects of 
argumentation and prove, we decide to focus the students’ proof conceptions on: 
(1) the arguments they would adopt for their own approaches; (2) the arguments 
they consider would receive the best mark; (3) assessing the validity of the given 
arguments; (4) assessing the explanatory power of the given arguments; (5) the 
competence of constructing a proof. These five elements should be concrete and 
sufficient for investigating the students’ abilities to prove and analyse arguments.  
The comparative research in mathematics education between the east and the west 
has been becoming a hot issue for decades. There exists great variation in 
mathematics classroom culture between Taiwan and the UK (e.g. Lin, 1988). In 
the end of Healy and Hoyles’ paper (2000), they seem to suggest some 
international comparisons as possible future studies. Consequently, an incidental 
purpose of the study is to compare our results with Healy and Hoyles’ for 
shedding light on any valuable findings.  
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THE STUDY 
Questionnaire survey method was adopted as the main research method in the 
study. The content of the questionnaire consisted of the domains of arithmetic/ 
algebra while three booklets of instruments with respect to grades 7, 8 and 9 (aged 
12-15 years) were designed. The content of items in the questionnaire included 
views and conceptions about different proof approaches, true or false of a 
statement, specialisation and application of a proved statement or a specific 
argumentation, local reasoning, constructing proofs, validity of a conditional 
statement, cognition of number patterns, and cognition of representation 
translating. In this article, we report some findings from the booklet of grade 9. 
The related items to probe students’ conceptions of proof included two types. 
First, students were presented mathematical conjectures and a range of arguments 
in support of them; they were asked to make two selections from these 
arguments — the argument that would be closest to their own approaches and the 
one they considered would receive the best mark from their teachers. Second, 
students were also asked to make assessments of these given arguments in terms 
of their validity and explanatory power. Two conjectures were offered to students, 
including one familiar (A1) and another unfamiliar (A2). These two conjectures 
first appeared in the UK’s version (see Healy & Hoyles, 2000, pp.400-401), but 
we modified some arguments in the familiar conjecture by deleting a visual 
argument which is not a possible answer for our students, and adding another 
three wrong algebraic arguments with single variable which are the typically 
wrong styles of answers, in Taiwan’s version. Besides, two items, one familiar 
and another unfamiliar, with an open format to ask students to construct their own 
proofs were included in our analysis in the article. The two questions are as 
follows: (A3) Prove that when you add any 2 odd numbers, your answer is 
always even; (A4) Prove that if p and q are any two odd numbers, (p+q)×(p-q) 
is always a multiple of 4.  
The surveyed subjects were nationally sampled by means of two- stage sampling 
approach, different from the UK’s who were high-attainers (the top 20-25% of the 
student population). The numbers of subjects answering different booklets of the 
questionnaire were within a range from 1059 to 1181. In addition, 136 teachers 
also responded to some selected items from the booklets for providing data to 
analyse the teachers’ factor.   
As to the data analysis in the study, students’ responses to A1 and A2 were coded 
and their constructed proofs of A3 and A4 were scored from 0 to 3, in which “0” 
means “no basis for the construction of a correct proof”, “1” means “no 
deductions but relevant information presented”, “2” means “partial proof 
including all information needed but some reasoning omitted”, and “3” means 
“complete proof”. Descriptive statistics based on frequency tables, simple 
correlations, and tests of significance were produced by means of SPSS 13.0.  
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MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Students’ performances in the four questions A1–A4 will be analysed and 
interpreted mainly by means of descriptive statistics. Besides, the main results are 
also compared with the UK’s (Healy & Hoyles, 2000) as well. 
Students’ responses to the multiple-choice questions A1 and A2 
Without respect to A1 or A2, the differences between the choices students made 
for their own approaches and for best mark appeared highly significant (A1: 
χ
2=198.5, p＜.001; A2: χ
2=227.2, p＜.001). In the familiar conjecture A1, as to 
students’ own approaches, there were 49% students choosing algebraic arguments 
whilst 33% picking the wrong ones. 28% students chose the only empirical 
argument, which is wrong. The rest 23% chose the two narrative arguments, 
which are both correct. As to students’ choices for best mark, it increases to 73% 
choosing the algebraic whilst 55% picking the wrong ones. It decreases to only 
8% choosing the empirical. In the unfamiliar conjecture A2, as to students’ own 
approaches, both 31% chose narrative and empirical, whilst both 19% selecting 
the other two algebraic. As to students’ choices for best mark, the most complex 
algebraic one, which is correct, drew most favour (58%), whilst the empirical one 
was only 7%. Compared with UK’s results, their high-attainers’ responses to A1 
and A2 appeared more significant differences than Taiwanese students since p 
values were less than .0001. In addition, the arguments that were the most popular 
for the UK’s students own approaches turned out to be the least popular for best 
mark, and vice versa. This phenomenon did not happen with our Taiwanese 
students.  
As the same with students’ responses, no matter in A1 or A2, the differences 
between teachers’ choices were highly significant either (A1: χ
2=43.1, p＜.001; 
A2: χ
2=42.5, p＜.001). About teachers’ responses to A1, it is not surprisingly that 
84% teachers chose the correct algebraic argument, whilst only 49% predicted the 
students would select it for best mark. Besides, 21% teachers predicted the 
students would select the correct narrative argument for best mark. In A2, as to 
teachers’ choices for their own approaches, 68% chose the narrative, which is a 
correct argument, and 26% picked the complex correct algebraic one. As to the 
argument teachers predicted the students would select for best mark, 57% chose 
the complex algebraic one, whilst 29% picking the narrative. Compared with 
UK’s results, more significant differences appeared with Taiwanese teachers 
since the p values is only less than .05 for A1 and .01 for A2, respectively.  
From the above results, Taiwanese students seemed to prefer the algebraic 
arguments and refuse the empirical for best mark. However, the teachers’ views 
appeared to be a bit different. They seemed to consider the beauty of logic as a 
crucial factor rather than simply on form. 
About students’ evaluations of the validity and explanatory power of each given 
argument, Taiwanese students were much more likely to correctly identify a  
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wrong algebraic proof with nonsense symbols than a wrong algebraic argument 
with limited generality. They might not correctly evaluate the generality of 
narrative and algebraic arguments even though they thought these arguments 
were correct. They appeared to have clear ideas of the validity of the two 
empirical arguments (80% & 76%). But they also considered these empirical 
arguments could tell them the given conjectures were correct. The reason is that 
the examples given in the empirical arguments were all positive. Thus the 
students considered these empirical arguments could help them make sure of the 
correctness of the conjectures, but would not be sufficient for offering valid 
proofs for these conjectures. 
Students’ constructed proofs of A3 and A4 
Both in A3 (familiar conjecture) and A4 (unfamiliar conjecture), more than 40% 
students offered empirical arguments. In A3, about a third students provided 
algebraic arguments, whilst only a ninth in A4. Narrative is a much less popular 
form of arguments in Taiwan than in the UK.  
In A3, 37% were classified with partial or complete proof, and in A4, 20%. 
Compared with the UK, Taiwanese students performed much better in A4, and 
about the same in A3. It should be noted that, in Taiwan, the current curriculum 
for junior high school mathematics is algorithm-oriented, in which the formal 
algebraic proof is not included. Students’ are only taught to verify some algebraic 
conjectures but not prove them formally. 
We also compared the total number of students who chose a correct argument in 
A1 and A2 with the total number of students who construct either a partial or 
complete proof for A3 and A4 for checking the difference. Only the χ
2 test 
between A1 and A3 did not reach the significance level (χ
2=.05, p=.498＞.05). 
The other three all showed highly significant (the p values are all less than .001) 
which might suggest that the students were significantly better at selecting correct 
arguments than at constructing them. However, the case in the UK is more 
obvious since the p value in the χ
2 test is less than .0001.  
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More than two thirds of students failed in 2-steps geometry proof tasks. The 
reading and coloring strategy has been proved effective for incomplete provers to 
have acceptable performance whereas ineffective to the below average students. 
In this paper, we report the study on this issue in Taiwan. We develop a 
step-by-step unrolled strategy to help below average students to enhance their 
competence on multi-steps geometry proof. The results show that the step-by-step 
unrolled strategy is effective on computational proof but not effective on narrative 
proof. And the transition from computational proving to narrative proving is 
discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Proof is at the heart of mathematical thinking and deductive reasoning (Healy and 
Hoyles, 1998). To construct a formal geometry proof plays an important role in 
many countries. Nevertheless, many recent national-wide survey results show 
that there are at most one-third of junior high students can construct a correct or 
acceptable formal geometry proof in a multi-steps question (Healy and Hoyles, 
1998; Reiss, Hellmich and Reiss, 2002; Lin, Cheng and linfl team, 2003). These 
results show that there are about two-thirds of students need more aids to learn 
geometry proof. 
Reiss, Heinze, Renkl and Groß (2008) reported that the students at the different 
achievement levels may not be equally benefit from the learning environment. 
They show that a learning strategy has no significant effectiveness to 
higher-achievement students because the strategy emphasizes the aspects which 
the high-achievement students are already familiar. Our previous studies also 
show that even the reading and coloring strategy may help more than 60% of 
grade 9 students to construct an acceptable proof. It is quit few benefit to the 
below-average students (Heinze,Cheng, Ufer, Lin and Reiss, 2008). These studies 
mentioned that there are different learning difficulties in those who failed in 
proving. It needs to develop learning strategies for different difficulties rather one 
strategy for all students. 
One specific group of students who failed in constructing 2-steps acceptable 
geometry proof has been identified as incomplete provers in our national survey 
(Cheng and linfl team, 2003). We have developed the reading and coloring 
strategy to solve their learning difficulty and it has been proved to be effective 
(Heinze, Cheng, Ufer, Lin and Reiss, 2008). The incomplete provers are able to 
recognize some crucial elements to prove but miss some deductive process. They  
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start their first step properly and construct suitable intermediary information for 
next step of reasoning. Except incomplete provers, the remained students are 
those who do not have any responses in the 2-steps question or apply only one 
theorem (of course it is improper one) to prove it (Cheng and linfl team, 2003). 
We find that these students’ achievement in geometry course is all at bottom 40% 
in their class (Cheng and Lin, 2007). And the reading and coloring strategy do not 
help them to construct acceptable geometry proof (Heinze, Cheng, Ufer, Lin and 
Reiss, 2008). That is, these below average students seem to learn nothing in our 
traditional teaching and even in our diagnostic teaching for incomplete provers. 
Under the vision of taking care of all students so that every child gets progress, we 
try to identify the reachable learning goal for below average students on 
multi-steps geometry proof and to develop the effective learning strategy for them 
to learn in this study. 
THE NARRATIVE AND COMPUTATIONAL TASK OF PROOF 
There are two typical tasks of geometry proof, namely computational and 
narrative. The narrative task is easy to know as the Euclidean proof. It asks the 
students to prove the assigned relation of configurations under the given 
conditions. The written form of narrative task is quite flexibility in Taiwan. It may 
be the form of 2-column or any other descriptive one. The key point is the clear 
expression of inference from premise to conclusion and the acceptable theorem to 
support the inference. Mathematical symbolic or daily life languages are 
acceptable to be used in narrative tasks. The computational task asks students to 
find out the assigned measure(s) of configuration under the given conditions (as 
Fig1). In computational task, students are allowed to write down the results 
(intermediary concluded measure) of reasoning. The whole process may look like 
a number calculation task. 
 
Fig1. example of computational proof 
It is not easy to compare the level of difficulties between narrative and 
computational proof. However, some studies reported that there are many junior 
high students are able to solve geometry computational task before they learn 
formal narrative proof. For example, there is 59.6% of Taiwan grade 8 (Cheng 
and linfl team, 2003) and 33% of English Year 9 (Küchemann and Hoyles, 2002) 
students are able to solve the 3-steps question of Fig1(2). And the formal narrative 
proof are learn in one grade/year after. Since the below average students are not 
able to solve 3-steps computational question completely either, the curriculum 
goal of multi-steps geometry proof is computational rather than narrative for left 
behind students.  
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THE DIFFICULTY OF BELOW AVERAGE STUDENTS IN PROVING 
Healy and Hoyles(1998) proposed that the process of constructing a valid proof 
involves several central mental processes. Students have to sort out what given 
properties are already known or assumed and what is to be deduced, and then 
organize the necessary transformation to infer the second set of properties from 
the first into coherent and complete sequence. Duval(2002) proposed a two-level 
cognitive features of this proving process. The first level is to process one step of 
deduction according to the status of premise, conclusion, and theorems to be used. 
The second level is to change intermediary conclusion into premise successively 
for the next step of deduction and to organize these deductive steps into a proof. A 
standard geometry proof question in junior high lessons is of the form ‘Given X, 
show that Y’ with a figure. To prove means to construct a sequence of 
argumentation from X to Y with supportive reasons. An acceptable reason in the 
junior high geometry proof lessons is usually deduction with acceptable theorems. 
One may say that to prove is to bridge the given condition to wanted conclusion 
with acceptable theorems. In a multi-steps proof, there is no single theorem can be 
applied to bridge X and Y directly. Students have to construct an intermediary 
condition (IC) firstly for the next reasoning. The IC might be reasoned forwardly 
from a premise. It is an intermediary conclusion which might be a new premise 
for the next step (Duval, 2002). Or, it might be reasoned a step backwardly from a 
conclusion. It is an intermediary premise which might be a subgoal for the next 
step. The process of proving in a multi-steps task is then a process of constructing 
useful ICs to bridge from X to Y. No matter these ICs are constructed forwardly 
or backwardly, it is an essential process of conjecturing and selecting/testing. We 
may say this kind of reasoning competence in proof is hypothetical bridging. It is 
the crucial competence to proceed the process of ‘infer the second set of 
properties from the first’ proposed by Healy and Hoyles(1998) and also to 
proceed the second level of proving proposed by Duval(2002).  
The below average students are those who do not have any responses in the 
2-steps questions or apply only one theorem to prove it. Their competence of 
geometry proof is only restricted in the first level (Duval, 2002) of proving. In 
other words, the below average students are those who can not do hypothetical 
bridge in a multi-steps task (Cheng and Lin, 2007). The challenge is how to start 
their hypothetical bridging thinking.  
The reasoning direction for bridging may be forward, backward or even 
intertwined between forward and backward. The learning strategy may be 
emphasized on one way or both. The backward reasoning in proving a multi-steps 
question is to set up the subgoals for next step reasoning. It may be the preferred 
way by mathematicians, teachers and text book authors. However, it is quite 
difficult to our students. According our previous studies, less than 40% of 
incomplete provers improved their quality of proof with the backward analytic 
approach. Moreover, only 29% of them can then construct an acceptable proof. It 
is far less than the reading and coloring strategy which is based on the forward  
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approach (Cheng and Lin, 2006). This is very important information to develop 
the learning strategy for the below average students. Since they are weaker in 
learning geometry proof than incomplete provers, the loading of analytic 
reasoning would be too heavy for them. And we then develop the strategy based 
on forward reasoning only. That is, the learning strategy will teach the below 
average students to construct multi-steps proof from given condition to wanted 
conclusion only. 
THE STEP-BY-STEP UNROLLED STRATEGY 
To motivate below average students to start their hypothetical bridging reasoning, 
the step-by-step unrolled (SU) strategy is developed based on the suggestion of 
Boero(1999). We modify proving from the traditional form of “given X, show 
that Y” into a step-by-step open-ended reasoning. That is, we split the complex 
process of multi-steps proof into guided stepwise micro reasoning (Duval, 1999) 
activities. In the SU strategy, we give students a ‘covered’ proving task, unroll the 
first condition to the students, and ask them to conclude what should be true under 
such given condition. And then we unroll the second condition, ask them to 
conclude what should be true under such given conditions and conclusion from 
the first step of inferring, and so on. As we mention above, this is a forward 
reasoning approach (referring to Fig.2).  
Since identifying the learning goal on multi-steps geometry proof for below 
average students is an issue in this explorative study, both narrative and 
computational tasks are used in SU strategy. If the narrative one is too heavy to 
learn, then we may shift to a computational one. 
 
Fig2. examples of step-by-step unrolled task 
THE EXPORATIVE STUDY 
A questionnaire with four items is developed and tested as a pre-test in 5 classes 
of grade 9 students. 11 students who are identified below average are regrouped 
into an extra class after the regular lessons. The content of extra class teaching 
covered four topics: (1) triangle (2) quadrangle (3) congruent triangles (4) parallel 
lines. To each topic, we review the knowledge of the topic. Students have to 
accomplish a step-by-step unrolled reasoning task. It spends about 100 minutes in 
each topic and the teaching last 6 weeks. A post test is conducted right after the 
extra class teaching. Students’ performances are analyzed in order to know the  
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effectiveness of step-by-step unrolled strategy in constructing narrative and 
computational geometry proof. Four weeks after post test, a delay post test is 
conducted. The number of correct intermediary conditions from each participated 
student is conducted in order to measure the retaining effectiveness of 
hypothetical bridging competence under the step-by-step unrolled strategy. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of our experiment for below average students show that the SU can 
help 9/11 students to develop the competence of hypothetical bridging in all 3 
post test items. Only two of them fail in one item. Moreover, the SU can help 9/11 
students to solve 3-steps computational questions. However, the SU strategy 
seems to be ineffective to narrative proof tasks. A detailed analysis of the 
students’ responses show that this kind of stepwise open-ended reasoning reduce 
the heavy loading in proving or computing a complex question. Since there is no 
wanted conclusion, students then can retrieve all they know to answer the 
question in every step. It is essentially a free recalling task before the last step for 
bridging the wanted conclusion. It split a multiple bridging process to many free 
conjecturing and one (the last step) simple bridging. Moreover, there is enough 
known information shown in the final step. It makes the final bridging easier. 
Our study shows that for the below average students, they are not able to do 
hypothetical bridge in a multi-steps task. The challenge is to improve the below 
average students’ competence on hypothetical bridging in order to start the 
bridging process. A stepwise guided open-ended reasoning procedure like the 
step-by-step unrolled strategy is effective to help them start the hypothetical 
reasoning process and go on to answer the question. 
However, the SU strategy seems to be ineffective to multi-steps narrative proof. 
That is, the SU strategy is not enough to enhance the quality of narrative geometry 
proof. It tells us that the experience of guided stepwise reasoning (SU) on 
computation proof is not easily transited to narrative proof. One reason is that 
there may be some essential differences of thinking between computational and 
narrative proving task, such as the ability to present the format of a narrative proof. 
A newly study (Hsu, in preparation) shows that in the same question setting, there 
are about one-third of students who are able to do a computational proof but 
unable to do a narrative proof. Hsu’s interview data show that the crucial step to 
learn is ‘how to write down the process of reasoning’. If we can develop activities 
for them to learn to present their reasoning process, we can expect that the below 
average students may transit from multi-steps computational proof to narrative 
proof. In conclusion, whether all the students are able to learn the multi-steps 
narrative geometry proof is still an open question and needs more experimental 
studies.  
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐129 
REFERENCES 
Boero, P. (1999). Argumentation and mathematical proof: A complex, productive, 
unavoidable relationship in mathematics and mathematics education. Inter- 
national Newsletter on the Teaching and Learning of Mathematical Proof 7/8. 
Cheng, Y.H. & Lin, F.L (2006). The development from figural reasoning to 
geometry proof. Annual Research report (in chinese). National Science 
Council. Taiwan.. 
Cheng, Y.H. & Lin, F.L (2007) The effectiveness and limitation of Reading and 
coloring strategy in learning geometry proof. Research Report in Proceedings 
of the 31th Conference of the International Group for the Psychology of 
Mathematics Education. Seoul (Korea) University. 
Duval, R. (1999). Questioning argumentation. International Newsletter on Teaching and 
Learning in Mathematics Proof. Newsletter on the Teaching and Learning of 
Mathematical Proof (991112) 
Duval, R. (2002). Proof understanding in MATHEMATICS: What ways for 
STUDENTS? Proceedings of 2002 International Conference on Mathematics: 
Understanding Proving and Proving to Understand, pp. 61-77. 
Healy, L. & Hoyles, C.(1998):Justifying and proving in school mathematics. 
Summary of the results from a survey of the proof conceptions of students in 
the UK. Research Report Mathematical Sciences, Institute of Education, 
University of London. 
Heinze, A., Cheng, Y. H., Ufer, S., Lin, F. L. & Reiss, K. (2008): Strategies to 
foster students’ competencies in constructing multi-steps geometric proofs: 
teaching experiments in Taiwan and Germany. ZDM Mathematics Education 
(2008) 40:443–453 
Hsu, H.-Y. (In preparation). Comparing students' performance in constructing a 
geometric proof and solving a paired geometric calculation. 
Küchemann, D. & Hoyles, C. (2002):The quality of students' reasons for the steps 
in a geometric calculation. British Society for Research into Learning 
Mathematics Conference, Bristol May 2002 
Lin, F. L.; Cheng, Y. H. & linfl team(2003)：The Competence of Geometric 
Argument in Taiwan Adolescents. International Conference on Science & 
Mathematics Learning. 2003.12.16-18。 
Reiss, K.; Hellmich, F.; & Reiss, M. (2002): Reasoning and proof in geometry: 
Prerequisites of knowledge acquisition in secondary school students. 
Proceedings of the 26th Conference of the International Group for the 
Psychology of Mathematics Education. Norwich (Great Britain) University. 
Reiss, K. M., Heinze, A., Renkl, A & Groß, C. (2008): Reasoning and proof in 
geometry: effects of a learning environment based on heuristic worked-out 
examples. ZDM Mathematics Education (2008) 40:455–467  
1‐130  ICMI Study 19－2009 
CHALLENGES TO TEACHING AUTHENTIC 
MATHEMATICAL PROOF IN SCHOOL MATHEMATICS  
Michelle Cirillo 
Iowa State University, USA 
As pointed out by Stylianides (2007), a major reason that proof and proving have 
been given increased attention in recent years is because they are fundamental to 
doing and knowing mathematics and communicating mathematical knowledge. 
Thus, there has been a call over the last two decades to bring the experiences of 
students in school mathematics closer to the work of practicing mathematicians. 
In this paper, I discuss the challenges that a beginning teacher faced as he 
attempted to teach authentic mathematical proof. More specifically, I argue that 
his past experiences with proof and the curriculum materials made available to 
him were obstacles to enacting a practice that was more like what he called “real 
math.” 
INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT LITERATURE 
A major reason that proof and proving have been given increased attention in 
recent years is because they are fundamental to doing and knowing mathematics 
and communicating mathematical knowledge (Stylianides, 2007). In describing 
proof as the “guts of mathematics,” Wu (1996b, p. 222) argued that anyone who 
wanted to know what mathematics was about needed to learn how to write, or at 
least understand, a proof. These comments complement the call to bring students’ 
experiences in school mathematics closer to the practices of mathematicians (Ball, 
1993; Lampert, 1992; NCTM, 2000). Thus, many mathematics educators 
advocate for engaging students in ‘authentic mathematics,’ where they are given 
opportunities to refute and prove conjectures (Lakatos, 1976; NCTM, 2000; 
Lampert, 1992). 
However, researchers have pointed out that not only do students find the learning 
of proof to be challenging (Farrell, 1987; Senk, 1985), but teachers also find the 
teaching of proof to be a difficult endeavor (Knuth, 2002; Wu, 1996a). This is not 
a problem that is unique to the United States, as similar issues related to 
difficulties with proof at various school levels have been noted in other countries 
as well (see, e.g., Furinghetti et al., 2001). At the same time, in recent reforms of 
school mathematics in the United States (National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics [NCTM], 1989, 2000), the Standards documents have reframed the 
issue of mathematical understanding around constructivist ideas and have served 
as the impetus for  the creation of reformed, understanding-based curricula (Bohl, 
2000). More specifically related to proof, the NCTM recommends that teachers at 
every level “help students make, refine, and explore conjectures on the basis of 
evidence and use a variety of reasoning and proof techniques to confirm or 
disprove those conjectures” (NCTM, 2000, p. 3). As a result, the role of 
curriculum materials has been viewed as increasingly important over the last two 
decades (Remillard, 2005).  
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 In the case of geometry proof, the curriculum has been noted as a primary cause 
of students’ poor performance, both in what topics are addressed and how they are 
communicated (Jaime et al., 1992). Contemporary curriculum materials, even 
those which purport to be Standards-based, do no necessarily assist teachers in 
carrying out the goal of teaching authentic proof. Thus, an enormous 
responsibility is placed on teachers who wish to enact a Standards-based 
pedagogy (Knuth, 2002) with the aim of teaching mathematical proof that is more 
authentic.  
The work reported in this paper is based on a three-year case study designed to 
learn more about how a teacher of proof developed in the context of geometry. 
Due to space limitations, I limit my discussion here to two issues that could serve 
as obstacles to teaching authentic mathematical proof: past experiences and 
curriculum materials. In the sections that follow, I first describe the context of the 
study as well as the data that were collected and analyzed. I then present some 
findings and discussion before concluding the paper. 
CONTEXT OF THE STUDY AND DATA 
This study was designed as a longitudinal case study. The secondary school where 
the teacher, Matt (a pseudonym), taught was located in a city in a Midwestern 
state in the middle of the United States. Despite the fact that he was a beginning 
teacher, Matt indicated that he was confident in his knowledge of mathematics. 
Because his grasp of mathematics (and therefore proof) did not seem limited, I 
was able to tease out some curricular issues and pedagogical dilemmas that 
teachers might face as they learn to teach geometry proof.  
During each year of the study, Matt selected a focus class for observation that he 
believed to be fairly typical of 10th-grade (ages 15-16) geometry classes in that 
particular school. He used a conventional geometry textbook that developed 
Euclidean geometry as an axiomatic system. The authors either led the reader 
through the proofs of these theorems or left the proofs as exercises. I refer to the 
textbook as “conventional” because as with “traditional textbooks,” this book is 
organized in such a way that it presents the content without much guidance as to 
what is important to emphasize or how to teach it (Posner, 2004).  
The primary data sources for this study were classroom observations and 
interviews with Matt. I visited the classroom during lessons when the teacher 
introduced proof and taught triangle congruence proofs. Each lesson was audio 
and video recorded. All interviews were semi-structured and audio recorded. For 
more detail about the data collection and analysis, see Cirillo (2008).  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to understand how Matt’s prior experiences with proof influenced the  
ways in which he interpreted his mathematical world, I discuss his early 
experiences as a student learning proof and then describe his beliefs about “real 
math.” I hope to impart the beliefs and philosophies that motivated Matt to make  
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the changes that were described across time (Cirillo, 2008). In the larger study, I 
argued that the changes found in his teaching of proof were motivated by Matt’s 
desire to create experiences for his students that were more closely related to “real 
math” than to the “school math” experience provided through lecturing from his 
textbook.  
Early Experiences with Proof 
Matt could not recall ever being asked to write a proof during his school 
mathematics experience, and he did not recall even being shown a proof in high 
school. As a mathematics major at a university, however, Matt said: 
Example 1 
I was immediately asked to do all sorts of proofs, which…now, looking back at it, 
I can see as not being so bad, but at the time I’m like, this is a joke. I’m like, this 
is impossible. You know, you can’t do this…How can people prove things about 
eigenspace values and all this other kind of stuff?...It was very much like what 
you thought was real is now no longer true. (Interview, 6/21/06) 
 
The difficult transition that Matt experienced from school to undergraduate 
mathematics is not uncommon. The paucity of proof in school mathematics 
coupled with the fact that even in the lower-level university courses (e.g., calculus 
and linear algebra), few, if any, proofs are required of students (Moore, 1994) 
helps us understand why Matt felt that doing proofs was “impossible.”  During the 
first year of this study, Matt compared the challenge of doing his first proof (as a 
student) to walking through a wall. This, he said, caused him to rethink his major 
in mathematics. When I asked Matt about this experience, he said, “Yeah, actually 
I really questioned if I was going to keep going to college or not, but 
yeah…because I was like, this is imposs-, I mean, this is a joke” (Interview, 
6/21/06). These comments may seem surprising given that Matt was clearly 
above-average in school mathematics, evidenced by (among other things) his 
being two years ahead in his studies prior to graduating from high school. As 
Moore (1994) explained, however, “This abrupt transition to proof is a source of 
difficulty for many students, even for those who have done superior work with 
ease in their lower-level mathematics courses” (p. 249). Matt said that even 
though he did not take any sort of an introductory proof course, eventually he was 
“able to do it” and “able to understand or believe that this was something that [he] 
could do” (Interview, 6/21/06). The experiences described here caused Matt to 
begin to think about mathematics in new ways.  
“Real Math” versus School Math 
The classroom episode described in this section took place during the third year  
of the study when students were first introduced to proof. After the completion of 
the first proof of the school year, a brief conversation occurred about the class 
working on proofs over the course of the next few months. After this conversation, 
students could be heard saying, “I’m going to get sick of this” and “this is going to  
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get very tedious very quickly.”  In the transcript that follows, Matt responded to 
his students’ comments by referring to proof as being “real math” several times.
1  
Example 2 
Matt: It’s not tedious. It’s exciting….It’s fun 
  MS: I like numbers. Numbers are fun. This is harder. 
  MS: This takes too long. 
Matt: No. No. This is math. Everything that you were taught before with numbers 
that you thought was math, that’s not really math. Okay. That’s arithmetic. Right? 
This [gestures toward the proof on the board] is math. 
   MS: It’s geometry. It’s not math. Math’s a bigger category. It has all of those in 
it.  
Matt: Okay. This is more like real math. 
    MS: How is it more like real math? 
    MS: Define real math. 
Matt: This [gestures, again, to the proof on the board] is like math. 
               MS: Well how? 
     MS: Why is this like math? 
Matt: Because, because we’re proving, but there’s no numbers. (Transcript, 
9/21/07)      
As can be seen in this transcript, Matt explained that he saw “this,” meaning proof, 
as “real math.”  When a student challenged him, Matt conceded: “This is more 
like real math.” So for Matt, it seemed that “real math” had to involve proof. In 
addition, he told his students that all of the mathematics that they learned before 
the geometry course was arithmetic. One might question this claim since these 
10
th grade students would have taken algebra the previous year. Algebra, however, 
is sometimes described as an extension and a generalization of arithmetic (Leitzel, 
1989). In an interview three months later, Matt talked about supplementing the 
textbook with additional proofs so that his students could experience “real math.”  
When asked why he believed that it was important to supplement his curriculum 
with additional proofs, Matt said: 
Example 3 
‘Cause it's actual math. Like it's real. It's like real math. You know…going to 
college and getting a degree in mathematics, that's the biggest thing is that, you 
know, computationally, we just don't care….So, I mean it's real math. That's 
what people really did…it was cutting edge math 3000 years ago, but it was still 
cutting edge to a certain point, and it can be seen. It's relatively straight-forward 
to them….they can still draw the picture, they can still see it, and they can see 
how we can apply the structure that we've agreed upon to reach that conclusion. 
So in that sense, it's sort of, yeah, it's real mathematics…there's no numbers in it. 
They actually can write a proof. And they can write a pretty rigorous 
                                           
1 In all transcripts, MS is male student, FS is female student, S is a student whose gender was 
not determined, Ss is a collective group of students, and I is interviewer.  
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proof…from a pretty well agreed upon set of axioms and definitions. (Interview, 
12/15/07) 
The statement “computationally, we don’t care” seemed similar to the statement 
that Matt made in class related to arithmetic not really counting as mathematics. 
In Matt’s view, since mathematicians would only be concerned with “real math” 
(i.e., proof), then they could not be bothered with simple computations. Again, 
Matt points to differences he saw between school math and “real math.” In the 
examples provided, Matt seems to be saying that, as a student, he did not 
experience real math, and unless he supplemented the textbook, his students 
would not experience it either. 
CONCLUSION 
Lampert (1992) discussed the idea of “authentic mathematics,” which is similar to 
what Matt called “real math.” Related to proof, the Standards have called for a 
de-emphasis of the two-column form (NCTM, 1989) and a focus on the logical 
argument rather than the form of the proof (NCTM, 2000). In his quest toward 
“real math,” Matt also emphasized the proof process with his students. 
An implication related to authentic proof practices involves the presentation style 
of conventional textbooks. The textbook exercises that emphasized applications 
of the theorems, rather than the proofs did not engage students in reasoning and 
proof. If we are serious about promoting more authentic practices in school 
mathematics classrooms, more attention must be given to teachers’ past 
experiences with school mathematics, and the curriculum objectives and 
materials that teachers are provided with to teach proof.  
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INSTRUCTIONAL STRATEGIES IN EXPLICATING THE 
DISCOVERY FUNCTION OF PROOF FOR LOWER 
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS 
Liping Ding & Keith Jones 
Massey University, New Zealand; University of Southampton, UK 
In this paper, we report on the analysis of teaching episodes selected from our 
pedagogical and cognitive research on geometry teaching that illustrate how 
carefully-chosen instructional strategies can guide Grade 8 students to see and 
appreciate the discovery function of proof in geometry. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper focus on two of the issues in the teaching and learning of mathematical 
proof that have drawn educators’ and researchers’ serious efforts during the last 
two decades. The first is to do with students’ cognitive development for acquiring 
proof capability, and the second is associated with the relationship of teaching to 
such development. To date, what the pedagogical factors are and how they may 
relate to the development of students’ understanding of proof remain elusive. For 
instance, Martin, McCrone, Bower, and Dindyal (2005) found that the teacher’s 
modeling of deductive reasoning was an effective means for helping students 
learn to develop arguments and provide appropriate justifications. Yet these 
researchers also found that students might still not be fully capable of 
understanding the abstract and general nature of arguments and representative 
diagrams. Next, the intervention studies conducted in Taiwan and in Germany by 
Heinze, Cheng, Ufer, Lin, and Reiss (2008) show that two totally different 
instructional approaches were successfully used to foster students’ proof 
competence in the different classrooms and learning cultures of East Asia and 
Western Europe. Noticeably, the two teaching strategies had their own 
advantages and limits on learners with different levels of achievement on 
constructing a multi-step proof.  
For these reasons, and others, it is vital to research new strategies for teaching 
deductive proof, particularly the teaching of the functions of deductive proof as a 
means of explanation and discovery to promote students’ mathematical 
understanding. In this paper, we make a contribution to this central research 
question (raised in theme 5 of the ICMI Study 19 Discussion Document) of how 
teachers might develop effective strategies to help students see and appreciate the 
discovery function of proof – for example, deriving results deductively rather than 
experimentally. 
THE COMPLEXITY OF TEACHERS’ DIDACTICAL PRACTICES 
One of our research aims is to develop fundamental understanding of the 
complexity of teachers’ didactical practice in respect of the development of 
students’ thinking for constructing proofs in secondary school geometry classes. 
In one component of our research, we linked the van Hiele theory to the  
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instructional practice of a sample of expert teachers of geometry at Grade 8 
(13-14 years old) in Shanghai, China (Ding & Jones, 2007). What we found was 
that although the practices of these teachers were linked to some of the van Hiele 
teaching phases, their instructional intentions were sometimes quite different. For 
example, in the Chinese classrooms we noted that the teacher played a significant 
role in building the bridge between students and the mathematical subject in the 
teaching of the solving of geometrical proof problems. Based on the analysis of 
our classroom observation data within the larger study (see Ding, 2008), we 
proposed a pedagogical framework to elucidate the unique instructional strategies 
and approaches that expert teachers apply to support the development of students’ 
thinking in constructing proofs in geometry. Our proposed framework seeks to 
account for alternative pedagogies to the van Hiele-based instructional model.   
In this paper, we focus on one aspect of this pedagogical framework – that of 
teaching with inductive and deductive approaches. In particular, we apply Polya’s 
(1945) problem-solving framework to the analysis of the instructional strategies 
used by a selected case-study teacher that we call Lily (pseudonym) to help her 
students to see and appreciate the discovery function of proof (for further details 
of the teacher and her class, see Ding & Jones, 2007).  
INSTRUCTIONAL STRATEGIES TO DEDUCTIVE PROOF  
During the process of solving a problem, Polya (1945) highlights two essential 
stages: “working for better understanding” and “hunting for the helpful idea” 
(pp.33-36). In this section, we select two teaching episodes which exemplify the 
instructional strategies related to these two fundamental stages within the context 
of solving a proof problem.  
Working for better understanding 
Proof problem Given: Triangle ABC and AED are equilateral triangles; CD=BF. 
Prove: Quadrilateral CDEF is a parallelogram. Teacher Lily, in the second of a 
sequence of lessons on developing her students’ understanding of this multi-step 
proof problem (see figure 1.1), first guided her students to consider a related 
problem that they had learned before (see figure 1.2).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 and 1.2  
Thus, Lily began her instruction by redrawing part of the whole figure, equilateral 
triangle ABC, on the blackboard (in other words, figure 1.1 was redrawn as figure 
1.2). Lily then turned to explaining the importance of the given (CD=BF) of the 
problem. She explained this as follows:  
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425. Lily: CD=BF. What does this mean?  
426. Students do not respond 
427 Lily: It means that D and F are dynamic points, aren’t they? (The teacher repeated 
the question a couple of times, dialogue omitted).  
430 Lily: OK. CD=BF. This means that D and F are dynamic points. D could be here, 
could be here, could be here, right? (The teacher recreated the figure by using 
compasses to draw D and F, making CD=BF, and then used a ruler to link C 
and F, A and D. see the result of her drawing in figure 1.2.)  
434 Lily: D and F are dynamic points. Now they move such that CD=BF. So if D goes 
this way. F goes that way. … The different dynamic points go in different 
directions at the same speed, right? … So the length they (D and F) moved 
should be the same, shouldn’t they? (The teacher put red arrows in the figure 
on the blackboard, see figure 1.2)  
435 Lily: If you are told like this statement, you might understand that this means 
CD=BF. We could describe a problem in different way, yet the meaning 
could be same. In this problem, it means that CD=BF.  
436 Lily: Well. Now, are you familiar with this figure? (see figure 1.2)  
The teacher encouraged students in the whole class to observe and compare between 
figures 1.1 and 1.2 on the blackboard (#437-439). 
440 Lily: You could think about this figure during the lesson break (see figure 1.2). 
You learnt about the equilateral triangle at Grade 7. In the process of the 
movement of D and F, D and F move regularly. Could you find what is never 
changed in the movement? 
The instructional process at this stage is one of discovery, to involve students in 
finding the implicit relationship of a geometric figure (see #440). To prove 
quadrilateral CDEF is a parallelogram, one way is to prove CF=ED and CF//ED 
(see figure 1.1). Thus, the teacher’s instructional intention here is to involve 
students in first exploring the facts that AD=CF and angle AOF=60°(see figure 
1.2). The teaching process starts with developing the students’ understanding of 
the principal parts of a “problem to find” (Polya, 1945, p.33), namely the 
unknown, the data, and the condition. Here, the teacher dynamically presents the 
static figure on the blackboard as an interesting way to interpret the data (the 
length of the sides of triangle ABC and the length of CD and BF. #430-435), and 
the conditions of the problem (equilateral triangle ABC and CD=BF). However, it 
is noted that the unknown is not of the construction of the figure, but of the hidden 
geometrical objects and properties of the figure (#440). Moreover, two types of 
teacher questioning simultaneously occur during this stage. The first type of 
question (see #440) requires students to make their own guess (Polya, 1945, p.99). 
The second type of question (see #436, 440) is like the questions such as “Is it 
familiar to you? Have you seen it before?” (Polya, 1945, p.110). Here, the 
teacher’s main intention is to engage students in extracting relevant elements  
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from their memory, and mobilizing the pertinent parts of their prior knowledge. 
Accordingly, students’ thinking fostered during this teaching process can be 
linked to hypothetical bridging in the work of Heinze et al. (2008, p.445), the 
reasoning of which is similar – to construct the intermediary condition in a 
multi-steps proof. 
Hunting for the helpful idea 
Students continued to have difficulty in perceiving the hidden geometrical objects 
and properties of the figure (AD=CF and angle AOF=60°, see figure 1.2). So, at 
the beginning of the following lesson, Lily instigated a whole-class discussion of 
the problem: 
37. Lily: In this figure, could you find what is not changed, when D and F are moving? 
(see figure 1.2) (Students discussed in the classroom (#38).) 
40. Some students: DC=BF. 
41. Lily: DC=BF? This is already given. Except this, what else is not changed? 
42. Some students: Oh, AF=BD. Because AB=BC. 
43. Lily: AB=BC? This is given, as it is an equilateral triangle (ABC).  
More students discussed CF=AD in the class. Lily encouraged a boy student to stand 
up and to present his finding to the class (#44-49). 
50. Wang WY (boy): Two triangles are congruent (probably ADC and CFB). AD and 
CF are always equal.   
After CF=AD was made explicit in the class, Lily moved to draw students’ attention 
to another hidden property of the figure – the location relationship of AD and 
CF. 
58. Lily: Obviously, they (AD, CF) are not parallel. They are intersected, aren’t they? 
How is the angle they formed? Will it change? You could use a protractor to 
measure the figure on your book. You could measure the angle before and 
after the movement. (see figure 1.2) 
59.1. Some students: It will be the same. (One students responded 60º. (#57)) 
59.2. Liuliu (boy): (Noticed his classmate’s response.) 60º, 60º. Only need to prove 
two parallel lines. (probably CF//ED in figure 1.1) 
60. Lily: How do you explain that they are equal? No change? How much is the angle 
then? 
More students like Liuliu suggested 60º of angles AOF and COD (#61-62). 
64. Lily: If this angle (AOF) is 60º. How to prove? (The teacher used number 1 to 
represent angle AOF, see figure 1.1). 
Some students like Beibei (girl) wondered why angle AOF is 60º, while Lily 
encouraged an explanation of the finding (#65-67). 
68. Beibei: (asked Liuliu) Why is it 60º? Parallel?  
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69. Liuliu: If both of them are 60º, then they are always parallel. (Probably if angle 
AOF=angle ADE=60º, then FC//ED.) 
70. Linlin (boy): Oh, in the middle, there is a pair of vertically opposite angles! 
(Probably angle AOF=angle COD) 
The teacher invited a boy student to present his ideas to the whole class (#71). 
72 Zheng YQ (boy): Because angle 1= angle DAC + angle ACF. (The teacher then 
used number 2 to represent angle DAC.) 
75.1 Some students, Linlin and Liuliu: Ah? It is angle ACF? (Surprised tune) 
76. Zheng YQ: Because of the congruent triangles (ADC and FBC), angle 2=angle 
FCB. 
76.1 Some students: Oh, the bottom angle! (Probably angle ACD.) (Surprised tune) 
The instructional process at this stage facilitates further discovery, involving 
students seeing and appreciating how new pieces of information are logically 
deduced by proof. Students are engaged in seeking the logic connection of the 
principal parts of a “problem to prove” (Polya, 1945, p.33), namely the hypothesis 
and the conclusion. Here, the hypothesis of the problem involves equilateral 
triangle ABC and CD=BF. There are several conclusions hidden in the static 
figure, such as congruent triangles ADC and FBC, CF=AD and angles AOF and 
COD are 60º. Moreover, the teacher varies two types of questions during this 
stage. The first type of questions (see #37, 58) encourages students to make their 
own guess. Mostly, however, the teacher addresses the second type of questions 
(see #60), which leads students to make a deductive reasoning for their 
conjectures. Noticeably, during this teaching process, some students (see #42) 
could only make simple bridging for a single-step proof (Heinze et al., 2008, 
p.444). Some (see #59.2, 69, 70) constructed hypothetical bridging, yet goalless 
at the moment as they were not able to order the relationship of geometrical 
properties. A few students (see #50, 72, 76) demonstrated their coordination 
ability to approach the multi-steps proof (ibid, p.445).    
DISCUSSION  
In this paper, two factors characterize the instructional strategies for helping 
lower secondary school students to see and appreciate the discovery function of 
proof in geometry: one is the variation of mathematical problems; the other the 
variation of teaching questions.  
Understanding of a proof problem is the instructional result of the variation of 
mathematical problems in the foregoing episodes. The instruction started from 
guiding students to understand the principles of a “problem to find” and achieved 
finally in engaging students to seek the logic connection of the principal parts of a 
“problem to prove”. The instructional strategy here may be called presenting a 
proof problem as an experimental problem. Such instructional practice, in our 
opinion, represents an important didactical opportunity for enhancing students’ 
capability in coping with the co-operation between experiment and proof. In such  
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐141 
ways, students learn to mentally manipulate geometrical objects. Consequently, 
they learn to derive results not from operational construction and measurement of 
a figure, but from their previously acquired geometrical knowledge.  
The episodes also provide evidence of the variation of teacher questions. On the 
one hand, the teacher’s questioning involves students’ geometrical intuition, as 
she encourages students to formulate a range of plausible reasons for the 
properties and relations of the geometric figure (for instance, see #57, 59.1, 70). 
On the other hand, the intention of the teacher’s questioning is to increase 
students’ awareness of the discovery function of deductive proof, in which 
deduction makes possible a discovery that is inaccessible to insight or empiricism. 
For instance, as shown in the two selected teaching episodes, though an empirical 
approach by itself can be a plausible way to perceive some facts and gather 
information for deduction (see #40, 42, 59.1, 59.2, 70), it would be insufficient to 
discover the relation of angles AOF, COD and ACD 60º (see #68, 75.1, 76.1).  
The didactical practice identified in our study substantiates the hypothesis by 
Martin et al. (2005) that students can, with the appropriate instructional strategies, 
become more skilled in how to construct proofs on a multi-tiered procedure 
(p.122). In addition, students’ diverse learning responses indicate the complex 
pedagogical situations the teacher created. A key task for our future research is to 
identify types of pedagogical situations which would systematically involve the 
dynamical co-operation between experiment and proof, towards their fusion in 
unitary mental objects for solving mathematical proof problems. 
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APPROACHING PROOF IN SCHOOL:  
FROM GUIDED CONJECTURING AND PROVING  
TO A STORY OF PROOF CONSTRUCTION 
 Nadia Douek 
UMR P3 ADEF Aix-Marseille Université, INRP, IUFM de Nice, France 
 
This paper presents some aspects of an ongoing research aimed at leading 
students (through activities of conjecturing, guided construction of proof and 
story making of the construction process) to become aware of some salient 
features of proving and theorems. Theoretical elaboration as well as an example 
of didactic engineering concerning Pythagoras' theorem will be outlined. 
INTRODUCTION 
School approach to theorems has been a subject of major concern for mathematics 
education in the last two decades. Students' learning to produce proofs and their 
understanding of what does proof consist in (see Balacheff, 1987) have been 
considered under different perspectives and with different aims: among them, 
how to make students aware of the differences between proof and ordinary 
argumentation (Duval, 2007); how to exploit "cognitive unity" (that for some 
theorems allows students to exploit the arguments produced in the conjecturing 
phase to construct the proof) in order to smooth the school approach to theorems 
(Garuti, Boero & Lemut, 1998); in what cases of cognitive unity students meet 
difficulties inherent in the passage from an inductive or abductive reasoning, to 
the organization of arguments in a deductive  way (lack of structural continuity: 
Pedemonte, 2007); what aspects are in common between ordinary argumentation 
and proving, and how to prepare students to proving by relying on those aspects 
(Boero, Douek&Ferrari, 2008). This paper presents a theoretical and pragmatic 
elaboration about how to deal with those theorems for which cognitive unity does 
not work, and approach the rationale of a proof at first stages of proof teaching 
and learning. We focus on two aspects of proving:  exploration in order to find 
reasons for validity of a statement; and organisation of those reasons, aimed at a 
proof. In particular we make the hypothesis that the rationale of a proof can be 
approached early in the school context through “story making” situations, 
preceded by suitable activities of conjecturing and guided proof construction, and 
related classroom discussions. We illustrate this position by an example of a 
didactical engineering concerning the Pythagoras' theorem.  
FRAMING THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROOF, AND THE ROLE OF 
ARGUMENTATION 
We consider proving as a cognitive and a socio-culturally situated activity and we 
adapt Lolli's four modes of activity in proof production (See Arzarello 2007).  
MODE 1: exploration and production of reasons for validity of the statement; 
MODE 2: organisation of reasoning into a cogent argumentation;   
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MODE 3: production of a deductive text according to specific cultural constraints 
concerning the nature of propositions and their enchaining; 
MODE 4: formal structuring of the text according to shared rules of 
communication. 
These four modes are not necessarily successive phases in proof construction. 
Jumps form one mode to another can occur at each stage of producing the proof. 
For instance, once one thinks she has produced good reasons for validity (Mode 1) 
and tries to organize them into a cogent argumentation and a deductive text 
(Modes  2 and 3), she may discover that some non trivial conditions of validity 
have not been considered, and thus she has to come back to a Mode 1 reasoning. 
The different modes of reasoning involve several cultural rules of validity, 
including the delicate game of changes from what is allowed or even needed for 
one mode, to what is allowed or needed for another mode. For instance, abductive 
reasoning is allowed only for Mode 1, and it is not easy for students to move from 
it to deductive reasoning needed for the other modes (see Pedemonte, 2007). We 
can also consider the use of examples and the conscious handling and conversion 
of different semiotic registers according to different  modes of reasoning (see 
Morselli, 2007; Boero, Douek & Ferrari, 2008). 
This analysis leads us to give a special role to argumentation both as an intrinsic 
product of the modes of reasoning, and as a tool to manage the different modes of 
reasoning and the relationships between them in a conscious way, keeping into 
account specific cultural rules (to be mediated by the teacher). 
ARGUMENTATION IN PROOF AND PROVING 
In this paper, an "Argument" will be "A reason or reasons offered for or against a 
proposition, opinion or measure" (Webster), including verbal arguments, 
numerical data, drawings, etc. An "Argumentation" consists of one or more 
logically connected "arguments".  Proof by itself is an argumentation. But other 
argumentations play an important role in proving and thus in the perspective of 
learning to prove: in particular Modes 2 and 3 are based on argumentative 
activities. For instance, discussing the use of a theory or a mathematical frame to 
produce a step of reasoning relies on a meta-mathematical argumentation (see 
Morselli, 2007). It is not really part of a proof, but it is needed to produce it.  
In general, an argumentation is made of more elementary ones that may be 
organised in various ways (converging towards a conclusion, or being parallel as 
when producing different explanations, etc.). In a proof, the elementary 
argumentations may form a linear chain, each conclusion being an input as an 
argument for the following argumentation, thus forming one whole "line of 
argumentation". But in many cases of proofs some argumentations may contain 
parentheses - like "blocks", or side argumentation branches that meet the main 
line of argumentation to input a supplementary data or argument. A parenthesis 
might be considered a secondary line of argumentation. This description 
underlines the possible hierarchical relations between various argumentations  
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involved in a proof (see Knipping, 2008), which is a difficult matter for students 
who are being introduced to proof  (see the Example for a way to tackle it).   
EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS 
In the early stages of proof teaching and learning, students must be enabled to 
move from theorems for which cognitive unity works (see Garuti, Boero & Lemut, 
1998) to theorems (like Pythagoras' theorem) for which proof cannot consist in 
the deductive arrangement of arguments produced during the conjecturing phase. 
In those cases proving needs to be an activity strongly guided by the teacher; but 
teachers' guidance can offer the opportunity of initiating students to the awareness 
of the mechanisms inherent in the Mode 2 reasoning, with a projection towards 
Mode 3. The inherent argumentative activities could be promoted through debates 
(with real others) about arguments and their relations on one side, and story 
making on the other.  
The debate 
Classroom debates, if well oriented and guided, stimulate efforts of expression 
and explanation. These efforts, in turn, may favour consciousness of the logical 
rules and the range of their validity. For instance, discussing a statement may 
bring students to understand that producing an example to support it can be an 
efficient step in the exploratory phase, but it is not a valid argument when 
organizing a general mathematical justification. It may drive them to understand 
that some semiotic registers are crucial for exploration but insufficient to produce 
a suitable argumentation. Reflection on cultural rules of mathematical reasoning 
and on mathematical knowledge is engaged. Also the relation between arguments 
and the construction of lines of argumentation can be discussed in a debate and 
draw students' attention to the goal of the line in relation to its steps. 
Making a story  
Let us consider the following quotation from Toulmin (1974, p. 6):  
Logic is concerned not with the manner of our inferring, or with questions of 
technique: its primary business is a retrospective, justificatory one - with the 
arguments we can put forward afterwards to make good our claim that the 
conclusions arrived at are acceptable because justifiable conclusions.  
In order to grasp the rationale of a proof, we make the hypothesis that students 
may make a story from the ideas and calculations involved in a reasoning that 
validates the statement. We emphasise the story that connects steps and fragments 
with reasons, in order to serve the conclusion, and not particularly the story of 
how the steps occurred in one's mind. The goal is that students recognise the 
involved lines of argumentation, their possible hierarchical relations, and their 
role in the logical combination that produces the proof.  
AN EXAMPLE CONCERNING PYTHAGORA'S THEOREM 
Pythagoras theorem was chosen for two reasons: because it is an important and 
early met theorem in school mathematics; and because it is not difficult to get the  
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conjecture through a loosely guided path, while the construction of a proof needs 
a strong guidance by the teacher (cognitive unity cannot work, because the 
geometric constructions needed for the usual proofs are not suggested by the work 
done in the conjecturing phase). Teachers' guidance, classroom discussions and 
story making will provide the students with the opportunity to approach the 
rationale of the proof and occasions for learning about proof and proving. 
First phase: “Discovering” Pythagora's theorem, expressing the conjecture 
and making sense of it 
Students have not only to grasp the theorem, but also to develop some proving 
skills (though no proving activity is demanded in this phase) and prepare for the 
further work; thus the activity on Pythagoras' theorem is prepared by Task 1 (an 
individual production on another theorem), followed by classroom discussion: 
Task1:  Consider the statement: "In a triangle of sides a, b and c, a+b is always 
smaller than c". Is it true? always? Why? Prepare yourself to explain how you 
checked it and why you think it is true, or it is not, or what makes you doubt.  
No triangle is presented by the teacher; students are encouraged to draw some 
triangles for a check, if they did not do it spontaneously. This task aims at leading 
the students to express the rationale of the activity and to make visible the 
generality of the proposition they produce. An expression like “we wanted to see 
if it is true that... so we tried to verify it with four examples” is encouraged: such 
simple story making reflects an ability (and invites) to reconstruct the logical 
skeleton of the activity the student went through. It bridges a Mode 1 reasoning 
with a Mode 2, and prepares Task 2.  
Task 2 (individual): Now if we consider the squares of the lengths, instead of the 
lengths themselves, the situation is different. See if a relation between the squares of 
the lengths of the sides of a triangle exists. Once you think you produced a valid 
statement (a "conjecture"), put it clearly in words to explain it to other students.  
A number of triangles, right angled, acute and obtuse, are presented on the 
worksheet. Afterwards a collective discussion guided by the teacher is needed to 
share and discuss within the class the conjecture(s) produced, and the ways 
followed to produce them; and to attain and share acceptable expressions of the 
conjecture(s) (according to mathematical standards). An incomplete conjecture or 
an erroneous one may offer fine opportunities to make explicit the important 
elements of the theorem (in particular the condition of validity of the Pythagoras' 
theorem, i.e. the angle being right) and their role. 
Task 3 (individual): Write down the conjecture as now you think it should be. Explain 
it and illustrate it with some examples. 
At the end the teacher presents the usual expression of Pythagoras' theorem. 
Concerning proof learning, the first phase aims at involving students in Modes 1 
and 2 to a narrower extent: exploring (drawing, measuring, calculating, repeating 
procedures and modifying data), organising the steps of exploration in relation to  
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a goal and organising the exploitation of the gathered data, expressing results in 
everyday language but in a general and rather conventional way, etc.  
Second phase: the proof of Pythagoras' theorem, and learning to organise 
the steps of reasoning into lines of argumentation 
Due to the fact that cognitive unity cannot work, we help students to approach the 
proof through individual and collective guided activities; afterwards they will 
have to reconstruct the lines of argumentation. 
Task 4 (individual): Here we study the proof of the theorem we have conjectured, you 
will be guided towards this proof. Consider a right angled triangle with sides a, b, c. 
We build the square A (see below). Its central square S is of area c
2.  
 
I) Can you explain why S is a square of area c
2?  
II) Try to write the area of A in two different ways. Find and explain the two ways. 
III) How can this help us to validate our conjecture?  
A geometrical reasoning is expected to intertwine with an algebraic reasoning in 
order to attain the equality between the areas. If needed, some supplementary 
tasks can be inserted either for the whole group or for some students.  
The teacher guides a discussion concerning the reasoning that allows to prove, the 
steps of argumentation and the calculations and why they are needed, and in 
particular, the connection between geometrical arguments and algebraic 
arguments. We note that Task 4 was formulated and organised in a way to 
approach a story making of the proof. The discussion of the organisation of the 
line of argumentation and the insertion of "blocks" of arguments/calculations in 
this line could prepare students to a “story” like the following one, after Task 5:  
first (block 1) we calculate the area of A, then (block 2) we find another algebraic 
expression of it, because (looking forward to the final goal) surface measures of 
squares are written as algebraic squares. So we think that a
2, b
2 and c
2 will appear and 
will be related (possibility to rejoin the main line). So, we can write the algebraic 
equality, and find the relation after transformations.  
It is important to notice with the students that the algebraic equality is the 
principal aim (and first to come to the mind, since it is near to the conclusion we 
want to reach) but that we have to begin with geometrical considerations, which 
are like parentheses besides the principal aim. Thus the reasoning is made of a 
principal line of argumentation and side parentheses involving reasoning and 
calculations, whose conclusions flow into the main argumentation line. 
Task 5: Write down how you organized your steps of reasoning  to reach a general 
justification of the conjecture, and justify why those steps are important   
This phase is particularly important for those students who were not productive in 
the first sequence in order to allow them to grasp the rationale of the proof. In the 
Mode 2 reasoning needed for this task, in block 2, students must go through an  
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abductive reasoning ("how can I find a
2 and b
2 in this big square?") while 
deduction prevailed in block 1 and will prevail afterwards, till the end. 
Note that getting familiar with mathematical proof practices (like moving from a 
geometrical setting to an algebraic one, and even using the geometrical one only 
for strategic purposes) is a peculiar aspect of this work. 
DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN THE CLASSROOM IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE PROPOSAL 
According to my first activities with teachers on the subject of this paper, I must 
say that there is a number of difficulties the teacher might encounter in the 
classroom implementation of the proposed activities. They put into question both 
the ways of presenting the proposal to teachers, and teachers' preparation in 
general. One difficulty consists in the fact that "To produce a conjecture" is a task 
that does not fit the most frequent didactical contract in our schools (statements 
are presented and illustrated by the teacher, and learnt by students who repeat and 
apply them afterwards). Moreover the presentation and management of the tasks 
in a way that guides students' work but does not prevents creativity is not easy; 
however, if creativity is not practiced, there would be no sense in making a story 
out of a series of calculations. 
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ANALYSIS OF MATHEMATICAL PROOFS: 
SOME QUESTIONS AND FIRST ANSWERS 
Viviane Durand-Guerrier, Gilbert Arsac  
Université de Lyon, Université Lyon 1, France 
Analyzing mathematical proof is part of the work of mathematicians, but also of 
teachers, and of students. According with three main functions of such an analyze 
- checking the validity; understanding the proving strategy of the author; 
appropriating the mathematical field -, we explore some questions, trying to 
precise the contour of what is for us “to analyze a proof”. This leads us to explore 
the respective roles of logic and mathematical objects in the proving process. Our 
corpus is composed of two classical mathematical proofs. We hope this paper will 
open paths for teachers’s work at various grades at secondary or tertiary level. 
INTRODUCTION 
To analyze logically mathematical proofs fulfils for us three main functions. The 
first one, which was the main purpose of logicians since the late nineteenth, is to 
control validity. A second function is to understand the proving strategy of the 
author of the proof. The last one is to contribute to the understanding and 
appropriation of proofs, as part of the study of the contents of the course in which 
they appear on the one hand, as a means to better understand what are 
mathematical proofs and their possible specificities in a given mathematical field 
on the other hand.  
What logical theory is relevant for the study of mathematical proofs? We think 
that the use of propositional calculus, which takes the statement as a non-analyzed 
unit could explain why prominent mathematicians as Dieudonné or Thurston 
consider that logic is of little use for mathematicians (Dieudonné, 1987; Thurston, 
1994). Indeed, from that point of view, mathematical objects become invisible 
while, for us, their role is crucial both in elaborating and writing down proofs. So 
we support the thesis that Predicate calculus, in the semantic perspective 
developed by Tarski, is a relevant logical system for such analysis, 
(Durand-Guerrier & Arsac, 2005, Durand-Guerrier, 2008). Thus we choose a 
rather unusual way in the research on mathematical education, which relies 
generally only on propositional calculus. Besides, in contrast with the fact that 
many students face strong difficulties with reasoning in mathematics, even at 
advanced levels, only few researches have been developed on the role of logic in 
the proving process
1 and its learning
2. 
                                           
1 The proving process includes both the activity that leads to proof, and the writing of the proof. 
2 Nevertheless, concerning tertiary level, authors as Selden & Selden (1995) or Epp (2003) take 
in consideration these matters.  
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In the following, we check some elementary questions that may rise up for 
teachers writing down a proof, preparing a proof’s correction for their students, or 
trying to understand the origin of their students’ difficulties in the proving process. 
When speaking of proofs we refer to those texts identified as proofs in textbooks 
or mathematical books, whatever the level, or to texts provided by students. So, 
we try to propose a study of proofs encountered by teachers in their classroom 
practice, as well as proofs that could be encountered by a researcher, an advanced 
student or a prospective teacher. 
II. FIRST EXAMPLE IN PLANE GEOMETRY, FIRST QUESTIONS 
We start from the classical proof attributed to Pythagoreans that the sum of the 
angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles.  
“Given a triangle ABC, let draw DE parallel to BC through A. The alternate angles 
are equal, on the one hand the one under DAB to the one under ABC; on the other 
hand, the one under EAC to the one under ACB. Let add the one under BAC to the 
two others. The angles DAB, BAC, CAE, that means the ones under DAB, BAE, that 
means two rights, are hence equal to the three angles of the triangle. Hence, the three 
angles of the triangle are equal to two rights.” 
Two remarks stand out: 1. A first object is given, a triangle, and nothing is said 
about hypotheses; 2. A second object is introduced, a parallel line DE to BC 
through A, that appears as a key for the proof, due to the fact that the whole proof 
is built on properties of alternate angles.  
Then, two first questions emerge: Q1. What relationship between data and 
hypotheses? Do we use a hypothesis in this proof? Q2: What role for the 
introduction of objects? Could the main ideas of a proof be resumed to the list of 
objects that have to be introduced? 
In a middle school’s textbook, we can read that it is necessary to take a triangle « 
absolutely ordinary (scalene) », that means that the proof has to be a general one. 
This leads to a new question: Q3. How is Generality taken into account in 
Geometry? Is it the same process in Algebra?  
II.1 Data and hypotheses 
The proposition is on triangle, so it is natural to introduce a triangle. But the proof 
relies entirely on the introduction of a second object, a line. Introducing that line 
can be justified only by the proposition that “exactly one line can be drawn 
parallel to a given line through any point not on the line”. As a triangle is defined 
by a set of three points not on the same line, we can actually apply this statement. 
This allows us to answer to Q1: here the data are three points and the hypothesis is 
that they are not on the same line. So data are objects and hypothesis express 
relations between these objects. This was hidden in the initial writing of the proof 
where the necessity of using a hypothesis is masked by the material possibility of 
doing the construction: drawing a triangle, one determines three points not all on a 
same line, and then it is actually possible to draw the parallel. This leads to a new 
question, closely related with Q3: namely Q4: what evidences are used in proofs,  
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particularly in Geometry? And how are we sure to check validity? In fact, there 
are still others evidences hidden in that proof (Arsac, 1998). 
II.2 Evidence, generality and validity  
The Pythagorean proof above provides an example of such evidence; we are 
inclined to conjecture that this recourse to evidence is possible because Geometry 
as a theory has been elaborated in such a manner that those types of evidence, that 
are expressed by true statements in the drawing register, are logically deducible in 
the theory (the axiomatic has been build on this purpose). However, it is also clear 
that some evidences in the drawing register have to be questioned in the theory, 
this corresponding to the back and forth between objects in an interpretation (here 
the drawing register) and the theory (here Plane Geometry), and hence between 
truth and validity (Durand-Guerrier, 2008). On a pragmatic level, it is not possible 
to prove every “evidence” of the drawing register; hence, to know which 
“evidences” are (logically) acceptable in a proof is clearly a difficult question that 
necessitates both mathematical knowledge and logical competencies (in 
particular to understand what is an axiomatic, and how it is related with 
interpretation). These questions are at the very core of Tarski’s methodology of 
deductive science (Tarski, 1936) that permits a genuine articulation between form 
and content, allowing to take in account the powerful methods provided by syntax, 
without giving up to the advantages of the semantic approach (Sinaceur, 1991). 
We encounter a same kind of construct with Algebra. The algebraic rules are built 
to match the numerical properties of numbers. As a consequence, it does not seem 
necessary to explicitly state the axioms and theorems justifying the calculation 
rules. This contributes to the idea that Algebra is a “blind calculation”. However, 
before mastering such a calculation, it seems necessary to be able to give a 
signification to the transformation rules of Algebraic expressions. There is a first 
level of generality: the solution of a problem is provided by a formula, due to the 
fact that this formula describes a program recognized as correct in every case. 
Here, particular cases play the role of generic element (Balacheff, 1987), and the 
generality comes from actions on numbers. A second level of generality relies on 
the “evidence” that, as algebraic expressions express program of calculation, the 
general properties of operations in numerical fields will hold for elementary 
algebra. Finally the semantic definition that “two algebraic expressions are 
equivalent if and only if they provide the same numerical result whatever the 
values attributed to the variables”, is related with the syntactical definition: “Two 
expression are equivalents if and only if there exists a transformation from one to 
other using exclusively the properties of the elementary operations of the 
numerical field”. Barallobres 2007 shows that working with students on the first 
level is not sufficient: to sketch equivalence between formulae, students need to 
come back to the concrete situation. 
It is an important feature that in the both domains - elementary geometry and 
elementary algebra - the theory is built so that the “evidences” emerging from 
actions in an empirical register (drawings on the one hand, numbers on the other  
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hand) holds as consequences of the theory. It is only in a second time that theories 
will provide, through proofs, new knowledge in the theory itself, and also in 
relevant empirical domains. 
III. SECOND EXAMPLE IN NUMBER THEORY, OTHER QUESTION 
In the first chapter of “Proofs from the Book” (Aigner & Ziegler, 1998, 2004) the 
authors examine six proofs of the following statement: “The sequence of primes 
does not end”. According with the authors, the six proofs rely on the same basic 
idea: the natural numbers go beyond all bounds, and every natural number n≥2 
has a prime divisor.  
The first one is the classical proof by Euclid:  
For any finite set of primes  p1p2...pr {} , consider the number n = p1p2...pr +1. This n 
has a prime divisor p. But p is none of the  pi; otherwise, p would be a divisor of n and 
of the product  p1p2...pr, and thus also of the differencen − p1p2...pr =1, which is 
impossible. So a finite set  p1p2...pr {}  cannot be the collection of all prime numbers. 
(Op. cit. p.3) 
Here we have two introductions of objects: the finite set of primes and the number 
n. An approach quite similar to that of the first example would lead apparently to 
introduce firstly the sequence of all primes. This is not the case (and for Euclid 
himself, it was unthinkable); in fact the initial statement is replaced by “no finite 
set of integers can be the set of all primes”, which leads “naturally” to introduce a 
finite set of primes. So we can consider that there are two key ideas in the proof: 
the transformation of the statement and the introduction of n. 
It is necessary to note that Euclid, who did not use indices in his notation, could 
not do this proof like this. He did it with three numbers A, B and C. So Euclid who 
had an answer to the question of generality in geometry did not have the 
equivalent in arithmetic. Regarding question Q3, it means that the answer to that 
logical question depends actually from the mathematical objects concerned: 
historically the answer by literal notation of Viete appeared several centuries after 
Greek geometry. And we know that students do not recognize easily the generic 
character of  ε  in the field of limits! 
In the five others proofs of this statement proposed in “Proofs from the Book” we 
find similar features, linked closely, that we can gather in two categories in which 
we find the key ideas of the proofs:  
-Transformation of the statement to prove: another statement is proved whose 
initial one is a consequence. For instance, it is proved that two Fermat numbers 
are always coprime which yields the conclusion as there are infinitely many 
Fermat numbers 
- Introduction of objects which can appear a priori as very far of the problem as 
for instance the series of the inverses of all primes or the logarithm as an integral, 
a topology over the set of all integers, the Fermat and Mersenne numbers.  
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CONCLUSION 
In the preceding paragraphs, we have tried to give some evidence that to analyze 
logically a mathematical proof requires both logical and mathematical 
competencies, leaning strongly on mathematical knowledge and on the following 
questions: what are the relationships between data and hypotheses; what objects 
are introduced along the proof and what is their role; what process permits to pass 
from the statement to prove to data and hypotheses; how is generality taken into 
account, and in particular how does the proof deal with empirical (semantic) and 
theoretical (syntactic) aspects; what evidence is used and how are we sure to 
check validity. These are questions that we consider as relevant for analyzing a 
given proof, the relevance of each question depending of course of the proof to 
analyze. We have already shown (Durand-Guerrier & Arsac, 2005) that some of 
these questions appear both in History of mathematics, and in Didactic of 
mathematics. Also, the study reported in Weber 2007 on “How mathematicians 
determine if an argument is a valid proof” enlightens the role of objects and the 
intertwinement of logical and mathematical aspects while analyzing a proof. 
Our main didactic hypothesis is that developing an ability to analyze proofs could 
help undergraduate students to improve their ability in the proving process on the 
one hand, and prospective teachers to develop competencies for making choices 
while elaborating proofs for their students, and for evaluating their students’ 
proofs with respect to validity, on the other hand.  
Therefore we aim to develop a program of research to go deeply in the study of 
these questions following two axes. The first one is an exploration to better 
understand how undergraduates, prospective teachers and mathematicians deal 
with the questions we have identified
3, and eventuality, with other questions that 
may arise and to try to determine which logical concepts and methods could be 
taught at tertiary level in order to permit the development of abilities in analyzing 
proof. We have already checked that Truth and Validity and their relationship, 
which were already emphasized by Aristotle, and developed by modern logicians, 
are clue concepts (Durand-Guerrier, 2008). Concerning methods of logic, 
Chellougui (2004) and Durand-Guerrier & Arsac (2005) show the utility for the 
researcher in Didactics of mathematics of Copi’s natural deduction, which makes 
explicit introduction and elimination of connectors and quantifiers (Copi, 1954). 
The teaching experience of the first author of this paper incites us to support that it 
is possible and useful to teach it to scientific undergraduates; so it is for us an 
example of candidate. 
The second axis, which is rather ambitious, will aim to test our main hypothesis, 
by studying to what extent competencies in analyzing proofs and in elaborating 
proofs are related. 
                                           
3 An example of such an exploration is given in the submitted paper from Blossier, Barrier and 
Durand-Guerrier: Proof and quantification  
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PROOF ISSUES WITH EXISTENTIAL QUANTIFICATION 
Susanna S. Epp 
DePaul University, USA 
This article focuses on issues connected with the use of existential quantification 
in mathematics proofs. Examples of common incorrect proofs from tertiary-level 
students are given, and issues raised by the proofs are analyzed: (1) the use of 
bound variables as if they continue to exist beyond the statements in which they 
are quantified, (2) the implicit use of existential instantiation, (3) the 
“dependence rule” for existential instantiation, and (4) universal instantiation 
and its use with existential instantiation. Suggestions for responding to student 
errors are offered. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many university students start a “proof” that the sum of any even integer and any 
odd integer is odd as follows: 
Example 1. Proof: Suppose m is any even integer and n is any odd integer. By 
definition of even, m = 2k for some integer k. Also, by definition of odd, n = 2k + 1 for 
some integer k, and so m + n = 2k + (2k + 1) = 4k + 1… 
To help students avoid this mistake, a reasonably effective countermeasure is to 
lead them to see that the resulting “proof” would not apply to any even integer and 
any odd integer but only to an (arbitrary) even integer and the next consecutive 
odd integer.  
From a technical point of view, the problem with the argument in Example 1 is 
that it violates the logical principle known as existential instantiation: 
Existential Instantiation: If we know that an object exists, then we may give it a 
name, as long as we are not currently using the name for another object in our 
discussion. 
In Example 1, of course, once the letter k has been used to denote the integer 
which, when doubled, equals m, existential instantiation prohibits giving the letter 
k a different meaning in the representation for n.  
BOUND VARIABLES THAT EXCEED THEIR BOUNDS 
The description of the mistake in Example 1 does not, however, address the issue 
of why students make it in the first place. One reason is that having learned the 
definitions of even and odd as 
An integer n is even if and only if there exists an integer k so that n  = 2k 
An integer n is odd if and only if there exists an integer k so that n = 2k + 1, 
students come to believe that the k’s have an independent existence beyond the 
defining sentences.  In fact, the k’s are what logicians call “bound” by the 
quantifier “there exists.” The scope of the quantifier, and hence the binding of the 
k’s, extends only to the end of the sentences. In other words, the k’s used in the  
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defining sentences do not have a meaning related to even or odd integers once the 
definitions are finished.  
Both the n and the k are, in fact, merely placeholders that make it convenient to 
refer, for instance, to an even integer and the integer which, when doubled, equals 
the even integer. Thus another countermeasure to help students avoid the mistake 
in Example 1 is to write the definitions of even and odd in a variety of ways – both 
with other letters in addition to, say, n and k and without any letters at all. For 
example, one can phrase the definition of even by saying that an integer is even if 
and only if it equals twice some integer. In general, exercises that ask students to 
phrase mathematical statements both formally (using variables and quantifiers) 
and informally (avoiding the use of variables as much as possible) are very 
helpful in deepening their understanding of the use of variables in mathematical 
discourse.  
Sometimes we have to acknowledge that mathematicians’ own use of notation or 
terminology has unforeseen consequences for student understanding. Indeed, 
another reason students may make the mistake in Example 1 is that they have seen 
instances in ordinary mathematical writing which appear to suggest that variable 
names can, in fact, maintain their meaning beyond the statements in which they 
are bound. For instance, when the statement of a theorem is universal, the 
variables in the hypothesis are bound. From a technical point of view, therefore, 
the proof should start by introducing the hypothesized objects as generic elements, 
say by writing something like “Suppose that…” or “Assume that…” or 
“Given ….”
1 Yet it is common practice to view this step as unnecessary repetition. 
The following is a simple example: 
Example 2. Theorem: If n is any odd integer, then n
2 is odd. 
Proof: Since n is odd, there is an integer k such that n = 2k + 1. Therefore,  
 n
2 = (2k + 1)
2 … 
IMPLICIT USE OF EXISTENTIAL INSTANTIATION 
The second sentence in Example 2 illustrates another subtle but important 
phenomenon related to existential instantiation. Consider the statement “There is 
an integer k such that n = 2k + 1.” Even though the k in this statement is a bound 
variable, the very fact of using the specific letter k encourages a reader to imagine 
a particular integer, called k, that satisfies the equation. In other words, because 
the statement names the integer k, it is common to proceed as if existential 
instantiation had already been used to bring a specific integer into the discussion 
and call it k. This is what occurs in the second sentence of Example 2 where k is 
treated as an instantiated object. 
                                           
1 This follows from the logical principle known as Universal Generalization: If we can prove 
that a property is true for a generic element of a set (i.e., a particular, but arbitrarily chosen, 
element of the set), then we can conclude that the property is true for every element of the set. 
(As a proof technique, this property is also called Generalizing from the Generic Particular.)  
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THE DEPENDENCE RULE 
Following common usage, let us call an AE statement one in which a universal 
quantifier precedes an existential quantifier. As the analysis of Example 2 
suggests, the use of the same symbol in both the existential part of an AE 
statement and in a subsequent existential instantiation of the existence part of the 
statement is extremely common in mathematical writing. In many cases it causes 
no problems, but in some cases it leads to error.  
Arsac and Durand-Guerrier (2005) introduce the term dependence rule, to 
describe the fact that in the AE statement “For all x in set D, there exists a y in set 
E…” the value of y depends on the value of x. In other words, if x is changed, y 
must ordinarily be changed also. Their main point is that as soon as an argument 
contains two AE statements with elements of the same sets, the dependence rule 
becomes critical. Strictly speaking, the definitions of even and odd given earlier 
are both AE statements, with implicit universal quantification over the variable n 
as well as explicit existential quantification over the variable k. Thus a refinement 
of the explanation for the mistake in Example 1 is that since the value of the k in 
the second sentence depends on m, it is highly unlikely to be the same as the value 
of k in the third sentence, which depends on n. Emphasizing the dependence 
relationship affords an additional way to help students understand the mistake 
they make when they start a proof as in Example 1. 
Making students aware of the dependence rule can also provide a means for 
responding when they make another common mistake. We illustrate it with the 
start of a “proof” that the square of any odd integer is odd: 
Example 3. Proof: Suppose n is any odd integer. By definition of odd,  
n = 2k+ 1 for any integer k… 
An effective response to the student who starts the proof in this way is to point out 
that, for example, k cannot be just any integer because its value depends on n: k 
actually equals (n – 1)/2.  
Arsac and Durand-Guerrier give an example of a common “proof” of Cauchy’s 
mean value theorem that is erroneous because it fails to observe the dependence 
rule. They also point out that both Cauchy and Abel occasionally made similar 
mistakes in their own work. Example 1 shows that this type of error is not limited 
to advanced proofs but can actually occur in very simple ones. 
UNIVERSAL INSTANTIATION AND ITS USE WITH EXISTENTIAL 
INSTANTIATION 
In an elementary proofs course, the following is a typical student’s “proof” of the 
statement: If f  is any surjective function from X  to Y and g is any surjective 
function from Y to Z, then the composition gof  is surjective. 
Example 4. Proof:  By definition of surjective, given any y in Y, there is an x in X 
with f (x) = y. Also by definition of surjective, given any z in Z, there is a y in Y with g 
(y) = z. So gof (x) = g (f (x)) = g (y) = z.  
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Of course, the main problem with this proof is that it is backwards. The only way 
to prove that gof is surjective – and the point to emphasize with students – is to 
start with a generic element of Z and show that there is an element of X whose 
image is that element of Z. But, as with the previous examples, we may ask: What 
leads a student to develop this “proof”? 
One possibility is the tendency, noted previously, to regard variables as having a 
continuing existence beyond the bounds set by the quantification. Thus, the y in 
the first sentence of Example 4 is simply regarded as the same as the y in the 
second sentence. 
To analyze Example 4 more deeply, we need to state another principle of logic. 
Universal Instantiation: If a property is true for all elements of a set, then it is true 
for any particular element of the set. 
In the first sentence of Example 4 both universal instantiation and existential 
instantiation are used implicitly in the sense that the naming of x and y is 
obviously considered sufficient to allow one to discuss them as if they were 
particular objects with the property that f (x) = y. Similarly, in the second sentence, 
there is implicit instantiation of both z and y. The problem, of course, is that the 
instantiated y in the first sentence is generic – it could be any element of Y – 
whereas the instantiated value of y in the second sentence depends on the 
instantiated value of z. In other words, the general property of surjectivity stated 
in the first sentence has to be applied to the particular instantiated value of y that is 
obtained using the second sentence. Copi (1954) pointed out that in general 
“whenever we use both EI (Existential Instantiation) and UI (Universal 
Instantiation) in a proof to instantiate with respect to the same individual constant, 
we must use EI first.” 
A CAUTIONARY EXAMPLE 
Because we are aware of the tendency to invest letters with continuing existence 
beyond the scope of the quantifier in the sentence where they are introduced, it is 
common to introduce differentiated symbols even when logic does not actually 
require them. For example, Selden and Selden (to appear) analyze a proof that the 
sum of continuous functions is continuous. The middle of the proof contains the 
following sentences: 
[1]  Now because f is continuous at a, there is a δ1 > 0 such that for any x1, if  
| x1 – a| < δ1  then |f(x1) – f(a)|< ε /2.   
[2]  Also because g is continuous at a, there is a δ2 > 0 such that for any x2, if  
| x2 – a| < δ2  then |g(x2) – g(a)|< ε /2. 
Strictly speaking, the letter x could replace both x1 and x2 in [1] and [2] because 
the scopes of the universal quantifiers for x1 and x2 only extend to the ends of 
sentences [1] and [2] respectively. By writing the proof statements in the form 
shown, the Seldens apparently wanted to avoid any possible misunderstanding 
that use of a common symbol might induce.  
1‐158  ICMI Study 19－2009 
Such well-meaning attempts to solve one problem can, however, occasionally 
produce another. For example, on an examination, I gave the following problem: 
Let    A = {n ∈ Z | n = 8r – 3  for some integer r}, and  
let    B = {m ∈ Z | m =  4s + 1  for some integer s}.  
Prove that A ⊆ B. 
In class I had solved a similar problem, starting with a generic element of A and 
going through the computations needed to show that the element was in B. In the 
examination problem, I used the letters n and r in the definition for A and the 
letters m and s in the definition for B to ensure that students would not confound 
the meanings of the variables in their answers. As things turned out, this effort 
appears simply to have increased the likelihood of their making a different 
mistake. Example 5 shows a type of answer made by a large number of students. 
Example 5. Proof: Let s = 2r – 1 for some integer r. Then     
               m  = 4(2r – 1) + 1   by substitution      ⏐Scratch work: 
                    = 8r  –   4   +   1         ⏐4s + 1 = 8r – 3 
                    = 8r – 3               by algebra.        ⏐4s = 8r – 4 
    Thus   m  = 8r – 3 = n, hence m = n.      ⏐s = 2r – 1 
    Therefore every element in A is also an element of B and hence A ⊆ B. 
The proof in Example 5 suggests that although the students had conscientiously 
learned the details of the computations, they did not fully appreciate the 
underlying logic of the proof well enough to realize the need to start with a 
particular but arbitrarily chosen element of A and to show that this element is in B. 
It is likely that by using different names for the variables in the definitions of A 
and B, I actually encouraged students to think of them as having an independent 
existence to which they were entitled to refer without reintroducing instantiations 
of them in the broader context of the definition of subset.  
CONCLUSION 
The University of Washington professor Ramesh Gangolli (1991) once made a 
statement that neatly summarizes an important insight into mathematics 
instruction:  
The mathematics profession as a whole has seriously underestimated the difficulty of 
teaching mathematics.  
The preceding examples illustrate the complexity of some of the logical issues 
that arise even in simple mathematical proofs. Coming to understand them 
provides ways for teachers to respond more effectively to students’ difficulties. 
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PROOF IN DIFFERENT MATHEMATICAL DOMAINS 
Filyet Asli Ersoz 
University of Georgia, U.S.A 
This paper raises the question of whether conceptions of proof and proving 
developed in high school geometry classes transfer to proof and proving in higher 
level mathematics courses. Studies on high school students’ conceptions of proof 
and research carried at the undergraduate level with a focus on proof are 
reviewed to provide insights into this question. Several problems caused by the 
way proof is introduced are discussed and the importance of domain-specific 
knowledge in proof construction is pointed out. 
INTRODUCTION 
The organizing committee of ICMI Study 19 adopts in the discussion document a 
developmental view of proof and state that “proof and proving in school curricula 
have the potential to provide a long-term link with the discipline of proof shared 
by mathematicians” (p. 2). The committee also advocates the gradual 
development of proof and proving starting in the early grades. It is expected that 
students, if they pursue further mathematical work, will use their knowledge of 
proof and proving gained in the early grades in different areas of mathematics. 
Although it is argued that teaching and learning of proof should start in the early 
grades, high school geometry is the “usual locus” (Sowder & Harel, 2003, p. 15) 
for introducing proof in U.S. curricula in the context of Euclidean geometry. 
Furthermore, “the only substantial treatment of proof in the secondary 
mathematics curriculum occurs” (Moore, 1994, p. 249) in this one-year geometry 
course. Then an important question to raise is if there is any evidence that 
students’ conceptions of proof and proving learned in the context of Euclidean 
geometry transfer to proof and proving in higher level mathematics courses. The 
goal of this paper is to review studies on high school students’ conceptions of 
proof and research carried at the undergraduate level with a focus on proof to 
provide insights into this question. A brief discussion of learning and transfer is 
embedded within the conclusions. This paper also contributes to a discussion of 
some other questions raised in this document. 
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS’ CONCEPTIONS OF PROOF 
Most prevalent findings of research on students’ conceptions of proof in high 
school both in and out of the U.S. show that students find giving proofs difficult 
and that their views of the purpose and role of proof are very limited. The results 
of the fourth National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in the United 
States (1985-1986) showed “little understanding of the nature and methods of 
mathematical argumentation and proof” by most 11th grade students (Silver & 
Carpenter, 1989, cited in Harel & Sowder, 2007, p. 24). Another large scale study 
by Senk (1985) found that only about 30 % of students in full-year geometry  
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courses that teach proof reached a 75 % mastery level in proof writing while “29 
percent of the sample could not write a single valid proof” (p. 453). 
In a smaller study Chazan (1993) found that some high school geometry students 
accepted the truth of a statement based on the examples supporting it. There were 
students who understood the limitations of using examples to prove a statement; 
however, they had strategies for minimizing these limitations; for instance trying 
different kinds of triangles as opposed to only one type. In a study outside the U.S. 
Porteous (1990), similar to Chazan, found that only 15 % of the students provided 
a proof of a general statement while the rest accepted the truth of the statement on 
empirical grounds.  
Given these findings, one question that should be asked is why proving is difficult 
for students. Is it the cognitive difficulties imposed by proof itself that makes 
learning how to prove more challenging or is it the way that proof is presented to 
students in the context of Euclidean geometry with a focus on two-column format? 
Proving is a complex, cognitively demanding process; however, there is evidence 
that students can learn mathematical reasoning even in the elementary grades 
when exposed to the ideas of proof (e.g. Carpenter, Franke & Levi, 2003). Hence 
it is possible to argue that some of the difficulties students experience with proof 
might be attributed to the way it is presented in the high school geometry 
curriculum. 
One of the problems with the way proof is taught in high school geometry is the 
expectation that students will be able to reason deductively at the beginning of 
their proving experiences. This way of reasoning separates mathematics from 
other disciplines and it is important for students to gain. However, as Healy & 
Hoyles (2000) observe “outside of mathematics, proof can be indistinguishable 
from evidence” (p. 396). In our daily lives we make generalizations based on a 
limited number of experiences. Even when a mathematician solves a 
mathematical problem, the way s/he would approach it would not be strictly 
deductive from the beginning (van Dormolen, 1977).  
Research also shows that (Carpenter et al., 2003; Harel & Sowder, 1998) 
students’ first attempts to prove are empirical in nature. Although students’ initial 
trials of examples lead them to believe unjustified results, as they engage in 
working with examples they realize the limitations (Carpenter et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, examples help the students to gain insight and be convinced about 
the truth of a conjecture (Healy & Hoyles, 2000), and they also help to proceed 
from thinking “local” – considering each case on its own – to thinking “global” – 
realizing common properties, hence leading to generality and deductive thinking 
(van Dormolen, 1977, p. 32). 
Another problem with the presentation of proof in high school geometry is the 
emphasis on the two-column format. Herbst (2002) characterizes three periods in 
the history – the era of replicating proofs, the era of crafting proofs for original 
propositions and the era of exercise – illustrating how the place of proof in 
geometry instruction evolved leading to the custom of two-column proving.  
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During the third era, it was suggested that the steps of a proof written on the 
blackboard “should be numbered for convenient reference by class and teacher” 
(Herbst, 2002, p. 297). Shibli (1932) advocated writing proofs in two columns of 
statements and reasons divided by a vertical line, the format which first appeared 
in a text in 1913, by arguing that “it saves time when the teacher is inspecting and 
correcting written work” (cited in Herbst, 2002, p. 297). Moreover textbooks 
started including shorter and easier exercises rather than original propositions. As 
a result of these changes, the two-column proving custom “brought to the fore the 
logical aspects of a proof at the expense of the substantive role of proof in 
knowledge construction” (p. 307).  
Formal proofs presented in the two-column format don’t go beyond promoting 
the role of proof as verifying the truth of an already known statement while de 
Villiers (1999) argues that the role of proof in a school mathematics curriculum 
should be, as reflecting the role of proof in the field of mathematics, verification, 
explanation, systematization, discovery, communication and intellectual 
challenge. This emphasis on format also gives rise to what Harel and Sowder 
(1998) call the “ritual proof scheme” (p. 246) where the appearance and form of 
an argument might hinder students’ abilities to construct and validate proofs. 
Sowder and Harel (2003) further argue that if “justifications such as those 
appearing [in a two-column proof]” (p. 23) are imposed on students it is likely for 
them to develop symbolic and authoritarian proof schemes. For students who hold 
authoritarian proof schemes, something is accepted to be true because the teacher 
or the book says so and there is no intrinsic need to provide a justification.  
Based on the discussion so far, it seems likely that students’ conceptions of proof 
developed in the context of Euclidean geometry will create obstacles as they are 
learning to prove in different domains of mathematics. Next, I will review studies 
which investigate undergraduate students’ conceptions of proof and proving 
abilities as they may shed some more light into the above question. 
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS’ CONCEPTIONS OF PROOF 
Sowder and Harel (2003), in their proof understanding, production, and 
appreciation (PUPA) project studied how undergraduate mathematics majors’ 
ideas about proof evolved over the course of their undergraduate studies. Among 
the cases reported, Ann’s PUPA was the weakest and her proof skills remained 
the same throughout the program as she first entered. This points out the difficulty 
of helping students to develop a better understanding of proof during their 
undergraduate mathematics courses if they already haven’t developed a basic 
level of understanding. Ben, on the other hand, entered with a strong PUPA and 
excelled even more. Sowder & Harel argue that “having had a very 
proof-favorable experience in secondary school geometry … predisposed him to 
react positively to proof demands and opportunities” (p. 14). This is an 
encouraging conclusion because it suggests that having a positive experience with 
proof during secondary school is likely to be fruitful later.   
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In another undergraduate level study, Moore (1994) identified seven major 
sources of the students' difficulties in doing proofs: not knowing the definitions; 
having little intuitive understanding of the concepts; inadequate concept images 
for doing the proofs; being unable, or unwilling, to generate and use their own 
examples; not knowing how to use definitions to obtain the overall structure of 
proofs; being unable to understand and use mathematical language and notation; 
and not knowing how to begin proofs. Most of these difficulties reveal the 
importance of understanding the concepts of a domain in the process of writing 
proofs in that domain. For example, not knowing the definitions was often a 
reason for the students' failure to produce a proof and a reason for having 
difficulty in learning the definitions was the abstractness of the concepts as seen 
by the student. However, there was another explanation for students’ overlooking 
the definitions. They failed to see the importance of precise definitions in 
constructing proofs and leading to this was general beliefs about mathematics and 
proof rather than a particular conceptual understanding. 
In a study with a particular focus in abstract algebra Weber (2001) found that 
knowing what a mathematical proof is and being able to reason logically, and 
knowing and being able to apply the important facts, concepts, and theorems of a 
mathematical domain would not ensure that a student can construct proofs in that 
domain. He also hypothesized that there are four types of strategic knowledge that 
the doctoral students in his study employed: knowledge of the powerful proof 
techniques in abstract algebra, knowledge of which theorems are most important, 
knowledge of when particular facts and theorems are likely to be useful, and 
knowledge of when one should or should not try and prove theorems using 
symbol manipulation. As an example doctoral students knew that comparing 
group theoretic properties of two groups would be useful when they were asked to 
prove or disprove that the two groups were isomorphic. They were also able to 
articulate the reasons for choosing to apply particular theorems. This is a very 
powerful study as it shows that there is a body of domain-specific but 
proof-related knowledge that successful provers possess. This implies that having 
developed a good understanding of proving in a geometry class may not guarantee 
success in another class with proofs. 
There are also other differences between the natures of the subject of Euclidean 
geometry and other abstract math courses which are likely to impose difficulties 
on students. In Euclidean geometry “the objects, which are derived from an 
idealization of the physical reality, determine the set of axioms” while in abstract 
algebra “the objects are determined by a set of axioms” (Harel, 1999, p. 602). For 
example, in geometry, a student can operate with axioms that correspond to 
her/his personal geometric intuition and imagination like “one and only one line 
goes through two points” (p. 602). If “students are unable to be detached from a 
specific context” (p. 603) like Euclidean space in geometry, it becomes difficult 
for them to realize the non-triviality of a statement like -1(x) = -x. Hence, they 
might struggle with many mathematics topics, such as the theory of vector spaces, 
group theory and real analysis.  
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Another difference between the two domains is the kinds of proofs students are 
asked to produce. In a geometry course, most of the time the required proofs are 
direct proofs and probably proofs by counterexamples. In another math class, 
students would need to use proof techniques like proof by induction, proof by 
cases, proof by contradiction and proof by contrapositive. So, moving to a 
different context without spending time on introducing various proof techniques 
would make the transition difficult for students. Also, while students in geometry 
classes are asked to write proofs in two-column to ensure that reasons are stated in 
each step of the argument, in a typical advanced level mathematics textbook 
proofs are written in a narrative style usually with gaps between the statements 
that would need to be filled by the reader. This change in form and the level of 
precision might be a source of difficulty for students.  
IS THERE EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER? 
Coming back to the question that was posed at the beginning of the paper as to 
whether knowledge of proof learned in the context of Euclidean geometry 
transfers to other mathematical contexts, the answer depends on what is meant by 
transfer and what counts as transfer. A traditional definition of transfer is 
application of knowledge learned in one situation to another situation. 
Researchers predetermine the similarities across the situations and look for 
normative performance as evidence of transfer. From this perspective one might 
hardly find evidence of transfer as research has shown the importance of 
domain-specific knowledge to construct proofs. On the other hand, Lobato (1996) 
has redefined transfer as the “personal creation of relations of similarity” (p. 8). 
According to her, looking for correct performance hinders transfer. From this 
perspective, even though a student who may not be able to prove a theorem 
correctly in abstract algebra, s/he might be using some knowledge gained in the 
geometry context. Moreover, as discussed students’ conceptions of the nature of 
proof gained in the context of geometry, even though not useful from an expert 
point of view, are invoked by the students in a new context and influence their 
performance. Consistent with Wagner’s (2006) “abstraction through transfer” 
view the idea of proof is not learned and abstracted in the context of geometry and 
then simply applied in different contexts, rather students are more likely to 
develop a more generalized and abstracted view of proof as they transfer it to 
different contexts and learn how it applies in those contexts. However, these 
arguments are based on the results of research which didn’t necessarily have the 
goal of looking for transfer. Further empirical studies where normative 
performance is not the criteria for transfer are necessary to investigate what 
similarities students actually produce in different contexts of proving. 
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TEACHERS’ BELIEFS AND THE TEACHING OF PROOF 
Fulvia Furinghetti and Francesca Morselli 
Dipartimento di Matematica dell’Università di Genova. Italy 
In this contribution we outline the main features of a research project aimed at 
describing the way secondary school teachers treat proof and at understanding 
which factors may influence such a treatment. In our theoretical framework we 
combine references coming from the research on proof and the research on 
teachers in relation to their beliefs. We pay a particular attention in the 
description of the method. After that, we present and discuss some findings from 
our study and identify some issues that have didactical implications in teacher 
education. 
INTRODUCTION 
In literature works on proof are carried out with different foci: curriculum, 
students, teachers. Following this latter stream of research, we are carrying out a 
research project concerning proof centered on teacher perspective, performed 
through the analysis of teachers’ (declared) instructional practice. In this 
contribution we outline the main features of the research project and sketch out 
some results.  
In our study, the teaching of proof is viewed in its two aspects: how it is developed 
in classroom and which factors shape such a development. We believe that it is 
important to take into account these two aspects, that is to say not only teachers’ 
instructional choices, but also the reasons for these choices. This could help to see 
in a different light the common claim that “proof is dead in school” and to identify 
forms of reincarnations of proof that are present in school nowadays. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Our study is aimed at discussing how proof is developed in classroom and which 
factors shape this development. In particular, as stressed also in the DD of ICMI 
Study 19, we feel that beliefs are a crucial factor shaping the treatment of proof. 
Our theoretical framework encompasses different contributions, coming from the 
research on proof and the research on teachers in relation to their beliefs.  
Concerning research on proof, we take as a reference the work of Hanna (2000), 
who identifies proofs that (only) prove and proofs that (also) explain. In the 
former case the focus is on the product and proof is just a means for checking the 
truth of a statement. In the latter case the attention shifts on the process and proof 
becomes also a means for enhancing mathematical knowledge. More recently, 
Hanna and Barbeau (2008) discuss the implications for mathematics education of 
Yehuda Rav’s ideas on proof, namely that proofs are bearers of mathematical 
knowledge, since they convey to students mathematical methods, strategies and 
techniques. The two functions discussed in (Hanna, 2000) parallel those identified 
by Barbin (1988), who outlines the crucial moments in the historical evolution of  
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the concept of proof. The previous distinctions on the functions of proof are 
developed by De Villiers (1990), when observing that students’ difficulties with 
proof are due to the fact that students may not see the “function (meaning, purpose 
and usefulness) of proof” (p. 17); according to the author, the question is: “what 
functions does proof have within mathematics itself which can potentially be 
utilized in the mathematics classroom to make proof a more meaningful activity?”. 
De Villiers singles out different functions of proof in mathematics: 
verification/conviction, explanation, systematization, discovery, communication. 
The author underlines that “the teaching of mathematics should (at least in part) 
reflect the nature of mathematics and that which is really meaningful to practicing 
mathematicians” (p. 23) and advocates a teaching of proof where “conviction is 
not gained exclusively from proof alone nor is the only function of proof that of 
verification/conviction”. We note that some of the functions outlined by the 
author (conviction, systematization) mainly refer to the product, while other 
functions, such as explanation, refer to the proving process. Our interest on the 
distinction of these two aspects of proof (process, product) is in the fact that they 
mirror two ways of acting in the classroom when carrying out mathematical 
activities: to focus on the product vs. to focus on process. Indeed, we deem that 
the divide between product and process is the main feature characterizing the 
teaching practice.  
Concerning teachers and their beliefs, Ernest (1989) claims that three main 
elements affect the teaching of mathematics: the system of beliefs and knowledge, 
the social context in which the teaching takes place and the reflection on the 
teaching/learning process. Beliefs theory is central in mathematics education 
research (Leder, Pehkonen & Törner, 2002) and, in particular, in research on 
teacher professional development (Thompson, 1992). In an early study 
Thompson (1984) shows the influence of teachers’ beliefs in shaping teaching 
practice. We deem that beliefs are behind reasons for teachers’ decisions and in 
this role relies the importance of beliefs in relation to practice. Some studies on 
the relationship between beliefs and practice focus on inconsistencies, see 
(Raymond, 1997). Since our study is aimed at identifying reasons for the many 
decisions teachers make, we will not take into considerations inconsistencies. In 
this we follow Leatham’s (2006) claim: 
when a teacher acts in a way that seems inconsistent with the beliefs we have inferred, 
we look deeper, for we must have either misunderstood the implications of that belief, 
or some other belief took precedence in that particular situation (p. 95). 
Following Ernest (1989), we identify three main objects of teachers’ beliefs: the 
nature of mathematics, the nature of mathematics teaching, the process of 
learning mathematics. As for the nature of mathematics, Ernest identifies three 
views: problem solving view, Platonist view, instrumentalist view. As for the 
nature of mathematics teaching, we rely on Ernest’s (1989) description of the 
teacher’s role: the teacher may be seen as a facilitator (whose aim is to promote 
problem posing and problem solving), an explainer (whose goal is to foster  
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conceptual understanding), an instructor (whose interest is in developing the 
students’ skills mastery with correct performance). The main dimensions along 
which these roles are shaped are: attention to socio-mathematical norms (Yackel 
& Cobb, 1996), balance between instrumental and relational understanding 
(Skemp, 1976), internalist or externalist approach to mathematics teaching. 
Teachers’ role is strictly linked with the view of the learning process, that, 
according to Ernest (1989), may be wrapped around two dichotomies: active 
construction versus passive reception of knowledge, development of autonomy 
and interests in mathematics versus compliance and submission. 
The crucial question, at this point, is how to treat beliefs that are related to the 
special topic of our study, that is to say beliefs about proof. Taking into 
consideration beliefs about proof makes even more important to discuss the 
vexing question of the relation between knowledge and the system of beliefs. 
Thompson (1992) deems that it is impossible to distinguish beliefs from 
knowledge, because “teachers treat their beliefs as knowledge” (p. 127). Leatham 
(2006, p. 92) claims that knowledge is made up of those things that we “more than 
believe – we know”, while beliefs are those things that we “just believe”. In our 
work we refer to beliefs as a part of knowledge.  
METHOD 
Our research matches to the requirements of basic research, whose aim is 
understanding and explaining (Patton, 1990). We chose to carry out 
semi-structured interviews seen as a sincere sharing of opinions, between two 
persons confronting their points of view (Cicognani, 2002). This view underlines 
the non-neutral role of the interviewer and the human dimension of the interview.  
The “plot” of the interview was set up a priori, according to the theoretical 
background on proof and on teachers’ beliefs. Here is a list of the themes: 
moments of teaching and learning of proof, approaches to proof, students’ 
difficulties concerning proof, use of textbooks in the teaching of proof, proof and 
official programs, context. 
Ten teachers, with a long-lasting experience, were selected for our study. They 
were working in upper secondary schools with different orientations (scientific 
lyceum, humanistic lyceum, artistic lyceum, technological secondary school, 
vocational secondary school, …). The teachers were homogeneous as regards age, 
teaching experience (in terms of years of work) and years of teaching in the same 
kind of school. The small number of teachers that were interviewed makes our 
study a collection of case studies, that were analyzed one by one and after in 
parallel, looking for differences and commonalities. The interviews were 
audio-recorded and afterwards transcribed. 
We distinguish three phases of the interviews. The first phase began with an 
entering question (“What is the space of proofs in your lessons?”), aimed at 
finding out whether the proof is a topic regularly treated or not. This question  
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allowed to approach the subject of the interview in a smooth way and to avoid 
non-pertinent questions in the subsequent phases.  
The second phase encompassed a series of questions, centered on what emerged 
from the answer to the first question (proof as a central topic vs. proof as a 
marginal topic). These questions concerned the instructional practice related to 
proof (class work, homework, use of textbooks, use of the blackboard). This part 
of the interview provided “declared” data, as well as ground for our inferences in 
terms of beliefs (i.e., we interpreted some sentences in terms of beliefs about 
mathematics and its teaching/learning, or even about proof and its 
teaching/learning).  
The interviews ended with a third phase, whose aim was to gather further 
information on factors influencing the instructional practice concerning proof. 
For example, the teachers were given two different proofs of Pythagoras Theorem: 
a geometrical one and an algebraic one. The teachers were asked to say which 
proof they preferred and which proof they would have presented in the classroom. 
The two questions were aimed at eliciting beliefs about what characteristics a 
proof must have, but also what are the roles of proof in the classroom and what are 
the difficulties of students in relation to proof. Furthermore, these questions might 
reveal whether the teachers were keen to rely only on the kind of proofs they 
studied when they were students or they were ready to take into consideration 
different kinds of proof. Afterwards, the teachers had to comment some answers 
given by prospective secondary school teachers to a questionnaire on proof (e.g. 
What is the role of proof in mathematics? What features must have a proof, in 
order to be accepted?). This was an indirect way to grasp the teachers’ opinions. 
Eventually, there was a sort of summing up question: “If a student asked you what 
is a proof and what is its purpose, what would be your answer?”. In this third 
phase, the teachers had the opportunity to describe and discuss explicitly not only 
their teaching practice, but also their preferences and knowledge related to proof. 
The first two series of questions were performed in order to get “declared” data 
about the teachers’ practice, as well as to have a ground for our inferences in 
terms of beliefs and other factors. When analyzing phases 1 and 2 of the interview, 
we moved from (declared) practice to beliefs. The third series of questions was 
planned in order to elicit beliefs in an indirect way, and to gather further 
information on factors influencing the instructional practice related to proof, 
which are behind the reasons provided in an explicit way. Our work, as any work 
on beliefs, poses the problem of interpretation. Berger (1998) uses the metaphor 
of the reconstruction of a dinosaur from fossils to illustrate that there are different 
degrees of arbitrary deciding and inference in reconstructing individuals’ beliefs 
from their statements and behavior.  
FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
The work presented in this paper is part of a research program on the way proof is 
treated in classroom and which factors may influence such a treatment. Analyzing 
the data, we found that it is hard to isolate the teaching of proof from the whole  
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teaching of mathematics. On the one hand, this points out that research on the 
teaching of proof is complex, since it touches almost all aspects of teaching. On 
the other hand, this means that proof is a sort of gateway to get information on the 
teaching practice tout-court. Indeed, the information we get from the interviews 
(carried out with the focus on proof) is so rich that we could even discuss further 
issues beyond proof.  
The first point is to understand whether proof is treated in classroom. Nine of the 
ten teachers declared that they treat proof in classroom. The only teacher who 
declared not to deal with proof, said that proof is not treated because Euclidean 
geometry is not on the program of her type of school. Also other teachers referred 
mainly to Euclidean geometry, as the most suitable domain for the teaching of 
proof. This evidences the presence of beliefs about proof and geometry: geometry 
is the ideal domain for the teaching of proof, the teaching of proof is confined to 
geometry.  
The next point is to understand how proof is treated. Here we identify two 
tendencies: teaching theorems and proving facts, versus teaching how to prove 
and teaching via the proof. In the first strand we see proof as a means for 
convincing and “systematizing” mathematical facts, while in the second one 
proof is mainly a means for promoting mathematical understanding. Going back 
to the distinction presented in the theoretical framework, we may say that in the 
first approach the focus is on proof as a product, while in the second one the focus 
is on the proving process. 
The crucial point, of course, is to understand why proof is treated in such a way. 
The teachers declare that the treatment is mainly influenced by the context (type 
of school, type of students). Going more deeply in the interpretation of the 
teachers’ answers we see that the context is not the only influencing element: 
some beliefs affect the way teachers deal with proof. We point out that, analyzing 
the case studies, we found that the teaching of proof is affected not only by 
specific beliefs on proof, but by a wide range of beliefs. Some of the teachers we 
interviewed are deeply influenced by their beliefs about the nature of mathematics, 
others are more influenced by their beliefs about mathematics teaching and 
learning. Drawing from the definition of central belief (Rokeach, 1968), we 
propose to speak of leading beliefs, i.e. beliefs (whose nature may vary from 
teacher to teacher) that seem to drive the way the teacher treats proof. For a more 
detailed analysis of two case studies, and the emergence of the concept of leading 
beliefs, see (Furinghetti & Morselli, 2008). The concept of leading belief may 
help to understand the teaching practice related to proof. 
We stressed that the beliefs affecting the teaching of proof are not confined to the 
beliefs about proof. An implication of this fact concerns teacher education 
programs. From one hand, teaching to teach proof seems complex, since it 
involves a wide system of beliefs. From the other hand, treating the teaching of 
proof has to be at the core of any teacher education program, since it means to 
tackle the teaching of mathematics from an efficient point of view.  
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In this paper we report on our analysis of textbooks commonly used for teaching 
students about proof in geometry in lower secondary school in Japan. From our 
analysis we found that, as expected from the curriculum specification, deductive 
reasoning is prominent in Japanese textbooks. Yet the way that proof and proving 
is presented in these textbooks shows geometry as a very formal subject for study, 
one that omits to illustrate convincingly for students the difference between 
formal proof and experimental verification. As such, we argue that an 
improvement in textbook design is likely to involve providing students with more 
effective instructional activities so that they appreciate more fully the notion of 
‘generality of proof’. 
INTRODUCTION 
Given the widespread findings of international research that teaching the key 
ideas of proof and proving to all students is not an easy task (see, for example, 
Mariotti, 2007; Mariotti and Balacheff, 2008), this paper focuses on the design of 
curriculum materials that are used by teachers in lower secondary schools in 
Japan. In our paper we tackle the issue of how students’ natural cognitive needs 
for conviction and verification might be changed and developed through 
instructional activity that is mediated by school textbooks in common use in Japan. 
Our premise, as Yackel & Hanna (2003, P234) emphasize, is that one of the most 
challenging undertakings for mathematics educators in their efforts to help 
students acquire competency in proof is to “design means to support teachers in 
developing forms of classroom mathematics practice that foster mathematics as 
reasoning”. 
This paper reports on part of our findings from one of our studies on proof and 
proving (for more details of our studies, see, for example, Fujita & Jones, 2002, 
2003). In another study (Kunimune, Fujita & Jones, 2008), we report that lower 
secondary school students who can construct deductive proof do not necessarily 
understand why such deductive argumentations are necessary in geometry. In this 
paper, we consider what is likely to be a source of some of the influences on why 
such uncertain knowledge and belief in proof in geometry is constructed among 
students. We do this by identifying features of geometry and proof, and 
approaches to geometry learning, privileged in school textbooks, focusing on 
those in common use in Japan (Fujita & Jones, 2002; 2003).   
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THE STUDY OF TEXTBOOK IN MATHEMATICS EDUCATION  
Various studies, including the Third International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS), have demonstrated that textbooks continue to play an important role in 
classrooms around the world (see, for example, Stylianides, 2008; Valverde et al, 
2002). In terms of the research reported in this paper, we argue that studying 
textbooks is important because such artifacts influence both teachers and learners. 
This is demonstrated by the following:  
•  The design of the curriculum in any particular country influences and 
‘shapes’ students’ knowledge in mathematical proof (Healy and Hoyles, 
1999) 
•  The intended schqool mathematics curriculum (as specified in documents 
such as National Curriculum in England or the Japanese ‘Course of Study’) 
is experienced by pupils through the textbooks that are used in their 
classrooms (and for their homework) (Schmidt et al, 2001, p. 22; Valverde 
et al, 2002, p. 5.) 
In these ways, textbooks constitute an important component of the potentially 
implemented curriculum - something which mediates between the intended and 
implemented curriculum. Recent relevant textbook research has examined how 
proof is presented in Swedish textbooks (Nordström & Löfwall, 2005) and 
Stylianides (2008) gives a detailed analysis of how proof and proving is prompted 
in US curriculum materials and guidance for teachers. One reason that, in our 
work, we focus on geometry is provided by Hanna and de Bruyn (1999) who 
comment that ‘only in the topic of geometry do the textbooks do a reasonable job 
of providing opportunities to learn proof”.  
ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY  
To enable us to undertake a systematic examination of the design of textbooks, 
our analysis is framed by the following procedure, derived mainly from Valverde 
et al (2002): 
•  division of the geometry parts of textbooks into ‘units’ and ‘blocks’;  
•  coding of each ‘block’ in terms of content, performance expectations and 
perspectives (Table 1, see also Valverde et al, 2002, pp. 184-7);  
•  identifying features of geometry in the textbooks; 
•  reviewing the design of textbooks in terms of latest findings based on 
classroom-materials-based research in proof such as Nordström. & Löfwall 
(2005) and Stylianides (2008).  
The detail of our analysis framework is provided in Table 1. 
In the component of our study reported in this paper, the textbooks selected for 
analysis were New Mathematics (or Atarashii Suugaku) for lower secondary 
school (published by Tokyo Shoseki, one of the major Japanese publishers, in 
2001). In previous analyses, we have examined textbooks published in Scotland  
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(Fujita and Jones, 2002; 2003) and we are currently analysing the latest editions 
of the textbooks published in Japan by Tokyo Shoseki, and the SMP Interact 
series of textbooks published in England by Cambridge University Press. 
Block type  Content  Performance Expectations  Perspective 
1 Central 
instruction
al narrative 
2 Related 
instruction
al narrative 
3 Unrelated 
instruction
al narrative 
4 Graphic 
(those 
directly 
related 
narrative) 
5 Graphic 
(those not 
directly 
related 
narrative) 
6 Question  
7 Exercise 
Set 
8 
Suggested 
activities 
9 Worked 
examples 
10 Others 
1.1. Geometry: 
Position, 
visualisation, 
and shape 
1.1.1. 2-D 
geometry: 
Co-ordinate 
geometry 
1.1.2. 2-D 
geometry: 
Basics (point, 
line, and angles) 
1.1.3. 2-D 
geometry: 
Polygons and 
circles 
1.1.4. 3-D 
geometry 
1.1.5. Vectors 
1.2. Geometry: 
Symmetry, 
congruence, and 
similarity 
1.2.1. 
Transformation  
1.2.2. Symmetry 
1.2.3. 
Congruence 
1.2.4. Similarity 
1.2.5. 
Constructions 
using 
straightedge and 
compass 
1.3. 
Measurement 
1.3.1. Perimeter, 
area, and 
volume 
1.3.2. Angle and 
bearing 
2.1. Knowing 
2.1.1. Representing 
2.1.2. Recognising equivalents 
2.1.3. Recalling properties and 
theorems 
2.1.4. Consolidating notation and 
vocabulary 
2.1.5. Recognising aims of 
lessons 
2.2. Using routine procedures 
2.2.1. Using equipment 
2.2.2. Performing routine 
procedures 
2.2.3. Using more complex 
procedures 
2.3. Investigating and problem 
solving 
2.3.1. Formulating and clarifying 
problems  
2.3.2. Developing strategy 
2.3.3. Solving 
2.3.4. Predicting 
2.3.5. Verifying 
2.4. Mathematical reasoning 
2.4.1. Developing notation and 
vocabulary (proof) 
2.4.2. Developing algorithms 
2.4.3. Generalising 
2.4.4. Conjecturing and 
discovering  
2.4.5. Justifying and proving 
2.4.6. Axiomatising 
2.5. Communicating 
2.5.1. Using vocabulary and 
notation 
2.5.2. Relating representations 
2.5.3. Describing/discussion 
2.5.4. Critiquing 
3.1. Attitude 
toward science, 
mathematics, and 
technology 
3.2. Careers 
involving in 
science, 
mathematics, and 
technology 
3.2.1. Promoting 
careers in 
science, 
mathematics, and 
technology 
3.2.2. Promoting 
the importance of 
science, 
mathematics, and 
technology in 
non-technical 
careers 
3.3. Participation 
in science and 
mathematics by 
underrepresented 
groups 
3.4. Science, 
mathematics and 
technology to 
increase interest 
3.5. Scientific 
and mathematical 
habits of mind 
Table 1: Codes used for the analysis 
Our intention in this paper is qualitative rather than quantitative. As such, the 
discussion that follows our analysis focuses on lessons containing the aspect 
‘justifying and proving’ and how this is achieved. We then look at how these 
textbook designs might influence students in geometry proving in Japan.  
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Our analysis suggest following: 
•  The design of lessons in the textbooks: Japanese textbooks start from a 
problem solving situation (for example, about 37% of lessons in Grade 8 
begin with problem solving situations). A narrative block (which recalls 
some facts and theorems) comes later and is accompanied by some 
exercises. The principles of how to proceed with mathematical proof are 
explained in detail, including explanations of ‘definitions’ and 
‘mathematical proof’. 
•  Performance expectations: ‘Justifying and proving’ is very prominent in 
Japanese textbooks and mainly uses congruency to prove various 
geometrical facts and theorems. 
•  Content of geometry: Japanese textbooks concentrate on 1 or 2 topics in 
each unit (for example, 2-D basic geometry, 2-D polygons and circles, 
symmetry, construction, measurement of areas and angles, etc) rather than 
mixing various topics (as happens in some textbooks in, for example, 
Scotland). 
•  Proof in geometry: In Japanese textbooks, proof in geometry is described 
as ‘Proof is to demonstrate that a statement is true by using already learnt 
properties as evidence’ 
From the national curriculum specifications in Japan, we expected to find that 
deductive reasoning would be prominent in Japanese textbooks and that is exactly 
what we did find. For example, in New Mathematics 2 (for grade 8), 33 out of 37 
geometry lessons focus on ‘justifying and proving’ geometrical facts. We found 
that the manner of mathematical proof is built up through proving various 
geometrical statements. Given the evidence about how curricula approaches 
influence students’ views of geometry of students, this fits with what we report 
elsewhere (Kunimune, Fujita & Jones, 2008) that Japanese students tend to see 
geometry as a very formal subject for study and it is this issue that needs some 
attention.  
The reason for this need for further attention is that, notwithstanding the design of 
Japanese textbooks, research indicates that Japanese students can have difficulties 
in fully understanding proof in geometry (see, for example, Kunimune, 1987; 
2000).  In a related paper, we capture students’ understanding of proof in 
geometry in terms of two notions: ‘Construction of proof’ and ‘Generality of 
proof’ (Kunimune, Fujita and Jones, 2008). These two notions are related to 
students’ understanding in definitions, assumptions, theorems, logical circularity 
and so on (the notion of ‘Construction of proof’), and difference between formal 
proof and experimental verification (in the notion of ‘Generality of proof’). Data 
collected in 1987, 2000, and 2005 show that while most 14-15 year-old students 
(Japanese secondary school third grade) can write down a proof (that is, they  
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know about ‘Construction of proof’), around 70% cannot understand why proofs 
are necessary (that is, they do not necessarily know the ‘Generality of proof’). 
Considering that textbooks remain one of the most influential artifacts, there are 
opportunities to improve the design of textbooks for the teaching of proof in 
geometry. In terms of Japanese textbooks, an improvement is likely to involve 
providing students with more effective instructional activities so that they 
appreciate more fully the notion of ‘generality of proof’ in geometry. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our analysis of textbooks commonly used for teaching students about proof in 
geometry in lower secondary school in Japan indicates that deductive reasoning is 
prominent. Yet the way that proof and proving is presented in these textbooks 
shows geometry as a very formal subject for study, one that omits to illustrate 
convincingly for students the difference between formal proof and experimental 
verification. As such, we argue that an improvement in textbook design is likely 
to involve providing students with more effective instructional activities so that 
they appreciate more fully the notion of ‘generality of proof’. 
As we stated above, we are currently undertaking an analysis of the latest editions 
of textbooks. While we continue to use our existing analytical approach, we are 
extending our analysis further by focusing ‘proof’ in Japanese textbooks, e.g. 
different types of proof, presentations of proof, and so on, which are suggested by 
the recent studies in textbooks and proof. For example, Hanna and de Bruyn 
(1999 p. 182) use the following sub-categories to classify direct proof; basic, 
analysis, existence or construction, induction, and miscellaneous. Our impression 
from our initial analysis is that ‘direct proof’ and ‘direct proof by analysis’ are 
dominant in Japanese textbooks, but we have yet to conduct an analysis to see if 
the other types of proof identified by Hanna and de Bruyn appear in Japanese or 
English textbooks. 
How proof is presented in textbooks is also an interesting issue for investigation. 
Nordström & Löfwall (2005) examine how visible (or invisible) are the different 
aspects of proof (such as inductive/ deductive, conviction/ explanation, etc) in 
textbooks. They argue that it might be helpful for students if the various aspects of 
proof were more visible in textbooks, for example by showing the logical 
structure of proof. Further analysis from these points of view should provide us 
with further considerations how textbook designs influence and shape students’ 
knowledge and understanding of proof in geometry. 
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The paper examines the role and significance which university students’ assign to 
proofs. It is often assumed that students encountered and understood proofs 
during their high school years. Consequently, university students are often 
expected to gain an elaborated insight in firstly understanding proofs and 
secondly inventing their own ones. But obviously, students are mostly lacking 
such a competence. We are interested in students’ view of proof, i.e., to what 
extent they consider them as necessary in mathematics lectures. Explicitly, we 
elaborate on a domain specific discussion while distinguishing the role of proofs 
in Real Analysis and Linear Algebra. Data was collected by means of a 
questionnaire and some interesting findings will be presented. 
INTRODUCTION  
The idea of a proof is doubtless at the center of mathematics and the number of 
articles written about this topic in the field of mathematics education is therefore 
very large. In fact, mathematics can be considered as the discipline that proves its 
statements (Hanna, 2005; Heintz, 2000). Consequently, the period of Greek 
mathematics (6, 5, 4th century BC) where gradually proofs were required and 
developed for mathematical results can be considered as the beginning of 
mathematics as a discipline (Artmann, 1999). Meanwhile, proofs belong to 
mathematics as the integral sign to integration theory. 
For the learning of mathematics in general, historical and generic nuances mostly 
do not play a crucial role, unless students both at school and university are 
particularly interested in. It is the tertiary level that is in the focus of this work (cf. 
Jones, 2000; Harel, Selden & Selden, 2006), since well-known and documented 
difficulties regarding motivation and epistemology have mostly been discussed 
on the secondary level (Mariotti, 2006). 
At first, the role of proofs in the study of mathematics appears to be uncritical. 
From a university teacher’s point of view no serious difficulty is anticipated, since 
it is often assumed that students encountered and understood mathematical proofs 
during their high school years (Harel & Sowder, 1998). Students are expected to 
acquire an increasing competence in first understanding proofs, and then also to 
invent their own ones since proving is of highest importance in research 
mathematics. However, students often do not bring the required skills with them, 
so they mostly discover the significance of proofs during their university studies 
for the first time. 
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It cannot be denied, that mathematical assumptions have to be justified by proving, 
actually it is the exclusive method of verification. Many proofs are also an 
essential part of mathematical lectures. Nevertheless, the question, To what 
extend does proving help students to understand mathematics? should be 
discussed and leads to the following one: To what extend are proofs needed in 
mathematical lectures? In this regard, the attitude of a mathematician is mostly 
rather rigorous: Primarily, it is proving that fosters general insight and thus it is 
indispensable for the understanding of mathematics.  
We are in some sense skeptical with respect to such a strict position and thus we 
are interested in the opinions of our university students in the first year of their 
studies. Therefore, we developed a questionnaire, which is guided by the 
following research questions: How do students perceive this process of 
understanding and even inventing proofs in the usual first term mathematics 
lectures? Is a domain specific discussion of the role of proof, especially in Real 
Analysis and in Linear Algebra, which are the first courses at German universities, 
necessary? Corresponding findings are presented in this paper. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Since the philosophy of mathematics changes over time, so does its view of what 
constitutes a proof and what type of proof is required at various occasions. We 
recall that the clarification of simple groups or the proof of the four color 
conjecture were accomplished only with the help of computers. Other proofs are 
so complex that only a very small number of mathematicians is able to check all 
the details. It also happens that wrong results are accepted as true, a phenomenon, 
which was already discussed by Felix Klein (1849-1925). 
In the past, it was generally practiced standard to prove all statements in 
mathematical lectures at the university level even if several sessions were needed 
to complete one proof. However, it becomes increasingly clear that this is neither 
very efficient (Dormolen, 1977) nor does it reflect the behavior of a working 
mathematician who mostly reads publications not linearly but selectively. Further, 
the offered proofs would only be analyzed if the reader considered them as 
necessary. Thurston (2006) nicely describes this habit of concentrating on the 
essential issues while providing the following metaphor:  
It’s like a new toaster that comes with a 16-page manual. If you already understand 
toasters and if the toaster looks like previous toasters you’ve encountered, you might 
just plug it in and see if it works, rather than first reading all the details in the manual. 
(p. 44) 
Surely, such an elaborated proceeding cannot be expected from a student in his 
first year of university studies. Nevertheless, it is an important competence that 
students need to reach, because it enables them to regard proofs in a much more 
sophisticated way, i.e., to assign “them a value far beyond establishing the truth of 
propositions”, since “proofs rather than theorems are the bearers of mathematical 
knowledge” (Hanna & Barbeau, 2008, p. 345/346).  
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Unfortunately, lectures at university are often not able to procure this 
qualification, especially in the education of teachers, because students are often 
required to commit a lot of information to mind while paying only little attention 
to the underlying correlations (Jones, 2000). Another obstacle for a more 
comprehensive appreciation of proofs might be that many university teachers take 
for granted what constitutes a proof and see no reason for providing an elaborated 
understanding (Harel & Sowder 1998). This complicates the learning of how to 
prove and how to distinguish between different forms of reasoning (Jones, 2000; 
Dreyfus, 1999).  
The remarks point out that the handling of proofs is influenced by many factors 
and time-dependent trends. According to Bauersfeld (1980), learning is 
“interpreted as a situation of human interaction in an institutionalized setting” (p. 
23). What Bauersfeld (2003) particularly stresses is the subjective component in 
the learning of mathematics. Thus, we are interested in students’ perceptions and 
reflections concerning the role of proofs with respect to the different domains 
Linear Algebra and Real Analysis. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data was collected by a questionnaire that was given to one class of students in 
the first year of their studies. A total of 13 students participated, they all attended 
the Real Analysis as well as the Linear Algebra course that both were taught by 
different instructors. The questionnaire dealt with three topics: 
In a first segment consisting of 8 items students were invited to reflect on their 
past experiences with proofs in school mathematics. 
In the second segment identical questions were posed about proofs in the 
Analysis as well as the Algebra lecture. 
In the final segment consisting of 6 items the students’ view on the role of 
proofs in mathematics as a science was to be explored. 
The students were asked to respond on a 5 point Likert-scale and mostly agreed to 
participate in interviews planned for August 2008.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section is organized according to the three topics of the questionnaire. Due to 
the constraints of space, we restrict ourselves to present only some selected 
results. 
1. Proofs during school education 
One of the questions asked about students’ first encounter with proofs. Manifold 
answers were given: Proofs firstly occurred at rather different times, somewhere 
in between grade two and grade thirteen. In any case, the participants do not 
assign an important role to proofs during their school time, but this evaluation 
also depends on the respective teacher or school type. In general, the average 
student’s experience with proofs is considered rather negative. Since we had 
assumed that the word proof, on the one hand, have had negative connotations and, 
on the other hand, is just the generic term for many related concepts we asked for  
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synonyms students used during their school years. The list of suggested terms is 
long including for example: to show, to check, to verify, to investigate, to 
substantiate and to give reasons, but it does not become clear if they are able to 
differentiate the deeper meaning of those. 
2. Proofs during the first year at university 
Whereas the preference of Analysis to Linear Algebra (mean 2,83) and the 
subjective estimation which domain is the more difficult one (mean 2,5) are more 
or less balanced, we found it very interesting that the students felt that proofs play 
a greater role in Analysis (mean 1,25) than in Linear Algebra (mean 2,17). These 
results caught in particular the attention of the third author who was the instructor 
of the Linear Algebra course. What could be a possible explanation for these 
results? The dominating scheme assumption - theorem - proof seems to find a 
better fit in Analysis than in Algebra. It also appears to be important that one goal 
in a first term Analysis lecture is to provide a solid foundation for the work with 
infinitesimal processes where common sense and intuition might be misleading. 
We recall that the history of Analysis shows that elaborating on self-evident 
concepts and proving of apparently trivial assumptions has led to deeper insight 
and gained additional theoretical foundations. For instance, a careful definition of 
the real numbers provided a more fruitful understanding. Such a multilayered 
development is not part of the history of the much younger domain of Linear 
Algebra. 
In this part of the questionnaire, one prompt addressed, which proofs students 
spontaneously remember. While analyzing the given answers, we realized that 
many theorems in Analysis bear a name. Obviously, this provides a stimulus for 
the students’ memory, an aspect, which has no equivalent in Linear Algebra. For 
example, the third author still remains lemma 99, i.e., the rules of l’Hospital, from 
his first mathematical lecture. One possible reason for this may be that 
assumptions and theorems in Analysis follow a more rigid canon than in Linear 
Algebra. Since the formulation of a theorem in Analysis does not considerably 
differ in various textbooks due to minimized conditions, Linear Algebra provides 
more degrees of freedom: Does one want to prove an assumption for the case of a 
finite-dimensional vector space or does one prefer to argue more generally? 
Monolithic propositions are consequently rare in Linear Algebra. 
3. Importance of proofs in mathematics 
We also used the questionnaire to gather individual statements about the 
importance of proofs in mathematics as a science. Please note that the surveyed 
students have not attended an introductory course reflecting on mathematics in 
general or from an advanced level. Consequently, the students seem to have only 
rather vague ideas about the role and historical development of proofs in 
mathematics. 
On the other hand, there is more than nothing: Students assign great importance to 
proofs. They were able to give examples of prominent theorems and their proofs 
like Fermat’s last theorem. However, we do not identify philosophical reflections  
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by the students about questions like, Who guarantees the correctness of proofs? 
What is the role of computers? Regarding the latter, students generally seem to 
trust in the supposed inerrability of computers. For instance, issues such as 
Gödel’s results about statements within a system that cannot be declared as either 
right or wrong nor the possibility that a statement f(n) is correct only for the first 
million n, but incorrect in the general case, are also not considered. 
CONCLUSION 
The aforementioned findings, which could only be presented exemplarily, are 
gained by a qualitative study that is embedded in ongoing research. Since the 
questionnaire shed light on some interesting issues, we do expect much more 
clarification about students’ views on proofs by the already scheduled interviews. 
Students’ perception of “Proof and proving” in mathematics is multilayered and 
influenced by various subjective factors. School education appears to contribute 
to the understanding and appreciation of proofs only in a minor and occasionally 
in a negative way. However, the students assign a central role to proofs in the 
mathematical discipline as well as in the university lectures during their first year 
at university. In fact, this is not surprising since the lectures are still in the style of 
Bourbaki, whereby the proofing of assumptions plays a crucial role.  
We also learnt that the students consider proofing as bipolar, i.e., a black and 
white issue: Proofs are given or not given, they have to be prepared for 
examination or not. That there is a wide scale, ranging from exploring some 
heuristic arguments or examples that illustrate the essential idea of a proof to 
precisely formal proving, does not seem to be a widely accepted insight for 
students after first year mathematics lectures. Not surprisingly, in the students’ 
mind, a mathematical proof is essentially represented by the following scheme: 
definition, theorem, proof, examples. Reflections on a meta-level are rarely 
considered. Obviously, the subject structure dominates the overall conception and 
impedes insightful processes. For an instructor it may be worthwhile to consider 
G. Strang's (1988) suggestion in his Linear Algebra text to rather explain than to 
formally deduce.  
We believe that it is an important and remarkable observation that students 
perceive proofs in Analysis differently than in Algebra. Although, the reasons 
given above provide some explanation, we seek for additional answers that 
students might express in the interviews. 
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The Isis problem asks: “Find which rectangles with sides of integral length (in 
some unit) have area and perimeter (numerically) equal, and prove the result”. 
Since the solution requires minimal technical mathematics, the problem is 
accessible to a wide range of students. Further, it is notable for the variety of 
proofs (empirically grounded, algebraic, and geometrical) using different forms 
of argument, and their associated representations, and it provides an instrument 
for probing students’ ideas about proof. A group of 39 Flemish pre-service 
mathematics teachers was confronted with the Isis problem. The results highlight 
a preference of many students for algebraic proofs as well as their rejection of 
experimentation.  
SOLUTIONS OF THE ISIS PROBLEM 
The Isis problem, so called because of its connection with the Isis cult (Davis & 
Hersh, 1981, p. 7) asks: “Which rectangles with integer sides (in some unit) have 
the property that the area and the perimeter are (numerically) equal?”. It is not 
difficult to prove that there are precisely two rectangles with integer sides (in 
some unit of length) that have the property that the area and perimeter are 
numerically equal, namely 4 × 4 and 3 × 6 (or three, if one defines a 6 × 3 
rectangle as different from a 3 × 6 – henceforth, we will refer to two solutions). It 
is the variety of types of argument that lead to proofs of this result that is most 
interesting. 
Empirical investigation  
A first way in which even a very young student could attack the problem is 
empirical, by calculating (or even counting) area and perimeter for many 
examples. In this way, one might quickly convince oneself that there are only two 
solutions. To convert this approach into a proof, one could construct a 
2-dimensional table, such as the following (Fig. 1), in which the numbers within 
the table represent the numerical difference between area and perimeter, and the 
zeroes represent the solutions to the problem. 
It is not difficult to find a clear argument – and thus, in a sense, a proof – that 
extending the table will not produce any more zeroes. If the width increases by 1, 
the area (A) increases by the length y and the perimeter (P) by 2. So the difference 
between A and P increases by y – 2, leading to arithmetic progressions in each 
row.   
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    1  234567
1  -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
2  -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4
3  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 01
4  -6 -4 -2 0246
5  -7 -4 -1 2 5 8 11
6  -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16
7  -9 -4 1 6 11 16 21
 
Figure 1: Numerical difference between area and perimeter 
Algebraic solutions 
Almost anyone who has studied algebra will react to the problem by immediately 
writing down an equation of the form: xy = 2x + 2y. The question is then to find 
specifically integral solutions of this equation, not generally a standard part of the 
algebra curriculum. Each of the following rewritings of the above equation can 
form the basis of a proof for the Isis problem. 
1.  y = 2x/(x – 2), which can further be simplified to y = 2 + 4/(x – 2). This 
rewriting follows the heuristic that in an equation with two variables it is often 
useful to express one variable as a function of the other.  From these two versions 
of the equation, arguments based on divisibility can be applied, noting that (x – 2) 
must exactly divide 2x, in the former case, and 4 in the latter. 
2. (x – 2)(y – 2) = 4, which some students will recognize as the equation of a 
hyperbola. As with expression 1, this establishes that (x – 2) and (y – 2) must be 
factors of 4, leading to a small number of possibilities that can be checked one by 
one, i.e. proof by exhaustion.  
3.   1/x + 1/y = ½. Either 1/x and 1/y must both be ¼ or one is greater than ¼ and 
the other less than ¼. In the latter case, the smaller of (x, y) must be less than 4. 
The small number of possibilities thus identified can be checked one by one. 
The arguments above do not need anything more than basic algebra and 
knowledge of basic arithmetical properties, but do require a degree of flexible 
expertise. These characteristics make the problem a good one for judging whether 
students can go beyond routine expertise. 
Geometrical proof 
There are also geometrical approaches. A very appealing one is the one referred to 
by Davis (Davis, 1993; Greer, 1993). Concretely, a rectangle with integer sides 
(e.g. 5 × 7) can be thought of as made up of square tiles of unit side. Consider the 
“thick perimeter” for this rectangle, represented by shaded squares (Fig. 2): 
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Figure 2: Rectangle with “thick perimeter” for geometrical proof 
You should be able to convince yourself that the number of shaded squares (and 
hence their total area) differs numerically from the perimeter by 4. The number of 
shaded squares in the figure above is 7 + 7 + 5 + 5 – 4 (because of the 4 squares at 
the corners being counted twice, so to speak), i.e. perimeter – 4. For the rectangle 
to have the property that area = perimeter, it follows that the area of the unshaded 
squares would have to be 4, hence the interior must by 2 × 2 or 1 × 4, and so to the 
solution. 
Since, for a general rectangle with dimensions x and y, the area within the “thick 
perimeter” is (x – 2)(y – 2), this geometric explanation corresponds to the 
algebraic equation: (x – 2)(y – 2) = 4, which was the second algebraic expression 
suggested above, making a nice example of a connection between geometrical 
and algebraic representations. 
THE STUDY 
Design 
A group of 39 Flemish pre-service mathematics teachers participated in the study, 
of whom 16 already had a university degree in mathematics or were expected to 
obtain that degree shortly. These student teachers were being prepared to teach 
mathematics to 15–18-year old students. The other 23 participants were not 
studying mathematics at university level, but being educated at a professional 
instution to become mathematics teachers for 12–15-year olds.  
All participants were given a task consisting of two parts and on each part they 
could work for one hour. First, they were invited to solve the Isis problem and to 
look for more than one proof. Having finished that first part, the participants were 
invited to study five given proofs, to rank them in “order of quality” (not defined 
by the researchers) from best (= 1) to worst (= 5), and to comment on them. The 
five proofs, provided in different random orders, were: (1) the “table proof” (see 
Fig. 1), including an argument why the table will not produce any more zeroes, (2) 
the “graph proof” in which the original equation xy = 2x + 2y was rewritten as y = 
2 + 4/(x – 2), the corresponding hyperbola sketched and it was argued why (3, 6), 
(4, 4), and (6, 3) are the only three points with integer coordinates on that 
hyperbola, (3) the “unit fractions proof” starting from the equivalent form 1/x + 
1/y = ½, showing that either x = y = 4 or one of them is less than 4, then checking 
the limited number of possible cases, (4) the “factorization proof” starting from  
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the (x  –  2)(y – 2) = 4 equivalent form and, once more, checking a limited number 
of possible cases, and (5) the “tiles proof,” the geometrical proof explained above. 
Results with respect to proof findings 
Table 1 lists the number of proofs that were given by the future mathematics 
teachers. A distinction is made between complete and partial proofs and between 
the two groups of participants. A proof was considered as partial when an 
essential element to complete the argument was missing.  
   University students (N = 16) Non-university students (N = 23)
   Complete  Partial  Complete  Partial 
Graph 3    1   
Factorization 3       
Tiles 4       
Properties of  
divisibility 
4 2 1  1 
Proof by 
exhaustion 
 3  2  2 
Other 5       
Total 19  5  4 3 
Table 1: Type of proofs found by the pre-service mathematics teachers 
It can be seen that 23 complete proofs and 8 partial proofs were found. From the 
five types of proof that were included in the second part of the task, only the graph, 
factorization, and tiles proof were found (by, respectively, 4, 3, and 4 student 
teachers). Several student teachers tried to find a proof by using properties of 
divisibility or by exhausting all possibilities, starting from the expression 2x/(x – 
2), straightforwardly derived from xy = 2x + 2y, but not all were able to present 
these arguments in fully reasoned form. Levels of proving performance clearly 
differed for the two groups of participants. Whereas the student teachers with a 
university background in mathematics found (on average) 1.19 complete and 0.26 
partial proofs, those without this background only found 0.17 complete and 0.13 
partial proofs on average.  
Interpersonal differences were very obvious. In particular, among the group of 
university student teachers 12 of the 19 correct proofs were found by only three 
participants and one participant, Xander, even produced five different proofs, all 
clearly and fully argued. Besides the factorization, tiles, and divisibility proofs, he 
produced two others using quadratic equations. One of these proofs started from 
the quadratic equation x
2 – cx + 2c = 0 with roots x and y for which the property xy 
= 2x + 2y holds (x + y = c and xy = 2c). For x and y to be natural numbers, the 
discriminant c
2 – 8c must be a perfect square. By rewriting c
2 – 8c as  16 ) 4 (
2 − − c   
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= k
2, the possible values for c (and k) can be found, leading to the integer solutions 
of the quadratic equation (c = 9, with roots 3 and 6, or c = 8 with double root 4).  
Results with respect to proof evaluations 
Table 2 lists the mean ratings (and corresponding standard deviations) for 
students’ rankings of the five given proofs. 
   University students Non-university students Total 
Table 3.7  (1.28) 4.2  (1.04) 4.0  (1.17) 
Graph 3.9  (1.25) 3.6  (1.33) 3.7  (1.30) 
Unit 
fractions 2.9  (1.22)  2.6 (1.15)  2.7 (1.19) 
Factorization 1.6  (0.89)  2.0 (0.98)  1.9 (0.97) 
Tiles 3.0  (1.20)  2.5  (1.27) 2.7  (1.27) 
Table 2: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) of student teachers’ 
proof rankings from best (= 1) to worst (= 5) 
First, average rankings as well as typical comments showed the preference of 
many students for algebraic proofs (factorization and unit fractions). Whereas 
students almost unanimously ranked very high the factorization proof (in both 
groups, standard deviations of rankings were less than 1), their average ranking of 
the unit fraction proof was lower and the spread was higher, likely because of the 
more “tricky” character of this latter proof and of the high emphasis (and status) 
of “factorization” in Flemish secondary mathematics education. Typical 
comments were: “The proof with the unit fractions and via factorization [are] best. 
There is no need for drawing,” or “The tiles are less clear. Only to represent it, it is 
probably handy, but you really prove it with factorization and unit fractions.”  
Second, in line with the high standard deviation for the rankings of the tiles proof, 
also students’ reactions on that proof were rather ambivalent: “Proof with tiles: 
This is a better proof because it is clear and from the beginning till the end, it is 
neatly reasoned. Nevertheless, I miss some equations and it is a rather intuitive 
proof” (Xander), or “This is a very nice proof: fast, it is not necessary to know 
“real” mathematics. On the other hand, it is very much focused on the concrete 
problem. It is ad hoc, not immediately generalizable to other problems.” A high 
standard deviation of the rankings was also found for the graph proof, but an 
ambivalent attitude toward this proof was less reflected in participants’ 
comments. 
Third, generally speaking, students rejected experimentation: the average ranking 
of the table proof was low and, in some cases, it was even rejected as a proof. 
Several comments also showed confusion between a proof by exhaustion and 
“trial and error.” A typical reaction was: “Proof by means of a table succeeds in 
this case because there are few possibilities that have to be considered. In general, 
an “enumeration” is not a good technique. In fact, it is not a “nice” proof.”  
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Fourth, the five given proofs also elicited several emotional and aesthetic 
reactions, such as: “Checking by trial and error which number can and which 
cannot [work] and I do not find this pleasant. It is indeed a proof, but it doesn’t 
look like it,” “The factorization is very simple, clear and beautiful,” “The proof 
with the tiles comes over as a little bit playful,” “The proof with unit fractions is 
far-fetched.” A sporadic reaction pointed to the difference between proofs that 
convince logically versus proofs that illuminate: “The proof with the tiles is the 
most visual one: you are not only convinced about the truth of the judgment, you 
also get the feeling that you “see” why it is so.” 
CONCLUDING REMARK 
At a time when many scholars are bemoaning the decreasing attention to problem 
solving, proof, and proving in the school curriculum (e.g. Hanna, 2007), the 
problem also has many aspects that suggest that it would be a powerful teaching 
tool. These aspects include, among other things: 
1.     Showing how systematicity, and then proof, can emerge out of empirical 
explorations. 
2.   Providing practice in the flexible rewriting of algebraic equations. 
3.    Showing the connections between different forms of mathematical 
representations, as in the case of the algebraic and geometric forms of               (x – 
2)(y – 2) = 4. 
4.   Illustrating a wide range of forms of argument and proof. 
5.   Demonstrating clearly the intimate relationship between problem solving 
and representations (Davis, 1993).  
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TESTING A MODEL  
FOR THE SITUATION OF “DOING PROOFS”  
USING ANIMATIONS OF CLASSROOM SCENARIOS  
Patricio Herbst
1 
University of Michigan, United States of America 
A research program is outlined that seeks to understand the rationality of the 
teacher’s work managing academic transactions. The situation of “doing proofs” 
in American high school geometry classrooms is examined, illustrating the 
theoretical constructs instructional situation, model, and norm. Methods for the 
empirical study of teachers rationality are described, illustrating key concepts 
used to build animations of classroom scenarios used for that study. 
How does a teacher manage the place that proof occupies in the work of a 
mathematics classroom? The vague expression “the place of proof” helps point 
not only to the actual role that proof may play in the mathematical thinking and 
discourse of the people involved, but also to the cultural and institutional 
expectations that make it possible for proof to have a role in those institutional 
settings called classrooms. American high school geometry classrooms (AHSGC) 
are examples of such a setting, one in which proof not only may play a role in the 
work people do, but also one in which proof is at stake in the transactions between 
teacher and students. The teacher is responsible to manage those transactions.  We 
are interested in understanding the work of the teacher in geometry classrooms 
and how the nature of that work affects the kind of opportunity to learn a teacher 
may create. To that effect we have built a theoretical perspective, created 
theoretical models, and developed methods to test those models. In this short 
paper we provide a succinct account of how animated classroom scenarios help us 
create experimental conditions to test those models. “Doing proofs” is one 
situation that the teacher of geometry needs to manage and for which we have 
developed models and experimental settings. 
We build on the hypothesis that the teacher, the students, and the knowledge at 
stake are tied by a didactical contract—a set of tacit rules that bring students, 
teacher, and content together and keeps them together for limited time. This 
contract establishes differential roles for participants and creates a timeline and a 
timescale for those roles to unfold: teacher and students are bound by this contract 
to procure certain objects of knowledge of the grain size of headings in a textbook. 
Proof has historically been one of those contracted objects of knowledge for 
AHSGC (González and Herbst, 2006; Herbst, 2002): Since the 19th century, 
geometry teachers have been expected to teach proof, and geometry students 
                                           
1 This paper is based on work supported by the US National Science Foundation, through grants REC 0133619 and 
ESI-0353285. All opinions are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Foundation. The author acknowledges valuable comments from Michael Weiss.   
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expected to learn it. That expectation has been understood variously over the 
years, including (among other things) that students should learn that the truth of 
mathematical propositions is confirmed by showing that a proof exists, that they 
should know how to deduce a statement from prior statements, and that they 
should be disposed to reason deductively when solving mathematical problems. 
At various times during a year of work, a class does certain things that can be 
taken as laying claim on "proof". Yet the classroom work that might have such 
exchange value exists at a different timescale than that of the contract, in which 
“proof” is an object of knowledge; classroom work deploys over the much smaller 
timescale of interaction and discourse. A major problem for the teacher is to 
manage transactions between what is done in that moment-to-moment timescale 
and what can be claimed from the larger timescale of the contract. From our 
observations of geometry classrooms, we have proposed that AHSGC have 
historically developed some frames or defaults to facilitate those exchanges 
between interactive work and claims on knowledge. These frames are 
specializations of the rules of the didactical contract that make possible 
transactions between different kinds of work and different kinds of knowledge at 
stake. We use the expression “instructional situation” to designate each of those 
different frames available for teacher and students to realize their daily 
transactions between the work being done and their entitlement to lay claim on 
particular contracted mathematical ideas (Herbst, 2006).  
There are at least three instructional situations in AHSGC where students have the 
chance to participate in work that potentially lays claim on proof. We call these 
situations “installing a theorem,” “doing a proof,” and “calculating (a measure).” 
We describe these briefly here and then zoom in to the second. The situation we 
call “installing a theorem” frames the interactions that mediate between the 
moment when a class is ready to learn, but not yet entitled to use, a theorem, and 
the moment when they can be held accountable for using it (Herbst & Miyakawa, 
2008; Herbst & Nachlieli, 2007). The situation we call “doing a proof” consists of 
students’ production of an argument (a sequence of statements and reasons) that 
shows how a set of “givens” lead to a conclusion that they are asked to “prove” 
(see Herbst & Brach, 2006; Herbst, Chen, Weiss, González, et al., 2008). The 
situation we call “calculating a measure” consists of students’ use of known 
measures of a given figure and properties known of the given figures to calculate 
(determine deductively) unknown measures of that figure (Hsu, 2007).  
To say that those situations exist means to claim that there exist normative (or 
unmarked) ways of carrying out those activities (installing a theorem, doing a 
proof, calculating a measure), including, in particular, canonical tasks for students 
to engage in and categories of knowledge at stake for which work on those tasks 
could exchange. To say that those situations exist is not to suggest that real 
interaction is always predictable or routinized. We do suggest that in constructing 
interactions in pursuit of contracted objects of knowledge, teacher and students do 
so against the background of (perhaps tacit) expectations of what is normal in 
those situations, and marking departures from them.   
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Our research agenda can be described as one of understanding what those 
instructional situations consist of :  what kind of mathematical work they enable, 
what mathematical ideas and practices they put at stake. As argued in Herbst 
(2006), novel tasks may find a place in a class by prompting teacher and students 
to negotiate an ad hoc situation made up of elements from a variety of those that 
are customary in that class. We expect that in managing students’ engagement in 
desired mathematical work, or in stirring that work to stimulate students’ learning 
of targeted ideas, a teacher will make departures from the expectations set forth by 
existing instructional situations. She will do so using a set of resources that we 
call practical rationality (Herbst & Chazan, 2003) and that includes ways of 
seeing and valuing classroom events and actions. We want to know what that 
practical rationality consists of (and how it relates to teachers’ knowledge of 
mathematics for teaching; see Ball, Thames, & Phelps, in press).  
To pursue this research agenda we create models of instructional situations. The 
situation “doing proofs” in AHSGC consists of an exchange between, on the one 
hand, students’ completion of a chain of deductive, justified statements between a 
premise and a conclusion, and on the other hand the teacher’s claim that students 
know “how to do proofs.”   By a model we mean a system of norms, i.e., 
statements that describe normative or unmarked actions that we hypothesize are 
characteristic of an instructional situation. A model could be prototyped through a 
representation of classroom interaction in which action conforms to what is 
described in the model.  For example, we have created an animated movie (titled 
"The equilateral triangle") that portrays a classroom collectively producing a 
proof in a way that is hypothesized to be normative in AHSGC. By "normative" 
here we mean two things:  (1) as a whole, the story represents an activity that 
teachers would accept as being about “doing a proof,” and (2) in specific moves, 
the story represents events and actions that participants would not explicitly 
denounce as breaches of the norms of “doing a proof.”  Table 1 provides some 
norms of “doing proofs” and how they are realized in “The equilateral triangle.” 
(A more comprehensive list of 25 norms in the model of “doing proofs” is 
provided in Herbst et al., 2008.) 
The notion that models can be prototyped in classroom stories, and that these can 
be represented using rich media, has been instrumental in designing a method for 
the collection of empirical data.  We pursue two research questions of (1) 
confirming or falsifying the viability of our models and (2) identifying elements 
of the practical rationality with which teachers respond to the demands of a 
situation. The method builds on the ethnomethodological tradition in which the 
viability of a model of practical actions (or script) is studied through the use of 
breaching experiments (i.e. instances of the practice being modeled that contain 
purposeful breaches of the hypothesized norms). In our method, participants 
(experienced teachers of AHSGC) are asked to watch an animation (or read a 
comic) that purportedly shows a class doing a proof. In making that animation, 
one or more of the norms of the model of “doing proofs” have been breached. 
Ethnomethodologists gather experimental data from the reactions of participants  
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to a breaching experiment: The way participants denounced or repaired the 
features of the episode that ran counter what had been hypothesized as normative 
in the model being tested. Likewise, we gather data from experienced 
practitioners of “doing proofs” by examining what moments in a story they 
comment on, and what they say about those moments — in particular how they 
denounce or repair the presumption that the story is a case of “doing proofs.” We 
have shown elsewhere (Nachlieli, Herbst, and González, accepted) that this 
method can be executed using videotaped episodes. In that study we found 
confirmation to the hypothesis that it is normative for every statement to be 
justified by a reason before moving on to make another statement.  
Table 1   
Norms of the situation “doing proofs”  Actions in “The equilateral triangle” 
The teacher provides all the premises that 
can be taken as true, the “given,” using a 
diagrammatic register 
The teacher provides the conclusion to be 
reached, the “prove,” using a diagrammatic 
register 
 
The work to be done consists of writing a 
sequence of statements, each written in the 
diagrammatic register
2  
Each statement is followed by a reason 
stated in the conceptual register, 
immediately after the statement it justifies
 
  Animations of cartoon characters are particularly useful for implementing 
this method of data collection. Not only do they allow more control in the 
development of media content, in the sense that one can represent stories that 
never existed; they also can elide aspects that are too particular to one 
geographical, historical, or social context. While those characteristics of the 
medium may not be important for all researchers of teaching, they are important 
for us in that what we seek is to uncover and understand the rationality of a 
practice (managing the doing of proofs in AHSGC) as opposed to the rationality 
of an individual in his or her particular context. These representations have shown 
to be sufficiently immersive to enable participants to respond to them by 
projecting their own contexts onto the animations (Herbst & Chazan, 2006). In 
Table 2 I list other stories that we have represented using animations, and I 
                                           
2 For the distinction between diagrammatic, generic, and conceptual registers see Weiss & Herbst (2007).  
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identify the norms of “doing proofs” that each story breaches and what those 
breaches are. (It bears emphasizing that while the animation events breach norms 
that we hypothesize hold in AHSGC, our making of those hypotheses should not 
be understood as an endorsement of them.) 
Story Breach  event  Norm  breached 
The Square  The teacher asks class to 
prove “in a F the ang bis 7”
A student requests to erase a 
diagonal in the diagram being 
used for the proof 
The given and conclusion for a 
proof are stated in terms of a 
diagram. 
Students don’t add or take away 
objects from the diagram. 
The Isosceles 
Triangle 
The word “hint” is used to 
justify a statement. 
 
The existence of an auxiliary 
line is included as a statement 
in the proof. 
Justifications can only be 
definitions, theorems, postulates, 
or “given.” 
The original diagram includes all 
objects needed for the argument. 
The Kite  The student draws the 
diagram for the proof. 
The problem is to prove that 
angle bisectors of a kite meet 
at a point, yet the diagram 
shows the diagonals. 
The diagram is provided to the 
student. 
The original diagram includes all 
elements needed for the 
argument and no extraneous 
elements. 
A proof about 
rectangles 
The teacher draws a diagram 
and invites students to 
propose plausible premises 
and a conclusion to prove  
Statements are listed but 
reasons are skipped. 
The teacher provides the given 
and the conclusion. 
 
Statements are justified 
immediately after produced and 
before new statements are made.
The Midpoint 
Quadrilateral 
A student justifies a statement 
with a conjecture that the 
teacher had confirmed as true 
the day before. 
Justifications can only be 
definitions, theorems, postulates, 
or “given.” 
   
Those animations constitute a set of resources with which we collect data on the 
practical rationality of teachers. Empirical data gathered from groups of teachers 
looking at and responding to those animations lends credence to our hypotheses 
that those norms exist. The second aim of the research is currently the object of 
exploratory discourse analysis. This analysis looks specifically at how 
practitioners describe the events they see in the animations and how they appraise  
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them. The warrants with which practitioners defend or indict a moment in a story, 
or propose an alternative to that story are the building blocks we unearth and use 
to reconstruct the practical rationality of teaching proof.  
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DEVELOPING CULTURES OF PROOF PRACTICES 
AMONGST BRAZILIAN MATHEMATICS TEACHERS 
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Bandeirante University of São Paulo, Brazil 
ABSTRACT:  This paper describes a research project aiming to examine the 
challenges associated with the development of cultures of proof practices 
amongst Brazilian mathematics teachers. It presents in brief the methodology of 
the project, which privileged the establishment of collaborative groups of 
teachers and researchers. These groups engaged in two activities: the mapping of 
proof practices of their students and the design of learning situations aiming to 
further develop these practices. The results of participating in these inter-related 
activities are discussed.  
CHARACTERISING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Innumerous research projects in the field of Mathematics Education have 
indicated the complexities associated with the teaching and learning of 
argumentation and proof in mathematics, which permeate all levels of 
mathematics education (see, for example, Harel e Sowder, 1998; Healy e Hoyles, 
1998; Knuth, 2002; Pietropaolo, 2005). Such studies highlight not only the 
various difficulties that students have in understanding and constructing valid 
mathematical arguments, but also the scarcity of cultures of pedagogic practices 
related to the theme, especially as far school mathematics teachers are 
concerned – and despite the fact that mathematics curriculum documents from a 
number of different countries argue for the need for innovative approaches for 
teaching proof. With this need in mind, many researchers have directed their 
attention to the potential of digital tools as contexts for the learning of proof and 
with which learners might engage in the definition and construction of classes of 
mathematical objects (based on the making explicit of common properties) as 
well as exploring innumerous specific examples of these classes as they attempt to 
identify and proof certain relationships  (e.g. Mariotti, 2001; Healy e Hoyles, 
2001; Govender e De Villiers, 2004).  
In thesis, the learning scenarios presented in these research studies could serve as 
a source of pedagogic resources. In practice, however, there is a need to recognize 
that successful approaches to teaching proof do not depend solely on innovative 
learning situations, they also require the acceptance and appropriation of the new 
contexts and tools on the part of the teachers. It was with this background in mind, 
that the research project Argumentation and Proof in School Mathematics 
(AProvaME) was conceived. In this article, we report on the methodology of the 
study and present the results in brief.
1  
                                           
1 In relation to the conference themes, this contribution can be directly related to questions 
posed within the themes: 1. Cognitive aspects; 2. Argumentation and proof; 3. Types of proof.  
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THE STUDY 
The principal aims of the research project were to:  
1.  Create collaborative groups composed of researchers and school 
teachers to: (a) map the proof practices of adolescent students (aged, in 
the main, between 14 and 16 years) attending schools in the state of São 
Paulo, Brazil; (b) conceive learning situations, aimed at involving 
students in the processes of constructing conjectures and proofs in 
technology-integrated contexts. 
2.  Investigate to what extent the participation of the school teachers in 
these collaborative groups contributed to their appropriation of new 
perspectives on the teaching and learning of proof.  
It involved a two-year collaboration between six university-based lecturers in 
mathematics education and 27 mathematics teachers. All the mathematics 
teachers were undertaking a professional Masters qualification in the teaching of 
mathematics and all taught mathematics in schools within the public school 
system of the state of São Paulo. The research strategy adopted was based in the 
establishing of collaborative and continuous partnerships between the school- and 
university-based participants. The project aimed to involve the mathematics 
teachers in a co-generative investigation (Greenwood and Levin, 2000), a kind of 
action research in which all participants co-generate knowledge through a process 
of collaborative communication. In a co-generative study, the meaning 
constructed in the process of investigation leads to social action and reflection 
about the research activities involves participants in the construction of new 
meanings for their practices. In the case of the project AProvaMe, the social 
action in question related to the challenges inherent in the teaching and learning of 
proof , and particularly, how this challenge manifested itself within the in the 
schools of the teachers involved.  
Phase 1: Mapping the proof practices of students and teachers 
In this phase, the main instrument for mapping the practices and performances of 
students was a questionnaire, modified by the whole research team from the 
questionnaire originally design by Healy and Hoyles (1998). Before the 
modification began, each teacher was asked to provide a set of data which was 
used to compose their initial profile (experiences during initial teacher education, 
description of a proof-related activity they had developed, responses with to items 
from the unmodified version of the proof questionnaire).  
The task of modifying the questionnaire and developing a system for coding the 
protocols occurred during weekly meetings of the team (which divided into three 
subgroups). A virtual environment was also established to enable communication 
                                                                                                                                    
The project itself also involved participants in discussion of theme 4. Dynamic Geometry 
Software and Transition to Proof, although this was not the only digital tool under focus.  
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between meetings. During team meetings (which were video-taped), the 
participants read a number of research articles and in particular discussed in depth 
the model of proof types outlines in Balacheff (1988). Pilots of the modified 
questionnaire where also conducted and discussed, serving as an important basis 
for the development of a system for coding. This in turn was tested as a subset of 
data from the pilots was coded by each teacher in attempts to ensure its reliability. 
The final version of the questionnaire was administered in 81 classes from 31 
different schools, resulting in dataset consisting of 1998 protocols. Each teacher 
was responsible for the coding of the protocols of the students in the 3 classes for 
which he or she has collected data. This data was then analised by a subgroup of 
the research team, composed of 6 teachers and 3 researchers.  
Phase 2: Supporting the emergence of a cultures of proving 
The second phase aimed to contemplate both axes of the investigation: learning 
and teaching. In relation to learning, the main objective was the conception and 
evaluation of learning situation, specifically destined at the areas of difficulties 
and limitations in understanding identified in Phase 1. In relation to teaching, 
attention was focused on the teachers’ participation – on their contributions 
during the process of the design and on the modifications of the learning situation 
in action. For the activities of Phase 2, the research team divided into 5 groups in 
which the development of the learning situations occurred in a cyclical manner. 
Each group was responsible for the development of at least two 
technology-integrated activities (one in the domain of geometry and the other 
number/algebra). Two kinds of digital tools were selected, dynamic geometry and 
spreadsheets.  
In the first, each group met fortnightly to discuss the activities with the various 
versions saved in the group’s Portfolio on the virtual environment, for posterior 
analysis. In addition, the group discussions were video recorded. In the second 
stage, each group was responsible for testing the activities produced by other 
groups. To facilitate intergroup communication, Forums were created in the 
virtual environment, where all comments during the testing process were posted. 
Experimentation with the mathematics classroom occurred only during the third 
and final stage. In general, in these experimentations, individual teachers assumed 
the responsibility for implementing what then became “their situation” (and the 
focus of the final coursework for their Masters). These teachers were also 
responsible for determine, together with one of the researchers, other instruments 
for data collection to be administers to the participants involved in the final 
scenarios.  
RESULTS IN BRIEF 
The data collected in the first phase show clearly that, at the start of the project, 
the teachers did not feel ready to work on argumentation and proof in their own 
classrooms. Their visions of the proving process was limited to their experiences 
during their initial education courses (which emphasized only formal proof), 
along with, for a handful only, experiences within the classroom indicating formal  
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proofs to be inaccessible to their students. Their initial visions value disciplinary 
rather than developmental proof and many of them (16 of the 27) were unable to 
describe a single proof-related activity they had development with their students.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the absence of any culture of proving in their 
mathematics classrooms, their students experienced enormous difficulties in 
completing the questionnaire.   
Analysis of these student responses indicated the existence of three groups: those 
who were unable to offer any justification for mathematics statements (for most 
items, this was the largest group), those whose justifications were based 
calculations with particular cases and a third, extremely small group, who 
managed to construct arguments based on mathematical properties. These results 
provide further evidence of the cognitive lacuna between pragmatic and 
conceptual proofs as suggested by Balacheff (1988). In the Brazilian context, 
however, a more elementary difficulty can also be identified: many students were 
unable to construct even a pragmatic justification. Considering this result in 
isolation might suggest that Brazilian students have more difficulties in dealing 
with argumentation and proof than their contemporaries in other countries. But, 
when the scarcity of proof practices in Brazilian school mathematics is taken in to 
account, it seems likely that these results reflect didactical as much as cognitive 
issues. 
Participation in the modification and administration of the proof questionnaire, 
turned out to be an important activity for the teacher participants. Analyses of this 
participation suggest that it sparked the beginning of a process of reflection, a 
raising of awareness, about what might be expected of students at different 
moments in their schooling and about the value of certain types of arguments. In 
particular, generic examples, initially dismissed as purely empirical, were 
appropriated as containing at least some traces of the reasoning required for valid 
mathematical argument. Their discussions, both face-to-face and virtual, illustrate 
these reflections, as an example, Figure 1 presents the evaluation of an argument 
representing a student’s attempt to prove the statement “when you add any two 
even numbers, the answer is always even” by the teacher William posted to the 
virtual environment at the end of Phase 1. 
Hanna’s answer 
8 + 6 = 14 
8 = 2 x 4 
6 = 2 x 3 
14 = 2 x (4 + 3) 
8 + 6 =  2 x 7 
So, Hanna says that the statement 
is true 
Hanna presents a solution that on first sight 
seems to be a simple example, in her case 8 + 6 
+ 14. However when she writes that 8 = 2.4 
and 6 = 2.3 she makes use of the property, and 
afterwards when she writes that 14 =2(4+3), 
that is, puts 2 in evidence, and finalizes saying 
8 + 6 = 2.7, she shows that she understands the 
property of evens and from this the step 
towards presenting an argument more formal 
is not so big. 
Figure 1: William’s evaluation of a generic example  
1‐200  ICMI Study 19－2009 
In relation to the changes in the teachers’ attitudes to examples such as Hanna’s, it 
is important to stress that all Phase 1 activities took place in the context of 
conducting a research project – the readings of articles concerning different proof 
types and the discussions about coding responses were not simply exercises, they 
were associated with an explicit and tangible objective associated with the 
demands of participation in a collaborative project.  But, although the activities of 
the first phase certainly seem to have stimulated reflection about the teaching and 
learning of proof, the teachers during this phase had adopted the role of researcher 
in a form essentially separated from the role of teacher. As the process of 
designing and testing learning situations for proof in Phase 2 began, a certain 
resistance of the part of teachers to reassume this role was identified. This 
resistance was associated with feelings of insecurity about engaging in 
proof-related teaching practices, reinforced by a corresponding absence of any 
repertoire of pedagogic practices integrating the use of digital tools.  
As a consequence, the elaboration of the situations took longer than predicted and 
passed through two rather different stages. Using the distinction introduced by 
Trouche e Guin (2006), in the first, the teachers concentrated on designing for use, 
privileging questions of epistemological and cognitive natures, with less attention 
given to didactic questions.  During group meetings extensive discussions 
considered issues such as the kinds of arguments that could be counted as proofs, 
how to evaluate the relative sophistication of different arguments and whether or 
not adolescents possess the necessary cognitive structures to deal with formal 
proof. The first versions of the activities emerged from these discussion. But, it 
was only during the second stage, when the teachers were working with the 
scenarios in use that the roles of researcher and teacher were assumed 
simultaneously and didactical questions gained as much attention as 
epistemological and cognitive ones.  
One result was the transformation of the learning situation – from activities 
predominantly leading to particular proofs to sequences of activities exploring the 
dynamic aspects of the integrated software. It was at the point of such 
transformations that strategies for treating of different kinds of examples – in 
order to facilitate the construction of pragmatic arguments, while also bringing 
elements with which students might begin to contemplate the difference between 
these and conceptual arguments. Of the three main strategies for smoothing the 
passage between pragmatics and conceptual proofs, of particular note was the 
gradual inclusion into the learning scenarios of activities involving the 
exploration of generic examples (an idea that was completely unknown at the start 
of the project). The other two strategies were related to the form in which 
arguments were expressed. The teachers became increasingly convinced that the 
formal presentation was not the only form that should be encouraged, and in all 
the learning scenarios, the natural language register was valued. The teachers also 
came to recognize that when more formal presentation were desired it was 
necessary to include activities specifically addressing the introduction of  
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structures for the organizing of logical chains of the steps of the constructed 
proofs. 
FINAL WORD 
In synthesis, the results of the Project suggest that collection partnerships between 
teachers and researcher can contribute to confronting some of the challenges 
associated with the teaching and learning of proof in school mathematics, but for 
this to happen, there has to be a real merging of both communities. When research 
issues dominate, pedagogical practice can be left to the side. Conversely, without 
some contact with the research community, the teachers in this project at least, 
would have seen little possibility that proof might be integrated in any form into 
their classrooms.  
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TRANSPARENCY IN A TUTOR-STUDENT INTERACTION 
CONCERNING THE CONVERSE OF LAGRANGE'S 
THEOREM 
Kirsti Hemmi  
Linköping University, Sweden 
Barbara Jaworski   
Loughborough University, England 
We analyze a piece of data with tutor-student interaction dealing with the 
refutation of the converse of Lagrange's theorem from a perspective of 
transparency. We look at aspects of proof that are intended to be made visible for 
students by mathematicians and aspects that seem to remain invisible for students. 
In particular we highlight some logical and formal aspects of proof the dealing 
with which seems to be arbitrary both in school and university mathematics. We 
show that there are many crucial aspects of proof that are invisible in the 
teaching context but also that the condition of transparency is an intricate 
dilemma and should be considered in a didactical, and possibly a developmental  
frame both from teacher and student perspectives.   
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this article is to investigate some crucial aspects of proof that are taken 
for granted in university mathematics learning environments and seem to cause 
difficulties for students’ access to proof. We apply a theoretical framework that 
was developed and tested against data during a four year study on students’ 
encounters with proof at a university in Sweden (Hemmi, 2006; Hemmi, 2008). 
The condition of transparency is a part of the theory and refers to the intricate 
dilemma in the mathematical instruction about how and how much to focus on 
various aspects of proof and how and how much to work with proof without a 
focus on it.  
The study on students’ encounters with proof at a Swedish university showed that 
there were many aspects of proof that remained invisible for students (Hemmi, 
2006). The study also shows that, in school mathematics, proof is often used for 
explanation and students have very little experience about other functions of 
proof. The students in all focus groups stated that, in the very beginning of their 
studies, they met a lot of proofs in the lectures but at the same time struggled with 
the question of what proof actually is and why it is needed.  
The study showed that the lack of the knowledge of elementary logic caused 
difficulties for the students. Students in focus groups studying abstract algebra 
talked for example about scarcity of information regarding “if and only if”. 
“I have felt that it was expected that you know what it is all about. Yes, when we 
started it was taken for granted that you knew what a proof was. It’s nothing you have 
learnt. I think it was during the course in combinatorics when someone happened to  
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say something about “If and only if”, that you have to first show it in one direction 
and then in the other. So it wasn’t until then I heard it. So there is nobody who has 
told you what a proof is.” (Student in Abstract algebra, 2004) 
Many students had also difficulties with following the deductive way of 
presenting mathematics in the lectures as well as in the textbooks. They were 
struggling with elementary questions that are often implicit and seldom discussed 
in the community of mathematical practice. 
In this article, in order to shed further light on the condition of transparency, we 
apply the theory to analyse data obtained from tutor-student interaction in a UK 
study of university level mathematics tutoring (Jaworski, 2002; Nardi, Jaworski 
& Hegedus, 2005). We start by giving a brief presentation of the theory.  
THEORETICAL FRAME: THE CONDITION OF TRANSPARENCY 
The theoretical perspective applied in this study was created by combining a 
social practice approach with theories about proof (Hemmi, 2006). From this 
perspective proof can be seen as an artefact in mathematical practice. According 
to the theory of Lave and Wenger (1991) there is an intrinsic balance in learning 
environments between the uses of artefacts on the one hand and the focusing on 
artefacts as such on the other hand. Due to this theory, artefacts need to be seen 
(be visible) and to be used and seen through (be invisible) to enhance newcomers’ 
access to the practice. Combining these two characteristics in the learning 
environments is called the condition of transparency. Learning is conceived as 
enhanced participation in practice, in our case the practice of doing university 
mathematics.  
Applying this theory to the uses of proof in mathematics classrooms we define 
visibility as referring to the different ways of focusing on various aspects of proof 
like logical structures, specific proof techniques, historical role and functions of 
proof in mathematics and meta-mathematical aspects connected to proof. By 
invisibility we refer to the opposite: not focusing on particular aspects of proof, 
not discussing the logical structures of proof and so on but getting involved with 
proof as derivation of formulas or explanation or convincing arguments; not 
focusing on the process of proving but the products of proving like formulae and 
theorems and the justifying of solutions of problems without thinking of it as 
proving (see also Hemmi, 2008). 
MASTER – APPRENTICE INTERACTION   
We refer here to a study of tutorial teaching in which a tutor works with (typically) 
a pair of students, focusing on their submitted work on problem sheets related to 
university lectures. The example we analyze relates to lectures in abstract algebra 
and in particular to proof of Lagrange’s theorem (see Jaworski, 2002). In marking 
written solutions from a number of students, the tutor realized that several 
students believed the converse of Lagrange’s theorem (LT) to be true; i.e. that 
given a finite group G, where o(G) means the order of G,   
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if H is a subgroup of a finite group G then o(H) is a factor of o(G),           (*)   
and then also,  
for any factor of o(G), we can find a subgroup whose order is that factor.  (**) 
With one pair of students, the tutor set out to explain the implications of Lagrange 
theorem and to show that its converse was not true, taking as an example, the 
group A4. He established with the students that the order of A4 is 12, so that, 
according to LT, the order of H, any subgroup of A4 must be a factor of 12, i.e. a 
member of {1,2,3,4,6,12}. He said, “So we now know what sizes to look for”. 
Very quickly he ran through “the easy” ones, 1 and 12, and then reminded the 
students of the nature of groups of orders 2 and 3. So at this stage subgroups of 
orders 1,2,3 and 12 were identified. He then said, “Four. Now what orders could 
elements have inside a group of order four?” (See Jaworski, 2002, pp 79-80 for a 
full transcript.) 
The tutor wanted to demonstrate that for at least one factor of 12 there was no 
subgroup of that order. If there is no subgroup for one factor of 12, then this 
means that the converse of LT is disproved by counter example. At the moment 
the focus is on the factor 4. We ask here, to what extent are the tutor’s intentions 
and associated concepts visible to the students, and suggest that they are not 
visible at this stage in the dialogue. 
When a student replied, “2, 1, 4”, the tutor asked a second question: “Is there any 
element of A4 of order 4?” This implies a lack of need to ask about elements of 
orders 1 and 2, possibly because of the dialogue that had already taken place. The 
tutor waited for 5 seconds for a response to this second question, and then 
answered it himself that there are no elements of order 4. He showed, therefore, 
that there is just one subgroup of order 4. 
What about a subgroup of order 6? We see this as a crucial question, but its crucial 
nature may not have been obvious to the students. They establish that orders of 
elements of this subgroup can be 1, 2, 3 or 6. Then the tutor continues: 
Right. There aren’t any elements of order 6 in A4, so we can’t have those; so it’s got 
to be 1,2, or 3. Let’s suppose every element had order 2, except the identity, we’d 
have to have five elements of order two. There aren’t enough. So there must be some 
elements of order two and some elements of order three. Well, why must there be an 
element of order two?  That’s because, last week we proved that a group of even order 
has an element of order two, so it would have to have at least one of these in, and at 
least one three cycle in it. So, it would have to have, let’s say for sake of argument, 
(one, two) (three, four) and (one, two, three) in it. So it would also have to have the 
product of these two. Multiply them together in this order, one goes to … three goes 
to four, four goes to one … right … and multiply them the other way round and keep 
multiplying together, you would actually end up with the all of A4  [Tutor is writing 
as he speaks. Some inaudible words were omitted here]. You can’t actually fix them 
together. Once it’s got at least one double transposition and one three cycle, just by  
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐205 
multiplying them together lots of times, you get everything in A4., So, there’s no 
subgroup of order 6. (Jaworski 2002, p. 80) 
Thus, the tutor has demonstrated for the students the key element of his dis-proof 
(or refutation) of the converse of LT. He went on as follows: 
The two reasons that this is interesting are that first of all you can have several 
subgroups of the same size; the other thing is there may be a size which by 
Lagrange’s theorem is allowed for a size of subgroup, but for which there is no 
subgroup. Neither of you wrote this but some other people did, they wrote, by 
Lagrange’s theorem there must be a subgroup of size n for every n that divides the 
order of the group. And that’s not true. Here was an example. (Jaworski 2002, p. 80)    
So, the key ideas are, “there may be a size which by Lagrange’s theorem is 
allowed for a size of subgroup, but for which there is no subgroup” and thus it is 
not true that “there must be a subgroup of size n for every n that divides the order 
of the group”. The didactical style of the dialogue gives little indication of what 
students actually understand of this. We suggest that the key elements of what has 
been proved are at best implicit in the dialogue, and therefore not necessarily 
visible to students. For example, do they realize that to disprove the converse it is 
enough to give one counter example, A4 ?  We ask also, what would it take for a 
tutor to make visible such notions? 
This takes us overtly into didactical questions. The tutor in the example above 
chose to present or to demonstrate what he wanted the students to know. His aim 
was to convince the students that the converse of Lagrange theorem was not true. 
However, in accord with the results from Hemmi's study, it is not clear that 
students understand the idea of counter example. Largely the dialogue consisted 
of the tutor's own words with only brief contributions from students at an almost 
trivial level. What was visible was the relation between factors of the order of the 
group and existence of subgroups related to these factors. What was less visible 
was the logical structure of an if..then proof, or the generality of proof by counter 
example. The tutor could have chosen to highlight these elements in the same 
didactic style – present and demonstrate, although in this case he did not.  
It is not clear that crucial aspects do become visible using this teaching approach. 
In a study of first-year university students’ understanding of implication 
Durand-Guerrier (2003) emphasises that students’ difficulties are not 
straightforward; that difficulties involve a didactical effect of implicit 
quantification usual in mathematics classrooms in statements like “if p(x) then 
q(x)”. She advocates inquiry relating to truth values using models for open 
sentences and searching for domains in order to reveal important aspects of 
implication.  
Furthermore, it is possible that students do not understand that a statement and its 
converse are not the same thing. Hoyles & Kuchemann (2002) show that only a 
small minority of high-attaining students in English schools state that a 
conditional statement and its converse are not saying the same thing (irrespective  
1‐206  ICMI Study 19－2009 
of their truth values). They claim there is also very little progress between year 8 
and year 9 students in this respect.  
We ask also whether students are able to formulate the converse of a statement 
like )) ( ) ( ( X Q x P x → ∀ .  
A careful scrutiny of the informal statements of Lagrange’s theorem and its 
“converse” in the teaching context analyzed here reveals that the second 
statement that the tutor is refuting is actually not the converse of Lagrange’s 
theorem as given. Formalizing the statement (*) we get: 
G H ⊂ ∀ (H subgroup of G → o(H)│o(G))  
However, the second statement above (**) would be the correct converse if the 
theorem was formulated in the following manner: 
n ∀ (n is o(H) for some subgroup H→ n │o(G))  
A focus on such distinctions can help the student start to appreciate (make visible) 
the formality of symbolism and its importance for meanings in proof.  However, it 
may at the same time obscure (make invisible) other aspects, for example  by 
taking the students' focus away from elementary and necessary work needed in 
problem solving (such as in examining possible subgroups for a group with a 
certain order).  
DISCUSSION  
In the light of earlier studies, we know that it is difficult for many students to read 
and interpret what a theorem actually states and what it does not state (e.g. Hemmi, 
2006). What are the consequences of the theorem, how can the theorem be used to 
prove other results in mathematics?  
There are many possible ways of working with Lagrange’s theorem with a view to 
enabling students’ understanding of the theorem itself, its logical statement and 
relation to its converse, the use of counter-examples for refutation, and the 
generalization of logical ideas to theorems more widely.  We saw above a tutor 
offering his own explanation for some of these concepts, but perhaps, in the 
process, obscuring others.  The students here had little overt involvement.  It 
seems to us very important to involve students in the didactical process so that the 
working of tutor and students together can make possible the revealing of 
transparencies related to students difficulties in conceptualization within the 
complexity of ideas. Although we have obtained many important results about 
these aspects through studies in the field, more studies are needed to shed light on 
the condition of transparency concerning aspects of proof. It has to be considered 
both from student and teacher perspectives.  
Didactic style and visibility/invisibility seem to us to be closely linked. Data from 
the project in England revealed many tutorials with a didactic style of 
presentation/ demonstration. Just a few showed different styles in which tutors 
were seen to think alternatively about what to make visible, how to approach it, 
and to reason accordingly about their approach. In our work at the time we talked  
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of a spectrum of pedagogic awareness in which pedagogic awareness could be 
seen to vary from naïve and dismissive to confident and articulate (Nardi, 
Jaworski & Hegedus, 2005). We see pedagogic awareness, didactic style and 
visibility/invisibility to have important links in making aspects of proof 
transparent for students. 
We would say finally that developmental research studies may be one way ahead 
in addressing these links. Such studies design the didactic process and both 
promote and chart development (Jaworski, 2008). Design in this case would draw 
on the research literature in proof and transparency.  The didactic process itself 
would promote pedagogic awareness and its focus on visibility/invisibility. 
Research would promote knowing in practice and offer abstracted knowledge to 
those studying proof more widely. 
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HOW MUCH PROOFS ARE STUDENTS ABLE TO LEARN IN 
MATHEMATICS CLASS FROM THEIR TEACHERS 
Feng-Jui Hsieh   Fang-Ting Lee   Ting-Ying Wang 
Department of mathematics, National Taiwan Normal University 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how well ninth graders could learn from 
teachers teaching geometrics properties and their proofs. The sample included 
three experienced mathematics teachers and their 119 students. This study is a 
descriptive research that utilizes natural inquiry. Three aspects for analyzing 
qualities of proofs were employed: major component, local reasoning, and 
logical sequencing. Some important findings are as follows: Many students could 
catch the properties teachers taught. However, a large amount of students could 
not catch the major components teachers emphasized in proving. Even if students 
could catch a major component they might not be able to draw out this component 
through necessary local reasoning. 
INTRODUCTION 
Proving and reasoning are fundamental in mathematics, which help us with 
making sense of mathematics, communicating mathematical ideals, and justifying 
the validity of mathematical theorems (Martin, McCrone, Bower, & Dindyal, 
2005). In terms of explanation, discovery, systematization, and intellectual 
challenge, proof also places a crucial role (Harel & Sowder, 2007).  
One would never doubt the importance of proving in mathematics nor in school 
mathematics (Harel & Sowder, 2007). Developing students’ ability to prove and 
reason is one goal of the curricular standards in many countries. Therefore, the 
researches on students learning proofs have been well established in the literature. 
Many researchers were devoted to the study of categorizing and describing the 
proofs which students constructed (Gutierrez, Pegg, & Lawrie, 2004; Weber, 
2004). And they found that most students had difficulties with constructing proofs 
(Healy & Hoyles, 2000; Lin, 2005; Segal, 1998; Senk, 1982, 1985; Silver & 
Carpenter, 1989.). However, most students learn how to construct proofs in 
mathematical classes. Before they can construct a proof by themselves, they have 
to understand mathematics teachers’ explanation of properties and proofs. 
Nevertheless, researches on students’ understanding of teachers’ proofs during 
classes are limited. 
How much can students learn when teachers teach proofs on geometry properties? 
Can students comprehend what properties the teachers are teaching? Can they 
learn the proofs of these properties? Therefore, this research has two main 
purposes: 
1.  To investigate whether ninth graders could learn the geometry properties that 
the teachers taught.  
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2.  To investigate how much students gain understanding from teacher's 
reasoning and proving in aspects of a) major components, b) local reasoning, 
and c) logical sequencing. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Analyzing the quality of reasoning and proving 
It is necessary to analyze a student’s method to determine wether a student has 
learned the reasoning or proving. How does one analyze the quality of reasoning 
or proving? What are the aspects that can be analyzed? Based on other research 
literatures and focus group discussions conducted by this study, this research has 
categorized three aspects in analyzing qualities of proving: 
Major component aspect: In a step of reasoning or proving, (1) an extracted 
outcome from givens, properties, or outcomes of previous steps, which is the 
main emphasis of the step; (2) an operation in the process, for example, 
connecting points A and B. 
Local reasoning aspect: local reasoning may indicate few steps of reasoning or 
reasoning with many references. The definition of local reasoning in this research 
is retrieved from Duval (1998); deductive steps are organizing at least three 
propositions according to their status, and organizing one or more deductive steps 
yields a local reasoning. 
Logical sequencing aspect: the logical sequences of the major components in 
proving. There may be one or more appropriate logical sequences for a geometric 
proof because some major components are parallel in which no absolute sequence 
is imposed. 
Framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Structure of analyzing the quality of reasoning and proving 
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Research Design 
This study is a descriptive research that utilizes natural inquiry. The researchers 
selected two important geometrics properties and then went into the mathematic 
classrooms to observe and record how the teachers teach students to prove these 
properties. After observing a class session, researchers developed questionnaires 
for the next class session. These questionnaires were handed out to students in the 
next class session in attempt to survey how much students had grasped a property 
and its proof taught by their teachers. Research samples are composed of three 
classes from two junior high schools in Taipei county and city. The numbers of 
samples are 41, 39, and 39, and the teachers in these three classes have 25, 23, and 
23 years of teaching experience respectively. 
The mathematics topics of this research are (1) the relationship between tangent 
and radius; (2) the relationship between the length of a chord and the distance 
from the center to the given chord. In the first topic, the three teachers did not 
prove the same property. Teacher A proved: “The segment constructed by 
connecting a point of tangency and the center is perpendicular to the tangent.” 
Teacher B proved: “The distance from the center to the tangent equals the radius.” 
And teacher C proved: “When the distance between center O and a line equals to 
the radius, there is only one intersection between the circle and the line.” In the 
second topic, all three teachers taught similarly: “a long chord corresponds to a 
small distance between the center and the given chord, and a short chord 
corresponds to a large distance” or vise versa, “a small distance between the 
center and a given chord corresponds to a long chord, and a large distance 
corresponds to a short chord”.  
This research analyzed the statistics of students’ responses by categorizing, 
coding and inductive analysis. Researchers generated and compared the patterns 
of students’ responses based on different classes and different mathematical 
topics. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Mathematics teaching in classroom is intensive in Taiwan.  Teachers usually have 
very fast pass. In this circumstance, how much a student can learn geometric 
properties and their proofs taught by the teachers? This study found that for a 
taught property, in average 71% students could catch it, ranging from 51%~93% 
respectively (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Percentage of students in each class comprehended each math topic 
Class  
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For those students who caught the taught properties, in average 24% of them 
could catch more than 3/4 of the major components of a proof teachers 
emphasized, among them 15% could catch all major components (Figure 3). This 
percentage is not low in respect to only experiencing teachers’ teaching of these 
proofs once. However, in average 50% of students could only catch no more than 
1/4 of the major components of a proof, among them 35% could not catch any 
major components.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3  Amount of major components in a proof caught by students 
These students’ methods of proving or reasoning were apart from the teachers’ 
methods. The most common patterns of their proofs were as follows: 1) only write 
some properties that are either conditions or conclusions from the given 
statements, or properties that are totally unrelated to the proofs; 2) only use some 
examples to prove or reason. Some students may provide special examples while 
others may use general examples in reasoning; and 3) only prove by visual 
intuition. The students wrote something from what they saw on the given graphs. 
Although some students could catch a certain amount of major components, they 
might not be able to draw out these components through necessary local reasoning. 
For those students who caught the taught properties, in average 15% of them 
could conduct more than 2/3 local reasoning required in a proof, among them only 
2% could carry out all necessary local reasoning when extracting all major 
components (Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Amount of local reasoning in a proof caught by students  
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For a proof, in average 75% out the students who wrote some major components 
could not carry out all necessary local reasoning for extracting the major 
components they caught. Among them, in average 18% students did not express 
any deductive steps. Most of these students either only wrote the assertion 
conclusions or only wrote the givens, properties or definitions without writing out 
the conclusions. For those who attempted to write a proof (not blank), in average 
59% did not write out any local reasoning. This data showed that most students 
could not catch the teachers’ local reasoning in proving or did not gain the way of 
using adequate format to write down a proof. 
Regarding to the logical sequencing, this study found that when students caught 
two or more major components of a proof, they either had exactly the same 
sequencing with their teachers’ or they adapted and conducted some acceptable 
sequences, except for four students. One thing that is worth mentioning is that 
although these proofs may start with many different steps, all students started 
their proving or reasoning by constructing auxiliary lines or points, which was 
identical to the first steps of the proofs their teachers taught. 
Comparing the performances of the three classes, this study found that the ways a 
teacher used to prove the properties influenced students’ performance on catching 
the teacher’s teaching of proofs. In these three classes, students of class A have 
the highest mathematics level. However, they did not comprehend the most on the 
properties of topic 1 (see Figure 2). Besides, although students of class B 
performed well on catching the property the teacher taught, they performed the 
worst on catching the major components and local reasoning. None of the 
students caught more than one major component the teacher emphasized and no 
one wrote out any appropriate deductive reasoning for that component. An 
analysis of this teacher’s teaching revealed that the teacher used the method of 
“constructing a segment which is perpendicular to the tangent line and passes the 
center, then the foot coincides with the center”. The logic of this method was very 
hard for students. That is a possible reason why the students could not 
comprehend the proof and reasoning.  
Another important finding is that the more formal the proofs were, the more 
comprehension the students gained. One possible reason for this phenomenon is 
that when a proof is formal, structure of the proof will be clearer and the format of 
writing it out will be better-organized. In this case, it will be easier to draw 
Taiwan students’ attention and feel the importance of it. 
What are the most important things a proof or reasoning should have? Are they 
the major components in the process of a proof? or the local reasoning? or the 
logical sequencing? If students only write out a bunch of properties or statements 
without providing any logical reasoning, does it accomplish the objectives of 
teaching mathematical proofs? What should a teacher do to accomplish his/her 
objectives in teaching proofs? These are issues that should be stressed more by 
researchers.  
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FOSTERING 7
TH GRADE STUDENTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF 
VALIDITY: AN INSTRUCTIONAL EXPERIMENT 
Hui-Yu Hsu, Jya-Yi Wu Yu, and Yi-Chun Chen 
University of Michigan, USA; Wesley Girls HS, Blessed Imelda’s School, Taiwan 
This study examines whether a novel strategy can enhance 7th grade students’ 
understanding of validity when verifying an argument, especially for those 
students who are not willing to follow logical rules given that the premise is false. 
We designed teaching activities in which students can observe the independence 
between validity of assertion and truth of premises and conclusions. We also 
constructed a survey instrument for pre- and post-test that was sensitive enough 
to probe students’ conception of validity. The classroom experiments showed that 
students gained better understanding of validity. The findings also  lead to the 
claim that junior high  students can learn  logical rule well  which  is  the basic 
structure to learn advanced  mathematics concepts and truths (Rodd, 2000). 
INTRODUCTION 
Logical reasoning is of great importance for learning mathematics, especially for 
proofs. However, recent studies have shown that students face great difficulties in 
understanding deduction when verifying an argument. Chazan (1993) indicated 
that students may view the deductive proof as one kind of evidences when 
certifying an argument. Deduction itself does not guarantee safety from 
counterexamples. Holyes and Kuchemann (2002) and Yu, Chin, and Lin (2004) 
reported that quite a few of junior high school students fail to appreciate logical 
reasoning for supporting the conclusion because they hold different opinions of 
the conditional statements. These students could only follow deductive rule when 
the given is believed to be true. If not, they refuse to come to conclusion by using 
deduction but rather by checking the possible examples in the given statement. 
Alcock and Weber (2005) also reported similar results in undergraduate students’ 
learning of advanced mathematics. Students may validate a proof based on their 
knowledge of the premise and conclusion without considering how logical rule 
played a role in deducing the proof. In addition, the lack of understanding of 
logical rule also causes problems in learning mathematical induction. Being not 
able to recognize deduction, students could not realize why the proving step from 
P(n) to P(n+1) validates the general argument (Yu, 2001). 
Concerning that misconception of logical reasoning may hinder students’ 
learning of advanced mathematics concepts and proofs (Rodd, 2000), this study 
conducts experiments to examine if our novel teaching activities can improve 7
th 
graders’ understanding of validity that is the core of logical reasoning. In our 
teaching activities, we create instructional situations that allow students to 
observe the independence between validity of the assertions and truth of the 
premises or the conclusions that is hypothetically assumed to be the key to the 
understanding of logical reasoning.  
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON TEACHING PROOF AND REASONING 
Researchers have proposed different strategies to support students in constructing 
and understanding proofs. Reiss and Renkl (2002) suggested using heuristic 
worked-out examples to scaffold students in modeling their proving process. 
Hanna, de Bruyn, Sidoli, and Lomas (2006) recommended that application of 
physics experiments can help students gain insight into the geometric theorem 
with understanding. Cheng and Lin (2006) advised a novel strategy, namely 
reading-and-coloring strategy, that functions as visual aid for searching crucial 
properties for generating a proof solution. When teaching mathematical induction, 
Harel (2001) proposed that exploration of quasi-induction activities for 
internalizing the recursive patterns can help students perceive the need of using 
logical rule to validate a general argument and alter their thinking from empirical 
reasoning into transformational reasoning. In addition, researchers also recognize 
the importance of a meaningful context in classroom that provides many 
opportunities for students to explore new mathematics ideas, justify their thought, 
and further generate a mathematical argument (Ball & Bass, 2003). The 
meaningful context also nurtures students’ understanding of mathematics and 
reasoning. 
However, those studies do not concern the error of mistaking truth for validity 
which is one of the major difficulties in learning logical reasoning (Yu et al., 
2004). Since students are more apt to judge a conclusion as valid if it is believed to 
be true than to be false, interventions proposed in those studies do not help 
students overcome the possible error since premises developed in classroom are 
always true. It is highly possible that students still possess the error of validity 
even though they apply logical rule in deducing the conclusions. 
METHODOLOGY 
The aim of the intervention is to create instructional situations that allow students 
to observe the independence between validity and truth. In this paper, we take The 
Tower of Hanoi as an example to illustrate phases of the intervention. 
Phase one: Observing recursive pattern through empirical exploration   
Phase one is to let students engage in empirical exploration of activity for 
discovering the recursive pattern. For example, in the activity using The Tower of 
Hanoi, students spend around 10 minutes working in group or individual on the 
game by following the rules: (1) one disk is moved at a time; (2) a disk is never 
placed on the top of a smaller one. With the concern that not all students can 
obtain the recursive rule from exploration even though they move the disks 
successfully from peg to peg, several treatments are used to scaffold their 
discovery. First of all, we ask students to record their findings of the moves of 
disks on the paper so that they can easily access the results for further inferences. 
Secondly, after having successful experiences in moving small number of disks, 
we force students to perceive that moving n-1disks can be viewed as one object 
when working on moving n disks. For example, while moving 3 disks, we ask  
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students “do we know the steps for moving 2 disks?” “Do we still need to move 2 
disks one by one when working on 3 disks?” Because of the paper records, we 
expect students to apply the results from previous exploration directly and further 
view the moves of n-1 disks as one object. In addition, we also concretize the 
moves of 2 disks as one object by moving the top two disks together from peg to 
peg. The actions of taking two disks together help students visualize the recursive 
patter and advance the general pattern “steps (n+1 disks) = 2×steps (n disks) + 1” 
that is the key element in following phases. 
Phase two: Inferring the moves of disks by applying the formulated rule 
Second phase is to create opportunities in which students can internalize the 
pattern rule discovered in phrase one. We ask students to infer the moves of disks 
with different premises. For example, students are asked to calculate the steps of 4 
disks given that moving 3 disks requires 7 steps. Similar to phrase one, we also 
concretize the moves of n-1 disks from peg to peg so that students can make sense 
of the formulated pattern and focus on the inferring process. 
Phase three: Facing a conflict situation in order to observe the independence 
between validity and truth of premises and conclusions  
In the final phrase, we create conflict situations that allow students to observe the 
independence between validity and the truth of premises and conclusions. We ask 
students to infer the moves of disks with the given information that is incorrect. 
For example, students are required to inferring the steps of 7 disks given that 
moving 6 disks is 100 steps. However, moving 6 disks actually is 63 steps. In this 
situation, since those students have already internalized the recursive pattern, they 
directly infer the answer of 201 steps by following the formula. Then, we further 
question students whether the given is correct or not. At this moment, students go 
back to check their records and notice that their inference is made based on an 
incorrect premise. We further remind students that the moves of disks here show 
that one can make valid inference even though the premise is incorrect. 
Furthermore, considering authorities may influence students’ judgment of 
validity since students believe what teachers say is always true (Harel & Sowder, 
1998), we do not tell students the independent relationship between validity and 
truth. Rather, we create the conflict situations in which students have some 
experience of making deduction based on incorrect premises. 
Sample and Procedure 
This study was administrated to a total of 249 7
th grade students from six classes 
in a high school in Taiwan. Before implementing the instructional plan, all 
students were asked to complete the pre-test survey consisting of sets of items for 
evaluating students’ understanding of validity of conditional statements. After 
pre-test, a selected mathematics teacher from the same school taught the lessons  
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by following the instructional plan in six classes respectively
1. One week later, a 
post-test with the same survey items was administrated again to all students. 
Structure of survey items and coding scheme 
The survey consisted of 4 sets of items for testing students’ understanding of 
conditional statements. Each set of items contained two types of questions. One 
type was for evaluating students’ knowledge of conditional statements which 
were structured into pairs: one was a correct statement according to students’ 
mathematics knowledge and the other was not. The other type of questions was 
used to evaluate students’ conception of validity. Students were required to 
deducing from a correct premise and an incorrect paired premise (see an example 
of the items in appendix 1). As appendix shows, Items (c) and (d) are a pair used 
to examine the knowledge to conditional statement whereas items (a) and (b) are 
for examining the understanding of validity. 
To have a clear picture of analyzing whether or not the intervention can foster 
students’ understanding of validity and their knowledge to conditional statements, 
we created a coding scheme for statistic purpose. Regarding knowledge of given 
statements, we assigned point 1 to students when they judged the given statements 
correctly. Point -2 was assigned when students concluded an invalid conditional 
statement as “uncertain” or “unknown”. We gave point 0 to other responses on 
answering knowledge items. With respect to validity items, we assigned point 3 
when students deduced the conclusions from incorrect premises. Point 1 was 
assigned to those students who can make valid inference only when the premise is 
correct. Point -2 refers to the situation that students refuse to deduce a conclusion 
when the premise is incorrect. 
FINDINGS 
The instructional strategy improved students’ understanding of validity but 
not their knowledge of conditional statements 
 Mean 
Difference
Std. 
Deviation
T df Sig. 
(2-tailed)
Students’ understanding of validity  -.996  4.614  -3.413  249  .001 
Students’ knowledge to conditional statements -.220  4.911  -.708  249  .479 
As table above shows, students’ understanding of validity improved significantly 
but not their knowledge to conditional statements. The result is under our 
expectation since our teaching activities do not scaffold students in understanding 
mathematics content. 
                                           
1 Concerning the selected teacher’s understanding of validity and the instructional plan, before 
teaching six classes one of researchers discussed with her for checking (1) if she understand the 
meaning of validity; (2) if she makes sense of the plan and can implement the plan successfully 
in classes.  
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Students’ knowledge of conditional statements was related to their 
understanding of validity   
Our data also indicated that students’ knowledge of conditional statements was 
significantly correlated to students’ understanding of validity (person 
correction .731** in pre-test and .698** in post-test at the 0.01 level of 2-tailed 
statistic examination). The finding suggests that students with better knowledge 
of conditional statements have better understanding of validity and vice versa. 
DISCUSSION 
This study designed novel teaching activities to foster 7
th grade students’ 
understanding of validity. The result showed that the intervention is successfully 
in helping students gain better understanding of validity but not the knowledge of 
conditional statements. Our data also indicated that students’ performance of 
validating an argument is significantly related to their knowledge of the 
conditional statements. In spite of improving students’ knowledge of conditional 
statements, our study states that scaffolding students’ in appreciating the validity 
of assertions can enhance their competence in understanding logical reasoning.  
As Harel (1998) claims that the way students think of mathematics will influence 
their understanding of mathematics and vice versa, it seems reasonable to teach 
students logical reasoning from early age that may help them learn and think of 
mathematics well later. The correct way to think of mathematics can lead them to 
the better understanding of mathematics and in turn may reduce the possibility of 
making wrong inferences that is a common mistake when constructing a proof 
(Lin, Cheng, & et al., 2003).  
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Appendix 1: An example of sets of survey items   
Chih-Ming and Da-Cheng are discussing about the pair of numbers 3 and 11. 
They notice that: (1) the sum (3+11) is even; (2) the product (3×11) is odd: 
Chih-Ming: If the sum of two (whole) numbers is even, then the product of these 
two numbers must be odd. 
Da-Cheng: If the product of two (whole) numbers is odd, then the sum of these 
two numbers must be even.  
(a) If the product of two (whole) numbers is 1271, according to Da-Cheng’s 
statement, what conclusion can be deduced?   The sum of two numbers is 
even.   The sum of two numbers is odd.   It cannot be certain whether the sum 
of these two numbers is even or odd unless the two numbers are given. 
(b) Following item A3a. If the sum of two (whole) numbers is 1260, according to 
Chih-Ming’s statement, what conclusion can we deduce?   The product of two 
numbers is even.   The product of two numbers is odd.   It cannot be certain 
whether the product of these two numbers is even or odd unless the two 
numbers are given. 
(c) Is Chih-Ming’s statement correct?   Correct.   Incorrect.   Uncertain.   
Unknown (please check one). Please explain your answers. 
(d) Is Da-Cheng’s statement correct?   Correct.   Incorrect.   Uncertain.   
Unknown (please check one). Please explain your answers. 
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CONCEPT USAGE IN PROOF PRODUCTION: 
MATHEMATICIANS’ PERSPECTIVES 
Paola Iannone 
University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK 
In this paper I draw on mathematicians’ perspectives on students’ concept usage 
in proof production. Their analysis points to a spectrum of concept usages in 
proof: from concepts which are more effectively used syntactically as they lack an 
immediate pictorial representation to concepts which are more effectively used 
semantically as their syntactic representation is too complex to use. This suggests 
that, together with knowledge of mathematical objects and proof techniques, 
students need to acquire a meta-skill: to be able to recognize which is the most 
effective way to precede in proof and how this choice depends also on the 
mathematical concepts involved in the given proof. 
INTRODUCTION 
The contribution of this paper to the ICMI19 Study is situated at tertiary level and 
aims at gaining insight into mathematicians’ perceptions of their students’ efforts 
in producing proofs via an analysis of the students’ written work. Their insights 
(as teachers and as researchers in mathematics) are valuable in the sense that they 
offer an analysis of what skills the mathematicians believe students should have in 
order to be successful in producing proof. In this paper I will focus on one of the 
skills that mathematicians view as important, namely recognizing when to 
proceed semantically and when to proceed syntactically (Weber 2001, Weber and 
Alcock, 2004), and how such choice depends also on the specific mathematical 
objects that appear in a given proof.     
I will focus on concept usage  
… which refers to the ways one operates with the concept in generating or using 
examples or doing proofs. (Moore, 1994, p 252). 
In what follows I will describe mathematicians’ insights on concept usage in proof 
production. 
THE STUDY 
The data I present originate from a study
1 with mathematicians (indicated in the 
interview extracts with capital letters) from across the UK as educational 
co-researchers. The research engaged university lecturers
2 of mathematics (more 
details on the participants to the study can be found in Iannone & Nardi, 2005) in 
a series of Focused Group Interviews (Wilson, 1997), each focusing on a theme 
                                           
1 Supported by the Learning and Teaching Support Network in the UK, with Elena Nardi.  
2 In the text we refer to the participants of the study as Lecturers. Meanings of this term differ across 
different countries. We use it here to denote somebody who is a member of staff in a university 
mathematics department involved in both teaching and research.  
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regarding the teaching and learning of mathematics at university level that the 
literature acknowledges as seminal. Two of the themes revolved around proof 
production. For each interview a Dataset was produced. This included a short 
literature review and bibliography, samples of student data (e.g. students’ written 
work, interview transcripts, observation protocols) and a short list of issues to 
consider. The analysis of the interview transcripts largely followed Data 
Grounded Theory techniques (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and resulted in 
thematically arranged sets of Episodes – see elsewhere (e.g. Iannone & Nardi, 
2005) for more details. 
THE DATA   
In the interviews the participants discussed extensively concept usage in proof 
production. Their views, taken as expert views, contribute to the understanding of 
which skills students need to acquire early on in undergraduate mathematics. The 
data I present below suggest that the lecturers recognize that different 
mathematical concepts call for different usages in proof production. Furthermore, 
the interplay between semantic and syntactic concept usage depends also on the 
required proof. The participants highlight at least four distinct types of concept 
usage. 
Concepts without initial pictorial representation for which resorting to 
syntactic knowledge is the only suitable approach 
These are concepts which are very difficult to represent via mental images, for 
example via something that can be drawn on a number line or a Cartesian plane. 
These concepts can be used in proof production only via manipulation of the 
syntactic statement that defines them. One example is given below 
 E: A classic example that arises in analysis all the time is ''N arbitrarily large''. […] 
And it is a very sophisticated notion, the idea that all the quantities I am talking about 
are finite, but they are arbitrarily large […] one clearly needs to express [this] 
symbolically. The property that you might ascribe to this arbitrarily large number, the 
modulus of which is less than that and so this happens … in symbols and there is no 
way around it. Or at least, I am not aware of a way around it. 
Concepts for which syntactic knowledge is an effective tool 
These are concepts which can be used semantically, but while it is possible to 
have a visual representation, a syntactic approach is more effective. An example 
is the use of the negation of the statement ''the sequence converges'' (as discusses 
in the context of Example 1 in Appendix).  
A:  … working with intuitively geometric pictures, when it comes to convergence, is 
something that is very private: some people work like this and some don’t. And I can 
well imagine that there are students that can work along a string of quantifiers. They 
just do what they are told. You can view this as the recipe, you can do this, you do this 
and you do this… You just follow the steps. And in some ways they are safer 
because … they will not make mistakes as long as they are technically doing the right  
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steps. So, you see, this depends on how you can think about mathematics and we all 
are different in how we can see this things and how we can work with it.  
E: Sort of… I push very, very hard number lines, that they [the students] should draw 
number lines, have pictures and so on… but… You see, no human can have a … good 
intuitive geometrical or pictorial view of what the statement “the series does not 
converge” means, for example. I don’t think…  Or say certainly no one can have a 
geometrical view of the statement “this function is not uniformly continuous”, let’s 
say. 
This extract suggests a spectrum of concept usages:  from those that are used 
effectively semantically to those that are used effectively syntactically in proof 
production. Furthermore, in resonance with the literature (see for example Burton 
(2004)), the exchange above suggests that concept usage not only depends on 
proof and concept but also on personal proving preferences.  
Concepts for which syntactic knowledge can be used for proof production 
but only ineffectively 
These are concepts for which one could resort to syntactic manipulation, but this 
approach is not helpful in practice. This process leads to statements that are 
syntactically correct, but hard to work with.  An example is offered by Lecturer E: 
 E: They [the students] have to get used to it. To negate the statement [of convergence 
of a series] … you can algorithmically negate changing ''there exist'' with ''for all'' and 
so on … And then you come up with a very weird statement, not the sort of statement 
you can actually reason with effectively. You need to modify it by resource to its 
actual meaning. So the classic one in analysis is to say […] ''there is N such that for all 
n bigger than N this implies that …'', let’s say. And how do you exactly negate that? 
Well, if you negate it formulaically you end up with the kind of statement that is 
correct but it is not useful and it is not what you are going to use. You have to think: 
what does this mean now? And then write it down in words. 
In such situations semantic knowledge needs to come into play at the moment 
when syntactic knowledge has failed to produce meaningful statements.  
Concepts for which syntactic knowledge alone cannot be used 
These are concepts for which the use of syntactic knowledge by itself will lead 
towards higher symbolic complexity and away from the production of the proof 
requested. An example is given in the extract below, in the context of Exercise 2 
(see Appendix): 
E: What struck me in marking these, and tutoring people doing this problem [given a 
matrix A, find adj(adj(A))], is that there is …this is really pretty hard … There are two 
completely different things you need. One is you need to be confident in these very 
formal manipulations of expressions and then at the right moment you need to use 
some common sense and say: ”Oh, the determinant of the diagonal matrix is 
obviously this” as a calculation and not as a formal manipulation that can be 
visualized. It is obviously this  … this requires real thought.  
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A: In fact, it sort of does the thing which … it is almost like suspending the definition 
that is required before you can do anything. If you go away and work out the adjugate 
of the adjugate you are dead … you are really stuck.  
E: There are not enough sigmas in the world! 
(all participants laugh) 
A: You will never understand this. So you must suspend things and start to rely on 
algebraic manipulative insight and then you realize that after all you can do 
something. 
This situation is summarised by Lecturer  C (see also Moore, 1994, p 258 on the 
need to use definitions to guide through proofs): 
 C: … which is ironical because just before we were talking about how students 
cannot start from the definitions and you just realise that they don’t have to start from 
the definition for this homework [Exercise 2]. At some level students have to start 
from the definition and then they have to understand when not to start from the 
definition. 
[..] 
A: It is almost if… if you are successful at this question you… you have almost 
acquired a meta-mathematical ability, namely you are required to look out for the 
things that would be helpful rather than trying to understand what is this blooming 
thing and what is this and so on. So you are looking for the strategy by which you can 
enter and apparently [win] this battle. 
In the extract above Lecturer A points towards the acquisition of what he calls a 
‘meta-mathematical ability’ namely the ability to recognize which of the ways to 
proceed (syntactically or semantically) is best suited to the problem at hand, and 
that prescriptions for tackling proof are not effective.  
DISCUSSION 
Several interesting points emerge from the data above. The participants are aware 
of the existence of semantic and syntactic aspects of concept usage for proof 
production. This is perceived as a spectrum which covers concepts that cannot be 
used effectively by resorting to semantic knowledge only to concepts that cannot 
be used effectively by resorting exclusively to syntactic knowledge. The reasons 
put forward for the existence of this spectrum include the absence of pictorial 
representation for some concepts and the complexity of syntactic representation 
for others. The meta-skill that undergraduate students need to acquire is to 
recognize the effective way to operate with a mathematical concept in a given 
proof (see also Weber, 2001). Of course, as we have seen in some of the extracts, 
the personal preference of the prover plays a big part in this process while various 
proof strategies for undergraduate mathematics are well established. There is 
agreement among the participants, as observed also in Alcock and Weber (2005), 
that is possible to be successful in elementary analysis by resorting just to 
syntactic knowledge. At the same time the participants suggest that this strategy  
1‐224  ICMI Study 19－2009 
cannot be sustained, and that there are proofs, even in first year mathematics, that 
cannot be completed by proceeding purely syntactically.  
 
Another interesting point emerging from the data is that the participants do not 
distinguish between skills required for proof production at undergraduate level 
and those at more advanced level. Their observations originate from their own 
experience of research mathematicians. In the first interview extract Lecturer E, 
an analyst with several years of experience as a researcher, talks about a concept 
which has only syntactic existence for him even now, not just for students at the 
beginning of their studies. This observation corroborates the idea that to study 
expert behavior in doing mathematics, such as the behavior of a research 
mathematician, can help understanding what skills students need to acquire to 
become experts themselves. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From the data presented in this paper it emerges that mathematicians ascribe 
defined roles to syntactic and semantic knowledge in proof production. However, 
on the basis of their experience as learners, researchers and teachers, they argue 
that in order to produce proofs successfully, learners need to be able to move 
along this spectrum between the two modes in order to adapt their proof 
production to the type of mathematical problem in question and to the 
mathematical concepts involved in the proof. Hence, for a student to become 
proficient in proof production, the skill to tailor their proof behavior to the type of 
mathematical problem in question becomes indispensable. Moreover, each 
learner (be it a student or a mathematician producing new mathematics) may have 
a favorite learning style, but needs to recognize that the preference for one type of 
action over the other must come with the realization that it is necessary at times to 
adapt and leave the preferred mode of action behind in favor of a more effective 
one. 
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APPENDIX 
Exercise 1: Write out carefully the meaning of the statement "the sequence {an} 
converges to A as n →∞.” 
Exercise 2: Suppose n ≥2 and A is an n ×n matrix with det(A) ≠0.  In the 
following adj(A) denotes the adjoint (or adjugate) matrix of A.  
1.  Use the fact that (adj(A))A=det(A)In and the product formula for 
determinants to show that  det(adj(A))=(det(A))
(n-1). 
2.  Prove that adj(adj(A))=(det(A))
(n-2)A. 
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This paper presents a research concerned with the design of eLearning 
environments. Based on the principle that didactic decisions have to take account 
of learner’s conceptions, student modeling is at the core of the design. The paper 
presents how the student modeling, relying on the cK¢ model and instantiated for 
the case of reflection, allows a diagnosis of student’s conceptions and an 
automatic checking of logical coherence and validity of geometric proof. 
INTRODUCTION 
Baghera Assessment Project (BAP) relied on three fundamental principles: (1) 
learning is a process resulting from interactions between different types of agents, 
human and artificial (Balacheff, 2000); (2) human knowledge consists of a 
diversity of conceptions whose basic criterion of relevance is their efficiency in a 
certain domain rather than their conformity to a reference knowledge (Balacheff, 
2003); (3) there is no unique didactic strategy enhancing learning, but a set of 
strategies depending on the targeted knowledge and on learner’s conceptions. 
Thus student modeling is at the core of the BAP project.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: cK¢ MODEL AND CONCEPTIONS OF 
REFLECTION 
Student modeling developed within BAP relies on the cK¢ model (Balacheff 
2003) allowing a representation and a formalization of student’s knowledge. This 
model considers a conception C as characterized by a quadruplet (P, R, L, Σ), 
where P is a set of problems; R is a set of operators involved in the solutions of 
problems from P; L is a representation system allowing the representation of P 
and R, and Σ is a control structure ensuring non-contradiction of C. 
Four basic conceptions of reflection have been identified in the literature (Grenier 
1988, Tahri 1993): Reflection taking account of the fact that the line joining a 
point and its image is perpendicular to the reflection line, and these points are at 
the same distance from this line; Parallelism considering that a segment and its 
image are parallel and have the same length; Central symmetry considering that 
the image of a point is obtained by central symmetry, a center of which belongs to 
the reflection line; and Oblique symmetry consisting in choosing a direction (most 
often horizontal or vertical) in which the image of a point is constructed, usually 
at the same distance from the axis along this direction. These conceptions have 
been characterized according to the cK¢ model, i.e., operators and controls 
associated to each conception have been defined and implemented into Baghera 
platform (Webber and Pesty 2002). 
BAGHERA PLATFORM  
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Baghera platform was designed for two kinds of users: a student and a teacher. 
The student interface (Fig. 1) consists of a window (on the left) in which the 
student writes a proof to a given geometric problem (text of the problem and 
associated dynamic figure are on the right), either freely, or using tools from a 
vertical toolbar (on the left) or from a box containing a list of theorems and 
geometric properties.  
Figure 1. Student interface of Baghera platform. 
On demand, the proof can be analyzed automatically from two points of view: a 
diagnosis of the student’s conceptions of reflection is provided, and the proof is 
checked for validity and logical coherence.  
AUTOMATIC CONCEPTION DIAGNOSIS  
In the student’s proof, Baghera identifies operators and controls the student has 
used. Each of these elements is associated to an agent that, when identified in the 
text, becomes active. Active agents build coalitions according to the conceptions 
they are assigned to, and these coalitions are assigned a utility value. The 
algorithm for coalition formation is based on the emergence theory (Webber, 
2003). The coalition(s) having the greatest utility value corresponds to the 
diagnosed conception(s).  
Let us illustrate this process on an example. Consider the following problem: 
ABC is an equilateral triangle. A’ is the image of A with 
respect to the line d. L, M and N are midpoints of the 
segments [AB], [BC] and [AC]. P is the intersection of the 
lines (LM) and (CA’) and O the intersection of (NM) and 
(BA’). What is the reflected image of the segment [MN] 
with respect to the line d? Prove your answer.   
A student provided the following solution: 
The image of [NM] with respect to d is [MO].  
N is the midpoint of [AC]. O is on the same line as 
N but at the opposite of the drawing and at the other 
side of the line (d). M is on the line (d). Therefore M 
is its own reflected image with respect to the line (d). 
O is opposite to N or the reflected image of this  
1‐228  ICMI Study 19－2009 
point. Therefore [MN] is the reflected image of 
[MO]. 
To enable the analysis by the system of the proof written on paper, it had to be 
transcribed on Baghera interface respecting its constraints of expression. The 
transcription
1 consisted in separating the statements used by the student and 
organizing them into demonstration steps having at least one hypothesis and one 
conclusion. Table 1 shows the text resulting from such a transcription of the 
student’s proof and the operators and controls identified in it by the system: 
Student’s proof transcribed in Baghera  Operators and controls 
As the point (N) is the midpoint of the 
segment [A,C], the point (O) is on the 
same line as the point (N) and the point 
(O) is on the line (N,M) and the point (O) 
is at the opposite of the point (N) with 
respect to the line (d),  
then the point (O) is the image of the 
point (N) with respect to the line (d). 
(R71) If [NO]∩(d)={M}, then O=oppd(N) 
(R72) If O = oppd (N), then O=refld(N) 
(Σ122) The image of a point is at the other 
side of the reflection line. 
(Σ122) The image of a point is on the line 
passing through this point and a point on the 
reflection line. 
(Σ129)   A segment and its image lie on the 
same line. 
As the point (M) is on the line (d), 
then the point (M) is the image of the 
point (M) with respect to the line (d). 
(R49) If M is on the line d, then M=refld(M)
(Σ17) The image of a point on the reflection 
line is the point itself. 
As the point (O) is the image of the point 
(N) with respect to the line (d) 
and the point (M) is the image of the 
point (M) with respect to the line (d), 
then the segment (M, O) is the image of 
the segment (M, N) with respect to the 
line (d). 
(R65) If A’= refld(A) and B’= refld(B), then 
[A’B’]=refld[AB] 
(Σ20) In order to find the image of a segment, 
one has to find images of its extremities. 
Table 1. Student’s proof and elements of conceptions identified by the system. 
Among the list of identified operators and controls, the operators (R71), (R72) 
and the controls (Σ122), (Σ123), (Σ129) have formed a coalition with the greatest 
utility, which corresponds to the “Central symmetry” conception. More details 
can be found in (Trgalova & Soury-Lavergne, 2003). 
It is important to note that the diagnosis is based on a sequence of problems solved 
by the student. Different problems in a well-oriented sequence permit the 
construction of a student model having enough information to characterize 
student’s conceptions in a specific domain of knowledge.  
AUTOMATIC ANALYSIS OF PROOF 
In parallel, automated reasoning has been developed as a complementary 
                                           
1 This work of transcription was done manually by researchers involved in the project.   
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approach to the diagnosis of students’ conceptions by emergence. While 
emergence provides only a diagnosis at a behavioral level and does not take 
account of the validity of the proof provided by the student, automated reasoning 
allows an epistemic diagnosis involving an analysis at a content level 
(Soury-Lavergne 2003), which is as important as the conception diagnosis for 
appropriate decision-making. Automatic analysis of proof in Baghera platform is 
ensured by HOARD-ATINF (called ATINF in what follows), a generic theorem 
prover developed for the purposes of the BAP project (for a detailed description 
of the prover, see Peltier 2002). In what follows, we describe the nature of 
feedback provided by the prover and we discuss how this information can be 
exploited, on the one hand to confirm the diagnosis of conceptions obtained by 
emergence, and on the other hand, to bring forward elements necessary for 
didactic decisions making (Chaachoua & Lima, 2003). 
When a student asks for verification of her proof, Baghera platform sends a file to 
ATINF containing the description of the problem, the proof to be checked for 
validity and coherence (in the form presented in the previous section), and a list of 
operators used in the proof that are not predefined in the prover. As was 
mentioned above, the proof written by the student undergoes certain 
modifications to make it analyzable by Baghera platform in order to proceed to 
conceptions diagnosis. Additional modifications of the proof are necessary for 
ATINF. In particular, each step of the proof has to contain a rule of inference, 
which makes a logical link between the hypotheses and the conclusion (Table 2). 
A rule of inference can be part of the axiomatic basis of ATINF; this is the case of 
a definition (e.g., symetrie_axiale denotes a definition of a reflection), a theorem 
or a property (e.g., sym_ax_align denotes the property of a reflection to preserve 
alignment). A rule of inference can also be an operator used (explicitly or 
implicitly) by the student and which is not predefined in ATINF (e.g., 
sym_oppose). For this reason, new operators, valid or not, can be defined and 
included in the ATINF axiomatic basis. 
The proof in the ATINF language  Feedback provided by ATINF 
symetrie_axiale(O, N, droite(B,C))  
milieu(N, segment(A,C)) 
est_intersection(M,droite(O,N),droite(B,C)) 
sym_oppose 
[hypotheses_manquantes] 
milieu(M,seg(O,N)) 
perp(seg(O,N),seg(B,C)) 
symetrie_axiale(M,M,droite(B,C)) 
est_sur_droite(M,droite(B,C)) 
symetrie_axiale 
[correct] 
symetrie_axiale(seg(M,N),seg(M,O),dr(B,C))
symetrie_axiale(M,M,droite(B,C)) 
symetrie_axiale(O,N,droite(B,C)) 
sym_ax_align 
[correct] 
 [conclusion_prouvee] 
[preuve_coherente] 
[assertions non_utilisees]  
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milieu(N,segment(A,C)) 
[erreur_detectee] 
Table 2. Translation of the student’s proof into the ATINF language and feedback 
provided by ATINF. 
However, a definition of an incorrect operator would lead to a contradictory 
reference theory in ATINF and verification of a proof with respect to such a 
theory would not provide any relevant information about the proof validity and 
coherence. Thus, when a new operator is defined, its validity domain is 
determined and complementary hypotheses are added if necessary in order to 
guarantee the validity of the operator. Thus, the sym_oppose operator is valid if M 
is the midpoint of the segment [ON] and if the segment [ON] is perpendicular to 
the line (d) (Figure 2). 
sym_oppose implique ( 
 est_intersection(M,droite(N,O),droite(d)) 
  milieu(M,segment[O,N]) 
 perpendiculaire(segment(O,N),droite(d)) 
 symetrie_axiale(O,N,droite(d))) 
 
Figure 2. Definition of a new operator, sym_oppose: the hypotheses in italics are 
added to guarantee the validity of the operator.  
The proof is considered as correct if (1) it is logically correct, i.e., in each step, the 
conclusion can be inferred from the hypotheses by using the inference rule and 
each hypothesis is either a given or a conclusion of one of the previous steps, and 
(2) it is correct with respect to the given problem (Peltier 2002). The feedback 
provided by ATINF (Table 2) consists of local annotations regarding the 
correctness of each step of the proof and of global annotations concerning the 
whole proof. In the example, an error is detected in the first step of the proof; it is 
indicated by the flag [hypotheses_manquantes], “missing hypotheses” in English. 
The hypotheses that are missing are stated: M is the midpoint of the segment [ON] 
and the segment [ON] is perpendicular to the segment (BC). Global annotations 
say that (1) the conclusion proved is the one indicated as the answer to the 
problem, (2) some statements have not been used and their list is provided, and (3) 
errors were detected. The file with the annotated proof is sent to Baghera for a 
treatment by the system. Obtained information can be exploited in order to 
confirm or infirm the diagnosis of conceptions (Trgalova & Soury-Lavergne, 
2003), as well as to support didactic decisions making (Chaachoua & Lima, 2003). 
Indeed, in our example, it seems that the student has omitted some hypotheses 
when using an operator. However, it would be hasty to conclude that she is not 
aware of the importance of these hypotheses. She might have considered them, 
but omitted to explicit them in her proof. It is therefore necessary to check 
whether the missing hypotheses are verified or not in the problem. In the first case, 
it can have happened that they remain implicit in the proof, while in the second,  
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐231 
the student has indeed used the operator outside its validity domain. Moreover, 
the information about the nature of the missing hypotheses is valuable from the 
learning point of view; it can suggest a choice of appropriate counter-examples or 
problems helping the student become aware of the limits of her/his conceptions.  
CONCLUSION 
Baghera platform allows a diagnosis of student’s conceptions and an automatic 
verification of the logical coherence and validity of the proof provided by the 
student when solving problems concerning geometric reflection. These two kinds 
of analysis of student’s productions are complementary and necessary to enable 
the system make didactic decisions enhancing the student’s learning. 
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In our work we focus on learning from the teaching of proof in geometry at the 
lower secondary school level across countries in the East and in the West. In this 
paper we summarize selected findings from a series of classroom-based 
experiments carried out over an extended period of time. By extracting key 
findings from our research, we show how we are identifying good models of 
pedagogy and using these to develop new pedagogic principles that are intended 
to help secondary school students not only to know ‘how to proceed’ with 
deductive proof, but also to understand more fully why such formal proof is 
necessary to verify mathematical statements. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on how improvements in student capabilities with proof and 
proving might result from the identification of good models of pedagogy. In our 
research we address questions of how teachers might foster students’ fuller 
appreciation of the meaning of proof (including the discovery and explanatory 
functions of proof) and how teachers might motivate students to prove theorems. 
We also seek to identify teaching approaches that might inform future research 
into developing new pedagogic approaches for teaching deductive proof.  
Our various studies focus on researching, and comparing, the teaching of proof in 
geometry at the lower secondary school level in countries in the East and in the 
West, specifically China, Japan and the UK. For example, in our studies of 
teaching we show some of the varying ways in which teachers structure their 
lessons to develop students’ deductive reasoning and in our analysis of 
curriculum materials (such as school textbooks) we report varying amounts of 
emphasis on ‘justifying and proving’ across our countries (Ding, Fujita, & Jones, 
2005; Ding & Jones, 2007; Fujita and Jones, 2003; Fujita, Jones and Kunimune, 
2008). What we are finding is that even when ‘justifying and proving’ is 
prominent, and principles about how to proceed with mathematical proof are 
explained for students, there remain students who may be able to construct 
deductive proofs but who do not necessarily understand why such deductive 
arguments are necessary (Kunimune, 1987; 2000). Such findings point to 
opportunities to improve the teaching of proof and to develop new pedagogic 
principles.  
The results reported in this paper are illustrative of how we are extracting from 
our research studies some principles for teaching proof, and then testing these in  
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the classroom, aimed at helping secondary school students not only to know ‘how 
to proceed’ with deductive proof in geometry, but also to understand more fully 
why such formal proof is necessary to verify mathematical statements. 
RESEARCH IN THE TEACHING AND LEARNING OF PROOF 
As Mariotti and Balacheff (2008) summarize, current research in the teaching and 
learning of proof has been making effort across a range of issues. In terms of 
providing pedagogic principles for the teaching of proof and proving in geometry, 
it goes without saying that various scholars have worked on this. For example, the 
van Hieles proposed five ‘phases’ of geometry teaching that aim to take learners 
to success in deductive reasoning (van Hiele, 1999), Bartolini Bussi, (1996) has 
worked on teaching sequences with ‘germ theorems’, and Boero (1999) has 
provided a view of ‘conjecture production and mathematical proof construction’. 
In this paper we do not have space to relate in full to all such models. What we do 
show is how we are deriving some principles for the teaching of proof in 
geometry through the analysis of classroom-based research carried out over an 
extended period of time. Where we have space to do so in this paper, we relate our 
findings to various theoretical models. 
IDENTIFYING GOOD MODELS OF PEDAGOGY FOR PROOF 
In our research we are sensitive to how the ways in teachers structure their lessons 
in the countries that we are researching in the East and in the West (specifically 
China, Japan and the UK) is influenced (as, no doubt, everywhere) by various 
cultural factors and by specific educational issues such as the specification of the 
mathematics curriculum, the demands of examinations, and the design of 
textbooks (see, for example, Ding, Fujita, & Jones, 2005; Jones, Fujita & Ding, 
2004, 2005).  
In China, for example, one distinctive character of Confucian heritage in respect 
of learning is to ask questions constantly and to review previous knowledge 
frequently. This is reflected in the ways teachers teach proof in geometry. In Jones, 
Fujita & Ding (2004) we provide a case-study of a Grade 7 lesson on angles in 
parallel lines, showing how the teacher’s questions are carefully sequenced and 
how the special vocabulary is introduced. In this way the students are gradually 
involved in investigating the characteristics of each definition associated with 
angles in parallel lines, and they are expected to articulate their thinking through 
providing explanations. In later work we report on classroom data showing how 
teachers in China use sophisticated instructional strategies in explicating the 
discovery function of proof for lower secondary school students (Ding & Jones, 
2008). 
In Japan, an influential factor is ‘Lesson study’, one of the most common forms of 
professional development for teachers that involves them working in small teams 
in collaboratively crafting lesson plans through a cycle of planning, teaching and 
reviewing. For example, as we illustrate in Jones, Fujita & Ding (2004), to teach 
the properties of the parallel lines and ratio in Grade 8, a Japanese teacher might  
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organize a lesson (of 50 minutes duration) as follows. First, a problem for the day 
is introduced such as ‘Let us prove that if PQ//BC in a triangle ABC, then 
triangles APQ and ABC are similar to each other’. Then, in the ‘development’ 
stage of the lesson, students would undertake to prove this problem, either 
individually or in groups. Their ideas are shared in a whole class discussion. 
Finally, the topic of this lesson is summarized as ‘If PQ//BC in a triangle ABC, 
then triangles APQ and ABC are similar to each other, and therefore 
AP:AB=AQ:AC=PQ:BC, and if PQ//BC then AP:PB=AQ:QC’.  
In the UK (specifically England) teachers have, in recent years, been provided 
with much guidance through a major Government initiative to improve 
mathematics teaching. In a Grade 8 case study that we analyze in Jones, Fujita & 
Ding (2004) the emphasis is on reasoning, with the teaching aiming to encourage 
greater rigor by re-establishing already familiar definitions and properties into a 
logical hierarchy. The idea is to apply properties established in earlier lessons to 
the solution of problems that involve constructing geometrical diagrams and 
analysing how these are built up. The lesson develops written solutions, where the 
‘given’ facts (assumptions) are stated as justification in logically ordered 
explanations and proofs. The lesson reviews established facts and properties and 
the connections between them, so that students begin to gain a sense of a logical 
hierarchy.  
Yet it seems that while the above approaches may be relatively successful at 
teaching ‘how to proceed’ with deductive proof in geometry, it can happen that 
there are students who do not fully understand why such formal proof is necessary 
to verify mathematical statements (Kunimune, 1987; Kunimune, Fujita and Jones, 
2008). Hence our interest in teaching approaches that might inform future 
research into developing new pedagogic approaches for deductive proof and the 
reason we now turn to some selected findings from some of our classroom-based 
experiments. 
DEVELOPING NEW PEDAGOGICAL PRINCIPLES 
In this section we highlight some principles for lower secondary school (Grades 
7-9) extracted from a range of our classroom-based research carried out in Japan 
(for more details see Kunimune et al, 2007). Our aim, in researching these 
principles, is seeing how, and to what extent, they might help students appreciate 
the need for formal proofs (in addition to the students being able to construct such 
proofs). 
•  Grade 7 lessons can start from carefully-selected problem solving 
situations; for example, a Grade 7 lesson starting point might be ‘consider 
how to draw diagonals of a cuboid’ – the classroom research that we have 
carried out suggests that this starting point can help develop students’ 
geometrical reasoning and provide experiences of mathematical processes 
that are useful in studying deductive proofs in Grades 8 and 9;   
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•  Geometrical constructions can be taught in Grade 8 alongside their proofs; 
this might replace the practice of teaching constructions in Grade 7, and 
then proving these same constructions in Grade 8, as such a gap between 
the teaching of constructions and their proofs, our classroom research 
suggests, may not always be helpful; 
•  Grade 8 lessons can provide students with explicit opportunities to examine 
differences between experimental verifications and deductive proof; this 
helps students to appreciate such differences; 
•  Grade 8 lessons involving the teaching of deductive geometry can be based 
around a set of ‘already learnt’ properties which are shared and discussed 
within the classroom, and used as a form of axioms (a similar idea to that of 
the ‘germ theorems’ of Bartolini Bussi, 1996); this provides students with 
known starting points for their proofs. 
While we do not have space to provide data to support all these principles, in what 
follows we substantiate the principles related to problem solving and to 
geometrical construction (plus see Kunimune, Fujita & Jones, 2008).  
Problem solving  
In a series of teaching experiments, we investigated problem-solving lessons that 
might link typical geometry topics in a way that supports students’ deductive 
reasoning. As an example, rather than merely showing students the diagonals of a 
cuboid, in one our Grade 7 teaching experiments the students were asked to 
investigate ‘how to construct diagonals of a cuboid’. The reason we chosen this 
approach was that it integrates the properties of 3D shapes and geometrical 
constructions in a way that emphasizes deductive thinking. From our teaching 
experiment, we observed the following:   
•  Students freely explored various ways to draw the diagonals of a cuboid. 
These ideas were shared in the classroom. The definition of diagonal was 
then introduced and students understood that ‘there are four diagonals in a 
cuboid’. 
•  Some students noticed that ‘the lengths of diagonals of a cuboid are equal’, 
and this led the class to consider why. Students then shared their own ideas 
such as ‘the diagonals are on a rectangle, and we have learnt that the lengths 
of diagonals of a rectangle are equal, and therefore the diagonals of the 
cuboid are equal’.  
•  Students further explored how to construct the diagonals using ideas that 
they had already learnt, such as how to construct angle bisectors, 
perpendicular bisectors, and so on.  
We were interested to note that, at the beginning of our classroom experiment, the 
students just explored the properties of diagonals. As the experiment progressed, 
the students’ attention progressed towards certain geometrical properties and  
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deductive arguments. This, we contend, is a kind of ‘conjecture production and 
proof construction’ proposed by Boero (1999).  
Constructions and proofs 
In our analyses of curriculum materials we have found that while geometrical 
constructions (with ruler and compasses) may be taught in Grade 7, these 
constructions are often not proved until Grade 8 (after students have learnt how to 
prove simple geometrical statements). In a series of teaching experiments, we 
investigated the use of more complex geometrical constructions (and their proofs) 
in Grade 8. As an example, one of our lessons in Grade 8 started from the more 
challenging construction problem ‘Let us consider how we can trisect a given 
straight line AB’. After students have worked on this problem, one of ideas from 
the students was chosen and its proof considered by the students in groups. In the 
final stage of the lesson the relevant theorem (which students would have noticed 
during the construction activities) was introduced and summarized: ‘In a triangle 
ABC, P and Q are on the line AB and AC respectively. If PQ//BC then 
AP:AB=AQ:AC=PQ:BC and AP:PB=AQ:QC’.  
In our classroom studies, we observed that such lessons are more active for the 
students. The students could also experience some important processes which 
bridge between conjecturing and proving. For example, students could first 
investigate theorems/properties of geometrical figures through construction 
activities, and this would lead them to consider why the construction worked. 
Following appropriate instructions by the teachers, the students then started 
proving the construction. Again, this relates to Boero’s (1999) ‘conjecture 
production and mathematical proof construction’. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In our work we focus on learning from the teaching of proof in geometry at the 
lower secondary school level across countries in the East and in the West. In this 
paper we summarize some of the results of our research, including the findings of 
a series of classroom-based experiments carried out over an extended period of 
time. Through our research we are identifying good models of pedagogy and 
using these to develop new pedagogic principles. Our aim is not only help 
students to know ‘how to proceed’ with deductive proof in geometry, but also 
help students to understand more fully why such formal proof is necessary to 
verify geometrical statements. 
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PROOF AND THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES 
Hans Niels Jahnke 
Universität Duisburg-Essen, Germany 
The paper discusses the role of mathematical proof in the empirical sciences and 
argues that this role should explicitly be discussed in the classroom by means of 
some exemplary cases. The main argument in favor of this view will be (1) that 
this is a necessary component of an adequate and authentic image of 
mathematical proof and (2) the claim that in this way a bridge between 
argumentation in every day situations and mathematical proof can be built. 
INTRODUCTION 
The present paper presupposes a long-term conception for the teaching of proof 
which has been described in (Jahnke 2005 and 2007a). The approach would 
consist of three phases, a first phase of informal thought experiments (grade 1+), a 
second phase of hypothetico-deductive thinking (grade 7+) and a third phase of 
autonomous mathematical theories. 
The first phase would be characterized by informal argumentations and comprise 
what has been called ‘‘preformal proofs’’ (Kirsch 1979), 
‘‘inhaltlich-anschauliche Beweise’’ (Wittmann and Müller 1988) and ‘‘proofs 
that explain’’ in contrast to proofs that only proof. (Hanna 1989). In the second 
phase the concept of proof is explicitly made a theme. In this paper we are 
interested in this phase. Only students of the third phase would work in closed 
theories and only then proof would mean what an educated mathematician would 
understand by proof. 
In the following we discuss the role of mathematical proof in the empirical 
sciences and argue that this role should explicitly be discussed in the classroom by 
means of some exemplary cases. Our main argument in favour of this view will be 
(1) that this is a necessary component of an adequate and authentic image of 
mathematical proof and (2) the claim that in this way a bridge between 
argumentation in every day situations and mathematical proof can be built. We 
start with a historical example. 
SAVING THE PHENOMENA 
Greek astronomers were the first in history who discussed the relation between a 
theory and its empirical evidence (see Jahnke 2007b). This started at the time of 
Plato and concerned the paths of the planets. In general planets seem to travel on 
the sky of fixed stars on circular arcs. At certain times, however, they perform a 
retrograde and thus irregular motion. This caused a severe problem because since 
the Pythagoreans it was a deeply rooted conviction of the Greeks that the 
heavenly bodies perform circular movements with constant velocity. How then 
could they account for the irregular retrograde movement of the planets? 
A second phenomenon which at first sight contradicted the basic astronomical 
assumptions of the Greeks was the so-called ‘anomaly of the sun’. It was  
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investigated in the second century BC by the great astronomer and mathematician 
Hipparchos. Roughly speaking the term referred to the observation that the half 
year of summer is about one week longer than the half year of winter. 
Astronomically, the half year of summer is defined as the period that the sun on its 
yearly path around the earth (thought in terms of the geocentric system) needs to 
travel from the vernal equinox to the autumnal equinox. Analogously, the half 
year of winter is the duration of the travel from the autumnal equinox to the vernal 
equinox. Vernal equinox and autumnal equinox are the two positions of the sun 
on the ecliptic at which day and night are equally long for beings living on the 
earth. Since both points observed from the earth are exactly opposite to each other 
(that means that vernal equinox, autumnal equinox and centre of the earth form a 
straight line) Greek astronomers had a problem. From their supposition that all 
heavenly bodies move with constant velocity on circles around the centre of the 
universe, and that meant in a geocentric system around the centre of the earth, 
follows with necessity that the half years of summer and winter are equal.  
What hypothesis could they develop to explain this phenomenon? Part of the 
modern solution is the assumption of a slowing down of the movement of the sun 
in the summer and of an acceleration during the half year of winter (2
nd law of 
Kepler). For the above mentioned reasons that wasn’t acceptable to the Greeks. 
Therefore, Hipparch proposed another hypothesis placing the centre of the 
circular orbit of the sun not in the centre of the earth but a bit outside of it. If this 
new centre is adequately placed then the arc travelled through by the sun during 
summer and observed from the earth is greater than a half circle, and the anomaly 
of the sun is explained. Later the hypothesis of Hipparch was called ‘eccentric 
hypothesis’ by Ptolemaios (Toomer 1984, 144 pp). 
There was a second hypothesis competing with that of Hipparchos, the so-called 
‘epicyclic hypothesis’. It said that the sun moves on a circle concentric to the 
centre of the universe however “not actually on that circle but on another circle, 
which is carried by the first circle, and hence is known as the epicycle” (Toomer 
1984, 141). Both hypotheses allow to derive from them consequences which 
agree with the astronomical phenomena. Since there is no further reason in favour 
of either one it didn’t matter which one was applied. The Greeks behaved exactly 
this way. Ptolemaios showed that given an adequate choice of parameters both 
hypotheses are mathematically equivalent and lead to the same rather exact data 
for the orbit of the sun. Of course, physically they are quite different; nevertheless, 
Ptolemaios did not take side for one or the other. The Greeks astronomers called 
the task of inventing such hypotheses “saving the phenomena” („σᾠζειν τὰ 
φαινόμενα“). 
In the modern era Galileo generalized the Greek idea of ‘saving the phenomena’ 
to become a universal method of empirical research. It is impressive to read 
Galileo’s considerations by which he motivated his law of the falling bodies. He 
referred to the general order of nature which behaved always in the simplest 
possible manner. Hence, the falling bodies should also follow the simplest  
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possible law. Thus, Galileo did not have a specific argument in favour of the law 
of falling bodies and the whole burden of justifying it lay the fact that its 
consequences agreed with the phenomena. At the end of the 19
th century 
philosophers of science designated this procedure as “hypothetico-deductive 
method”. It amounted to the idea that in the empirical sciences that make use of 
mathematics we put up hypotheses about certain phenomena draw consequences 
from these hypotheses via mathematical proof and investigate whether the latter 
fit with the data. In case they do, this speaks in favour of the hypotheses and we 
may accept them. Otherwise we reject them. Thus, as Lakatos has pointed out, in 
the period of establishing a new empirical theory the flow of truth provided by a 
mathematical proof goes from the consequences to the assumptions and the 
function of a proof is a test of the hypotheses. It is only at a later stage, after a 
theory has been accepted, that the flow of truth goes from the assumptions to the 
consequences as we are used to think in mathematics. 
TOWARDS AN AUTHENTIC IMAGE OF PROOF 
Mathematics is a purely intellectual enterprise and at the same time a powerful 
tool for the understanding of the world around us. Hence, the full meaning of 
mathematical proof cannot be understood by referring solely to subjects internal 
to mathematics. Rather, the role of mathematical proof in the empirical sciences 
as exposed in the examples above should be explicitly discussed. The example of 
the ‘anomaly of the sun’ is a wonderful case for the classroom which can be 
treated by Dynamical Geometry Software. Since toady most such systems can 
provide numerical data it is possible to show to the pupils the astonishing 
precision of the Greek methods for calculating astronomical predictions. 
Especially in geometry it is necessary that pupils (and teachers) should 
understand the difference and the connection between mathematics and the 
empirical sciences. Unfortunately, still today many teachers motivate proof by the 
claim that one cannot trust in measurements. For example, students are asked to 
measure the angles of a triangle. After they have found that their sum is always 
nearly equal to 180°, they are told that measurements are not precise and can 
establish this fact only for individual cases. If they really want to be sure that the 
statement is true for all triangles they have to prove it. However, for the students 
(and their teachers) the theorem is a statement about real (physical) space since it 
is used as such in numerous tasks. As a statement about real space, however, the 
theorem is true because it is corroborated by measurement. Only if the teacher 
takes into account the fundamental role of measurements in the empirical sciences 
he can give an intellectually honest answer to the question of why we are 
interested in a mathematical proof for the angle sum theorem. Such a motivation 
for proof would stress that in the empirical sciences proofs do not replace 
measurements but make them more intelligent. 
It is surely possible to stick in mathematics teaching to a Platonic epistemology 
and tell the students that geometry deals exclusively with mental objects which 
are not subject to empirical measurements. But then we are not justified to apply  
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐241 
our mental theorems to real space. If we do this we have to investigate whether 
our theory fits with reality and we are back to the situation above. 
A sketch of a teaching unit about the angle sum in triangles can be found in 
(Jahnke 2007a). In this unit the alternate angle theorem (as a substitute for the 
axiom of parallelism) is introduced as a hypothesis suggested by measurements. 
Then a series of consequences about the angle sums in polygons is derived from 
this hypothesis which can be checked by measurements. That speaks in favour of 
the hypothesis. Pupils learn: a proof of the angle sum theorem makes this theorem 
not absolutely safe, but dependent on a hypothesis. Since we draw a lot of further 
consequences from this hypothesis which can also be checked by measurements, 
the security of the angle sum theorem is considerably enhanced by the proof. 
BRIDGING THE GAP BEWTEEN EVERY DAY ARGUMENTATION 
AND MATHEMATICAL PROOF 
The structure of argumentation underlying the “hypothetico-deductive method” 
occurs frequently in every day situations. For example, person A has an 
appointment with person B and the latter does not show up at the agreed time. 
Then A will form some hypotheses about the reason why B did not come and he 
will check these hypotheses against further knowledge he has about B. He will 
choose the hypothesis which fits best with the available data and dependent on 
this choice will decide what to do. Similarly, a detective in a criminal story might 
form the hypothesis that person A has been at the railway station at a certain time. 
From such a fact a host of consequences would follow, and the detective would 
try to find some evidence which fits to these consequences. In case he is 
successful he will be inclined to accept his hypothesis. Of course, thought 
processes in every day life are not as clean and clear-cut as described here. 
Usually, they are a mixture of such arguments which overlap and interact. 
Nevertheless, in principle thinking works this way, and the more a person is 
forced to communicate his thinking to other people as the detective above the 
more he will adjust his thinking to this scheme. 
In the following I will call a hypothesis or. a set of hypotheses together with a 
chain of deductions leading to explicitly formulated consequences a complete 
argument. There is nothing sensational with this concept, nevertheless it is useful 
to introduce it because frequently we use or meet elliptic forms of an argument. 
One elliptic form is the concept of proof itself. This concept is usually identified 
with the chain of deductions whereas the premises or hypotheses used in a proof 
are not considered as a part of the proof. On the other hand, giving reasons in 
every day situations means frequently to mention only the fact from which some 
event depends without an explicit deduction. “The road is wet.” – “Yes, it’s 
raining.”  
It is not so easy –or, to say the truth: not possible- to tell in a few words what a 
proof is. This is the reason why many teachers use ad-hoc-explanations like the 
one about the unreliability of measurements to motivate proof. What a proof is 
cannot be explained without referring to the concept of a theory. But to speak  
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about theories is not feasible with seventh graders. Hence in (Jahnke 2007a) it is 
proposed that instead of speaking about theories, axioms and proofs we should 
speak about proofs and hypotheses. The term hypothesis has a broader meaning 
and is less technical than the term axiom and provides more connections to other 
fields of knowledge. Thus, speaking about proof would amount to speaking about 
complete arguments.  
The path from every day argumentation to mathematical proof requires a growing 
consciousness that statements are dependent of other statements and that we 
cannot speak about truth without specifying the conditions/hypotheses from 
which we start. Therefore, in school proving should be initiated by inventing 
hypotheses and experimenting with them rather then devising chains of 
deductions. A similar approach is proposed in (Bartolini Bussi et al. 1997) and 
(Bartolini-Bussi 2008). The latter paper contains an impressive list of examples 
which can be used in this sense reaching from the primary grades to upper 
secondary teaching. 
The dependence of statements from hypotheses should be made a theme in 
mathematics teaching again and again from grade 7 to grade 12. With teachers of 
other disciplines this could be expanded to an interdisciplinary module on 
‘‘scientific argumentation’’. In such a module mathematical proof would be 
sensibly integrated. Other opportunities for experiments with hypotheses are the 
so-called ‘‘Fermi-questions’’ (see Herget & Torres-Skoumal 2007) and, more 
generally, any sensible modelling activity (see e.g. Hanna & Jahnke 2007). 
Modelling is nothing else than inventing a hypothesis fitting to a concrete case. 
All in all, situations of every day life as well as fundamental procedures of 
argumentation in the sciences following the hypothetico-deductive scheme would 
form a basis on which the idea of mathematical proof could develop. 
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JUSTIFICATION, ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE 
EXPLANATORY NATURE OF PROOF
1  
Ivy Kidron  Tommy Dreyfus 
Jerusalem College of Technology, Israel  Tel-Aviv University, Israel 
Justification is a central component of mathematical reasoning. In the process of 
justifying a mathematical phenomenon, learners frequently need to expand their 
knowledge, and construct new knowledge. The abstraction in context framework 
provides tools to identify and follow the emergence and interaction of new 
knowledge constructs. We use this framework to show, by means of three 
examples, that justification is often associated with combining constructions of 
knowledge. Such combining has a high potential to lead to the learner’s 
enlightenment and to enhance the explanatory nature of the justification.  
ABSTRACTION IN CONTEXT (AiC) 
AiC is a theoretical framework that considers abstraction as a process of 
emergence of knowledge constructs that are new to the learner. In order to 
describe such processes at a fine-grained level, AiC makes use of the RBC model, 
which is based on the three epistemic actions of Recognizing, Building with, and 
Constructing (Hershkowitz, Schwarz, and Dreyfus, 2001). Recognizing a 
previous knowledge construct takes place when the learner realizes that this 
construct is relevant to the problem presently at hand. Building-with takes place 
when the learner acts with the recognized constructs in order to achieve a goal 
such as solving a problem. Constructing is the central epistemic action of the 
model. It consists of assembling and integrating previous constructs by vertical 
mathematization to produce a new construct. It refers to the first time the new 
construct is expressed by the learner. The new construct might be fragile. Indeed, 
the genesis of an abstraction passes through a three stage process, which includes 
the arising of the need for a new construct, the emergence of the new construct, 
and its consolidation. The third stage, consolidation, concerns the reuse of the 
new construct with increased awareness and flexibility. It is often a long term 
process. A comprehensive description of AiC has recently been given by Schwarz, 
Dreyfus and Hershkowitz (2008). 
COMBINING CONSTRUCTIONS AND ENLIGHTENMENT 
The RBC model provides micro-analytic tools for interpreting knowledge 
constructing processes. We present three examples, in which we observe how 
these tools lead to insights into how learners produce justifications and conceive 
of them as justifications. 
                                           
1 Research supported by the Israel Science Foundation under grants 1340-05 and 1166-05  
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The bifurcation example  
Our first example relates to the analysis of a solitary learner’s (L) construction of 
a justification for bifurcations in dynamical systems. Dreyfus and Kidron (2006) 
analyzed the emergence of L’s justification for the second bifurcation point in the 
logistic dynamic system. The complexity of this learning process is expressed in 
that it consists of several interweaved C(onstructing)-actions that go on in parallel. 
Specifically, we found an overarching C-action, within which four secondary 
C-actions were nested. These secondary C-actions were not linearly ordered but 
went on in parallel and interacted by branching of a C-action from an ongoing one, 
combining of parallel C-actions, interruption, and resumption of C-actions (see 
the diagram for a representation of these parallel interacting constructions; the 
time axis runs from top to bottom). 
L is an experienced learner of mathematics and her motivation for finding a 
justification drives her entire learning process. Kidron and Dreyfus (2007, 2008) 
discuss what justification means for L, and analyze the relationship of this 
meaning of justification to the C-actions and the interactions between them.  
We deal with the justification of results that L obtained empirically from her 
interaction with a computer. L’s epistemic actions were inferred from her detailed 
notes during the learning experience and from her interaction with the computer. 
The computer files served as a window into her thinking. L's 
aim was not to convince herself or others, nor was she 
looking for truth in the logical sense of the term; rather, she 
wanted to gain more insight into the phenomena causing the 
second bifurcation point. The term enlightenment, 
introduced by Rota (1997) seems appropriate to express her 
interpretation of the word justification. Rota also pointed out 
that contrary to mathematical proof, enlightenment is a 
phenomenon which admits degrees. We demonstrate that in 
L’s learning experience, combining C-actions indicate steps 
in the justification process that lead to enlightenment. 
In L's learning experience, we may observe three degrees of enlightenment. They 
occur at the three points in time when C-actions combine, and each combining 
point was characterized by the integration of different C-actions and different 
modes of thinking. In L's learning experience, we highlighted an important 
observation which gives an analytic dimension to the AiC model and to its 
parallel constructions aspect: the combining of constructions leads to 
enlightenment, not in the sense of a formal proof of the statement the learner 
wants to justify but as an insight into the understanding of the statement. In the 
present paper, we confirm the validity of this observation in other contexts with 
students of different age groups dealing with different mathematical topics.  
1 
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The seals activity 
The seals activity (Dreyfus, Hershkowitz and Schwarz, 2001) provides another 
example of using the micro-analytic tools offered by the AiC model to gain 
insight into a process of justification. It is a focused, short activity for pairs of 
introductory algebra students. The students were asked to find properties of two 
by two number arrays of the form shown in the diagram, and to establish whether 
these properties were true for all such arrays. The research focus was on the 
diagonal product property (DPP): The difference of the products of the diagonals 
in the array equals 12. The activity was designed toward two new (for the learners) 
constructs: to use, for the first time, algebra as a tool for justifying a general 
statement, and to make use, for the first time, of the distributive law, which is 
needed to show the DPP. We will call the corresponding C-actions C and C1. 
Thus C motivates the activity and C1 is nested within C. 
In the present study, we re-analyze some of the data from the seals 
activity research, with the aim to answer the question whether 
combining is indicative of justification in this case as well. We 
consider a pair of girls, Ha and Ne. We note that their construction of the extended 
distributive law occurred in a verbal, procedural form. They consider expressions 
like XX as a process: X, X times, and not as having the status of an algebraic 
object. Their procedural mode is well expressed in the transcript: 
Ha: Wait. X times X plus 8, right? So this is XX, like X, X times, so it's XX.  
Ha was able to manipulate the expressions algebraically without expressing any 
need for knowing the numerical value of X. However, when turning to the goal of 
justifying the DPP, whose object is a number (12), the students said:  
Ha: Ah, 12! Like, for this we have to know X.... 
Ne: One simply needs to know what the X is. 
They try several cases on a computer but realize that this will only check but not 
convince. This, together with their motivation for a justification, encourages them 
to look at the verbal extension of the distributive law in a different way: 
Ha: Ah, it's XX plus 8X, but I don't know, like, how this [pointing to the other side of 
the equation] will also be XX plus 8X. Like, it HAS to be. 
Here, they start combining C1 with a new C-action, C2, the transition from the 
procedural mode in which students ‘do’ expressions to an object mode: Ha 
realized that one can ‘trade’ expressions against each other. The justification of 
the DPP, construction C, was the motivation which enticed the students to 
construct C1 and C2, and the combining of C1 and C2 enabled the justification. 
The important point of our analysis is that C1 and C2 had to combine in order to 
enable to students to reach the goal C, the justification of the DPP. This could not 
happen in the process mode afforded by C1. The transition C2 to the object mode 
was necessary for the justification to be completed.  
X X+2
X+6 X+8 
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C1 and C2 are interacting parallel constructions, which complete and reinforce 
each other: Only when the students were able to see the distributive law in the new 
object mode of thinking, could they justify the DPP. This demonstrates the 
influence of C2 on C1 in the process of justification. We note that even though the 
object is seen as a new entity, it is related to the process which formed it. 
Here like in the bifurcation example, we observe a relationship between 
combining constructions and justification. The cases are different and thus the 
students’ view of justification might be different. It might not be enlightenment in 
the sense of the previous example. Even so, we observe satisfaction when the 
students reach the conclusion that the difference is always 12. This satisfaction is 
also expressed in their language, which became progressively more precise after 
realizing that expressions can be ‘traded’ against each other.  
A class discussion on infinite sums 
In the third example, we describe and analyze a class discussion about 
convergence (Kidron, 2002): Students justify why an infinite sum of numbers is 
not necessarily growing to infinity. When we replace a given function f(x) by its 
Taylor polynomial 
n
n
2
2 1 0 n x a ... x a x a a     (x) P + + + + = , we leave off the “infinite tail”. 
Some students had problems with this “infinite tail”:  
D:  How could we speak about a graph that describes the error  (x) P f(x) n − ? 
This difference is the “infinite tail”  ... x   a x   a
2 n
2 n
1 n
1 n + +
+
+
+
+ : How could this 
difference be well defined? 
When proving Taylor’s theorem at x = 0, a similar reaction ensued. The teacher 
mentioned that the error term  ) x a ..... x a x a (a ) f(x     d
n
0 n
2
0 2 0 1 0 0 + + + + − =  is a 
constant if  0 x  is a constant ( 0 x  is the point in which we compute the error; n is the 
degree of the Taylor polynomial). Some students' reactions demonstrate the way 
they destabilized the conception that an infinite sum must be infinite. 
J:  But d is the ”infinite tail”…of the polynomial. How could it be a constant? 
T:  We compute the error for a given n. 
J:  But d =  .... x   a x   a
2 n
0 2 n
1 n
0 1 n + +
+
+
+
+ , so how could it be that d is a constant? 
T: d  =  .... x   a x   a
2 n
0 2 n
1 n
0 1 n + +
+
+
+
+  is an infinite sum that is equal to a given number! 
R:  Yes! For example, you have 1/2+1/4+1/8+1/16+1/32+… which equals 1. 
J:  Will it not be bigger than 1 when we continue to add terms? 
D:  In the example 1/2+1/4+1/8+1/16+1/32+… the infinite sum is a defined number 
but there are other examples in which the infinite sum tends to ∞ ! 
A:  So, how could we know if d  is an infinite sum which is equal to a given number? 
Y:  In the last lab we have seen animations, which demonstrate that when  ∞ →   n , the 
expression  ) x a ... x a x a (a    -   f(x)
n
n
2
2 1 0 + + + +  tends to 0. Therefore, the expression 
d =  .... x   a x   a
2 n
0 2 n
1 n
0 1 n + +
+
+
+
+ is a given number and not an expression which tends 
to ∞ !   
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This class discussion was analyzed in Kidron (2002) with the process object 
framework. Here, we analyze it with the AiC model. Like previously, we ask 
whether combining constructions are indicative of justification.  
The teacher presented the error term as the difference between the function and 
the approximating polynomial but J considered it as an infinite sum of numbers, 
as the infinite tail, as an unending process, as something that keeps growing. Her 
reaction to R’s example shows that she could not differentiate the unending 
process of adding terms to the sequence from the process that converges due to 
the smallness of the additional terms (Núñez, 1994). 
We denote by C1, the construction that represents the unending process view of 
adding terms to the infinite tail. We denote by C2, the construction of the 
transition from this process view to the visual dynamic object, the animation as an 
object that helps to concentrate on the error term that tends to zero. The animation 
creates a visual impression of completing the potentially infinite process. C1 and 
C2 mutually influence each other. Only when the unending process view and the 
visual dynamic object view combined, only then the class discussion was 
completed and the justification was achieved.  
A point of interest is that J was convinced (according to evidence from a later 
questionnaire) even though C2 was initiated by another student, Y. The class 
discussion has implications for teaching. It shows that in class either the teacher 
or other students may initiate the additional construction that has to combine with 
the actual construction in order to achieve the justification. 
ENLIGHTENMENT, COMBINING CONSTRUCTIONS AND 
EXPLANATORY PROOF  
According to Kidron and Dreyfus (2007), L’s use of the word justification was 
very close to Rota’s (1997) view of enlightenment in the sense of insight into the 
connections underlying the statement to be justified:  
… the logical truth of a statement does not enlighten us as to the sense of the 
statement… Students must be given some enlightenment as to the sense of the 
statement. (Rota, 1997, pp. 131-132) 
Similarly, the students in the class discussion were more interested to gain insight 
into the reasons for which infinite sums can be equal to a given number than in a 
formal proof. These views of justification are consonant with Hanna’s (1995) 
view that the main function of proof in mathematics education is that of 
explanation. Hanna makes clear that explanatory proof can take different forms 
depending on the level of the learners and on the context of instruction. She 
underlines that the common denominator is that students are learning new (to 
them) mathematical statements and that the challenge is to lead them to 
understand why these statements are true. She adds that the evidence presented by 
an explanatory proof derives from the mathematics or the phenomenon itself. 
Hanna's views of justification are consonant with the AiC based view presented in 
this paper. In the examples, we analyzed students constructing justifications for  
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new knowledge in different contexts. Thus a justification is not explanatory as 
such but explanatory for a particular student in a particular context. We 
demonstrated that combining constructions have a high potential to enhance the 
explanatory nature of justification for the student whose constructions combine. 
When constructions combine, we observe a new degree of enlightenment in the 
sense of Rota: Students not only see that it is true, but why it is true (Hanna, 2000). 
The observation that additional degrees of enlightenment occur with a 
combination of constructions allows researchers to use the epistemic actions of 
the AiC model in order to identify a learner's enlightening justification.  
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A SURVEY OF TEACHER BELIEFS ON PROVING 
Usha Kotelawala 
Graduate School of Education, Fordham University, USA 
This study explored teachers’ attitudes and beliefs on proving in the mathematics 
classroom.  Conclusions were based on a survey of 78 secondary mathematics 
teachers.  While some outcomes were as expected, others were surprising.  The 
most critical measure in this study was a constructed scale measuring the 
likeliness of proving occurring in teachers’ classrooms.  A majority of teachers 
indicated that proving was not a priority and that their students were not ready 
for proving.  When teachers were compared based on the amount of college 
mathematics coursework (CMC) they had taken, results indicated that those with 
more CMC were less inclined to focus on proving.   
INTRODUCTION 
Proof is recognized by mathematicians as a critical element of mathematics.  
While mathematicians focus on proofs as the requirement for extensions in their 
field, in mathematics education the primary role of proving is to explain why a 
statement is true (Hanna, 1989).  A deeper understanding of mathematics depends 
on an ability to prove or justify conclusions.  Almost two decades have passed 
since the 1989 NCTM standards called for a de-emphasis on two-column proofs.  
While the 1989 standards still placed “Reasoning” as one of the five core 
standards to emphasize, varying interpretations of these standards ignited shifts in 
curriculums and state standards across the country.  Critics of the 1989 standards 
called for a greater emphasis on proof (Ross, 2000; Raimi, 2000).  In 2000, to 
clarify and promote the role of justification and proving, “Reasoning and Proof” 
was made one of the ten central standards in NCTM’s Principles and Standards 
for School Mathematics.  If we are concerned about how mathematics is being 
taught we need to learn about where teachers stand in their thinking and practice 
with proving.   
Teacher beliefs strongly affect choices and practices in teaching (Ernst, 1989; 
Lubinski & Vacc, 1994).  While some research on teachers and proving has 
focused on their knowledge, skill, and beliefs about proofs (Knuth, 2002; Riley, 
2004; Mingus, 1999), these studies have not inquired into beliefs about proving in 
the classroom.   
The purpose of this study was to gain a greater understanding of teachers’ beliefs 
on proving in the classroom focusing on the following questions:   
1.  What are teachers’ attitudes and beliefs about the role of proving in their 
mathematics classrooms? 
2.  How does the quantity of college mathematics coursework taken by teachers 
affect their attitude about proving in their classroom? 
3.  Do teachers perceive current curriculums and state tests as barriers or supports for 
proving in the classroom?  
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐251 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
The 78 teachers participating in this study were secondary mathematics teachers 
who had completed at least one full year of teaching mathematics.  Fifteen were 
from a suburban school district in Washington State and 63 were from an urban 
school district in New York.  Teachers completing the questionnaire remained 
anonymous.  The response rates of teachers returning the questionnaires were 
17% and 19% for New York and Washington, respectively. 
Instrument 
The instrument used was a questionnaire designed for the doctoral dissertation, 
Exploring Teachers’ Attitudes and Beliefs about Proving in the Mathematics 
Classroom.  From the 59-item questionnaire used in the dissertation, a 
representative set of items were selected for this study.   
Items were designed to measure the priority teachers placed on proving in 
comparison with the priority they placed on procedural tasks and basic skills.  
While a number of existing survey instruments were studied in the development 
of the instrument (Almeida, 2000; Mingus and Grassl, 1999; Peterson, 1989), the 
items used were developed to specifically address the research questions. 
All but two of the items used in this study were multiple choice questions using a 
four-point Likert scale.  The response choices were Disagree (D) = 1, Tend to 
disagree (TD) = 2, Tend to agree (TA) = 3, Agree (A) = 4, and Undecided or don’t 
know for which no score was recorded.  One item was a multiple-choice question 
asking about ranges of grades to begin focusing on proving.  Another item asked 
the participant to state the number of quarters and semesters of college 
mathematics coursework (CMC) taken.  Three quarters or two semesters were 
considered equal to one full year of college mathematics.  Additionally if the 
participant had taken a year of calculus in high school a year was added to the 
measure of their CMC. 
The term “proof-related activities” was often used in questionnaire items to 
include varying degrees of rigor in defining what a proof is.  In this study, the 
researcher was interested in teachers considering a wide scope of what the whole 
proving process includes, not only completed, successful, and rigorous proofs.  
The term proof-related activities was defined as, 
“problems, activities, and discussions that are aimed at one or more of the following: 
  an informal or incomplete proof, 
  a statement or argument explaining why something is true, 
  discussion and questions focused on explaining why something is true or false.” 
This definition was provided on a glossary page distributed with the 
questionnaire. 
RESULTS 
A representative sample of items is presented in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
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Table 1: Item Results, Means and Standard Deviation  
Item   D TD TA A    Mean  SD
A  For my students, acquiring a toolbox 
of arithmetic facts, general rules, and 
skills in using these rules is more 
essential than skills and experience in 
proving. 
7 25 25 19   2.7  0.9
B  Understanding how to prove a 
statement requires a developmental 
stage that most of my students have 
not yet reached. 
10 14 20 34   3.0  1.1
C  Most of my students need more work 
on basic skills and procedures before 
they can work on proving 
generalizations to be true or false.   
6 15 15 40   3.2  1.0
D  Exercises in proving in math are 
important for students to develop 
logical thinking skills. 
2 1 17  56   3.7 0.6
E  Most all rules and theorems used in a 
high school math classroom should be 
proven. 
13 29  24 5  2.3 0.9
F  In my classes I expect most rules or 
theorems used to be proven by 
students rather than the teacher. 
8  33  24 7  2.4 0.8
G  The math curriculum used at my 
school frequently uses proof-related 
activities. 
17 21  28 9  2.4 1.0
H  State testing requirements prevent me 
from spending as much time as I 
would like on proof-related activities. 
9 20 24 19   2.7  1.0
I  Time focusing on proof-related "how 
do you know?" questions will assist 
my students on their state exams. 
7 9 23  29  7 3.1 1.0
 
Item J asked the teacher to select “The most appropriate place(s) for students to 
begin focusing on proof-related activities,” with categories as given in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Frequency distribution for beginning proving  
ICMI Study 19－2009  1‐253 
 
A measure for Proving Occurs in My Classroom (POMC) was developed on a 
scale of one to four from an average of seven item responses.  POMC items were 
designed to measure the likeliness of proving occurring based on the priority the 
teacher placed on proving and the teachers’ perception of their students’ readiness 
for proving.  Each item came from a four point Likert scale.  The items used were 
items A, B, and C from Table 1 and the four listed below which were also scored 
on the 4 point Likert scale:   
Item K: In the classes I teach, learning how to accurately carry out mathematical 
procedures is more important than focusing on proofs or proof-related activities.  
Item L:  Most of my students need more work on basic skills and procedures before 
they can work on proving generalizations to be true or false.   
Item M:  I agree with the educational psychologists who conclude that students are 
not ready for proof-related activities until they master the skills of the more concrete 
developmental stage. 
Item N:  I agree with educational psychologists who conclude that students are not 
ready for proof-related activities until they are at the age of the formal operations 
development stage. 
To align a high priority on proving with a high score the average was subtracted 
from five.  Thus, a low POMC score indicated that the teacher saw proving as a 
low priority and they felt their students were not ready for proving.  Correlations 
between all pairs of the seven items were significant (p<.01).  The combination of 
the items was supported by a highly satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of .87.  Results 
for POMC (mean = 2.20, SD = .77) indicated that a majority of the secondary 
teachers devalued proving and did not feel their students were ready to work on 
proving.  Forty-seven out of 78 (60%) had POMC scores below 2.5 while only 26 
had scores above 2.5. 
When POMC was considered in relation to different levels of mathematics 
coursework, the results showed that as the quantity of the teacher’s coursework 
increased they were less likely to be practicing proving as is evident in Table 2.  
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Table 2: College Mathematics Coursework Level and POMC 
  College Mathematics Coursework (CMC) 
Proving occurs in my mathematics classes Low  Medium  High 
POMC < 2.5  8  8  26 
POMC > 2.5  8  6  10 
Note:  Low CMC was measured as less than 3 years; Medium CMC indicated at least 3 years 
but less than 5 years; High indicated at least five years of CMC. 
DISCUSSION 
In Item D, 73 out of 76 agreed with an importance in proving for developing 
logical thinking skills.  However a majority did not find that theorems used in 
high school should be proven (Item E).  The importance of proving indicated in 
Item D did not translate into a clear role for the students to be the ones working on 
proving theorems.  In Item F, a majority of the teachers disagreed with the 
expectation of students being the ones proving.  
Teachers were close to split on Item G with 51% indicating that their curriculums 
did not support proof-related activities.  While a majority (60%) indicated on Item 
H that state tests prevented them from more time on proving, a larger majority 
(70%) indicated that a focus on proof related activities would assist their student 
on the exams.  This left a puzzling contradiction of sorts which is worth 
investigating further.   
The results for Item J show that teachers vary greatly on when they feel proving is 
appropriate.  Thirty-two teachers (43%) did not see proof-related activities having 
a role prior to the 8
th grade and 21 (28%) felt it did not have a place as a focus until 
high school geometry. 
The most critical measure in this study was the constructed scale of Proving 
Occurs in My Classroom (POMC).  It was based on seven highly correlated 
survey items which asked teachers to compare the importance of proving with 
procedures and skills or asked teachers whether they felt their own students were 
ready to begin working on proving or proof-related activities.  The result 
indicated that 60% of teachers are not regularly focusing on proving in their 
classrooms.   
The most surprising result came from considering the effect of varying amounts 
of college mathematics coursework (CMC) on proving.  Those with more CMC 
were less likely to favor proving.  They saw their students as less ready for 
proving and they valued a focus on procedures and basic skills over proving. 
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“WHY DO WE HAVE TO PROVE THIS?” FOSTERING 
STUDENTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF ‘PROOF’ IN GEOMETRY 
IN LOWER SECONDARY SCHOOL 
Susumu Kunimune, Taro Fujita & Keith Jones 
Shizuoka University, Japan; University of Plymouth, UK; University of 
Southampton, UK 
This paper reports findings that indicate that as many as 80% of lower secondary 
age students can continue to consider that experimental verifications are enough 
to demonstrate that geometrical statements are true - even while, at the same time, 
understanding that proof is required to demonstrate that geometrical statements 
are true. Further data show that attending more closely to the matter of the 
‘Generality of proof’ can disturb students’ beliefs about experimental verification 
and make deductive proof meaningful for them. 
INTRODUCTION 
While it is recognized internationally that it is very important to teach ‘proof’ to 
all students, it is the case that this is not an easy task. A range of research and 
professional experience has found that it is difficult for many students to behave 
like professional mathematicians when they study deductive geometry, and they 
often find difficult to know how to advance logical arguments (Mariotti, 2007). 
One key issue is that students may not understand why they have to prove 
statements as experimental verification can seem enough. Students can consider 
more formal forms of mathematical argument, such as proof, as not necessary.  
In this paper we report findings from a series of research projects carried out in 
Japan on the learning and teaching of proof, specifically in geometry. We address 
the issue of students’ natural cognitive needs for conviction and verification and 
how these needs might be changed and developed through instructional activity. 
In what follows, we first present how students in lower secondary schools 
perceive ‘proof’ in geometry by using data from 418 Japanese lower secondary 
school students (206 from Grade 8, and 212 from Grade 9) collected in 2005. We 
then offer some suggestions developed from classroom-based research 
(undertaken since the 1980s) about how we might encourage students’ 
understanding of deductive proof in geometry.  
THE TEACHING OF PROOF IN GEOMETRY IN JAPAN 
The specification of the mathematics curriculum for Japan, the ‘Course of Study’, 
can be found in the Mathematics Programme in Japan (English edition published 
by the Japanese Society of Mathematics Education, 2000). It should be noted that 
no differentiation is required in the ‘Course of Study’, and mixed-attainment 
classes are common in Japan. ‘Geometry’ is one of the important areas in lower 
secondary schools (the other areas are ‘Number and Algebra’ and ‘Quantitative 
Relations’), and the curriculum states that in geometry students must be taught to 
“understand the significance and methodology of proof” (JSME, 2000, p. 24).  
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However, research repeatedly shows that many students demonstrate poor or 
sometimes no understanding of proof in geometry (for example, Kunimune, 
2000). 
STUDENTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF PROOF IN GEOMETRY 
In the research summarized in this paper, we capture students’ understanding of 
proof in terms of the following two aspects: ‘Generality of proof’ and 
‘Construction of proof’. On the one hand, students have to understand the 
generality of proof in geometry; universality and generality of geometrical 
theorems (proved statements), roles of figures, difference between formal proof 
and experimental verification, and so on, and we call this aspect ‘Generality of 
proof in geometry’. On the other hand, they also have to learn how to ‘construct’ 
deductive arguments in geometry; definitions, axioms, assumptions, proof, 
theorems, logical circularity, axiomatic systems and so on, i.e. ‘Construction of 
proof in geometry’.  
Considering these two aspects, the following levels of understanding are 
proposed (we do not, in this paper, relate these levels to the van Hiele model): 
•  Level I: at this level, students consider experimental verifications are enough to 
demonstrate that geometrical statements are true (Level Ia: Do not achieve both 
‘Generality of proof’ and ‘Construction of proof’ and Level Ib: Achieved 
‘Construction of proof’ but not ‘Generality of proof’) 
•  Level II: at this level, students understand that proof is required to demonstrate 
geometrical statements are true (Level IIa: Achieved  ‘Generality of proof’, but 
not understand logical circularity and Level IIb: Understood logical circularity)  
•  Level III: at this level, students can understand simple logical chains between 
theorems 
The following questions are used to measure students’ levels of understanding: 
Q1 Read the following explanations by three students who demonstrate why the sum 
of inner angles of triangle is 180 degree.  
Student A ‘I measured each angle, and they are 50, 53 and 77. 50+53+77=180. 
Therefore, the sum is 180 degree.’ Accept/Not accept 
Student B ‘I drew a triangle and cut each angle and put them together. They formed a 
straight line. Therefore, the sum is 180 degree.’ Accept/Not accept 
Student C Demonstration by using properties of parallel line (an acceptable proof) 
Accept/Not accept 
Q2 Prove AD=CB when ∠A=∠C, and AE=CE. 
Q3The following argument demonstrates that ‘the diagonals of a parallelogram 
intersect at their middle points’ carefully. ‘In a parallelogram ABCD, let O be the 
intersection of its diagonals. In ΔABO and ΔCDO, AB // DC. Therefore, ∠BAO = 
∠DCO and ∠ABO = ∠CDO. Also, AB = CD. Therefore ΔABO ≡  ΔCDO. Therefore,  
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AO = CO and BO = DO, i.e. the diagonals of a parallelogram intersect at their middle 
points’ 
 Now, why can we say a) AB // DC, b) AB = CD, and c) ΔABO ≡  ΔCDO? 
Q4 Do you accept the following argument which demonstrates that ‘in an isosceles 
triangle ABC, the base angles are equal’? If you don’t accept, then write down your 
reason. ‘Draw an angle bisector AD from ∠A. In ΔABD and ΔACD, AB = AC, 
∠BAD = ∠CAD and ∠B = ∠C. Therefore, ΔABD ≡  ΔACD and hence ∠B = ∠C’ 
A
D B
C
E
     
A D
B C
O
     
A
D BC  
Q2                           Q3                                  Q4 
Q1 checks whether learners can understand difference between experimental 
verification and formal proof in geometry. Q2 checks whether learners can 
understand a simple proof. Q3 checks whether learners can identify assumptions, 
conclusions and so on in formal proof. Finally, Q4 checks whether learners can 
identify logical circularity within a formal proof (proof is invalid as ‘∠B = ∠C’ is 
used to prove ‘∠B = ∠C’). To achieve Level II, students have to answer correctly 
for Q1. Students who perform well in Q2 and 3 can be considered at least at Level 
Ib as they achieve good understanding in ‘Construction of proof’. Figure 1 
summarizes the criteria and levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: criteria and levels of generality and proof construction 
This framework has been used in several research studies in Japan. For example, 
the results of surveys carried out in 1987, 2000 and 2005 indicate that over 60% 
students consider that experimental verification is enough to say it is true that the 
sum of the inner angles of triangle is 180 degree. Here, we briefly report on data 
collected in 2005 (with 206 students from Grade 8, and 212 students from Grade 
9), see Tables 1 and 2.  
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The results presented in Table 1 indicate that whereas students can accept (or 
understand) that a formal proof (Student C explanation) is a valid way of 
verification, many also consider experimental verification (student B’s 
explanation) as acceptable. There are, however, changes from Grade 8 to Grade 9, 
as, by the later grade, more students reject empirical arguments or demonstrations. 
This is because Grade 9 students have more experience with formal proof, 
whereas in Grade 8 the students are only just started studying proof (for more on 
this, see Fujita and Jones, 2003). 
  Student A  Student B  Student C 
 Accept 
Not 
accept
Accept
Not 
accept
Accept 
Not 
accept
Grade 8  62% 32%  70% 21%  74% 15% 
Grade 9  36% 58%  52% 38%  80% 6% 
Table 1: Results of Q1 
  Q2  Q3 a)  Q3 b)  Q3 c)  Q4 
Grade 8  57% 82% 80% 53% 34% 
Grade 9  63% 85% 81% 59% 49% 
Table 2: Result of Q2-4 
The results in Table 2 indicate the following in terms of students’ understanding 
of ‘Generality of proof’ and ‘Construction of proof’.  
• Q2: More than half of students can construct a simple proof.  
• Q3: Students show relatively good performance for a) and b), and these 
indicate that students have good understanding about deductive arguments of 
simple properties. Q3 c) is more difficult as students are required to have 
knowledge about the conditions of congruent triangles.  
• Q4: The results suggest that more than half of students cannot ‘see’ why the 
proof in Q4 is invalid; that is, they cannot understand the logical circularity in 
this proof.  
In summary, as shown in Table 3, 90% of Grade 8 and 77% of Grade 9 students 
were found to be at level I. Data from 1987 and 2000 show similar results (see 
Kunimune, 1987, 2000). 
Level  Ia  Ib  IIa or above 
Grade 8 33%  57%  9% 
Grade 9 28%  49%  22% 
Table 3: levels of understanding  
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MOVING STUDENTS TO DEDUCTIVE THINKING 
As evident in a recent review of research on proof and proving by Mariotti (2007, 
p181), the ‘discrepancy’ between experimental verifications and deductive 
reasoning is now a recognized problem; Japan is not an exception. The findings 
given above indicate that Japanese Grade 8 and 9 students are achieving in terms 
of ‘Construction of proof’, but not necessarily in terms of ‘Generality of proof’. 
There is a gap between the two aspects. This means that students might be able to 
‘construct’ formal proof, yet they may not appreciate the significance of such 
formal proof in geometry. They may believe that formal proof is a valid argument, 
while, at the same time, they also believe experimental verification is equally 
acceptable to ‘ensure’ universality and generality of geometrical theorems.  The 
data for Grade 9 students can be considered as quite concerning as almost 80% of 
students remain at level I even though they have studied formal proof at Grade 8 
(with 90% of relevant intended lessons in a Japanese textbook were devoted for 
‘justifying and proving’ geometrical facts’ in G8 (Fujita and Jones, 2003)).  
Now we turn to the question of working with students on why formal proof is 
needed. Kunimune (2000) reports on a series of lessons for Grade 8 students 
which were designed and implemented to disturb students’ beliefs about 
experimental verification. In these lessons, students were asked to compare and 
discuss various ways of verifying the geometrical statement that the sum of the 
inner angles of triangles is 180 degrees. This statement was chosen as way of 
trying to bridge the gap between empirical and deductive approaches as students 
often encounter the angle sum statement in primary schools and they study this 
again with deductive proof in lower secondary schools. While we do not have 
space to provide the data we can provide a summary from studies by Kunimune 
(1987; 2000) of ways which can be useful in encouraging students to develop an 
appreciation of why formal proof is necessary in geometry. 
• Students first exchange their ideas on various ways of verification; they 
comment on accuracy or generality of experimental verification; they 
discuss the advantages/disadvantages of experimental verifications. 
Students’ comments such as ‘A protractor is not always accurate ...’, ‘The 
triangle is not general’, and so on, often cause a state of disequilibrium in 
students (viz Piaget), and make students doubt the universality and 
generality of experimental verification. 
• Advice from teachers is necessary to encourage students to reflect critically 
on different ways of verifications (viz establishment of ‘social norm’ in 
classrooms, Yackel and Cobb, 1996). 
Kunimune (1987; 2000) found that, after such lessons, around 40% of students 
previously at Level Ib have moved to Level II. They no longer accept 
experimental verification and start considering that deductive proof is the only 
acceptable argument in geometry. A later post-test carried out one month after the 
lessons found that about 60% of students are at Level IIa.   
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In summary, we conclude that the matter of the ‘Generality of proof’ could 
usefully be explicitly addressed in geometry lessons in lower secondary schools.   
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper outlines research findings from Japan suggesting that, in terms of 
‘Generality of proof’ and ‘Construction of proof’, many students in lower 
secondary school remain at Level I (where they hold the view that experimental 
verifications are enough to demonstrate that geometrical statements are true), 
even after intensive instruction in how to proceed with proofs in geometry. 
Classroom studies have tested ways of challenging such views about empirical 
ways of verification which indicate that it is necessary to establish classroom 
discussions to disturb students’ beliefs about experimental verification and to 
make deductive proof meaningful for them. 
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PROBLEMS MANIFESTED IN PROSPECTIVE SECONDARY 
MATHEMATICS TEACHERS’ PROOFS AND 
COUNTEREXAMPLES IN DIFFERENTIATION  
Yi-Yin Ko & Eric Knuth 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, U.S.A. 
In advanced mathematical thinking, proving and refuting are vital abilities to 
help demonstrate whether and why a proposition is true or false. Learning proofs 
and counterexamples in the domain of differentiation is especially important 
because students encounter differentiation in many mathematics courses. We 
examined 36 prospective secondary mathematics teachers’ performance 
producing proofs for statements believed to be true and counterexamples for 
statements believed to be false. Problems were identified in the teachers’ written 
work, which highlights the need to empower instructors in their teaching and 
prospective mathematics teachers in their learning to write complete proofs and 
counterexamples in undergraduate mathematics courses. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Proving and refuting play essential roles in advanced mathematical thinking 
because they help demonstrate whether and why propositions are true or false. A 
mathematical proof requires that definitions, statements, or procedures are used to 
“deduce the truth of one statement from another” (Tall, 1989, p. 30), helping 
people understand the logic behind a statement and the “insight into how and why 
it works” (Tall, 1992, p. 506). Counterexamples similarly play a significant role in 
mathematics by illustrating why a mathematical proposition is false; a single 
counterexample is sufficient to refute a false statement (Peled & Zaslavsky, 1997). 
Together, mathematical proofs and counterexamples can provide students with 
insight into meanings behind statements and also help them see why statements 
are true or false. Accordingly, undergraduates, including prospective mathematics 
teachers, in advanced mathematics are expected to learn and to use both proofs 
and counterexamples throughout the undergraduate mathematics curriculum. 
In recent years, mathematical proof has received an increased level of attention 
because of the various roles it plays in the mathematics community, including 
communication, explanation, or validation of mathematical claims (Bell, 1976; de 
Villiers, 1990; Hanna & Jahnke, 1996). In fact, the Principles and Standards for 
School Mathematics (National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 2000) 
devoted a standard to reasoning and proof and asserts that students in 
pre-kindergarten through grade 12 should regularly study mathematical proof. In 
order to implement current reform recommendations successfully regarding 
mathematical proof, prospective teachers must have a solid understanding of 
proof themselves. The challenge of fulfilling this demand is that many teachers 
have not traditionally been expected to teach proof. Knuth (2002) indicated that 
the enactment of reform efforts with respect to proof in school mathematics  
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depends heavily on teachers’ conceptions, “a general notion or mental structure 
encompassing beliefs, meanings, concepts, propositions, rules, mental images, 
and preferences” (Philipp, 2007, p. 259). In light of this challenge, a growing 
number of researchers have started to investigate conceptions of proof held by 
pre-service mathematics teachers (e.g., Cusi & Malara, 2007; Martin & Harel, 
1989; Stylianides, Stylianides, & Philippou, 2004, 2007).  
Despite the importance of prospective teachers’ conceptions of proof, few 
research studies have investigated prospective mathematics teachers’ abilities in 
producing proofs and counterexamples in the domain of differentiation, which is 
essential content across the world in college mathematics (as well as in 
pre-calculus and calculus courses in high school). Further, few studies have 
examined how proofs and counterexamples in differentiation convey the structure 
of analysis from basic conceptions addressed in previous calculus courses, as well 
as prospective mathematics teachers’ performance proving and refuting 
statements. In order to address such deficiencies in the field, the main purpose of 
this paper is to contribute to the knowledge base in this area by identifying the 
problems manifested in prospective mathematics teachers’ attempts to produce 
proofs and counterexamples in the mathematical area of differentiation. The 
findings suggest more attention should be paid to teaching and learning proofs 
and counterexamples, as prospective mathematics teachers with mathematics 
majors showed difficulty in writing these statements. More importantly, our 
analysis also suggests potential means for improving prospective teachers’ 
performance producing proofs and counterexamples in undergraduate 
mathematics courses. 
METHODS 
Taiwanese undergraduates enrolled in Advanced Calculus I in Fall 2007 at a 
national university in Taiwan participated in this study. They were selected by 
convenience sampling; in other words, participants were contacted by colleagues 
of the researchers and were recruited on the basis of their willingness to 
participate in the study. Every undergraduate volunteering for the study was 
accepted, and thus resulted in a sample size of 36. With only a few exceptions, 
these participants will complete a mathematics major and become secondary 
mathematics teachers. Differentiation is a topic addressed in their previous 
calculus courses, thus all of the prospective mathematics teachers participating in 
this study had some relevant domain knowledge. The instrument, which was 
comprised of five mathematical statements modified from textbooks and entrance 
examinations, was designed to provide a measure of prospective teachers’ 
concepts of differentiation. The instrument was written in English because 
English is used in advanced calculus courses at the university in Taiwan. 
Participants were asked to construct proofs for statements they believed to be true 
and to generate counterexamples for statements they believed to be false. The 
errors manifested in the students’ attempts to construct proofs and to generate 
counterexamples were investigated by analyzing participants’ written work. Due  
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to page limitations, this paper only focuses on Problem 1, a false statement, and 
Problem 2, a true statement, as listed in Table 1. 
Problem  Mathematical statement  T or F
1. Let  f be a function defined on a set of numbers S, and letaS ∈ . If f 
is continuous at a, then f is differentiable at a. 
False 
2. Let  f be a real-valued differentiable function defined on [a, b]. If 
'' () () f af b λ << , then 
'() f z λ = for some z in (a, b). 
True 
Table 1: The First Two Propositions Used in This Study 
RESULTS 
A selection of interesting responses to Problems 1 and 2 are discussed here in 
order to illustrate the prospective mathematics teachers’ performance as well as 
their understandings of differentiation.   
Problem 1 
With respect to Problem 1－a false proposition, 1 participant left blank (3%), 7 
participants provided an incorrect proof (19%), 2 participants provided no basis 
for generating a counterexample (6%), 4 participants provided relevant 
knowledge but not a counterexample (11%), 1 participant provided an incomplete 
counterexample (3%), and 21 participants provided a complete counterexample 
(58%). Although the statement in Problem 1 is false, 7 participants of 35 (20%) 
who answered believed this was true and attempted to provide a proof to support 
their claim. They all described, “f is continuous at S a∈ , then ) (a f exists. So  
) (
' a f
a x→ = lim
a x
a f x f
−
− ) ( ) (  exists. Therefore, f is differentiable at S a∈ ”. Such  
evidence shows that  
these participants seemed to believe ) (a f exists if f is continuous at S a∈ which 
implies that ) (
' a f exists. Moreover, these participants demonstrated an unclear 
understanding of the differences between continuous functions and differentiation, 
and thus determined this false proposition to be true. Two participants provided,  
“ ⇒ =
x
x f
1
) ( x x f ln ) ( ' = ”as a counterexample to refute Problem 1. One of them  
indicated that  
“ ) (x f is continuous at 0 but ) (
' x f is not continuous at 0”, and the other showed that 
“ ) (x f is continuous at -1 but ) (
' x f is not differentiable at -1”. These two  
participants misrepresented the first derivative of 
x
1  as x ln which yielded to an  
invalid counterexample to refute this statement. Additionally, the first student  
expressed the misunderstanding of continuity, because 
x
x f
1
) ( =  is not continuous  
at 0. The above descriptions illustrate that these participants did not have a clear 
understanding of continuous functions as well as differentiation. 
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Problem 2 
As to Problem 2－a true proposition, 8 participants left blank (22%), 6 
participants provided an incorrect counterexample (17%), 13 participants 
provided no basis for constructing a proof (36%), and 9 participants provided 
relevant knowledge but not a mathematical proof (25%). In addition, no 
participants produced a complete proof for Problem 2. While the statement in 
Problem 2 is true, 6 participants of 28 (21%) who answered believed it to be false 
and provided an incorrect counterexample. They all provided a polynomial 
function with a particular domain, and then showed that they found one z which 
did not belong to a given domain. For example, one student showed, “ + =
2 ) ( x x f  
2 3 + x is a real-valued differentiable function defined on [-1, 2]. 1 ) 1 (
' = − f , = ) 2 (
' f  
7and let 2 = λ , then ∉ − ⇒ − = ⇒ = 1 1 1 ) (
' x z f (-1, 2)”. This student seemed to use a 
specific example to demonstrate that the proposition was false. Because this 
student chose 2 = λ , he or she made a mistake on the step of 1 3 2 ) (
' = + = x z f  
1 2 2 1 ) (
' − = ⇒ − = ⇒ = ⇒ x x z f not belonging to (-1, 2). This result led the student to 
determine this statement was false. Four of the participants, who attempted to 
provide a proof, all described, “ ⇒ < < ⇒ < < ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
' ' ' b f z f a f b f z f a f  
b z a < < ”. They expressed their misunderstandings of the relationships between 
the differentiation and function as well as the function and the elements and 
seemed to believe such processes involving symbolic manipulations yield a valid 
proof. Furthermore, these participants did not show their understandings of what 
knowledge is appropriate for writing a mathematical proof. 
DISCUSSION  
All participants in this study were mathematics majors, and they had opportunities 
to learn about differentiation in their current advanced calculus course as well as 
in previous calculus courses. However, our results suggest that some prospective 
secondary mathematics teachers still possess an inadequate understanding of not 
only proofs and counterexamples but also differentiation (46% for Problem 1 and 
100% for Problem 2 who answered). Determining the truth or falsity of a 
proposition and writing a correct proof or counterexample requires an 
understanding of the relevant concepts and strategic knowledge, and some of the 
participants failed to express such an understanding. This confirms Weber’s 
(2001) findings that undergraduate students did not demonstrate their knowledge 
techniques of proving. Also, several participants seemed to regard their symbolic 
manipulations as a mathematical proof, which is consistent with Harel and 
Sowder’s (1998) and Weber’s (2004) findings. Overall, the majority of 
participants did not show a clear understanding of concepts in differentiation 
when producing a proof or counterexample.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Weber (2001) noted that manipulating symbols with understanding, “knowledge 
of the domain's proof techniques” (p. 111), and “knowledge of which theorems 
are important and when they will be useful” (p. 112) are essential skills in writing 
mathematical proofs. In order to enhance prospective mathematics teachers’  
1‐266  ICMI Study 19－2009 
proof techniques, instructors should provide students with exposure to the same 
concepts more than once (Sowder, 2004). 
Given the mathematical backgrounds of the participants, it is surprising that they 
still had considerable difficulty identifying the true or false proposition as well as 
producing proofs and counterexamples. This result confirms Ball’s (1990) and 
Ball, Lubienski, and Mewborn’s (2001) arguments that majoring in mathematics 
does not guarantee that teachers will be equipped with sufficient subject matter 
knowledge for their teaching. As prospective mathematics teachers are expected 
to develop fluency with proof and counterexamples in undergraduate courses for 
their future teaching with respect to current reform recommendations of proof and 
reasoning, mathematics and mathematics education professors must consider how 
to best communicate with each other to better connect their courses and engage 
students in developing knowledge and fostering understandings of proof and 
counterexamples. In order to better prepare prospective mathematics teachers 
with content knowledge in the area of proofs and counterexamples, further 
research is needed, which could involve observing students’ college mathematics 
courses, examining students’ homework and examinations, and designing more 
mathematical statements and conducting intensive interviews with students to 
understand their perspectives. In doing so, we have a better understanding of how 
to enhance prospective mathematics teachers’ knowledge in the area of proof and 
counterexamples. This paper highlights the need for attention to empowering 
instructors in their teaching and prospective mathematics teachers in their 
learning to produce complete proofs and counterexamples in undergraduate 
mathematics courses. 
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